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Abstract	  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the transformation of the Korean employment 
system since 1980. The common themes in the study of the comparative political economy 
of capitalist states deal with the restructuring of the democratic nation-state, the 
liberalisation of national economies, and the concurrent globalisation of markets and of the 
political institutions that regulate them. To address these issues, this study explores, on the 
one hand, the overhauling of Korea’s labour laws in the direction of greater labour 
flexibility, the changes in collective labour relations, and the policy innovations on labour 
protection, and on the other, the transformation in Korea’s traditional rule-making process 
to include both the government and social groups, the restructuring of industrial relations 
(particularly as regards changes to the supply chain structure), and the embedded role of 
the state and labour practices in workplaces. 
Between 1997 and 1999, the trajectory of the Korean employment system experienced a 
critical juncture. The study therefore investigates the major labour policy reforms in this 
period in order to explain the transformation of the employment system and to situate the 
institutional outcomes within a formal conceptual setting, thereby contributing to the 
debate on the transformation of the Korean developmental welfare state. In so doing, this 
study argues that the Korean developmental welfare state has remodelled itself with the 
tradition of state intervention and investment, which has followed a self-reinforcing path in 
the employment system. Over the past two decades, the state’s interventionism in 
conjunction with the shifting role and responsibilities of elite bureaucrats on the one hand, 
and the developmental principle of policy reform involving a catching-up strategy for 
welfare development, on the other hand, appear as major factors in the Korean 
developmental welfare state’s transformation. It should be noted that labour had little 
impact on this development due to the fact that corporatism had not been embedded in 
Korean society to any great degree. With the result, although the institutional arrangements 
for worker protection in the labour market are characteristic of a flexicurity model – where 
workers are compensated, trained, and motivated to become re-employed in a highly 
mobile labour market, the model might appear to be in its infancy and to be in the path of 
reinforcing the labour market dualism and inequality. 
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Chapter 1 	  
Introduction 
 
1.1 The focus of the thesis 
 
When the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit South Korea (henceforth Korea), neoliberal 
schools in general predicted and encouraged more liberalised, market-oriented policies and 
programmes both in economic and social areas. For them, globalisation and restructuring 
tend to redirect the state’s economic role and functions to meet the neoliberal ideals of 
“global standards”, which are, in fact, based on the Anglo-American economic model 
(Soederberg 2004: 72). In fact, the crisis and the state’s resolution programmes under the 
terms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout generated an institutional basis for 
Korea’s economic transformation into an LME (Liberal Market Economy) and the 
introduction and pursuit of much more openly neoliberal industrial policies. For instance, 
the privatisation of major public enterprises and the selling of firms to foreign investors 
were carried out under conditions set by the IMF and justified as the means by which 
Korea could match levels of international competitiveness. Of particular note among the 
various reforms was the enactment of the 1998 Labour Standards Act, which aimed to 
bring about greater flexibility in labour market. 
However, in contrast to the argument that globalisation undermines the nation-state’s 
autonomy and causes the retrenchment of state welfare (Mishra 1999: 94–100; Ohmae 
1995: 59; Strange 1996: 66; Teeple 1995: 55–74; 2000: 188-190), the Korean state started 
to ‘bring the state back in’ to various social institutions (Haagh 2004: 10; 157-169). For 
instance, first, the beginnings of a neo-corporatist social partnership between labour, 
management, and government were instituted when the Labour-Management-Government 
Tripartite Commission (LMGTC) was established in January 1998 by newly elected 
president Kim Dae-jung. The LMGTC marked the first time that any form of social 
consensus had been achieved in Korea’s institutional history. A social pact containing 98 
measures that aimed at resolving the socio-economic collapse at the national level was 
unveiled by this new body and paved the way for the amendment of Korea’s labour laws 
and the state’s other major industrial structural reforms. As a result, contrary to some 
observers’ conclusion that Korea’s traditional unilateral policy implementation pattern 
2	  
appears to fracture or disappears altogether after the establishment of this tripartite policy-
making process (Beeson & Robison 2000; HS Lee 1998; Moon & Rhyu 2000; Pirie 2005b; 
2008), this study argues that the state re-established itself by regaining a degree of 
autonomy vis-a-vis social partners by playing a leading role in setting up key policy 
agendas and by mediating between business and labour through the tripartite system.1 
Second, and more importantly, to mitigate the painful social costs of the structural (and 
largely neoliberal) adjustment, the Korean government tried to build a stronger and more 
durable social safety net. For instance, the Employment Insurance programme (henceforth 
EI) has played a distinctive role in employment stabilisation in Korea, a role not commonly 
found in practice in other countries. As a programme separate from unemployment 
insurance, EI provides firms with subsidies as part of the employment stabilisation 
programme. These subsidies are designed to avoid firms having to make immediate layoffs, 
which increased dramatically during and immediately after the 1997 economic crisis 
(Haagh 2004: 184). While the EI vocational training scheme for workers is solely 
resourced by employers, the state is in charge of its operation. 
These developments were viewed by many analysts as a paradoxical move (Cheung 2005; 
Gills & Gills 2000; Hwang 2006; Hundt 2009; Kim & Moon 2000;Shin 2003, Yun 2008) 
both in terms of the increase in expenditure on and institutional innovations for labour 
protection and welfare, as they involved a fundamental reorganisation of Korea’s social 
policy system and ran contrary to the general expectation that neoliberal reforms in the 
economic and social sectors, such as greater flexibility and decreased stability in the labour 
market, would be inevitable (see Chapter 2). In general, it is believed that there is a strong 
relationship between economic and social policies: they are two sides of the same coin, as 
changes on one side constrain the results of the other (Gough 1996: 209). From this 
perspective, Korea’s reform of economic and social policies during the crisis era appears 
paradoxical.  
Among the various paths taken towards neoliberal reform, the most significant change that 
this study focuses on was the 1998 labour law amendment governing dismissal of 
employees, which, in permitting firms to carry out collective dismissals for managerial 
                                                
1	  For	  more	  on	   the	  argument	   that	   the	   state	   regained	   its	   autonomy	   through	   the	   LMGTC,	   the	   legacy	  of	   the	  
Korean	  developmental	  state	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  an	  external	  shock	  (i.e.	  the	  1997	  economic	  crisis),	  see	  Section	  
6.2.1	  in	  Chapter	  6.	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reasons and to pursue large-scale resignations (i.e. early retirements) and mass layoffs, 
allowed for far more numerical flexibility in the Korean labour market (i.e. the use of non-
standard, temporary, or fixed-term contracts and more flexible working hours).2 Alongside 
authorising the introduction of labour flexibility, however, the 1998 labour laws also 
sanctioned the rights of unions to undertake political activity and collective bargaining and 
established worker protection schemes in the workplace (i.e. the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Adjustment Act and the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency 
Workers in labour laws).  
According to current comparative labour market literature, which contends that distinct 
institutional configurations of labour and social policies generate a particular systemic 
logic of labour flexibility and labour protection (Barbieri & Scherer 2009; Emmenegger et 
al. 2012; Gough et al. 2006; Haagh 2006; Haagh & Cook 2005; Molina & Rhodes 2007; 
Palier & Thelen 2010; Standing 2011; Streeck & Thelen 2005), the Korean case of 
institutional reform in 1998 appears to have pursued a Nordic model in that it permitted 
greater flexibility in the labour market but guaranteed a high level of social protection. 
This stands in sharp contrast to the received expectation that a liberal economic system (e.g. 
as typified by the UK and US) will necessarily result in greater labour market flexibility 
and less protection.  
Theoretically, this interpretation of the comparative labour market literature derives from 
the fundamental concepts of the new institutionalist school: first, institutions shape and 
restrict the ideas, preferences, and behaviours of individuals and collective action so that a 
particular set of institutions provides actors with rules of political struggle and competition 
in the policy realm; second, political struggle and competition between actors with diverse 
ideas, preferences, and strategies contribute to the reshaping of institutions, with a 
particular set of institutions thus reflecting the conflicts and contradictions in that society; 
third, in terms of social science methodology, and according to the research objective and 
scope, institutions are therefore conceptualised either as independent variables that reflect 
the political configuration of individuals and social groups and the way in which this 
configuration changes or as dependent variables to be explained by the circumstances of 
                                                
2	  For	  more	  onthe	  concept	  of	  labour	  market	  flexibility,	  see	  Boyer	  (1988)	  and	  Wood	  (1989:	  1-­‐43).	  
3	  Employment	  practices	  refer	   to	  the	  policy	  outcomes	  from	  the	  employment	  system	  at	   the	  empirical	   level,	  
which	  includes	  labour-­‐market	  practices,	  labour	  relations,	  labour	  protection	  and	  other	  informal	  practices	  in	  
the	  workplace	  (i.e.	  the	  lifetime	  employment	  system	  and	  seniority-­‐based	  salary	  system	  in	  Korea).	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and the political struggle and competition between actors; and fourth, because not only are 
actors’ ideas and preferences locked in by past experiences and practices, but also so is the 
institution itself, institutional change occurs slowly in the absence of  any (contingent) 
external shock.  
Thus, the analytical focuses of this school aim to explore the internal and/or external 
conditions (e.g. the national political configuration and/or international fiscal austerity) that 
generate any institutional implementation. In addition, this school emphasises the factors 
that contribute towards a particular policy orientation in institutional reform (e.g. the extent 
of flexibilisation in the labour market) and the policy outcomes that stem from the 
complementary effect of newly implemented institutions and other existing or changing 
institutions (for example, the complementary effect that social policy and industrial policy 
have on the outcomes of labour policy outputs). In figuring out the dynamics and the 
impact of institutional change, the factors highlighted vary according to the researcher’s 
methodological framework. For instance, historical analyses emphasise the self-reinforcing 
mechanisms (path-dependency) of institutions through use of the critical juncture 
framework, while rational choice analyses stress the interest optimising process through 
examining the individual’s calculation in the process of institutional change.  
This study aims to draws together and develop these two theoretical traditions by 
employing a actor-based approach, in which the diverse and competitive interests (goals 
and ideas) of political actors matter when examining institutional change and its impact 
over time, and ultimately bring the analytical compass back to the realm of politics. Since 
all institutions – including the market (which is often assumed by mainstream economists 
not to be an institution) – are defined in relation to the structure of the rights and 
obligations (including the interests and preferences) of actors, and the definition of these 
rights and obligations is ultimately a political act, no institutions can be seen as being free 
from politics (Chang 2007: 7). Thus, the labour market also can be shaped by a variety of 
motives and interactions (Bronk 2009: 2; Solow 1990: 31) and is one of the arenas in 
which struggles between political interests takes places. 
Therefore, the central question that is explored in this dissertation is the following: How 
did the institutional reform in Korea generate the changes in the labour market and welfare 
system in the face of external shock (i.e. the 1997 Asian financial crisis)? Furthermore, by 
employing the theoretical foundation presented above, this study attempts to go beyond the 
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simple assessment that ‘institutions matter’ by answering the following sub-questions: 
What conditions made the opening up of the policy windows for institutional reform of the 
Korean labour and welfare system possible? What enabled particular institutional changes 
to be brought about? What was the policy outcome of the implementation of an 
institutional reform, and why did this occur? 
This chapter first presents the key concepts that are employed in this study as a lens to 
answer these questions. Then, the previous studies that have developed welfare typologies 
to explain the evolution of the Korean welfare state are reviewed briefly. Finally, in order 
to show how this research differs from previous studies and advances the research in this 
area, the analytical and methodological concerns of this study, that is, the actor-based 
institutional approach is briefly presented.  
 
1.1.1 Research object, scope and concept 
 
This thesis examines the restructuring of the employment system in Korea since the 1980s 
as an example of institutional adaptation by the Korean developmental welfare state. To do 
so, it will use the term ‘the employment system’ to facilitate an understanding of the 
transformation in the labour market, labour relations, and labour protection in Korea.  
The networks among institutions or institutional settings within and between firms and in 
labour policy, both legal and social, have been theoretically conceptualised as the 
‘employment system’ by Haagh (2004: 155), and it is through this lens that the 
transformation of the Korean developmental welfare state will be analysed. The term 
‘employment system’ was first used by Madsen (1999) in his analysis of the Danish labour 
market to describe how the combined effect of labour market regulations and policies and 
the organisational configuration of social partners structures a particular type of labour 
market (similarly Solow 1990; Chang 2007). From this, Haagh advanced the idea that the 
labour market is embedded in a set of institutions that have certain complementarities 
between the diverse policy realms of labour policy, social policy, and public policy, and 
which collectively comprise the employment system (Haagh 2004; 2012). In contrast to the 
neoclassical idea that regards markets as functioning in equilibrium when they meet Pareto 
optimal conditions, that is to say, where individuals behave in accordance with the 
6	  
principle of optimising self-interest, this approach instead views the labour market as a 
social institution (See Chapters 2 and 3). 
In this vein, this research assumes that analysing the combined consequences of economic, 
labour, and social policies for labour practice and protection is integral to determining the 
nature of a specific welfare system (Haagh 2011a; 2011b; 2012). The level of job security 
enjoyed by an individual, for instance, which is underpinned by a mixture of labour and 
social policies, contributes to that person’s ability and freedom to control their working life 
and well-being in capitalist society. Thus, examining the changes that are brought about to 
the employment system through individual or collective actions is integral to investigating 
the nature and form of the welfare system. From a general perspective, therefore, it is 
necessary to examine not only the form taken by the welfare state, but also the changes 
taking place among institutions that deal with employment practices,3 as well as the 
networks among those institutions.  
Regarding the term ‘developmental welfare state’, this study presumes that the 
developmental elements of the Korean welfare state are embedded in the way in which it 
has developed its employment and welfare systems. Korea has been a favourite research 
area for developmental studies owing to its economic growth after the Korean war in 1950. 
In the developmental studies that have researched Korea, the overwhelming priority given 
to economic growth policy (catch-up strategy) and the dominant role of elite bureaucrats in 
policy implementation (especially in industrial policy) has been seen as key to answering 
the questions raised by the developmental state thesis. Employing the key component of 
developmental state (i.e. submission of social policy to economic development), the 
developmental welfare state thesis (Aspalter 2006; Gough 2001; Kwon 2002; 2005; Lee & 
Ku 2007; Midgley & Tang 2001) currently emerged in the welfare literature and 
emphasised that democratic politics allow the transformation of developmental welfare 
state, in which labour market deregulation goes together with significant social policy 
development. In the case of Korea, recent unprecedented welfare reform is possible under 
the condition of democratisation and can be understood as a democratic shift to a new, 
inclusive welfare state beyond a simple response to economic uncertainty, by the creation 
of welfare policy coalition. This study largely shares the idea of developmental welfare 
                                                
3	  Employment	  practices	  refer	   to	  the	  policy	  outcomes	  from	  the	  employment	  system	  at	   the	  empirical	   level,	  
which	  includes	  labour-­‐market	  practices,	  labour	  relations,	  labour	  protection	  and	  other	  informal	  practices	  in	  
the	  workplace	  (i.e.	  the	  lifetime	  employment	  system	  and	  seniority-­‐based	  salary	  system	  in	  Korea).	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state and considers these developmental elements to have provided the foundations for and 
steered the course of Korea’s welfare development, and ultimately set the Korean case of 
welfare evolution apart from the Western experience. However, what this study challenges 
to the notion of developmental welfare state is that the Korea’s welfare development has 
been conducted largely by the elite bureaucrats who took on the role and responsibility for 
labour protection and employment reform. In addition, the transformation of Korean 
developmental welfare state after 1997 crisis can be analysed by examining combined 
effects of the crisis, embedded role of institutional actors who accept and those who 
challenge existing institutions (see Chapter 8).  
To sum up, the purpose of this thesis is to consider how the employment system in Korea 
is developing and why it matters. This implies that this research emphasises the impact that 
the political factors that are embedded in the Korean developmental state and their 
configuration have on the transformation of the employment system. To this end, the 
political determinants of institutional change, for instance, the role of political elites, the 
state’s changed function, the embeddedness of the state, business and labour, and the 
interaction among these factors, will be sought.  More specifically, this thesis takes as its 
point of departure the changes in the system (the political, economic and social changes) 
that took place in 1997, when a presidential election was held (leading to the transfer of 
power in early 1998), and the Asian financial crisis resulted in Korea availing itself of and 
consenting to the conditions of the IMF’s relief loan programme. This period might be 
regarded as a critical juncture (Collier& Collier 1991: 27-39; Leftwich 2009: 9-10; 
Mahoney 2000: 513; Pierson 2000: 263) in the political reshaping of the employment 
system. 
The next section introduces some of the previous studies on Korea’s transition into a 
modern welfare state and points to what this research can learn from them and what it 
contributes to the discussion. 
 
1.1.2 Previous studies: terminology 
 
It should be noted here that, according to the three-part welfare state typology presented by 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 3–29; 1993: 3–5) in which welfare states are categorised into 
liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes, Korea appears to be atypical in that it 
8	  
does not fit into any of Esping-Anderson’s categories. This claim that Korea’s welfare state 
does not conform to Esping-Andersen’s typology and must therefore be categorised 
differently derives from the logic of regional exceptionality and the developmental state 
thesis (See Chapter 2) and is based on three distinct characteristics of welfare development 
in Korea.  
First, the lasting impact of rapid economic growth and the legacy of the ‘Growth-First-
then-Distribution’4 (S.-Y. Kim 2008: 72) productivist paradigm that was proclaimed by the 
state in the 1970s and 1980s is considered to be a persistently dominant policy preference 
in all social areas, a preference that identifies Korea as a ‘productivist welfare state’ (S. 
Kwon & Holliday 2007: 242). In fact, it is widely accepted that the productivist model 
restricted the development of social (welfare) policy during Korea’s period of most rapid 
economic growth (Deyo 1992: 297; Holliday 2000: 709; Kang 2005: 357; S.-Y. Kim 2008: 
72; Lee & Moon 2008: 14; Reiger & Leibfried 2003: 264-268). However, these studies fail 
to agree on whether this paradigm continued to inform and affect social policy after 
economic liberalisation and democratisation in the late 1980s.  
In the arguments presented in these studies, social norms are identified as the independent 
variable, and examination of these social norms should therefore be of great value in 
investigating the nature of and changes in the Korean welfare state. However, it is difficult 
to concur with the assumption that is made in these studies that the dominant social norm 
underpinning the Korean welfare state and its development has been the ‘growth-then-
distribution’ paradigm and that this paradigm explains the uniqueness of the Korean 
welfare system after the 1997 financial crisis. In fact, Kim Dae-jung was able to take the 
reins of government thanks to the distribution and economic equity issues that were central 
to his presidential campaign in 1997. Indeed, during the course of the subsequent Roh 
Moo-Hyun government, welfare institutional sets were further intensified,5 and even Lee 
                                                
4	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  outcome	  fairness	  (in	  neoliberal	  theoretical	  terms)	   is	   implicit	   in	  this	  
paradigm.	  As	  Haagh	  notes,	   the	  neoliberal	  policy	   school	   regards	   systemic	  welfare	  provision	  as	   immoral	  or	  
unjustified	   because	   it	   not	   only	   harms	   antecedent	   (individual)	   rights	   and	   liberties	   but	   also	   fails	   to	   meet	  
neoliberal	  conceptions	  of	  cost	  effectiveness	   in	  utilitarian	  terms,	   i.e.	  a	  determined	  outcome	  for	  the	   lowest	  
cost.	   Thus,	   neoliberal	   theorists	   accept	   systemic	   (universal)	  welfare	   only	   if	   it	   represents	   outcome	   fairness	  
(which	  implies	  cost	  effectiveness)	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  cost	  accountancy	  model	  (Haagh	  2002a:	  18).	  
The	   use	   of	   this	   term	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   S.-­‐Y.	   Kim	   (2008),	   who	   called	   it	   a	   ‘"Growth-­‐First-­‐then-­‐Distribution"	  
strategy’	  (S.-­‐Y.	  Kim	  2008:	  72;	  emphasis	  is	  mine)	  and	  stressed	  the	  state’s	  intervention	  in	  industrial	  policy,	  and	  
to	  H.-­‐j.	  Kwon	  (2005a),	  who	  called	  it	  an	  ‘"economy-­‐first"	  paradigm’	  (H.-­‐j.	  Kwon	  2005a:	  28;	  emphasis	  is	  mine)	  
and	  employed	  a	  broader	  view	  of	  the	  state’s	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  
5	  See	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8	  in	  this	  thesis.	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Myung-Bak’s Grand National Party government, the opposition during the two previous 
presidents’ political tenures, has supported this institutional set, with the public 
expenditure on welfare programmes continuing to increase.6 This therefore leaves two 
feasible interpretations: one, the role played by the paradigm of growth has been 
overestimated, or, two, there is something more powerful than this (embedded) policy 
preference that is giving rise to institutional innovation. In light of this, this research 
assumes that not only has the role played by this paradigm been over-estimated, but that 
other factors have played greater roles in shaping the institutional set. Moreover, defining 
Korea’s unique welfare system as a ‘productivist’ welfare state operating in a productivist 
world (broadly speaking, the other East Asian states of Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore are included under the term ‘productivist’) is problematic because Holliday 
insists that productivist welfare capitalism stands alongside Esping-Andersen’s categories 
(Holliday 2000: 706). After all, are not all welfare states ‘productivist’ in this era of 
globalisation? As Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005) insist, ‘welfare states everywhere help 
improve productivity and contribute to economic growth by facilitating social cohesion 
and peaceful class relationships. In that sense, all welfare states are productivist’ (Bonoli & 
Shinkawa 2005: 21). 
Second, the ‘democratic-welfare-capitalist’ or ‘democratisation’ thesis contradicts the 
‘productivist welfare state’ thesis. Unlike the productivists’ view that social policy has 
always been subordinate to economic policy (Holliday 2000: 709), the democratic-welfare-
capitalist thesis concentrates on the changing (more pluralistic) role of the state, the 
emergence of new civic groups, and especially the extension of EI and the newly 
established LMGTC as innovative institutional moves towards the creation of a social 
democratic political system for welfare provision. In this thesis, the democratisation 
process in the mid-1990s served to empower the Korean labour force, instilling within it 
social democratic values and, with a great deal of support from the lower-middle class, 
made it possible for Kim Dae-jung, a left-wing politician and the long-time opposition 
party leader, to assume the presidency. Moreover, the decisive extension of EI and the 
establishment of the LMGTC after the 1997 financial crisis appear to be consistent with the 
government’s rhetoric of productive welfare (Kim Dae-jung government, 1997-2002) and 
flexicurity (Roh Moo-hyun government, 2002-2007). In light of the post-crisis institutional 
                                                
6	  See	  Chapter	  8	  in	  this	  thesis.	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innovations, some scholars insist that the government’s increased welfare and social 
insurance expenditure represents the Korean state’s transition from a ‘developmental state’ 
to a ‘democratic-welfare-capitalist’ state (Y.-M. Kim 2008: 120; Kuhnle 2002: 16; H.-K. 
Lee 2002: 481; 2004: 291).  
However, characterising Korea as a social democratic system would also be a mistake 
because the coverage and quality of welfare provision is not universal (Cho 2002:293; 326-
327; Chung 2002: 442-444)7 and the corporatist elements of the LMGTC have lost 
momentum owing to the two labour unions’ repeated withdrawal and return.8 Besides, it 
should be noted that the adoption of institutions for a particular purpose does not 
automatically guarantee the success of those institutions (Chang 2006: 5). For instance, 
from a Korean perspective, EI and the LMGTC have been criticised because EI has 
provided insufficient coverage for low-income and irregular workers (Lee 2009: 6), and 
the LMGTC, despite its original stated purpose being the advocacy of social consensus, 
has largely functioned in name only. 
Third, the effect of the ‘symphony of democratization and globalization’ (Song 2003: 405) 
has been argued to have given birth to the unique character of the Korean welfare system. 
In contrast to both the ‘productivist’ economic argument that globalisation would expand 
the role and impact of markets and the democratic-welfare-capitalist state interpretation, 
this explanation brings the traditional role of the Korean state back into the analysis. In this 
interpretation, the wave of globalisation in the mid-1990s transformed the previously firm-
centred welfare system into a quasi-state welfare system, involving private funding, quasi-
state organisational provisions, and state regulation. More importantly, the argument that 
Kim Dae-jung’s inauguration and the 1997 financial crisis were fundamental to the 
establishment of the modern Korean welfare system and that ultimately the state had no 
choice but to take the responsibility for tackling mass layoffs and unemployment problems 
is persuasive. The Korean state found itself reinvigorated with new roles, new networks, 
and new instruments precisely because the socioeconomic consequences of globalisation 
                                                
7	  See	  Chapter	  8	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
8	  See	  Chapter	  6	  in	  this	  thesis.	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created new political demands on the democratic state (Song 2003: 406). As Haagh 
suggests, there was ‘a need for an enhanced role for the state’ (Haagh 2004: 153).9 
However, this interpretation oversimplifies the Korean welfare system’s transformation 
from a firm-centred system to a quasi-state system. In this analysis, globalisation 
demanded that firms increased their competitiveness, which resulted in a decline in the role 
of companies as welfare providers and decreased the capacity of the firm-centred welfare 
system. There was, therefore, a need for the state to take on a new role as welfare provider, 
a role that was realised with Kim Dae-jung’s inauguration. Although this description 
provides an outline of why the state enhanced its focus on the rising strength of the labour 
sector, the changing relationships between the state, the business sector, and labour, and 
the challenge raised by the social norms that persisted from Korea’s democratisation period, 
the reality is much more complex. Doubts remain about whether welfare provision by 
firms has noticeably declined over recent decades, whether the liberal-democratic bloc 
actively supported institutional implementations for strong labour protection and the state’s 
role as welfare provider, whether the role of elite bureaucrats and the traditional policy 
preference for economic growth contributed to reinforcing the role of the Korean state in 
welfare development, and whether this social and political configuration lasted long 
enough to label the birth of (distinct) Korean welfare state. And these doubts are 
substantiated in the following chapters. 
In light of these previous studies’ contributions to our understanding of the Korean 
developmental state and the Korean welfare state but also their deficiencies, this research 
adopts the new-institutional approach in its attempt to understand the origins and character 
of the Korean developmental welfare state. Taking a long-term historical viewpoint, it will 
focus on the antecedent conditions underpinning the institutional transformation in the 
wake of the 1997 financial crisis, the institutional output (the employment system) after the 
crisis, and how the trajectory of the Korean welfare system’s evolution and the newly 
established institutions were influenced by the legacy of the Korean developmental state.  
In examining the dualism of Korean labour market, which of the Korean developmental 
state’s features and practices in the labour market and labour relations continued, or were 
reinforced, or decayed, and how did these elements shape the transformation of Korea’s 
                                                
9	  However,	  as	   she	  also	  observed,	   the	  embeddedness	  of	   the	   labour	  market	  played	  a	   role	   in	   reshaping	   the	  
institutional	  change	  (Haagh	  2004:	  194).	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employment system? For instance, have both the employer/employee relational contract 
and firms’ welfare policies for core insider workers, which were a distinctive characteristic 
of Korean labour relations during the country’s rapid economic development of the 1960s 
and 1970s, persisted as established practices since the 1997 crisis (albeit in a modified 
form)? To put it differently, have these traditional employment practices, characteristic of 
those under the Korean developmental state, continued despite the 1998 reform of Korea’s 
labour laws that aimed to restructure labour relations in line with a liberal labour market 
system (e.g. an annual salary system and a private insurance market)?  
Although this research accommodates the argument that the Korean employment system 
has undergone significant modification (D.-O. Chang 2002; Chang & Chae 2004; Pirie 
2005a; Pirie 2006a; 2006b), it remains doubtful whether this change fundamentally stems 
from past experience and practice, or any exogenous shock to break the path. The next 
section therefore presents how and why this study employs the new-institutional approach 
and critical juncture framework in its historical analysis of the Korean employment system. 
 
1.1.3 Institutional concerns: change and continuity 
 
This research endeavours to draw together and develop upon other theses (primarily the 
developmental state thesis and the East Asian welfare state thesis) by employing a new- 
institutional approach concentrating on the political factors that influenced the institutional 
changes. In order to proceed, the most important properties of institutions need to be 
identified. These have been analysed in detail in recent institutionalist approaches to 
comparative political economy, especially in those employing the critical juncture 
framework to investigate the political conditions that serve to enable institutional reforms 
to take place (Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Soifer 2012; Streeck 2009; 2010; Streeck & 
Thelen 2005; Thelen 2003). In this analytical framework, then, institutional change comes 
about as result of the continuous and dialectical process of tension and contention between 
the formal system and informal practices, between rule-makers and rule-takers, and which 
complements the logic of the self-reproduction mechanisms in institutional change.  
First, in the developmental studies that have researched Korea, the institutional 
arrangement of the state and the degree of its interconnectedness with business have been 
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seen as key to answering the questions raised by the developmental state thesis. 
Notwithstanding its notable achievements in understanding the nature and configuration of 
the developmental state, this approach is flawed in that it assesses the modern state’s level 
of political and social development by the extent to which the capitalist state has relative 
autonomy from the business sector. As a result of this, state-business relationships are 
overemphasised and regarded as static, and the political dynamics between the state and 
social actors with diverse and sometimes conflicting interests – and who are necessarily 
motivated to seek to (re-) form, interpret, and enact institutional arrangements in their 
favour – are largely ignored.  
Thus, the issue of in which way a change in or an evolution of the employment system 
under the Korean developmental state appears, essentially remains unexplored. For 
instance, which can be understood by illustrating both the changing relationships between 
the state and non-state entities and changes in the state’s means of exerting control over 
political actors and alliances by favouring or constraining them via certain institutional 
arrangements over time? 
As the relationships between state, business, and labour have changed in line with the 
development of Korean capitalism (with its distinct form and scope), a particular set of 
institutions that shaped the relationships between actors served to mould the employment 
system’s particular political configuration, in which each actor sought to reform or 
reinforce the existing institutional set in line with their own interests. The institutional 
change in Korea’s employment system, therefore, fundamentally derives from the inherent 
dynamic tensions and struggles between social actors and is ultimately a political process, 
a point that the developmental state thesis often ignores. 
The 1998 amendment of Korea’s labour laws, which is often regarded as the critical 
juncture for the Korean employment system, can be viewed as not only as the consequence 
of political struggles and negotiations over time between actors with diverse policy 
preferences (such as the business sector’s demand for greater labour flexibility and the 
unions’ desire to secure their political and social rights), but also as marking the point of 
departure for yet another stage of political struggle and negotiation during the period 
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following the juncture (institutional reform). 10  For example, the employers’ policy 
preference (greater labour flexibility) did not suddenly emerge during the specific period of 
crisis but was a long-standing goal that had been frustrated or only partly achieved via 
previous institutional reforms and was thwarted primarily by the strong resistance of labour, 
as evidenced by the Great Workers’ Struggle in 1987 and a general strike in 1997.  
In this sense, institutions can be seen as the exteriorisation of the contradictions of a 
particular society. All actors desire to achieve advantage by redirecting institutions in 
pursuit of their goals. Thus a radical and sudden change in institutional sets at a specific 
point in time may be understood as the result of actors’ accumulated efforts over time to 
resolve social contradictions and restructure compliance within the society. In this vein, 
institutional change also inherently entails further potential conflicts between rule-makers 
and rule-takers in that society because there are inevitably policy-winners and policy-losers 
in any institutional reform. Herein, this study then decides to adopt a new-institutionalist 
approach to understand the way actors cultivate change from within the context of existing 
opportunities and constraints. This is because this approach enables us to systematically 
analyse the ongoing skirmishing between actors who wish to restructure the existing 
institutional arrangements and to instil their interests in the institutions, on the one hand, 
and to overcome the limitation of the agency/ structure debate in explaining socio-
economic changes, in which agency matters more than structure or the other way around, 
on the other. 
A further question that must be posed in relation to all institutional change (and for the 
purposes of this study, the 1998 labour laws) is what brings about this institutional juncture 
and how the new institutional set generated during the juncture is reproduced. In the 
classical mechanical explanation for the occurrence of the critical juncture (e.g. Calvert 
1995; Collier & Collier 1991; Krasner 1984; 1988; Levi 1997; Shepsle 1989), it is assumed 
that a contingent and external shock (i.e. 1997 Asian financial crisis) brings about the 
juncture, and the self-reinforcing mechanisms of institutions serve to maintain institutional 
equilibrium over a relatively long period. However, as described above, the recent 
theorising of actor-based institutionalists (e.g. Amable & Palombarini 2009; Culpepper 
                                                
10	  See	   Chapter	   4	   and	   Chapter	   5	   for	   the	   history	   of	   the	   political	   dynamics	   between	   business	   and	   labour	  
between	   1980	   and	   1997	   and	   their	   policy	   preferences	   of	   labour	   flexibility	   and	   political	   and	   social	   rights,	  
respectively.	  Chapter	  6,	  Chapter	  7,	  and	  Chapter	  8	  deal	  with	   the	  struggles	  over	  and	  negotiations	  on	   these	  
competing	  interests	  during	  and	  after	  the	  critical	  juncture	  period	  (1997-­‐1999).	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2005; Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Streeck 2009) stresses the endemic and endogenous 
properties of institutional change, where the dynamics of political activity between actors 
is the key factor in explaining the continuity of and changes in institutions.  
Thus, an important theoretical concern of this research is to consider how these two 
contrasting approaches, although they both analyse the institutional change within the 
critical juncture framework, account for the origin and outcomes of the critical juncture. 
For instance, the questions of whether the traditional role played by the developmental 
state in the rule-making process for reform of the employment system and the 
developmental features in the labour market and labour relations broke down or survived 
the 1997 crisis, or whether the institutional reform of the employment system was the 
result of the accumulated demands of business, labour, and even the state are critical to this 
research.  
Second, there has been little consensus among the many commentators who have tried to 
examine and explain the origins and development of the East Asian welfare system 
through utilising the power resources model (See Chapter 2). In attempting to explain the 
features of a particular welfare system, the welfare state literature that employs the power 
resources model compares the social policy sets of differing welfare systems and points to 
the importance of political configurations and the role played by labour’s political 
empowerment (Esping Andersen 1985; Hicks 1999; Korpi 1983; 1989; Stephens 1979).11 
However, few people would agree that this approach has made a significant contribution to 
the understanding of the Korean welfare system. This may be due to its failure to 
investigate the policy process of the juncture in 1998 in detail and thus overestimating or 
ignoring aspects of the Korean developmental context, the emergence of a social 
democratic bloc in the policy realm, and the external pressure from the IMF and 
globalisation.  
                                                
11	  For	   instance,	   see	   Esping-­‐Andersen	   (1990).	   His	   position	   is	   that	   the	   stronger	   the	   trade	   unions	   and	   the	  
greater	   the	   political	   influence	   of	   social-­‐democratic	   parties,	   the	   more	   comprehensive	   and	   universal	   the	  
welfare	  policy.	  Hicks	  (1999),	  Korpi	  (1983;	  1989),	  and	  Stephens	  (1979)	  adopt	  similar	  positions.	  In	  contrast	  to	  
this	  positive	  view	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  (labour-­‐based)	  leftist	  political	  parties	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  
state’s	  welfare	  provision,	  commentators	  such	  as	  Rueda	  (2007)	  argue	  that	  social-­‐democratic	  political	  parties,	  
in	   the	  hope	  of	  mobilising	  political	   support	   from	  normal	   (tax-­‐paying)	  workers,	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  push	   for	  
reductions	   in	   the	   cost	   of	   universal	   compensation	   rather	   than	   increases	   in	   the	   cost	   of	   social	   protection	  
schemes	  or	  training	  programmes	  for	  them.	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For example, how elite bureaucrats, who had the traditional policy priority of economic 
growth and steered Korea’s institutional reforms (including economic, financial, labour, 
and social policies), played a role in the transformation of the welfare system around the 
juncture in 1998 (for instance, the expansion of EI) remains unexplored in the welfare state 
literature that employs the power resource model. Moreover, the issue of how the new 
employment system institutional set that was established in 1998 affected the form and 
scope of welfare provision and its practice at work remains largely ignored in this approach. 
Again, this research presumes that individual or collective action influences the shape that 
the political structure of welfare production and distribution ultimately takes, and that the 
roles and impact of these social actors are determined by institutional networks. The 
dynamics of the new institutional path are generated in the field of politics, which deals 
with the emergence, rise, and decay of particular legal and social institutional arrangements. 
This research endeavours to refine the developmental state and East Asian welfare state 
theses via an institutional approach that focuses on political dynamics and their impact on 
the institutional change to explain the transformation of the Korean developmental welfare 
state.  
 
1.2 The key questions 
 
The key question addressed in this thesis is how the employment system in Korea changed 
and affected the development of Korea’s welfare system. To this end, this research adopts 
the political (actor-based) approach of the new-institutionalist thesis. It should be noted, 
however, that this thesis does not follow the behavioural approach of focusing on the role 
played by ‘political giants’ (although presidential and political leadership undoubtedly 
played a role under Korea’s authoritarian regimes), nor does it employ an adaptation of the 
democratisation thesis, in which the rising force of policy advocates and policy coalitions 
is adjudged to have stemmed directly from democratisation. Instead, this thesis puts the 
institutions themselves at the centre of the analysis and investigates how rule makers and 
rule takers shape, and are shaped by, the institutions. Thus, it is necessary to take account 
of the roles played by political actors such as political elites, bureaucrats, business 
organisations, and unions in the institutional change. 
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Hence, the way in which a given institutional arrangement and its rule-making process 
constrain actors’ interests and behaviour is the first sub-issue for the key question. In the 
case of the Korean employment system, before the Kim Dae-jung’s inauguration in late 
1997 and the establishment of the LMGTC in early 1998, the state had a close bond with 
business and played the dominant role in directing the employment system. Labour and its 
interests had been largely excluded from the rule-making process. As a result, labour was 
unable to voice or pursue its interests as regards the employment system through the 
formal rule-making process, and confrontational relations between business and labour 
were deeply embedded in practice, with the consequence that the state continued to pursue 
its traditional government-led strategy for economic and social development, including the 
reform of the employment system.  
However, the formation of the tripartite system in 1998 appeared to open up more room for 
manoeuvre to labour and make the Korean employment system more geared towards a new 
social consensus model. In turn, this raises the following sub-question on the restructuring 
of the Korean employment system: Did the Korean developmental state’s approach to 
reform of the employment system remain constant over time, and if not, how and why did 
it change? For example, did the crisis or Korea’s path towards democratisation bring about 
a new form of rule-making process, and if so, what form did it take (i.e. tripartite system, 
corporatist model or a new hybrid one)? The answer to this question will provide a clue to 
the character of the Korean state after the 1997 economic crisis and the establishment of 
the tripartite system in 1998. 
Second, what, then, was the institutional result of this new form of rule-making for the 
employment system? For instance, were the increased rights of unions and the greater 
flexibility in the labour market gained through the 1998 labour laws or through further 
reforms carried out in the 2000s? From this, the key question is whether the reforms to the 
formal system led to changes in employment practices (i.e. labour relations, labour 
practices in the workplace, and labour protection) in line with the original intention of the 
rule-makers or whether political bargaining between actors was key to any changes that 
occurred, since the real practice of transforming the employment system is enabled by the 
dialectical and complementary dynamics both within the formal institutions and between 
the formal system and informal (empirical) practices. To put it differently, this thesis does 
18	  
not assume that the implementation of a formal institutional set will mean that actual 
employment practices will automatically function as the rule-makers intended.  
Thus, the second sub-issue pertains to the policy outputs that the reform of the Korean 
employment system brought about and how (or whether) the policy outcomes from the 
reform of the formal institutions altered employment practices at the empirical level. For 
instance, did the 1998 amendment of the Labour Standards Act, which aimed to allow 
employers to hire and fire more easily, produce a visible effect in terms of increased labour 
market flexibility? Addressing these issues will enable us to identify what changes to the 
Korean welfare system have occurred because the features of employment practices are 
directly related to the form and extent of labour protection and welfare. In the case of the 
Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency Workers, which was passed in the 1998 
reform of Korea’ s labour laws, it was intended and expected to provide atypical (non-
regular) workers with greater job security by protecting such workers from unfair labour 
practices in the workplace (i.e. from income and working condition disparities). Thus, not 
only social policies but also labour policies serve to construct a particular form of welfare 
system, and the employment system, which is the combined set of these policies, is an 
integral part of the welfare system. 
The third issue, in line with the first and second issues, involves the political determinants 
of the restructuring of the Korean employment system: How did the transformation in the 
roles, functions, responsibilities, and the capacity of the state (political elites and the 
bureaucracy), business, and labour, manifest itself in the new tripartite system and 
employment system? This question focuses on how the change in the political 
configuration between political actors and the changing degree of embeddedness of past 
practices could serve to lead to the transformation of Korean developmental welfare state. 
In answering this question, two elements must be considered: first, employing the 
developmental state thesis, how did the embedded roles of the state (especially the roles of 
elite bureaucrats), business, and labour that had persisted throughout the developmental 
state era change and to what extent did this influence the transformation of the employment 
system and the developmental welfare state’s transformation? If the traditional roles and 
functions of the actors (the state, business, and labour) and the relationships between them 
persisted in the employment system and welfare system during and after the critical 
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juncture, then it can be concluded that the Korean developmental state restored its capacity 
and maintained its traditional developmental approach in this policy realm.  
Second, if this is not the case, however, (that is, if this research reveals that actors have 
assumed modified or new roles and responsibilities) then this research will need to explore 
the complex and interlocking causes of the transformation of the employment system. In 
other words, it will need to explore how and whether the causal factors of institutional 
change are interactive (i.e. it involves inter-factor relationships), multilateral (i.e. it 
involves the relations between actors and their interests, preferences, and reactions to the 
institutions), or multidimensional (i.e. it involves the labour market, labour relations, and 
labour protection). To put it differently, it must examine whether the restructuring of the 
employment system derives from a mixture of domestic political conditions and external 
pressures, the competing interests and preferences of actors, and the combined effect of 
diverse policy implementations.  
Before addressing these issues, however, the research framework and methodology for this 
thesis will be presented. 
 
1.3 A brief introduction to each chapter 
 
This dissertation consists of a theoretical review of previous studies (Chapter 2), the 
methodological and conceptual framework used in this study (Chapter 3), five analysis 
chapters (Chapters 4,5,6,7, and 8), and a conclusion (Chapter 9). 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of welfare state theory in East Asia and 
developmental state theory. The study of the Korean welfare state, especially the recent 
thesis of the ‘productivist’ world of the Korean (East Asian) welfare system, is reviewed 
first. I will argue, however, that the current literature ignores the domestic political factors 
that have a de facto impact on institutional change and that no theoretical linkage between 
the notions of a ‘productivist welfare system’ and the ‘developmental state’ thesis is 
provided in the literature. The second part of this chapter explores the debate about 
developmental state theory and highlights the key elements of the Korean developmental 
state in Korea’s welfare evolution with the aim of identifying how and why the traditional 
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Korean developmental welfare state transformed. In sum, despite this research accepting 
the great role played by the Korean state in both economic and social policy development, 
neither the welfare state thesis nor the developmental state thesis can adequately explain 
the nature of the traditional Korean developmental welfare state and its transformation. 
Instead, this research emphasises the role of politics among political actors in shaping 
Korea’s institutional set. In the third section of this chapter, therefore, the contribution of 
the institutional approaches to understanding the transformation of the employment system 
and the political economy is examined. While this section sets out the economic and 
rational elements of institutional approaches, which generally point to the self-reinforcing 
mechanisms of institutions (path-dependency) and employ the abstract concepts of 
increasing returns and contingency, it also highlights the key elements of the incremental 
change theory of institutions, which explores institutional change by employing the critical 
juncture framework to focus on the roles of actors and their interactions and how these are 
influenced and shaped over time. 
Chapter 3 presents the analytical framework and methodology for this research. In this 
study, the Korean employment system is used as a lens to examine how the Korean 
developmental welfare state transformed through the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This 
transformation is expressed conceptually through the concept of institutional 
complementarity: the Korean employment system came about as a result of the 
institutional complementarity of industrial policy, labour policy, and social policy; 
furthermore, it did not suddenly emerge at a given period but rather had its own historical 
trajectory. Thus, it is assumed that the innovative and paradoxical institutional 
implementation of the employment system since 1997 can be understood as the combined 
result of institutional reform in various policy areas and the process of change and 
continuity as defined by the path-dependency thesis. Hence, this chapter will show how a 
focus on the employment system can serve to reveal not only the changes that occurred in 
the configuration of Korean employment practices (the labour market, labour relations, and 
labour protection) at the empirical policy outcome level, but also the political dynamics 
that shaped the transformation of the Korean developmental welfare state and its impact on 
the institutional rearrangement of the employment system. This chapter then presents the 
methodology used in this research and describes the method of qualitative research 
analysis used for the case study. It was felt that the use of semi-structured in-depth 
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interviews with former and current administration officials, executives and hands-on staff 
from the LMGTC, the KLI (Korean Labour Institute), two national unions and local unions, 
business organisations, and politicians would serve to provide vivid testimonies from 
political actors on the range of diverse institutional reforms and would guarantee data 
reliability and validity.  
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the trajectory of the Korean employment system during the 
authoritarian-conservative governments (1980-1998) is reviewed as an antecedent to the 
current system using the critical juncture framework. Here, the changes in state-business-
labour relations, the role and capacity of the state, and employment practices (as regards 
the labour market, labour relations, and workers’ security) are reviewed and reappraised. 
The central aim of this investigation is to reveal what changes occurred in the employment 
system before the 1997 crisis. These chapters first explore the changing face of the state’s 
governance of the employment system before and after the 1987 democratisation 
movement (in Chapter 4) and under the first civilian government (1993-1997) (in Chapter 
5). These chapters reveal that the state’s shift from despotic-authoritarianism (pre-1987) to 
negotiated-authoritarianism (post-1987) arose from the Great Workers’ Struggle in 1987 
and that as negotiated-authoritarianism began to give way to authoritarian-conservatism 
(post-1993), there were signs that past developmental strategies were beginning to be 
dismantled. Chapter 4 shows that while the huge asymmetry in power between the state 
and labour meant that the state had unilateral hegemony over labour, it also had a high 
level of relative autonomy against business due to the state’s interdependent interests of 
economic growth and political legitimacy and wish of business to preserve its position as 
the state’s subordinate partner. Nevertheless, it was business that took the initiative in the 
introduction of labour flexibility measures such as the flexible labour market (outer-
numerical flexibility) and the flexible working-hours system (inner-numerical flexibility). 
This study highlights a state practice that came to the fore at the beginning of the Kim 
Young-sam government: the promotion of autonomous labour relations. Chapter 5 
examines the state’s attempts to break from the path of direct physical intervention in 
labour relations and the institutional challenges it faced. For instance, despite the state’s 
expressed intention to see labour relations develop free from direct state intervention, both 
formal institutions (such as the labour relations acts banning third-party intervention and 
political activity by unions) and ideological control through the use of political propaganda 
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(such as debates on labour’s responsibility for economic growth and on sharing the pain of 
the economic crisis, and Kim’s rhetoric of Segyewha (globalisation)) were frequently 
employed to control labour and even the middle class. These institutional measures 
affected the ability of labour to organise effectively, and collective bargaining via 
enterprise unionism severely restricted the capacity of national-level unions to establish 
national-level agreements, with the result that the individual enterprise-level unions were, 
unsurprisingly, unable to thwart the implementation of labour flexibilisation measures such 
as those involving mass layoffs, flexible working hours, and so on.  
Through the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5, this research shows that the legal and 
social changes that provided the genesis for the restructuring of the institutional setting for 
business and labour (that is to say, the institutional changes that allowed the establishment 
of a form of corporatist collective bargaining) emerged alongside the important political 
developments of the pro-democracy movement in the late 1980s, the economic 
liberalisation by the Kim Young-Sam government in the mid-1990s, and the election of 
Kim Dae-jung to the presidency in 1997. This explanation implies two distinct arguments: 
the labour market had already taken on a neoliberal form before the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and was only partly modified by the crisis; and the state’s on-going revision of the 
employment system had its origin in the political realm rather than the economic sphere. 
These chapters elaborate on both these processes. 
Chapter 6 deals directly with the role of the Korean state in the reform of the employment 
system after 1997 (albeit modified in line with an empowered labour movement and 
pressure from globalisation) through the establishment of a tripartite institutional 
innovation, the LMGTC. This institutional development is recognised by many East Asian 
experts as a watershed moment in the retrenchment of the Korean developmental state. The 
case study of the LMGTC reveals two important arguments. First, it is important to note 
that the establishment of the LMGTC tripartite system (the first successful implementation 
of a corporatist institutional measure in Korean history) resulted from not only the 
exogenous shock of the economic crisis, but also the active choices made by social actors 
with diverse and sometimes contradictory interests (as the incremental change thesis 
contends). Second, the impact of the LMGTC changed over time due to the goals of the 
actors shifting in response to the changing environment, that is, the changing phases of the 
national crisis. 
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Following the actor-based institutional approach as set out in the incremental change thesis, 
the changes that took place in the LMGTC’s policy-making process provide the following 
lessons as regards the transformation of the Korean developmental state. First, ironically, 
the state’s internal autonomy was initially restored due to IMF support, but the state was 
able to enjoy this only in the national crisis phase (1998-1999). Second, after Korea had 
escaped from the worst of the crisis, business was no longer restricted by the state; its 
interpretation of and attitude towards the existing institution changed over time, and it 
began chasing its own policy objectives. Third, the institutional arrangements led to labour 
losing its political influence over and support from union members and the public. Fourth, 
the state, and bureaucrats in particular, became less insulated from the private sector, 
especially the business sector. Fifth, the shifting goals of business and labour, the state’s 
segmentation, and increasing collusion between bureaucrats and business led to the 
LMGTC becoming increasingly insignificant as an institutional apparatus for negotiation 
on labour relations. This resulted in the social partners – labour and business – returning to 
their tradition of confrontational relations, a pattern deeply embedded in Korea’s 
traditional system of state-led strategies for economic and social development. 
Chapter 7 examines the changes in the labour market and labour practices that took place 
after the establishment of the LMGTC in 1997. This chapter takes as its starting point the 
institutional sets that were introduced by the LMGTC’s 1998 social pact. Both the 
economic crisis itself and the state’s programmes to resolve the crisis under the terms of 
the IMF bailout generated an institutional basis for Korea’s economic transformation 
towards a more flexible labour market in which mass layoffs, the temporary agency system 
(the use of non-standard, temporary, or fixed-term contracts), and the flexible working 
hours system could be implemented. As a result, many commentators insist that this period 
marks a critical juncture in the transition of the Korean labour market and labour practices 
into those of a liberal market economy. This research, however, contends that labour 
market practices in fact took an unexpected path towards the deepening (continuity) of 
labour market dualism: although more institutional measures for functional flexibility (e.g. 
relocation of personnel and outsourcing) were used within the work places of large firms, 
between large firms, and at the margins, the large (core) firms’ labour market became 
characterised by greater rigidity (it became increasingly closed/impervious), whereas 
greater flexibility (a more mobile/permeable labour market) became standard on the 
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margins. And this study assumes that this is largely due to the greater autonomy of 
business against the state and labour in implementation and enactment of institutions, 
rather than a pure product of new system of neoliberal formula (see Chapter 7). 
This recent pattern of dualisation and dualism in Korea’s labour market and labour practice 
is not restricted to the Korean context, however, but is in keeping with the experience of 
Western industrialised countries. In fact, dualisation and dualism in the Korean labour 
market and deepening and widening inequality has its origins in the mid-1990s, not in the 
1998 institutional reforms, and these developments emerged as a direct result of the 
combined effect of institutions and a systemic change that aimed at industrial reform. This 
research reveals that the institutional measures that were introduced in an attempt to 
increase labour flexibility in fact produced the opposite effect, leading to a more rigid 
insiders’ labour market and to division of the labour market and workers. On the one hand, 
the 1998 Labour Standards Act hampered employers from firing and hiring workers easily, 
and the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency Workers in 1998 increased the 
number of non-regular workers at the micro-level. On the other hand, the structural reform 
of the chaebols led to the reorganisation of the supply chain, with the result that the 
measures for enhancing functional flexibility within the company (e.g. subcontracting and 
the employment of non-regular workers) increased, thus affecting industrial relations.12 
Nevertheless, the persistence of firm-based unionism alongside the reorganised production 
system excluded non-regular (atypical) workers from the core (insiders) labour market. 
However, it remains unclear whether such complex institutional arrangements directly led 
to business unionism becoming embedded or whether the institutional and systemic 
environments ultimately dragged the unions into representing only the regular workers in 
the large firms’ core labour market. Regardless of the answer to this question, it is clear 
that it would be wrong to apportion sole blame to the unions for this state of affairs.  
This chapter also provides support for the incremental change theory of institutional 
change, where particular actors seek to instil their diverse and sometimes contrasting 
interests upon the institution. This ultimately means that once the institution has been 
formalised through the commitment and compliance of distinct yet diverse actors, the 
institution will inherently contain a degree of ambiguity over its interpretational and 
                                                
12	  The	   chaebol	   is	   the	   South	   Korean	   form	   of	   business	   conglomerate:	   chaebols	   are	   family-­‐controlled	   and	  
government-­‐supported	  corporate	  groups.	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enforcement rules. Thus, it is not surprising that conflicts and struggles over the 
interpretation of the institution’s rules, its enactment, and revision will continue. As a 
result, the implementation of changes to the labour market and labour practice institutional 
sets led to political struggle between business and labour (and sometimes the state). 
Therefore, the gap that inevitably exists between the origin and the formal enactment of 
employment system institutions creates room for such struggles and may lead to 
contrasting policy preferences between actors. 
In Chapter 8, the developmental freedom thesis (Haagh 2007; 2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2013 
forthcoming), which provides a theoretical linkage between workers’ economic security 
(material conditions) and the welfare debate, is presented and serves to map out social 
policy (and its change) as regards the employment system. Developmental freedom, which 
is shaped by institutional sets and is underpinned by economic security (which consists of a 
mixture of social insurance and egalitarian rights both inside and outside production), 
comprises the extent of an individual’s autonomy to control their stable working life. In 
this regard, a high degree of labour market dualism and inequality in labour practices 
boosts the need for wider and more durable social security. Through this, individual 
workers are able to renew and develop their means of replenishing their human capital so 
as to (re-) enter the labour market easily, secure their job by improving their work skills 
through training, and be protected by universal compensation under the highly flexible 
labour market conditions of modern capitalism. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
tension and conflict between economic pressures for flexible adjustment in the 
employment system and individual workers’ needs for stable employment make politics 
central to any reform of the employment system.  
Thus, the labour market, labour practices and labour protection are ultimately constructed 
by the complicated (expected or unintended, sometimes inverted or biased) 
complementarities of institutions and shift in line with the political conflicts that emerge 
due to the gap between social partners’ interpretations and the actual enforcement of labour 
and economic policy. Therefore, comprehensive analysis of the nature of and changes to a 
particular employment system necessarily involves an investigation into the role and 
function of specific social policies, and more importantly, their interconnection or 
combination with labour, economic, and industrial policies.  
26	  
This chapter, therefore, focuses on the restructuring of EI (Employment Insurance) and 
regards the reciprocity and complementarity of the institutional set as due to a combination 
of Korea’s economic liberalisation in response to globalisation and the state’s 
responsibility for ensuring a stable society. In contrast to the common belief that firm-
based worker welfare is still the dominant form in the Korean welfare system, the role and 
function of the Korean developmental welfare state in welfare provision has increased 
significantly. However, while it is accepted that the active labour market policies (ALMP) 
of EI have contributed to bringing about a more protective employment system, that the 
scope of social protection in Korea has certainly broadened, and that the institutional 
purpose of Korea’s social polices is no longer subject to an economic rationale, it is argued 
that the EI institutional set for worker protection has not produced the results that were 
originally intended. EI’s occupation-based beneficiary system selectively served regular 
workers in larger firms and fostered the increasing inequality in welfare provision and 
ALMP for workers. Furthermore, it should be noted that labour has had little impact on the 
creation and evolution of the Korean developmental welfare state due to the fact that 
corporatism has not been embedded in Korean society to any great degree. Indeed, the 
findings of this study run counter to the democratisation thesis, which insists that the 
emergence of a policy network and coalition brought about the development of a Korean 
welfare state, and instead demonstrate that the Korean state reinvented and reinvigorated 
itself by taking on the role and responsibility for enhancing social (labour) protection by 
nurturing social bureaucrats. 
Finally, Chapter 9 considers the interplay of the different factors elaborated upon in 
previous chapters. First, this concluding chapter re-examines the critical juncture 
framework’s approach to institutional change and how the critical antecedent, political, 
economic, and social conditions for the opening of a policy window and the divergent 
policy preferences, outcomes, the end of the critical juncture, and the institutional 
mechanisms of reproduction have driven the transformation of the Korean employment 
system, its appearance, and its institutional forms. Through this more sophisticated 
consideration of the critical juncture framework, involving continuity and change 
(particularly at the empirical level), this study contends that a strong developmental 
context of state-centred and bureaucrat-led policy-making in Korea persisted during the 
implementation of labour market flexibilisation and the dualisation of employment 
27	  
practices. However, the study notes that, on the other hand, the roles, functions, and 
responsibilities of the state and its bureaucracy as regards reform of the Korean 
employment system (from the perspective of institutional implementation) have altered 
over time. 
Second, it should be noted that the institutions of a political economy cannot be understood 
in isolation from one another; instead, the political economy can be regarded as the 
complementary result of institutions in various realms. It is precisely this argument that 
points to the social system being not a static structure, but a dynamic process. An 
institution, once established, is not necessarily destined to be reproduced or self-reinforced, 
but rather may be continuously and creatively re-invented by actors in accordance with a 
specific or changing environment. Thus, it is misleading to assume that when an institution 
or institutional sets are implemented, further institutional change does not occur, and vice 
versa. Instead, the impact of both changing institutions and existing institutions at the 
empirical level shifts due to the political struggles between rule-makers and rule-takers 
with diverse expectations, preferences, interests, responsibilities, and interpretations. The 
change in the various institutions that underpin the Korean employment system can 
therefore be explored only by examining the political dynamics among social actors.  
Having outlined the overall structure of the thesis, the next chapter reviews the theories on 
the Korean state’s transformation, with a particular emphasis on the welfare state and the 
developmental state.  	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Chapter 2 	  
Theoretical Framework 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the main elements of the developmental state, 
their nature, and their role in the evolution of the Korean welfare system. This chapter 
therefore presents a literature review on how the Korean developmental welfare state 
emerged and changed. It should be noted that it is necessary to examine studies of the 
welfare state outside the Korean context in order to understand where the Korean welfare 
state stands in the world of welfare capitalism. Because studies of the welfare state focus 
their analysis on typologies and comparisons of different welfare systems – and are in 
effect equivalent to an attempt to explore to what extent labour can participate in or affect 
the formulation of and changes to an welfare system under globalised capitalism – the 
mode of labour participation and the degree of universality of welfare provision thus 
provides important clues to the nature of a welfare system. In short, the literature on the 
Korean welfare state, especially the recent thesis of the ‘productivist’ world of the Korean 
(East Asian) welfare system (Gough 2001; Holliday 2000; Y.-B. Kim 2002; S. Kwon & 
Holliday 2007; Lee & Moon 2008; White & Goodman 1998), provides the key to 
explaining its origin and its transformation after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
The second part of this chapter examines the debate about post-crisis Korean 
developmental welfare state theory, which has contributed significantly to clarifying the 
nature and configuration of the Korean welfare system. The main point of returning to and 
reconsidering the recent welfare debate is to identify which of its arguments can help to 
explain Korea’s developmental welfare state transformation, and more critically, how these 
arguments can be theoretically applied to the current labour market and labour protection 
institutional sets to illustrate the transformation of Korea’s welfare system.  
In brief, despite this research accepting the stress that the productivist welfare thesis places 
on the role of ideology and the focus that the developmental state thesis has on the role of 
the state, neither the welfare state thesis nor the developmental state thesis can solely 
explain the developmental state’s nature and transformation. This thesis therefore employs 
a new-institutionalist approach in order to explore this transformation and regards the 
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employment system as an integral part of the welfare system. The third section of this 
chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical grounds of the institutionalist approach to 
change and continuity in socio-economic development, and presents the political factors at 
work in institutional change via an analysis of the critical juncture framework, which 
contends that past or existing institutional arrangements are the prime cause of institutional 
change or continuity. Through a consideration of these two critical theories in current 
institutional approaches, it will be shown that institutional change unfolds not only by the 
exogenous shocks, but by the endemic (endogenous), continuous, and dialectical dynamics 
between political actors with diverse interests in and interpretations of both the enactment 
of specific institutions and the practices embedded by institutions. The issues that emerge 
from the literature review are then presented.  
 
2.1 Varieties of welfare state? Explaining the East Asian welfare states 
 
In the Western experience, the emergence and evolution of the welfare state originates 
from historical compromises shaped by a distinctive tripartite combination of democracy, 
welfare, and capitalism (Marshall 1981: 107-111): a compromise between the state and 
labour (the Scandinavian social democratic model), a compromise between capital and 
labour (the German corporatist model), and a compromise between the state and capital 
(the Anglo-American liberal model). The theoretical pivot of this rough classification of 
Western welfare states is decommodification. Apart from in the Anglo-American liberal 
model, where the influence of labour is relatively weak, decommodification has been 
brought about by the political dynamics of labour. Moreover, according to this ‘power 
resources model’ (Esping Andersen 1985; Hicks 1999; Korpi 1983, 1989; Stephens 1979), 
the difference in welfare standards in Northern European, Central European, and Anglo-
American countries is a result of the extent of the political influence and involvement of 
the labour movement and labour parties in shaping labour and social policy. In this 
approach, the major independent variables are unionisation as a political resource, the 
existence of strong unions, a leftist party with parliamentary seats, and a labour-centred 
class coalition.13 It argues that the welfare state is well established in countries that have 
                                                
13	  Korpi	  identified	  the	  labour	  union	  and	  the	  parties	  on	  the	  left	  as	  representing	  working-­‐class	  interests	  in	  the	  
democratic	  class	  struggle	  (Korpi	  1983:	  24-­‐25).	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well-developed trade unions and socialist parties, model examples of which are in evidence 
in the Scandinavian countries.  
If this is the case, how does the Western experience, which is explained by the power 
resources model, help to explain the emergence and evolution of the welfare system in East 
Asian states? Furthermore, did the Korean developmental welfare state followed the 
established paths taken by Western welfare systems or initiate its own path-dependent 
course of welfare development? To answer these questions, it is necessary to begin with an 
account of the welfare regime thesis. 
 
2.1.1 Welfare regime thesis and its application in the East Asian countries 
 
The key question for the study of welfare is why nations respond so differently to a set of 
social risks that are largely similar (Esping-Andersen 1999: 170). At the heart of welfare 
research is the welfare typology that is derived from the different policies taken by each 
state. Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) draws upon and 
draws together earlier welfare state typologies (i.e. Wilensky & Lebeaux 1965; Titmuss 
1974; Furniss & Tilton 1977)(Abrahamson 1999: 400-401). Its innovation lies in Esping-
Andersen’s forwarding of the decommodification index as a statistical tool to measure the 
degree of worker’s freedom from commodification in the labour market. In addition, he 
employs stratification as a means of analysing whether the various welfare regimes 
maintain (liberal model/class dualism), intensify (conservative model/status differentials), 
or compensate for (social democratic model) social class divisions (Esping-Andersen 1985; 
1990; 1993; 1999). Here, regime refers to the mode of assigning welfare to the state, the 
market, and the household (Esping-Andersen 1999: 73), and the term ‘the welfare-state 
regime’ is used to illustrate the varying extent of decommodification and stratification 
brought about by the different dynamics among the state, market, and family.  
The importance of Esping-Andersen’s research to this thesis is that his analytical approach 
is ultimately political, something that is often neglected by welfare researchers within the 
disciplines of social policy or sociology. Esping-Andersen therefore provides a means of 
comprehending the welfare state, identifying its problems, and seeking alternatives rather 
than merely presenting a comparative study of welfare systems. In his approach, the 
process of welfare production and distribution is determined in the realm of politics; class 
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struggle and class coalitions affect the welfare policy-making process; and the type and 
arrangements of the welfare regime determines its inequality, stratification, and class 
structure (Brush 2002: 163).  
However, despite its remarkable achievements, various aspects of Esping-Andersen’s 
approach have been criticised, and some of these criticisms are particularly relevant for this 
research.14 First, it has been argued that his approach was too narrowly focused on income 
maintenance and thus is unable to illustrate a welfare system in its entirety, since it 
comprises various social protection schemes and social insurance programmes. In 
attempting to understand and characterise the nature of a welfare state, this approach has 
the political structure for mobilising power as its main focus, and it focuses less on the 
micro-dynamics of domestic politics; for instance, the issue of who made a difference 
within the domestic political context and why. Second, Esping-Andersen’s typology 
attempts to provide a causal explanation of how the interaction among independent 
variables (historically established socio-economic ideology, religious values and tradition, 
and particular political institutions and the industrial structure) leads to one of three 
welfare system types. However, it remains doubtful that Esping-Andersen’s typology can 
be applied to the case of an immature welfare system or in the case of a separate and 
distinctive path of development, that is, one unlike Western welfare states (Chung 2007: 
265). Third, his approach focuses too much on a state-market duality and fails to take 
account of households and families (Wincott 2001: 411). For instance, according to Ha-
Joon Chang, social welfare in East Asia is provided by a combination of (weak) social 
policy, company welfare schemes, family provision, and other means (2007: 5; 2004a: 
247). Furthermore Song (2003) emphasises the central role played by business and family 
in welfare provision during the period of Korea’s high economic growth (1961-1987) 
(Song 2003: 411).  
In a similar vein, a recent academic vogue comprising the welfare regime of Esping-
Andersen and the approach of ‘Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)’ enumerate statistical figures 
of that Korean labour market structure and the changes of welfare regime after neo-
liberalistic globalisation in dimension of path dependency and path shaping and of 
institutional complementarity of production regime, especially focusing on industrial 
                                                
14	  For	   a	   critique	   of	   his	  welfare	   regime	   typology,	   see	  Arts	  &	  Gelissen	   (2002:	   142-­‐147).	   For	   critiques	   of	   his	  
ignorance	   of	   gender	   differences,	   see	   Adams	   &	   Padamsee	   (2001),	   Christopher	   (2002),	   Brush(2002).For	   a	  
critique	  of	  the	  un(der)acknowledged	  social	  foundation	  of	  the	  family/household,	  see	  Wincott	  (2001:	  411).	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relations, and welfare regime (Cho et al. 2008). This assessments have a different 
significance from general VoC thesis in the context of that exploring the theoretical 
relation between the Korean developmental state and the types of capitalist societies with 
the core term of institutional complementarity, however, these lack of qualitative analysis 
for examining the political dynamics along with formal and informal institution.  
Based on the VoC thesis, in addition, the government partisanship is suggested as 
independent variable for exploring the change of welfare expenditure and welfare 
institutional implementation (Alvarez et al. 1991; Garret & Lange 1989; Kim & Fording 
2002; Korpi 1983; Kwon 2010; Kwon & Pontusson 2010; Pontusson et al. 2002; Rueda 
2007).  Esping-Andersen (1990) pointed that the stronger the trade unions, and the greater 
the political influence of social-democratic parties, the more comprehensive and universal 
the welfare policy. In a similar vein, Hicks (1999), Korpi (1983), and Stephens (1979) can 
be addressed here. In contrast to this positive relations between the (labour based) leftist 
political partisanship and expansion of state’s welfare provision, some commentators such 
as Rueda (2007) argues that the social-democratic political party is more likely to reduce 
the cost for universal compensation, rather it increases the cost on social protection scheme 
with cash or training programme for normal (tax-paying) workers in the sake of mobilising 
political support from them. Recently, in addition, H.Y. Kwon and his colleague (Kwon & 
Shin2007; Kwon 2010) examines the effect of government partisanship on social spending 
in advanced democracies, which examines how the government partisanship effect 
manifests across the distinctive political – economic regimes – Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs) and Social Market Economies (SMEs). Following his analysis, however, the 
government partisanship effect is transitory rather than enduring: in LMEs Left 
government exerts a transitory effect on increases in social spending, while Right 
government leads to a transitory cutback effect on social spending in SMEs. In a similar 
vein, it is less convincing that there is stable partisanship effect on labour laws reforms in 
Korea (see Appendix 1-1). 
To summarise, these arguments are linked to the critique of the ‘triad’ problem, which 
doubts the usefulness of dividing welfare regimes into only three categories, something 
acknowledged as problematic by Esping-Andersen himself (1999: 12; 73). The critique 
argues that the tripartite model tends to over-simplify the complexity of social reality, 
especially the diversity of capitalism. This critique has presented new challenges to 
33	  
Esping-Andersen’s model and has led to the positing of other ideal types, such as the 
‘Latin Rim’ model (Leibfried 1993:142-145), the ‘Southern European’ model (Ferrera 
1996: 29-34), the ‘Wage-earners’ model (Castles & Mitchell 1992: 3-9), the ‘Confucian 
(Oikonomic)’ model (Jones 1990: 446), and the ‘East Asian’ model (Goodman et al.1998: 
6-15; Rieger & Leibfried 2003: 243).  
The ‘Confucian’ and the ‘East Asian’ models, which amply demonstrate the feasibility of 
there being a new hybrid system in East Asia, are vital in explaining the Korean welfare 
system. The common understanding among welfare researchers is that the East Asian 
welfare systems, including that of Korea, have attained low development compared to the 
economic growth that has been achieved. According to Midgley (1986), this is caused by 
an ‘aversion to welfarism’ (Midgley 1986: 234) among the political elites in the region, 
and this explains the lack of social policy development in the four little tigers (Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan).15 
However, the causes of the underdeveloped welfare systems in East Asia cannot be 
explained by a simple assertion that welfare (or social) policy has been sacrificed in favour 
of economic policy. According to S.-Y. Kim (2008), the popular assertion that attributes 
the exclusion of social policy in the region to its subsidiary role to economic policy only 
partly explains the much more complicated reality (S.-Y. Kim 2008: 84) because the 
standard of welfare provision should be considered not merely in terms of social policy but 
also in terms of economic policy and the possible harmony that exists between them 
(Hwang 2006: 142). For example, Chang (2004a) contends that social policy does not act 
merely as a safety net during economic development, but can actually form an integral part 
of developmental strategies (Chang 2004a: 259). He challenges the assertion that East 
Asian economic growth can be attributed to a concentration on economic policy and the 
neglect of social policy. To him, while social security in a narrow sense is underdeveloped 
                                                
15 	  In	   this	   cultural	   approach,	   the	   cultural	   legacy	   of	   Confucianism,	   which	   places	   the	   family’s	   role	   and	  
responsibility	  for	  welfare	  above	  that	  of	  the	  state,	  is	  emphasised	  (Jones	  1993:	  202;	  White	  &	  Goodman	  1998:	  
12).	   In	   this	   context,	  however,	  a	   ‘Confucian	  welfare	   state’	   is	  a	   contradiction	   in	   terms	  or,	  at	  best,	   refers	   to	  
‘Conservative	  corporatism	  without	  worker	  participation;	  subsidiarity	  without	  the	  Church;	  solidarity	  without	  
equality;	   laissez-­‐faire	  without	   libertarianism’	   (Jones	  1993:	  214).	  Moreover,	   there	   is	   a	   limit	   to	   this	   cultural	  
explanation	   in	   that	   it	   is	   unable	   to	   describe	   the	   dynamics	   of	   and	   explain	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   East	   Asian	  
welfare	  system.	  This	  approach	  is	  essentialist,	  static,	  abstract	  and	  over-­‐elastic	  (White	  &	  Goodman	  1998:	  13-­‐
16).	  More	  importantly,	  the	  institutional	  response	  by	  each	  national	  and	  regional	  welfare	  regime	  in	  East	  Asian	  
countries	   varies	   despite	   the	   common	   risk	   of	   financial	   crisis	   (Gough	   2001:	   184).	   In	   sum,	   it	   is	   simplistic	   to	  
argue	  that	  ‘everything	  different	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  culture’	  (Chung	  2009:	  85).	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compared to Western welfare states, social policies in a broader sense, such as land reform 
and public housing, are well developed in the region (Chang 2004a: 252-253).  
The next section presents the developmental state approach to the East Asian welfare 
system. 
 
2.1.2 Developmental state theory and its implication for the development of the 
Korean welfare system 
 
The developmental state (henceforth DS) is defined as a state that plays a critical role in 
economic development through planning and organisation based on strategic targets: first, 
the state prioritises economic development, in which the key goals are growth, productivity, 
and competition; second, in pursuit of economic success, the state aggressively intervenes 
in the market, guiding and controlling it and the private sector via the strategic allocation 
of resources (Cheng et al. 1998; Haggard 1990; Johnson 1982; I.-Y. Kim 2001; Leftwich 
1995; Rueschemeyer & Evans 1985);16 third, behind the success of the state’s strategic 
intervention lies an efficient and rational bureaucracy (Amsden 1989; Chang 2003c; Shin 
& Chang 2003; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1991) and state autonomy does not result in 
rent-seeking or looting (Evans 1995; Gough 2001; Johnson 1998).17 
In the case of East Asian DSs (henceforth EADS – Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
and Japan), some distinct foundations are added: the presence of a centralised state and 
bureaucracy, an overdeveloped state under the Cold War structure, vulnerability of 
capitalists and workers, and the weakening of landlordism due to land reforms. Among 
these elements, the focal target of the study of EADS is the role of the bureaucracy. From 
Johnson’s (1982) discussion of the rapid economic growth of post-war Japan, the 
theoretical attention of researchers moved to the active role of pilot agencies (Cheng et al. 
                                                
16	  As	   Linda	  Weiss	   notes,	   the	  DS	   is	   not	   necessarily	   based	  on	   coercive	  power,	   but	   rather	  on	   infrastructural	  
power.	  Both	  state	  bureaucracies	  and	  the	  people	  have	  a	  strong	  attachment	  to	  the	  state’s	  goal	  of	  economic	  
development,	  and	  they	  willingly	  devote	  themselves	  to	  this	  goal	  (Weiss	  1998:	  81).	  
17	  In	   the	  neo-­‐classical	   account,	   the	   state’s	   aggressive	   intervention	  necessarily	  brings	  about	   rent	  and	   rent-­‐
seeking	  activities	   that	   are	   inefficient	   for	   social	   and	  economic	  development.	   For	  neo-­‐classicists,	   therefore,	  
state	   intervention	   harms	   economic	   development	   (Tullock	   1980:	   20;	   Bhagwati	   1982:	   994).	   Contradicting	  
their	  view,	  however,	  East	  Asian	  DSs	  (especially	  Korea)	  have	  achieved	  rapid	  economic	  development.	  For	  DS	  
theorists,	  the	  matter	  is	  not	  the	  existence	  of	  rent,	  but	  the	  manner	  of	  its	  redistribution	  (S.-­‐Y.	  Kim	  2004:	  211-­‐
213).	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1998: 87; Leftwich 1995: 412), particularly the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI, Johnson 1982: 26). For Johnson, the Japanese model is the plan-rational 
DS, which stands in contrast to the market-rational regulatory state of Western 
democracies and the plan-ideological state of socialist countries. After his academic 
contribution, the bureaucrats in the EADSs were recognised as imitative of those in the 
Japanese model. Amsden (1989: 99-100) examined the state bureaucracy’s positive role in 
the process of Korean industrialisation, while Wade (1990: 345) analysed the economic 
success of Korea and Taiwan in terms of the ‘governed-market’ concept. Woo-Cumings 
(1991: 7-10) focused on the role of state-controlled finance in the EADS, and Chang 
(2003c: 257-276) stressed the importance of the industrial policies selected by government. 
Shin and Chang (2003) attributed Korea’s economic success to ‘a close collaboration 
between the state, banks and chaebols, with the state as the dominant player’ (Shin & 
Chang 2003: 1). To clarify the above interpretations, the characteristics of the DS model, 
focusing on the role of the state and bureaucracy, are outlined below. 
 
State intervention 
Chalmers Johnson pioneered studies on the developmental state, examining the key to the 
phenomenal growth of the EADS’ economies through his capitalist developmental state 
concept (Johnson 1982: viii). The DSs pursued growth, productivity and competitiveness, 
employing strategic industrial policy to realise their goal of economic development. The 
DS offered financing, planning, production and allocation of resources. Johnson’s study 
criticised the neo-classical account of political economy, in which state intervention 
invariably resulted in inefficiency and led to rent-seeking and corruption, and presented a 
new state concept. For him, the economic growth of the EADS like South Korea and 
Taiwan was fundamentally attributable both to the external factor of a new international 
division of labour and to the internal factors of market creation induced by state 
intervention, the role of local capital, and efficient production controls. In practice, the 
state enforced import restrictions and established tariff barriers to protect local industries 
while utilising state-controlled financial institutions as a vehicle to lead industrialisation 
(Johnson 1987).  In the process of industrialisation, the EADS took on a relatively broad 
role of leading and regulating the market, and the state provided local businesses credit on 
favourable terms and tax benefits in order to drive exports (Amsden 1989: 14).  
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From this perspective, the form of state intervention by the Korean DS was slightly 
different from that taken by other EADSs (Shin & Chang 2003: 7-23). Due to the 
underdevelopment of the capital market, the state’s intervention was necessarily ‘market-
substituting’ rather than ‘market-friendly’ or ‘market-enhancing’ (Aoki et al. 1996: 8-13). 
The result of such state intervention has been evaluated as being as efficient as that of 
market mechanisms (Amsden 1989: 13-14). The role of the Korean DS was not restricted 
to resolving market failure but rather to playing a role as a ‘market-conforming’ entity 
(Amsden 1989: 139-143) with the consequence that bureaucratic organisation, the policy 
network between the public and private sectors, and the will and leadership of political 
elites in order to push forward the development strategy were the key features of the 
Korean DS (Amsden 1989: 11-18; Wade 1990: 195-227; Evans 1995: 43-73).  
The question, then, is which conditions made it possible for the ‘state entrepreneur’ to 
install plan rationality and state controlled strategy in the EADS’s industry. Is the strategic 
intervention of the state a sufficient condition to identify a state as a DS? Naturally, this is 
far from being the case.  
 
State autonomy and capacity 
The channel for the state’s autonomous intervention in the economic development of the 
EADS lies in state autonomy and state capacity (Amsden 1989: 52; Wade 1990: 256; Kooh 
2009: 148; Yoon 2006: 71-72). According to Evans (1995: 32), the DS is characterised by 
its particular role, which is based on its insulation from private interests. He claimed that 
the state had enough autonomy to set its own objectives, and it established an industrial 
network to implement those objectives.  
However, securing the state’s autonomy from the interests of the business sector and social 
groups is not sufficient to define it as a DS; rather, the capacity of the state should be 
sufficient to realise and give shape to the goal of development. Without this, the state could 
degenerate into a predatory state. Only a state whose autonomy is guaranteed by state 
capacity could set economic development as its primary objective and enable it to collect 
information and mobilise resources. In other words, the feature of the developmental state 
that prevents it from becoming a predatory state (such as Zaire) is its state capacity. 
Therefore, the very point that Evans emphasised is in fact the state’s capacity rather that its 
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autonomy. He defined the state’s autonomy as ‘the ability to formulate collective goals 
instead of allowing officeholders to pursue their individual interests’ (Evans 1995: 45; 
emphasis mine). In this sense, the term autonomy is largely indistinguishable from the term 
capacity.  
What, then, is the key factor for determining state capacity? Before answering this question, 
it is necessary to mention a critique of the state-centred approach inherent in the DS thesis. 
Dealing with the DS theorists’ statist perspective, there is an argument that the state 
ignores the importance of social consensus given that it is the sole actor in policy decisions 
and is superior to social groups. To this end, the state selected certain industries with 
political linkage to social groups, and the pattern of industrialisation was therefore created. 
Thus, the state relied on cooperative relations with society to achieve economic success, 
that is, collaboration between state and business. 
 
Embedded autonomy 
Evans (1995: 249) argues that the network of ties between social groups, classes, and state 
apparatuses are important factors for state capacity. For him, the developmental state has a 
link with the social sector while preserving its autonomy from plural interests, with the 
consequence that the state facilitated the industrialisation of developing countries. For 
instance, unlike in Brazil and India, where the state played a unilateral role in production, 
he identifies the success of high-technology industry in Korea as a result of the 
collaborative relationship between the state and business (Evans 1995: 140-152). In 
particular, Evans emphasises the DSs’ connection to society by employing a concept of 
embeddedness, which refers to the collaboration between state and business.  
Moving on from Evans’ view, the chief organisational feature of the state, its internal 
cohesiveness, is highlighted by recent DS theorists. According to Chibber (2002), this 
feature was able to augment the state’s capacity (Chibber 2002: 961). The term 
cohesiveness refers to the extent of the bonds and solidarity among members within the 
organisation (Oh 1999: 308), and the more members within the organisation who share its 
norms and objectives, the higher its internal cohesiveness (Allison & Zelikow 1999: 153). 
More importantly, if a high level of internal cohesiveness is met with a similar level of 
bureaucratic rationality, a high level of state capacity can be realised (Chibber 2002: 959-
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960). Thus, this is the essence of why this dissertation stresses on the change relationship 
within the state entities like the President, Blue House (president office), economic-
bureaucrats, and others as the informal institutions, as well the critical prerequisite of the 
DS. 
In summary, the DS is identified by three key factors: strong bureaucratic organisation, 
cohesiveness within the organisation, and its connectedness with business. Examining the 
Korean developmental state from this perspective, particularly in the period of dramatic 
economic growth in the 1960’s and 1970s, it can be seen that the Korean DS was a paragon 
of strong state capacity.  
 
Korean developmental welfare system 
In the case of Korean DS, it enjoyed remarkable success thanks to its high rate of 
economic growth from the middle of the 1960s, which was achieved by employing a state-
centred economic strategy (Holliday & Wilding 2003: 27). Korea became one of the 
leading lights of the ‘East Asian Capitalist model’, achieving phenomenal economic 
growth while possessing a relatively fair distribution structure (Pempel 1999a: 155-156; 
Wade 1990: 38), demonstrated by the relatively small wage disparity among workers and a 
degree of income inequality that was very close to the level of advanced countries until the 
1997 financial crisis (Croissant 2004: 515).18 
Recent theorising on the productivist welfare system addresses the importance of 
developmental elements in Korea’s development of social policy. Developmentalist ideas 
such as self-reliance, work incentives, and minimal intervention by the state for social 
welfare became rooted in the formulation of Korean welfare institutions (Kang 2005: 357). 
In this approach to the productivist welfare model (i.e. ‘Productivist Welfare Capitalism’ 
(Holliday 2000) and the ‘Developmental Welfare System’ (Goodman et al. 1998)), social 
welfare policy is regarded purely as an instrument for economic development and is 
considered to have been so since the developmental era. The main contribution of this 
approach is its insistence that social policy in Korea is still subordinate to economic policy 
                                                
18	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Korean	   developmental	   state,	   most	   of	   its	   features	   have	   long	   historical	   traditions.	  
According	   to	  Leftwich	   (2007:	  21),	   for	  example,	   the	  hierarchically	  ordered	  structure	  of	  political	  power	  and	  
authority	  (strong	  and	  effective	  bureaucracies	  and	  the	  autonomous	  power	  of	  the	  political	  elite)	  is	  a	  relatively	  
long	  state	  tradition.	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(S. Kwon & Holliday 2007: 242; Holliday 2000: 709; emphasis mine) and that social 
policy essentially remains an instrument for economic growth. It is also argued that 
Korea’s abiding high economic growth itself acts as a form of social welfare, and the roles 
of the family and companies in welfare provision have been added as ‘accessories’ (Y.-B. 
Kim 2002: 335). Furthermore, it has been claimed that so-called ‘pie theory’, which 
contends that enlarging the size of the economy is a better solution for achieving economic 
fairness than redistribution of wealth, has been formed the basis for institutional evolution 
in the Korean welfare state (Lee & Moon 2008: 14). In other words, these productivists’ 
approaches have viewed the straightforward and positive conclusion that has informed the 
dominant policy preference among the political elites is that social problems such as 
poverty and income inequality can be solved by economic development and ‘trickle down’. 
Thus, the policy-making priority has been the institutionalisation of human capital 
reinforcement programmes (Deyo 1992: 297) such as education and health care rather than 
the development of socially progressive programmes to eliminate poverty or reduce social 
and economic inequality.19 
Although this productivist welfare explanation certainly provides a sophisticated 
interpretation of the Korean developmental welfare state in that it begins to recognise the 
importance of the welfare-economy nexus, this view still lacks a concrete elaboration of 
how specific welfare programmes are related to certain aspects of the production system. 
For instance, while this productivists’ view appreciates that state-led human capital 
programmes (education and wage-earner centred health care and pension systems) 
contributed to strengthening the production system, other important features of the DS that 
relate to the welfare-economy nexus are not analysed or discussed. In other words, only 
those features of the DS that are theoretically related to a productivist welfare system can 
be discerned through the productivist lens.  
Certainly, it is difficult to find any comprehensive examination of employment and welfare 
in the DS thesis paradigm. Rather, the DS thesis widely assumes that distribution-oriented 
social policy tended to be excluded in DSs. To the DS theorists, (somewhat in contrast to 
the productivist argument set out above), the Korean welfare system largely met the 
                                                
19	  Rieger	  and	  Leibfried	  (2003)	  describe	  this	  as	  the	  ‘minimalist’	  welfare	  system	  (Reiger	  &	  Leibfried	  2003:	  264-­‐
268),	   which	   comprises	   segmented	   contributory	   social	   insurance	   schemes	   paid	   for	   by	   wage	   earners,	   and	  
state	   that	   it	   is	   inclined	   to	   concentrate	   resources	   into	   policy	   areas	   that	   develop	   human	   capital,	   such	   as	  
education,	  health	  care,	  and	  job	  training.	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demands of welfare provision (especially in the developmental era) despite the lack or 
immature nature of social policy arrangements for worker protection and welfare provision. 
The purpose and policy scope of state institutions was mainly to devise and implement 
selective industrial policy (Chang 2003c: 257-276; Pirie 2005b: 40) or protective financial 
policy (Woo-Cumings 2007: 157-165) without too much thought for either the poor or the 
unemployed.  According to the DS thesis, Korea’s low unemployment rate and the high 
rate of real wage growth (You & Chang 1993: 33), the chaebols’ paternal orientation 
towards welfare provision within the company (Cho 2003: 119–120), a wage system based 
on seniority, a quasi-lifetime commitment (Haagh 2004: 165), and so forth provided the 
basis for welfare provision in Korea. In short, Korea’s rapid economic growth and 
workplace-based developmental practices ultimately restricted the development of social 
policy and prevented it from forming an integral part of the DS, remaining underdeveloped 
in a ‘social-policy-free-zone’ (Chang 2004a: 259), on the one hand, and the state’s full 
employment strategy and diverse practices of welfare provision by company were 
identified as the Korea’s genuine welfare measures with less development of social policy 
in the context of Western welfare system, on the other.20 
Notwithstanding its notable achievements in understanding the nature and configuration of 
the (Korean) DS and its welfare system, this approach is flawed in that it assesses the 
modern state’s level of political and social development by the extent to which the state 
has relative autonomy from the business sector in the capitalist state, with the consequence 
that the state and business relationships and the policy preference of economic growth are 
static and overemphasised. In fact, the relationship between the state and business should 
not be seen as unilateral. Rather, it is a complex and interactive relation that involves a 
process of resistance, negotiation, and compromise. Furthermore, this approach is also 
incapable of addressing the cause and effect of the internal and external pressures faced by 
the DS in recent years and the impact that these have had on its transformation.  
However, this does not mean that this study totally rejects the DS thesis and productivist 
approach. In fact, this study follows the tradition of DS studies, but it endeavours to refine 
                                                
20	  In	  the	  view	  of	  many	  DS	  theorists,	  this	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  rationality	  and	  neutrality	  of	  the	  bureaucrats	  
in	  the	  DS.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Korea,	  DS	  theorists	  insist	  that	  the	  Korean	  state	  has	  embedded	  autonomy	  because	  
bureaucrats	   are	  meritocratically	   selected	  and	  are	   therefore	  not	   corrupt;	   they	  are,	   furthermore,	   insulated	  
from	  short-­‐term	  political	  pressures	  (Cheng	  et	  al.	  1998,	  87;	  Evans	  1995:	  51–53;	  also	  Johnson	  1982:	  20;	  Wade	  
1990:	  225).	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the DS thesis to reflect better the changes that occur in the modern welfare capitalist world 
by arguing that a complicated set of institutional factors contributed to social policy not 
being incorporated into the DS’s strategy: the lack of a welfare-oriented policy preference 
among the political elites and elite (economic) bureaucrats, the lack of an institutional 
motivation on the part of the state and business to pursue welfare to encourage growth and 
efficiency , and low demands for welfare provision from the public and labour, which were 
oppressed by the developmental institutional arrangements. The transformation of the 
traditional developmental welfare state after the financial crisis can also be illustrated by 
changes in this set of factors. These factors, which are fundamentally the political output of 
the changing relationships between the state, business, and labour over time, are generally 
ignored in the DS thesis. 
There are two main theoretical challenges to the developmental state theory’s 
understanding of welfare provision in Korea: (a) the international approach; and (b) the 
democratisation thesis. 
 
2.1.3 Counterarguments to the developmental state approach on the transformation 
of welfare in Korea 
 
The international approach emphasises the way in which the welfare system in East Asia 
has been influenced by globalisation, especially with regard to US hegemony and the post-
war history of political vulnerability in this region (Gough 2001: 178). For theorists of this 
approach (Andrews 1994; Cerny 1995; Mishra 1999; O’Connor 1998; Schiff 2000; Scholte 
2000; Simmons 1999), welfare policy (or social policy) is an area that is strongly 
influenced by globalisation, and the internationalisation of market capital poses a challenge 
to social democratic states, which are characterised by the state’s prominence and their 
state-centred budgetary control (Mosely 2000: 738; Simmons 1999: 68-69).  
In Korea, the early stages of globalisation saw the Kim Young-sam government (1992-
1997) proclaim ‘Segewha’ (globalisation in Korean) and implement new economic and 
financial policies, such as the deregulation of company policy and the opening of financial 
markets. The subsequent Kim Dae-jung government further pursued the neoliberal policy 
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formula, with the dismissal of state regulation, strict fiscal control, and acceptance of FDI 
(Foreign Direct Investment (Lee & Moon 2008: 23)).21 
However, the globalisation explanation fails to explain the complexity of Korea’s welfare 
state transformation. In other words, this approach is unable to answer the following 
question: if the impact of globalisation as an independent variable were as strong as is 
suggested, why were the labour protection and welfare schemes of the Korean state 
considerably strengthened, while economic and financial policies were reformed in 
accordance with the neoliberal formula. For instance, the state made efforts to resolve 
employment issues that resulted from the newly enacted labour law in 1998 (which 
permitted easier hiring and firing) and obtained excellent results in unemployment and 
with the social safety net– e.g. the worst unemployment rate (7.0% in 1998) was recovered 
to the pre-crisis level in two years (4.1% unemployment rate in 2000 and around 3.5% 
unemployment rate since then). The series of welfare reforms clearly shows that the 
Korean state was expanding its role in social welfare under the pressures of globalisation.22 
Observing this post-crisis institutional innovation, some scholars even insist that in the 
context of the government’s increasing welfare and social insurance expenditure (see 
Chapter 8), the changes represent the state’s transition from the ‘developmental state’ to 
the ‘democratic-welfare-capitalist’ state (Y.-M. Kim 2008: 120; Kuhnle 2002: 16; H.-K. 
Lee 2002: 481; 2004: 291), a position that, however, is still debateable (see next section in 
this thesis).  
This explanation given by the ‘democratic-welfare-capitalist’ thesis, which challenges the 
productivist (or developmental) welfare argument, is underpinned by democratisation 
theory. Democratisation theorists focus on the enhanced role of labour and civil society in 
the transformation of the East Asian welfare systems, especially after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. Even though civil society and labour have had slightly different influences 
on the reform of East Asian welfare systems, it is argued that these new groups of non-
state actors have become increasingly involved in welfare politics since the mid-1980s 
(Wong 2004: 4; Peng 2005: 73). Above all, in Korea, ‘cross-class welfare alliances’ 
                                                
21	  As	   Haagh	   and	   Cook	   (2005)	   argue,	   the	   agency	   of	   collective	   actors	   tends	   to	   be	   particularly	   pronounced	  
during	  periods	  of	  sharp	  political	  and	  economic	  change,	  such	  as	  the	  combination	  of	  economic	  liberalisation	  
and	  democratisation	   (Haagh	  &	  Cook	  2005:	  175).	  The	  YS	  and	  Kim	  Dae-­‐jung	  administrations	  can	  be	  seen	   in	  
this	  light.	  
22	  See	  Chapter	  8	  in	  this	  thesis.	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organised by progressive civic groups and labour unions are argued to have contributed 
decisively to the establishment of solidaristic welfare programmes over the last decade, 
while productivist elements have all but disappeared (Y.-M. Kim 2008: 112; 120; also 
Kuhnle 2002: 16; H.-K. Lee 2002: 481; 2004: 291; Wong 2004: 145).23 For instance, 
according to Y.-M. Kim, a cross-class welfare alliance emerged in the late 1990s through 
successfully combining the traditional power of working-class movements and the 
emerging power of the middle-class-led civil movement, and this has gained an unusual 
political influence in democratic Korean civil society, dismantling the top-down method of 
social policy making of the past, and weakening the old developmental elements (Y.-M. 
Kim 2008: 117-118).  
If this is the case, did the innovative welfare reforms introduced by the Kim Dae-jung 
government represent an endeavour to strike a balance between welfare provision and 
economic development in response to the newly emergent labour and civil movement? In 
answer to this question, Chung (2007a) insists that, on the part of the state, a 
developmentalist idea remained at the heart of the welfare reforms: although it is true that 
the Kim Dae-jung government expanded welfare hugely compared to previous regimes, if 
the level of welfare coverage is examined, these welfare reforms appear to have followed a 
path-dependency established during the authoritarian period (Chung 2007: 298).  
In this sense, the question naturally arises of what path this developmental idea took after 
Kim Dae-jung’s inauguration: a greater role for the state or, on the contrary, a greater role 
for the class-coalition for welfare. The next section will examine the nature of Korea’s 
post-crisis welfare system, focusing on the role of the state, the neoliberal pressure for 
welfare reform, and the rise of the pro-welfare class-coalition.  
 
2.2 Debate on the post-crisis Korean welfare state 
 
From the previous section, it is evident that the evolutionary path of Korean welfare 
diverges in 1998, after the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and of Kim Dae-jung’s 
inauguration. Before the crisis, the elements of productivist welfare capitalism had a strong 
impact on the establishment of welfare institutions in Korea. However, democratisation 
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  Or	  an	  ‘advocacy	  coalition’	  in	  the	  term	  of	  H.-­‐j.	  Kwon	  (Kwon	  2005:	  31)	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and globalisation in the mid-1990s began to transform the Korean welfare system. As Tang 
notes, the Korean DS (and Taiwan) ‘assume[d] new responsibilities to ensure that part of 
the fruits of economic growth are equitably shared’ (Tang 2000: 158; also in a similar 
context, Hwang 2006: 163; Ramesh 2003: 88-90). It is widely accepted that there was 
dual-track reform in the Korean economic and social institutional set: the adoption of a 
neoliberal policy formula in economic policy and industrial policy, and the simultaneous 
adoption of socio-democratic (partly neo-corporatist) elements in welfare (social) policy. 
This has produced confusion among scholars in determining the nature and the cause of the 
transition in welfare policy and provision: should they employ an international 
(globalisation) approach or a developmental approach? It will be argued, however, that 
neither of these approaches is able to provide a comprehensive explanation for the 
transformation and the features of the Korean welfare system. Bearing this point in mind, 
the following section examines the recent debate on the post-crisis Korean welfare state. 
 
2.2.1 Mixed views on Kim Dae-jung’s institutional innovations 
 
The Kim Dae-jung government came to power and set about tackling the unprecedented 
financial crisis. The government’s claim after the crisis that it had established a democratic 
market economy (or so called ‘ DJnomics’) implies that capital liberalisation, including 
fiscal austerity, liquidating insolvent financial companies, corporate governance reform, 
and opening the market, had been its goal.  
The early years of the Kim Dae-jung government saw academic welfare studies 
accompany the government’s innovative welfare reforms. In particular, a welfare debate in 
2002 (Y.-M. Kim ed. 2002) contributed to promoting and improving the standard of 
Korean welfare study. However, the debate tended to centre on aspects of Esping-
Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, thus resulting in similar 
classifications of the welfare state: for example, Chung (2002: 442-444) argues that the 
post-reform Korean welfare state takes the form of enhanced state intervention with 
neoliberal aspects; Cho (2002: 292-293) regards it as an explicitly neoliberal system; Y.-M. 
Kim (2002: 379) contends that it exhibits enhanced responsibility by the state; and Nam 
(2002: 170-172) views it as a conservative welfare institution.  
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To put it in more concrete terms, Chung (2002) argues that the form that the Kim Dae-jung 
government’s welfare reforms took resulted from the influence of neoliberal pressure. He 
focuses on the fact that the Korean welfare state introduced by the Kim Dae-jung 
government drew upon the neoliberal emphasis on the principle of workfare and failed to 
overcome labour commodification. He concedes, however, that compared with the 
previous authoritarian governments, the reforms enacted by the government did make a 
difference by enlarging social insurance and establishing the LMGTC (Chung 2002: 56). 
In particular, he stresses the neoliberal features of the state’s remodelling of the 
institutional set by employing the term ‘flexicurity’. Chung holds that in the Kim Dae-jung 
government’s efforts to overcome the crisis, the demands for neoliberal reform by the IMF 
and World Bank were adopted unquestioningly. As a result, the opening of the Korean 
economy to the international market and increasing labour flexibility were unavoidable, 
especially from the middle of Kim Dae-jung government’s reign. Consequently, job 
insecurity and the number of working poor increased significantly, and social protection 
emerged as an important issue for the government. From this point, the Kim Dae-jung 
government followed a flexicurity path (Chung 2006: 63-64), which aimed to attain both 
flexibility in the labour market and social security for workers against such risks as 
employment insecurity and reduced income via the introduction of social welfare schemes. 
In sum, the state simultaneously aimed to make employment flexible and to undertake 
social protection.  
From this perspective, the ‘Productive Welfare’ proclaimed by the Kim Dae-jung 
government (here, ‘Productive Welfare’ is not to be understood in Holliday’s terms) 
cannot be interpreted as fully following a neoliberal course. Chung (2002) argues that ‘the 
contents and performance of welfare reform by Kim Dae-jung stand on the extent of not 
conforming to the neoliberal order’ (Chung 2002: 66), and the speed and innovation of the 
transformation of social welfare institutions was unparalleled in Korean history. During 
this transformation, state responsibility for welfare provision, rather than the individual 
responsibility that neoliberalism calls for, was intensified. In addition, Kim Dae-jung’s 
reform of the institutional set prevented privatisation of the social insurance scheme, 
something that international organisations such as the World Bank favoured. For instance, 
the state’s reinforcement of social protection schemes such as EI, Health Care Insurance 
(HCI), National Pension Insurance (NPI), and the National Basic Living Security scheme 
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(NBLS) left little place for privatisation (H.-K. Lee 2004: 293-297; Lee & Moon 2008: 18; 
and diverse interviewees in the fieldwork of this research). Nam (2007) agrees with the 
analysis that the welfare reforms achieved a quantitative expansion of welfare (although it 
remained subordinate to economic strategy) and the modification of various laws and 
regulations (Nam 2007: 49). For these reasons, there is a strong argument for placing the 
Korean case into a fourth category, the developmental welfare system (Chung 2002: 432-
442). 
In contrast to Chung’s argument that the Kim Dae-jung government simply failed to break 
with the neoliberal order, Cho contends that the Kim Dae-jung government’s response to 
the crisis was entirely neoliberal in nature. Cho argues that the ‘Productive Welfare’ 
announced by the Kim Dae-jung government was in fact the ultimate expression of its 
policy of implementing reforms founded on neoliberal ideology, and thus the direction of 
the Korean welfare state shifted towards the neoliberal model (Cho 2002: 293; 326-327).  
By contrast, Y.-M. Kim (2002) highlights the state’s increased responsibility for welfare 
provision: the Korean welfare system is an intermixture of the features of a liberal system 
and a conservative system rather than being exclusively one or the other (Y.-M. Kim 2002: 
136-137). In support of his argument, he points to the new solidaristic and redistributive 
health care system (the NPI and HCI) and the labour protection system (EI and Workers’ 
Compensation Insurance, WCI) in particular. Despite not being mentioned in his analysis, 
it should be noted that the Kim Dae-jung government also exhibited its commitment to the 
reinforcement of labour rights through its recognition of the KCTU (the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions) in 1999. The KCTU was established in 1994 in opposition 
to the FKTU (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions), whose origins date to 1949 and 
which was long regarded as a government instrument with moderate views compared to 
the KCTU (or its antecedents). The KCTU, an illegal organisation until 1999, was included 
as a partner in the LMGTC, which was established in 1998. This was a historic moment in 
the course of the Korean labour movement, although the role and influence of the KCTU 
was short-lived.  
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2.2.2 Combination of political, social, and economic conditions 
 
On the one hand, these analyses commonly note the remarkable expansion of welfare 
coverage and expenditure (such as those in EI, NBLS, and NPI) that took place under the 
Kim Dae-jung government and its innovative attempts to embrace labour and the lower 
middle class (for instance, the formation of the LMGTC and the legalisation of the KCTU). 
On the other, they also admit that labour’s role was comparatively small compared to that 
of the state in shaping labour reform. However, the arguments presented by the theorists 
above share the limitations of the power resources model in that they place excessive 
emphasis on the roles of the state and labour in shaping labour reforms and are shackled by 
their attempts to describe the post-crisis transformation of welfare provision in line with 
Esping-Andersen’s typology. As a result, they neglect the political explanation and 
institutional approach that this research stresses. For instance, the question of why Korean 
labour chose (or should choose) the course that it did is not answered. 
Other commentators (Choi 2008; Sonn 2005; also in a similar vein, H.-j. Kwon 2004; 
Seong 2002; Song 2003; Wong 2004) challenge the interpretation that there is a simple 
causal relation between the 1997 Asian crisis and the subsequent development of a Korean 
welfare state in Korea. For them, the argument that the 1997 crisis was a profound shock to 
Korean society, the living standard of the lower middle class worsened, and a relatively 
left-oriented political group assumed the reins of government at just the right time cannot 
fully explain the emergence of the Korean welfare state.  Rather, they present the argument 
that the government’s innovative welfare reforms were enacted under conditions of serious 
socio-economic risk: there was a temporary and unexpected expansion of state autonomy 
due to the sense of desperation that resulted from the financial crisis, the increased 
organisation of labour and civil society, the Kim Dae-jung government’s reform-friendly 
orientation towards welfare, and the need for welfare expansion in order to win the 2000 
general election. This explanation contrasts sharply with the power resources model, 
which focuses on the role of labour and the labour party, and it is the dominant view of 
those who advocate the influence of political factors on the quality of the Korean welfare 
state and its institutional transformation.  
However, this approach needs to consider more closely the nature of the Korean DS. For 
instance, the connection between Kim Dae-jung’s political preferences and decisions and 
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the autonomous role of the political elite and elite bureaucrats in the DS is not addressed, 
nor is the relationship between state embeddedness and labour and business considered.  
Building upon this criticism, the institutionalist viewpoint considers that the institutional 
arrangement in Korea resembles a ‘hybridization’ in which the old and newly emerging 
institutions are contradictorily intermingled, are interacting with each other, and are 
searching for new institutional complementarities (Deeg 2007: 626). It is argued, therefore, 
that the important aspects of institutional change are found not only at the formal level, but 
also at the informal level (Culpepper 2005: 174-181). In this sense, the actual operation 
and functioning of a welfare regime will ultimately depend on politics: the degree to which 
rule-making actors have hegemonic power over the specific conception of the welfare 
regime as against the competing rule-taking actors. This will be examined in the next 
section, focusing on institutional complementarities and the interpretational struggle 
between the state, business, and labour over an institution’s meaning and configuration. 
 
2.3 The political approach of new-institutionalism 
 
To sum up the previous sections, the labour market was an important factor in the 
formation of the welfare state in Korea. However, the labour movement’s power in Korea 
has been relatively weak (Ma 2002: 238-247), has failed to enter into mainstream politics 
(Koh 2004: 25-29),24 and even during the period of labour market transition (in the late 
1990s) played only a small part in shaping the development of the welfare state (Haagh & 
Cook 2005: 191). By contrast, the state has been strong and has played a prominent role 
through its developmentalist intervention in Korean welfare (under-) development. 
Especially since the 1997 crisis, ‘commodity-differentiation’ (Lee & Moon 2008: 113; 
Sonn 2005: 218-223), which indicates the increasing wage gap and job insecurity between 
regular and non-regular workers and between chaebol and SME workers, has significantly 
increased, whereas decommodification has not. Thus, the dominant argument among 
scholars is that the Korean welfare system is a unique and immature system of mixed 
corporatist and liberal elements, but one that ultimately aligns more closely to the liberal 
model (Cho 2002: 292-293; Chung 2002: 56; Lee 2002: 481; Yang 2005a: 408-409) due to 
                                                
24	  When	   the	   power	   resources	   model	   is	   applied	   to	   1960-­‐70s	   Korea,	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   then	  
underdevelopment	  of	  social	  policy	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  immaturity	  of	  trade	  union	  activities.	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its low level of trade union organisation, the segmented firm-based union system, and the 
absence of a labour party (Lee & Moon 2008: 2).  
However, the nature and history of the Korean developmental welfare state cannot be 
understood only in terms of its disunited labour movement, segmented labour market, and 
legacy of strong state intervention. Since little is known about the institutional foundations 
and conditions that impose restrictions on the formation and reorganisation of a particular 
political configuration between the Korean state, business and labour, this thesis 
emphasises that the elements that underpin the development of the Korean welfare state – 
weak labour and a strong state – are the result of the combined effect of socio-economic 
institutions that simultaneously constrain the interests and strategies of social actors. Thus, 
examining the configuration of and change in labour market and social protection 
institutions and the complementary effect of each institution is equivalent to investigating 
the causal mechanisms of the evolution of the Korean welfare state. In addition, it is 
presumed that the focal point for detecting institutional changes and the consequences of 
the interactions between institutions lies in the political dynamics of rule-makers and rule-
takers with diverse ideas, motivations, interests, and responsibilities because, as each social 
actor inherently wants to instil their interests in the institution, they compete, negotiate, and 
compromise in the policy-making process. Even economic actors do not simply rationally 
optimise their trading possibilities according to given preferences, goods, and constraints. 
Rather, they continually create new goods, new options, and new preferences; they 
imagine new goals and, in the vast space of possibilities opened up by the complexity of 
creative interaction over time, they must imagine new possible strategies and act on them. 
Thus, the institutional change or policy reform appears in the form of the fundamental 
tensions between actors with diverse and sometimes contradictory interests in the same 
policy implementation and enactment. This view, therefore, requires that we have to bring 
politics explicitly into the analysis of the market, and not just into the analysis of the state.  
This perspective, which is adapted from the new-institutionalist approach and which 
conceptualises institutions as the set of rules of conduct in organisations, routines, and 
repertories of procedures (March & Olsen 1989: 21), provides a critical approach that 
stresses not only the formal-structural aspect, but also seeks to explain individual 
behaviour under this construct: individual preference, strategy, behaviour, and patterns and 
practice of interaction within the institutional context. In this sense, this thesis emphasises 
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that the institutional nature of the labour market and social protection is defined by a range 
of formal and informal institutions that embody certain rights and obligations. As 
institutional approaches in economics argue (i.e. Bronk 2009: 2; Chang 2003b: 54; Haagh 
& Cook 2005: 173; Solow 1990: 31), the employment system, including the labour market, 
is characterised by around a thousand collective bargaining agreements, many of which 
define only the main principles and procedures of negotiation. According to Bronk (2009: 
2), this variety of motives and interactions, including the rights, obligations, preferences, 
choices, and even modes of vision and thoughts are interdependent and to some extent 
socially formed.  
In the next section, beginning with an account of the normative foundations of institutions, 
the institutionalist thesis is reviewed, with a focus on its understanding of the political 
dynamics in the logic of path-breaking (or path-reinforcing) incremental change. 
 
2.3.1 Normative foundations of the new-institutionalist approach 
 
Analysts belonging to what has been labelled the ‘New Institutionalist’ school of thought 
clearly separate themselves from ‘old institutionalism’, which merely focused on the 
description and comparison of formal features of state and social institutions (Rothstein 
1998: 6-7). New institutionalism does not comprise one single body of thought, and three 
diverging analytical approaches are usually identified by scholars: ‘historical 
institutionalism’, ‘rational choice institutionalism’, and ‘sociological institutionalism’ (Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Koelble 1995).25 
Although this section will not aim to address the differences between these different 
schools of thought in great detail, since this research focuses on new institutionalist 
arguments in its analytical chapters, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the 
fundamental concepts within the new institutionalist framework, especially as regards the 
                                                
25	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  slight	  simplification	  and	  might	  downplay	  some	  of	  the	  more	  subtle	  differences	  between	  
the	   institutional	   theories,	   this	   thesis	   follows	   Peters’	   (2005:160)	   conclusion	   and	   thus	   treats	   March	   and	  
Olsen’s	   (1989)	   ‘normative’	   approach	   as	   more	   or	   less	   equivalent	   to	   ‘historical	   institutionalist’	   studies.	  
Similarly,	  Peters	  stresses	  "the	  rational	  choice	  approach	  to	   institutions	  appears	  very	  compatible	  with	  some	  
aspects	   of	   the	   empirical	   approach"	   (Peters	   2005:160).	   Since	   this	   variant	   has	   not	   played	   a	   major	   role	   in	  
comparative	  research	  on	  public	  policy	  and	  welfare	  reforms,	   it	  was	  decided	  not	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  	  
‘sociological	  institutionalism’.	  Although	  ‘international	  institutions’	  have	  clearly	  gained	  significance	  in	  recent	  
years,	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  only	  allows	  for	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  OECD,	  IMF,	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  
on	  national	  social	  policy	  making	  in	  passing.	  
51	  
specific effects of institutional changes. The two major aspects of new institutionalist 
thinking that are most relevant here are the following: 
 (a) The argument that normative foundations, such as ideas, preferences, motivations and 
responsibilities, have direct effects on the nature of the institutional implementation. 
 (b) New institutionalism’s emphasis on ‘path dependency’, ‘policy feedback’, and ‘lock-in 
effects’, suggesting that it is institutions themselves (i.e. past policy decisions) that have 
the greatest impact on policy reform and stasis. 
 
Competing understandings  
The first of the new institutionalist approaches examined is categorised under the term 
‘rational choice institutionalism’. In keeping with other scholars from this school, North 
(2005) suggests that institutions are created by utility-maximising individuals with clear 
intentions (2005: 78-79). Employing a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions, this 
group of scholars assert that relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, 
behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximise the attainment of these preferences, and 
do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation (Hall & Taylor 1996: 
945). One of the contributions of rational choice institutionalism has been to emphasise the 
role of strategic interaction in the determination of political outcomes.  
The second approach is termed ‘historical institutionalism’. The contributors to the volume 
by Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1992) argue that one of the shortcomings of rational 
choice institutionalism is that it merely adds our preference formation to the analysis (1992: 
9). They contend that preferences are shaped by institutions. Steinmo and Thelen note that 
their work borrows from the notions of bounded rationality explored by March (1978). 
This approach does not deny that individuals attempt to calculate their interests, but argues 
that outcomes are the product of the interaction among various groups, interests, ideas, and 
institutional structures.  
Differences between ‘historical’ and ‘rational choice’ approaches become apparent as soon 
as we ask the fundamental question: ‘what constitutes an institution in the first place’. The 
‘rational choice’ approach stresses that individual utility maximisation lies at the heart of 
institutional formation, or in other words, human behaviour needs to be shaped, structured, 
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and constrained. In this approach, individuals are by definition rational, and the creation of 
institutions is seen as a logical consequence of this. 
The ‘historical institutionalist’ definition of an ‘institution’ is vaguer. Some scholars (e.g. 
Thelen & Steinmo (1992)) simply enumerate examples of institutions – such as formal 
government structures, electoral law, and social class – and ‘appear willing to accept all of 
this disparate set of structures as components of the institutional apparatus that they will 
use to explain political phenomena’ (Peters 2005: 74). Others are closer to the ‘rational 
choice’ approach in their highlighting of ‘formal rules, compliance procedures, and 
standard operating procedures that structure the relationships between people in various 
units of the polity and economy’ (Hall 1986: 7). Furthermore, some historical 
institutionalists include organisations in their definition, such as, for example, central 
banks (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 12). This research, however, adopts a different view: 
organisations are identified as actors (players), while institutions are regarded as sets of 
(general) rules (North 1990: 4-5; Leftwich 2007: 11-12). Recognising this basic distinction 
between institutions and organisations is essential in order to establish a broad analytic 
framework for the institutional analysis of politics and to explore the processes of 
institutional innovation, evolution, and transformation in a way that links ‘the subject in a 
creative relationship with an institutional environment’ (Hay & Wincott 1998: 955; cited in 
Leftwich 2007: 12). In the case of the LMGTC in this thesis, the government, the two 
labour unions, and the Korea Employers Federation (KEF) are regarded as political actors 
that cooperate, clash, and negotiate in the process of institutional rule-making and, 
simultaneously, over institutional change.   
 
Informal institutions as third-party? 
Some ‘historical institutionalists’ go so far as to include the role of ideas in the definition 
of institutions. Their emphasis lies on the formal character of such institutions – contrary to 
customs, which are merely informal practices, political economies contain a set of 
obligatory and expected norms and sanctions (Hall 1989; Streeck & Thelen 2005:10). They 
further stress that these ‘formalised rules […] may be enforced by calling upon a third 
party’, which is an indication of the legitimacy of the institution. Whether an institution is 
‘legitimate’ in this sense is important as it separate institutions from mere forms of 
voluntary agreed social convention. ‘With an institution we are dealing only if and to the 
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extent that third parties predictably and reliably come to the support of actors whose 
institutionalised, and therefore legitimate, normative expectations have been disappointed’ 
(Streeck & Thelen 2005: 11). ‘Third party enforcement’ is also crucial for the question of 
whether single policies should be included in ‘historical institutionalist’ analyses. Streeck 
and Thelen emphasise the essential qualities of policies, which ‘stipulate rules that assign 
normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors and provide for their “public”’ 
(Ibid. 12.), the principle example used being early retirement polices. ‘Policies […] are 
institutions […] to the extent that they constitute rules for actors other than for the 
policymakers themselves – rules that can and need to be implemented and that are 
legitimate in that they will if necessary be enforced by agents acting on behalf of the 
society as a whole’ (ibid.). Thus, this approach brings the methodological focus of political 
research down to the micro level and places the interaction of individual interests and the 
political dynamics of collective action at the centre of the research.  
As regards micro-level analysis, ‘rational choice institutionalism’ assumes that individuals 
seek to maximise a specific set of goals in line with their preferences. They do so by 
strategically choosing a specific course of action from the various possible options ‘based 
on either intelligent calculation or internalised rules that reflect optimal adaptation to 
experience’ (Shepsle 1986: 134). In this view, institutions are merely seen as providing 
information relevant to the behaviour of other actors; that is, they shape individuals’ 
decisions for or against a specific course of action by altering the expectations an actor has 
about the actions that others are likely to take (see, for example, the prisoner’s dilemma). 
Rational choice institutionalism, therefore, regards the process of preference formation as 
independent from the institutional setting; institutions are essentially treated as exogenous 
variables for choosing a specific course of action. 
By contrast, at the core of the ‘historical institutionalist’ model of human action lies the 
assumption that all individuals have to cope with an overwhelming complexity and 
uncertainty that makes them use a wide range of cognitive shortcuts in order to make sense 
of the social world. Thus, an individual’s decisions for or against a specific course of 
action are largely determined by their own ‘biased’ interpretation of given situations. More 
generally speaking, ‘historical institutionalists’ argue that individuals tend to follow 
socially defined rules, even though in doing so many may not be in their own self-interest. 
Hence, they should be seen as rule-following satisfiers – in many cases utilising a ‘trial-
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and-error approach to public politics – rather than as operating strategically as benefit 
maximisers. As a result, any form of individual decision bounded in rules is less likely to 
change and is more likely to be locked in, as is argued by the path dependency thesis 
contends in the case of institutional change. 
How, then, do institutions change in line with the concept of path dependency? Does 
institutional change come about via the materialisation of an exogenous shock or via the 
internal process of conflict and negotiations? The next section deals with the historical 
institutionalist approach towards the issues of institutional change. 
 
2.3.2 Path dependency: increasing returns vs. incremental change 
 
The interaction between historically rooted patterns of institutional arrangement and 
institutional innovation matters to the development of social economies and underlines that 
the beliefs and behaviour of individuals are, at least in part, socially formed (Bronk 2009: 
289). ‘Path dependency’ is central to the historical institutionalists, who argue that 
‘processes in which choices made in the past systematically constrain the choices open in 
the future’ (Myles &Pierson 2001: 306). The established policy path means that 
(authoritative) resources are often highly likely to be allocated and directed to certain 
options rather than others, affecting the relationship between different policy strategies and 
privileging some actors over others.  
To the historical institutionalists, therefore, formal institutions are by definition change 
resistant and typically designed to make it very difficult to overturn. If anything, 
institutions feature a high degree of ‘stickiness’, which is ‘built into the design of political 
institutions to reduce uncertainty and enhance stability, facilitating forms of cooperation 
and exchange that would otherwise be impossible’ (Pierson 2004: 43). Furthermore, 
preferences are formed by the institutional context within which they emerge and therefore 
ought not to be treated as fixed. However, institutions play a determinant role since 
although they shape the actions of individuals, they are at times affected by collective and 
individual choices. The notable feature of historical institutionalism is that it advocates an 
image of social causation that is path dependent. The same operative forces will generate 
the same results everywhere given that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the 
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contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past (Hall & Taylor 1996: 
941).  
Returning to the matter of institutional change in the welfare arena, if a change in welfare 
institutions (including institutional change on labour and employment issues) is consistent 
with its own historical trajectory, then it should be understood as path dependent. If this is 
not the case, then the focus should be on what caused the institutional innovation to begin 
to develop along a different path from its conventional historical trajectory. In keeping 
with Hall and Taylor’s assessment presented above, historical institutionalists have 
devoted a good deal of attention to the problem of explaining how institutions produce 
such paths, that is, how they structure a nation’s response to new challenges. Early 
historical institutionalists emphasised the impact of existing ‘state capacities’ and ‘policy 
legacies’ on subsequent policy choices. As Hall and Taylor note:  
In keeping with this perspective, historical institutionalists also divide the flow of historical 
events into periods of continuity punctuated by ‘critical junctures’; i.e., moments when 
substantial institutional change takes place, thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from 
which historical development moves onto a new path. The principal problem here, of 
course, is to explain what precipitates such critical junctures, and, although historical 
institutionalists generally stress the impact of economic crisis and military conflict, many 
do not have a well-developed response to this question (Hall & Taylor 1996: 942).  
This traditional logic of path dependency and critical juncture (Collier & Collier 1991; 
Crouch & Farrell 2004) was theoretically forged by the assumption that institutional 
change takes place via periodic cycles of self-reinforcement (Calvert 1995; Krasner 1984; 
1988; Levi 1997; Shepsle 1989), by inertia and stickiness (Pierson 2000: 252-253; 2004: 
17-18),26 and contingency and conjunctures (Mahoney 2000: 514; Pierson & Skocpol 2002: 
702). Although the terms used vary according to the point that each observer wishes to 
stress, the overall logic can be summarised by the concept of ‘increasing returns’ (Pierson 
2000), meaning that when attempts are made to overturn well-established existing patterns 
or rules, they are generally unlikely to succeed due to the high returns (costs) for this 
transaction, even when the change is seen as necessary and rational and garners 
                                                
26	  While	  Arthur	  (1994;	  cited	  in	  Pierson	  2004)	  identified	  four	  factors	  of	  a	  technology	  that	  trigger	  ‘increasing	  
returns’	   (large	   set-­‐up	   or	   fixed	   costs,	   learning	   effects,	   coordination	   effects,	   adaptive	   expectations),	   it	  was	  
North	   (1990;	   cited	   in	  Pierson	  2004)	   that	   argued	   that	   the	   same	   features	  play	   a	  decisive	   role	   in	   explaining	  
both	  emergence,	  persistence	  and	  change	  of	  (formal	  and	  informal)	  institutions	  (see	  also	  Pierson	  1993).	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considerable support. Furthermore, the older the institutions that are targeted for change, 
the higher the returns will be for that change. 
Despite the traditional critical juncture framework’s important contribution of placing the 
question of how institutions change at the centre of institutional studies, this approach, 
which is constructed around the analogy of mechanical equilibrium (borrowed from 
physics) and the assumption (borrowed from utilitarianism) that agents are self-interested 
maximisers (Bronk 2009: 6), is static and lacks well-developed causal explanations on the 
precipitators of the critical juncture that it is argued triggers institutional change (as is seen 
in Figure 2.1 and in the last part of Hall and Taylor’s quote above).  
 
Figure 2.1: The building blocks of the critical juncture framework 
 
*Source: Collier & Collier (1991: 30). 
 
This shortcoming has led to recent developments on the ideas of incremental institutional 
change and the endogenous properties of institutions, which have helped to refine the 
theorising on the critical juncture framework (Amable &Palombarini 2009; Culpepper 
2005; Mahoney & Thelen 2010: Streeck 2009). To these theorists, only rarely is the path-
dependent lock-in effect on institutional symmetry or continuity broken (or punctuated) by 
an unexpected exogenous shock (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 3; Streeck 2009: 2). Instead, 
the various slow-moving causal processes open up the possibility for institutions to evolve 
in more incremental ways. This does not mean, however, that this school rejects the path-
dependency model altogether. Rather, it is argued that path-dependency should be 
understood as a long-term process in which slow-moving causal processes act to bring 
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about institutional change, especially where ‘short, formative moments of exogenous shock 
causing institutions to be profoundly rearranged ... fail to materialise or remain too weak to 
overcome the [endogenous] forces of self-enforced stability’ (Streeck 2009: 14). This 
capacity for institutional change derives from the inherent dynamic tensions and pressures 
for change that are embedded in institutions (Mahoney &Thelen 2010: 14). Because 
existing socioeconomic institutions are the product not only of the conflicts and 
agreements over their design between the elites that control them, but also over their 
enactment between “rule-makers” and “rule-takers” (Streeck 2009: 15), it is precisely these 
self-undermining conflictual and dialectical properties of institutions that underpin the 
interpretative struggle between those institutional actors who accept and those who 
challenge existing institutions (Mahoney &Thelen 2010: 14).  
It is necessary, then, that this incremental approach amalgamates the meso-level approach 
of structural functionalist explanations and a methodological reductionism at the micro-
level in the analysis of institutional change by ascending and descending the ‘ladder of 
abstraction (Sartori 1970: 1040)’. This highlights conflicts between expected and actual 
behaviour or conflict between the preferences and institutional implementations of political 
actors in the open dynamics of institutional continuity or reproduction. To put it differently, 
‘it is more important to study the effects of interacting institutions or organizations than 
just to admit that “institutions matter”’ (Amable 2000: 680). Furthermore, this implies that 
institutional change is the intended or unintended result of individual and collective action 
in the context of institutions, that is, in compliance with or defiance of social rules. 
Understanding institutional change therefore requires exploration of the relationship 
between social rules and social action, in terms that can account for human action as rule-
making, rule-taking, and rule-breaking, spelling out what it means to follow a rule or not, 
and how this reflects on the rule itself.  
Through this revised framework, Thelen and her colleagues have suggested that there are 
diverse modes of gradual institutional change at work. First, Thelen demonstrated the 
conversion and layering mechanisms of incremental change. Conversion refers not to the 
complete dissolution of a particular institution, but to the change that is bought about 
through the shifting of part or all of the roles and functions of institutions by 
accommodating new goals or through the involvement of new actors in an institutional 
alliance. Layering refers to the process of grafting on new institutional elements while 
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maintaining the existing institutional setting (Thelen 2004: 35). In subsequent theoretical 
developments, displacement, drift, and exhaustion were added, which refer to the gradual 
substitution of prevailing institutions by other existing institutional forms that had 
previously been at the periphery, the decline of an institution due to deliberate neglect, and 
institutional dismantlement over a period of time and the ultimate disappearance of the 
institution, respectively (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 19-30). 
The contribution of this approach is that in recognising the mechanisms of gradual 
institutional change, it enables the opening of room for manoeuvre in the critical juncture 
framework and appreciates that institutions are re-invented by actors in light of both 
specific (political and social) situations and changing general circumstances. According to 
Streeck’s recent analysis, incremental institutional change is underpinned by the dialectical 
and continuous process of interaction between institutional actors: 
As rule takers creatively apply a rule that is supposed to govern them, they inevitably 
produce outcomes that rule makers could not have expected when making the rule, since 
they could not possibly anticipate the variety of future conditions under which the rule 
would have to be followed. Nor could they know in advance the innovative ways rule takers 
would invent either to follow or to circumvent the rule… As a result, rule makers may, in 
the light of what with time and ‘in practice’ has become ‘the rule’, feel a need to revise it 
in order to restore its originally intended meaning. Thus, not only rule-breaking, but also 
rule-following tends to set in motion interactive processes between rule makers and rule 
takers which make the institution and its meaning evolve over time (Streeck 2010: 6). 
These modes of incremental change may take place in response to endemic conflicts and 
contradictions (Streeck 2009: 14-15) in the absence of an exogenous shock, meaning that 
the institutional change is likely to be both slow and transformative. Furthermore, 
institutional outcomes ‘need not reflect the goals of any particular group; they may be the 
unintended outcome of conflict among groups or the result of “ambiguous compromises” 
among actors who can coordinate on institutional means even if they differ on substantive 
goals’ (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 8). To incremental change theorists, then, institutions 
inherently contain ambiguity, since as the institution is the material result of the political 
dynamics of competition and negotiation, it necessarily contains the diverse and 
contrasting ideas, interests, preferences, and practices of institutional actors.  
59	  
Therefore, investigating the cause of a particular path of incremental change depends on 
the extent of the ambiguity within the institution and the political configuration. First, the 
degree of ambiguity of an existing institution can be determined by the extent of its 
openness to contending interpretations and variation in its enforcement of institutional 
rules, which means that compliance (or defiance) with institutional rules is treated as a 
variable. When there is a high level of discretion in the enforcement of institutional rules in 
an existing institution, this gives rise to different (often starkly contrasting) interpretations 
of the institution among actors (Mahoney &Thelen 2010: 20-21). Second, given the view 
that institutional stability rests not just on the accumulation but also on the on-going 
mobilisation of resources, one important source of change is shifts in the balance of power 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 9). Where actors have strong veto possibilities at the moment of 
institutional change through access to institutional or extra-institutional means of blocking 
change, then change will either not take place or a different mode of change will occur. 
The effects of institutional discretion and political configuration on the four incremental 
change outcomes are shown in Figure 2.2.  
Although the purpose of this research is not to measure the analytical reliability of these 
four modes of incremental change, this model serves to increase our understanding of the 
relationships between actors and the way in which they change at the moment of 
institutional change, which affects the real practice of policy enactment at work. Since one 
of this study’s key questions is whether the institutional reforms in 1998 (i.e. the transition 
to a tripartite system and a more flexible labour market) derived from the breakdown in 
existing institutions or their replacement by new ones, the displacement mode of 
institutional change is of particularly relevance here, especially given that the contingent-
exogenous shock of the 1997 crisis has been generally regarded as the primary cause of the 
institutional reforms. To put it differently, of the four ideal-types identified, the 1998 
institutional reforms particularly resembled the displacement mode. 
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Figure 2.2: Contextual and institutional sources of institutional change 
 
*Source: Mahoney & Thelen (2010: 19). 
 
In addressing this question of whether the institutions were displaced or replaced, the 
following questions must be asked: (1) How did the roles and functions of veto players (i.e. 
business organisations and unions) contribute to the displacement of institutions? (2) How 
did the state lead and drive a particular set of institutions? (3) Was the exogenous shock 
sufficient on its own to precipitate institutional change directly? On the other hand, the 
reforms after the 1998 labour laws that aimed at reinforcing labour flexibility and the 
tripartite system can be seen as characteristic of the layering mode of institutional change. 
Furthermore, when the shifting roles and functions (or sometimes preferences) of actors in 
the enactment of institutions under changing circumstances is examined, the real impact of 
the institutions can be seen to have diverged from the original intentions of the institutions 
– that is, they can be seen to fall into the conversion or drift categories – especially given 
that rules were ambiguous enough to permit different (often contrasting) interpretations 
and preferences among actors. 
Since the focus of the incremental change thesis is on the stage of production and 
reproduction of the mechanisms of institutions within the critical juncture framework, the 
next section reviews a new theorisation of the critical juncture framework that 
demonstrates the systemic logic of the conditions of critical juncture.  
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2.3.3 Critical juncture: the conditions 
 
The incremental change thesis and the newly theorised form of critical juncture framework 
(Abbott 2001; Falleti & Lynch 2009; Slater & Simmons 2010; Soifer 2012; Weyland 2002) 
are mutually supportive. The critical juncture is a commonly deployed analytical device 
that has contributed much to our understanding of political and institutional change. 
However, it is also noteworthy that scholars have often been satisfied with labelling a 
critical juncture as a time period or a ‘turning point’ without inquiring into what makes that 
period distinct from those that precede and follow it. While the incremental change thesis 
focuses on how causal factors during (and after) the moment of ‘loosened’ institutional 
structure offset the processes of long-term continuity, the focal point of the new approach 
to the critical juncture framework concerns what enables the critical junctures to open and 
close before (and during) the moment of choice between diverse options.  
The common presumptions that underpin both the incremental change thesis and the new 
critical juncture approach are that most historical moments are characterised by slow-
moving process or incremental change rather than punctuated change, since no social order 
can ever be perfectly reproduced in its enactment (Streeck 2010: 6), and that incremental 
change is more common than punctuated change in reality. Nevertheless, this research 
certainly does not reject the role and function of exogenous in institutional change 
altogether. For instance, it is clear that the 1997 crisis acted as the catalyst in the ‘loosening’ 
of the structural stability of Korea’s institutions at the time. What is debateable, however, 
is that the crisis was the only condition that permitted institutional alternatives to become 
apparent and the extent to which the crisis directly influenced the actual institutional 
change and its nature. 
According to Soifer (2012), this new approach is distinct from the traditional critical 
juncture framework in that its analysis focuses on the permissive conditions and the 
productive conditions that enable the juncture to occur. Permissive conditions are defined 
as ‘those factors or conditions that change the underlying context to increase the causal 
power of agency or contingency and thus the prospects for divergence’ (Soifer 2012: 1574), 
while productive conditions are defined as ‘the aspects of a critical juncture that shape the 
initial outcomes that diverge across cases’ (Soifer 2012: 1575). For instance, in the 
formation of the Korean tripartite system in 1998, the crisis can be regarded as the 
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permissive conditions that disrupted the embedded patterns, practices, and institutional 
setting of the Korean rule-making process and prepared the ground for the launch of either 
an entirely new institutional configuration or one based on modified forms of the previous 
institutional pattern.  
It should also be noted, however, that the permissive conditions, while necessary, are 
insufficient on their own to bring about institutional divergence at the critical juncture, 
which appears as the watershed moment for institutional transformation or adaptation, and 
it is the productive conditions that serve to determine which institutional set is adopted 
over other choices. For instance, social actors with new ideas, interests, preferences, and 
responsibilities at the juncture compete, negotiate, and compromise (calculate) on the 
setting up of new institutional sets. In the Korean case, such social actors’ interactions (the 
productive conditions) in combination with the permissive conditions that existed in 1998 
led to the 1998 social pact and the 1998 amendment of the labour laws.  
As with the permissive conditions, productive conditions are again necessary but 
insufficient alone to produce the divergence. Permissive conditions simply provide a 
window of opportunity in which institutional divergence and alternatives may occur. To 
sum up, only when both conditions are combined can there be institutional divergence in 
the critical juncture (Soifer 2012: 1574-1580).  
As a result, two conditional situations may occur. First, when permissive conditions exist 
but productive conditions do not, the crisis continues due to the absence of the necessary 
dynamics or motives for institutional change. Second, and more significantly for this thesis, 
when productive conditions exist but permissive conditions do not, it is more likely that 
incremental changes occur. To put it differently, when the window of opportunity for 
institutional change is closed or the room for manoeuvre is limited (generally due to the 
absence of an external crisis), institutional change can be realised only by the political 
struggles between actors who wish to restructure the existing political configuration and 
institutional arrangements and to instil their interests in the institutions, as incremental 
change theorists argue. If the permissive conditions and productive conditions are initially 
coexistent but the permissive conditions later disappear, then the critical juncture ends with 
the disappearance or dissolution of the permissive conditions, and both the divergence and 
the struggles and competitions between actors will continue. To both incremental change 
theorists and new critical juncture theorists, this is observed much more frequently than a 
63	  
critical juncture phase with a clear beginning and an end, even when a long-term historical 
view is taken.  
Nevertheless, the real practice of institutional implementations since 2000 appears much 
more complex. For instance, when the economic crisis in Korea had in effect ended by 
2000 and that the permissive conditions had therefore disappeared by that point, a range of 
further labour policies and social policies to enhance labour flexibility and labour stability 
have been enacted since the 1998 labour law amendments (self-reinforcing), in contrast to 
the case of introduction of tripartite system which lost their institutional and functional 
influence since 2000 (decaying). Thus, the question arises as to why the reproduction 
mechanisms of institutions appear to have been successful or sometimes failed to function 
effectively in the absence of both permissive and productive conditions, and why the 
institutional divergence and the political tensions evident in the system in 1998 have 
remained.  
The following chapters will seek to answer these questions by investigating the way in 
which institutional change takes place through the competition and compromises made 
among institutional actors in response to shifting circumstances and conditions. 
 
2.4 Conclusion and emerging issues 
 
This thesis emphasises the ways in which the state, labour, and business interact over time 
to promote, negotiate, or block changes in formal and informal institutions. Although the 
political interpretation of Korea’s post-crisis welfare system presented in the current 
literature is revealing, it fails to address the political determinants of institutional change in 
regard to the role of ideas, interests, and preferences in institutions, the causal mechanisms 
of institutional change (i.e. the concepts of increasing returns and incremental change), and 
the political dynamics and its impact on and restriction of institutional change under the 
critical juncture framework. 
The functional explanations of the power resources model, the productivist welfare model, 
the developmental state thesis, and the classical welfare typology thus fail to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of changes in institutional arrangements, and the cause and effect 
of those changes, despite their significant achievements in their own areas.  
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From a methodological aspect, it is the contribution of the new-institutional approach that 
this thesis employs, which situates institutions themselves at the centre of the analysis and 
serves to investigate how institutional actors shape and are shaped by institutions, that 
permits the role of the interests, preferences, motives, and responsibilities of actors under 
specific contexts and institutional structures to be explored in the political process of 
institutional change. 
In the next chapter, the analytical framework and the conceptual foundation of institutional 
complementarity that this thesis employs to understand the politics of and the institutional 
change in the evolution of the Korean developmental welfare state will be presented. 
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Chapter 3  
Methodology 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the analytical framework and methodology for this research. The first 
section of this chapter proposes an analytical model for understanding the institutional 
change of the employment system. Toward that end, this thesis suggests this 
conceptualisation must be comprised of formal elements (e.g. diverse policies and 
regulations on labour, economics and welfare) and in formal elements (e.g. labour relations, 
labour practice and labour protection at work), as well as the key factors that impact 
institutional changes, including the state, business and labour, as actors, and globalisation 
and democratisation as conditions. This helps the researcher determine the direction and 
content of the changing relations among these elements and identify the institutional 
outputs (i.e. employment system). The second section of this chapter states a research 
method, which discusses the application of the analytical framework including the 
resources from which the data is drawn and the method and range of the data collection. In 
order to enrich the explanation, this study uses documentary literature, archives from the 
governmental bodies of Korea and data collected from verbal encounters (interviews), as 
well as references and contemporary literature from various interdisciplinary departments, 
including politics, economics and social studies. Finally, the last section of this chapter 
demonstrates the actual process and methodological disciplines of fieldwork research that 
this study conducted in Seoul.  
The next section presents the research framework of this thesis, employing the term 
employment system. 
	  
3.1 Conceptual framework 
 
In a recent academic trend, a broad and general theorising that aims to reveal the structural 
complexity of the modern capitalist state through the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
framework has emerged within comparative political economy (Hall & Soskice 2001). For 
instance, Aoki (1994) presents his argument utilising the institutional complementarity: 
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‘long-term employment is more feasible where the financial system provides capital on 
terms that are not sensitive to current profitability. Conversely, fluid labour markets may 
be more effective at sustaining employment in the presence of financial markets that 
transfer resources readily among endeavours thereby maintaining a demand for labour’ 
(Aoki 1994: 672; cited in Hall & Soskice 2001: 19).  
However, this thesis doubts whether the notion of government partisanship is able to adapt 
for the case of Korean developmental welfare stat, since the trajectory of party systems (or 
party politics) in Korea before political democratisation in 1987 can barely show the 
evidence of political partisanship which refers to supporting their party’s polices and even 
reluctance to acknowledge correctness on the part of their political opponents in almost 
any situation. And more significantly after democratisation in 1987 and in the period of 
institutional transformation during 1997-2007 when this thesis examines, the government 
partisanship was at incipient stage apart from the arguments whether labour force could 
access the process of shaping institutional implementation without any institutional 
blocking or leftist-labour party existed in the political reality.  
In this vein, this research assumes that the real practices of employment, including the 
labour market, labour relations and labour protections, are the complementary results of 
various institutional policies, such as labour policies, economic and industrial policies, and 
social policies, and are referred to as the ‘employment system’. As such, this thesis closely 
examines the term employment system, which is conceptualised as the interaction between 
the formal institutional sets of diverse policy regulations and the informal institutional sets 
of the labour market, labour relations and labour protection. Thus, the ‘employment system’ 
is a key concept when investigating the complex nature and change of modern capitalist 
welfare systems.  
Focussing on the methodological matter of measuring institutional complementarity, 
however, is not an easy task, since the institutional complementarity appears not only at the 
formal level of institutional interaction, but also at the practical (informal) level of 
institutional enactment. For instance, labour relations between labour and business, the 
state’s embedded role and practices toward business and labour and the institutional 
preferences of elites and bureaucrats interact at the level of informal institutions (practices), 
while the real practice of labour relations is designed and shaped by a distinct set of 
(formal) labour policy and industrial policy. Thus, an institutional complementarity is the 
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combined result of the interactions within the formal rules, and the interactions between 
the formal rules and the informal practices, which implies that the real impact of 
institutional implementation can be measured only by exploring its operation with other 
factors. 
More specifically, as Chang (2007: 5-29) emphasises, an institution has multiple functions 
and interacts with other institutions. Institutions may not function well if they are 
incompatible with other institutions (Chang 2007: 6), a characteristic that this study 
presents as the idea that the complementarity of institutions could be reversible or biased 
against the original intention of the rule-makers. For example, budgetary institutions 
provide several functions, such as investing in productive assets (e.g. physical 
infrastructure, R&D facilities), making provision for social protection (the welfare state) 
and increasing macroeconomic stability (e.g. through its ‘automatic stabiliser’ function). 
At the same time, the same function can be served by different institutions in different 
societies (or in the same society at different times). For example, social welfare is typically 
taken care of by the welfare state in most European countries. The same protection is 
provided by a combination of a (weaker) welfare state, company welfare schemes, family 
provision and other means in East Asia (Chang 2007: 5). Moreover, institutions do not 
function in a vacuum; rather, they interact with other institutions. If a country tries to 
change its institutions by importing new forms of institutions (or even by trying to import 
the kinds of institutions that are currently absent in that country), the imported institutions 
might not function well if they are incompatible with the local institutions, perhaps because 
they are founded upon moral values that are incompatible with local moral values, or 
perhaps because they assume the existence of certain other institutions that are missing in 
the local context (Chang 2007: 6). 
Thus, the nature and dynamics of contemporary capitalism—or the nature and dynamics of 
part of the social order (i.e. the employment system)—‘can be identified and assessed only 
in the context of other institutions, … or complementarities, [which] sometimes arose by 
accident and sometimes by political design’ (Streeck 2009: 2-3). For instance, ‘labour 
markets as embedded in employment regimes [system] analytic priority is not given to 
labour market as independent (natural law-like) systems’ (Haagh & Cook 2005: 173), since 
the labour market is formed by collective (political) bargaining agreements that employ a 
variety of motives and interactions. The variety of motives and interactions, including the 
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right, obligations, preferences, choices and even modes of vision and thoughts, are 
interdependent. Moreover, to some extent they are socially formed and they 
simultaneously structure the market. To put it differently, the whole is more than the 
simple sum of the parts; rather, the nature and development of the whole can be seen as a 
function of the mutual complementarities and complex self-reinforcing interdependence of 
the parts (Amable 2009; Bronk 2009: 88).	  
Based on this reasoning, this thesis ultimately arrives at the term ‘employment system’, 
which was first theorised by Louise Haagh (2004: 155). This concept will be more fully 
discussed in following section. 
3.1.1 Conceptualisation of the Employment System27 
 
The conceptualisation of the ‘employment system’ was first presented by Madsen (1999) 
and further theoretically refined by Haagh (2004: 155). According to these theorists, the 
employment system is conceptualised as a set of institutions combining labour policy 
(implying a certain extent of labour flexibility), industrial policy (structural reforms for 
redistributing resources and the state’s selective strategy for economic growth), financial 
and economic policy (regulation or deregulation of the private sector) and social policy 
(implying a certain degree of labour protection), which directly build an institutional 
arrangement for the employment system, and indirectly affect the character and 
transformation of employment practices at the empirical level (see Figure.3.1). It is also 
important to note that while the informal institutions embedded in employment practices 
through past practices (e.g. lifetime employment, seniority-based contracts and firm-based 
welfare provision) will also be regarded as elements responsible for (or causes of) the 
nature and transformation of the employment system, they will also simultaneously be 
regarded as policy outcomes from (or effects of) the formal set of the employment system,  
so that the relationship between the formal system and informal practices can appear as 
being interrelated and dialectical. Thus, this conception is useful not only for 
disassembling and looking into all the involved institutions, respectively; it can also be 
used as an inference of the complementary results of an institutional set’s involvement 
with the employment practices.  
 
                                                
27 	  The	   theoretical	   implications	   of	   employment	   system	   conceptualisation	   and	   its	   contribution	   to	   this	  
research	  are	  examined	  again	  in	  the	  conclusion	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  (see	  Section	  9.1	  in	  Chapter	  9).	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Figure 3.1: Institutional Complementarity of the Employment System 
 
For instance, the nature of the labour market in a particular society can be understood by 
the employment system, which is comprised of the firm policy, the labour policy and the 
social policy, and which is viewed as an output of the institutional complementarity of 
those policies. In such policies, change is equal to institutional change, so that the 
employment system is enlivened and varies following the complex causal connection of 
institutional change. In the case of the Korean employment system in 1998, a new labour 
law that allowed firms to engage in massive layoffs contributed to providing the labour 
market with greater flexibility (both numerical and functional), while the great expansion 
of unemployment coverage in the Employment Insurance Act (amended in 1998) was 
enacted to resolve the social problems of the unemployed. If there were only institutional 
measures for higher labour flexibility without significant innovation in labour stability, 
then the labour market could have clearly gained a higher degree of labour flexibility. 
However, the reforms in labour protection that served to widen the protection coverage 
hampered a pure neo-liberal shift in the Korean labour market, with the consequence that 
more workers would be protected and have the opportunity to be rehabilitated in the labour 
market through unemployment compensation programmes, such as cash benefits and job 
training schemes.  
Thus, while it is true that the Korean labour market became much more fluid, it also gained 
a degree of stability, although the complementary effects of these policy reforms have not 
been clearly revealed yet. For instance, it remains doubtful whether the real practices 
(implementation) of the labour market (policy outcomes), enabled the Korean labour 
market to become a neo-liberal system, a Nordic system or a hybrid system. This is a key 
question that will be explored in this research.  
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In addition, regardless of institutional reforms, whether the real practices in the workplaces 
were innovated and re-directed in line with the goals and intentions of the institutions 
remains uncertain, since the embedded practice and the legacy of past patterns is slow-
moving with inertia, and is about the relationship between the actors. For example, workers 
in big manufacturing companies who have enjoyed the protections of lifetime employment 
and a seniority-based salary system would not adopt and enact new institutional measures 
for labour flexibility, including collective dismissals and a (performance-based) annual 
salary system. Moreover, employers would seek out (institutional or sometimes expedient) 
ways of evading the increasing taxation associated with taxes that could be levied by 
expansions of the social protection schemes. Furthermore, the real practice of labour 
relations can be affected by other surrounding institutions, such as the behaviour or 
leadership of a union and its leaders, labour courts’ determinations, administrative 
regulations, and so on. 
If the institutional reforms were met with a strong possibility of being vetoed or were faced 
with the possibility of the institution experiencing an increasing returns mechanism if the 
reforms were enacted, the real policy outcomes of these institutional changes would be 
different from their original intention, as incremental theorists argue (see Chapter 2). Thus, 
herein is the reason that this research assumes that the employment system should be 
accessed and understood by examining the dialectical relationship between the formal 
employment system and the informal (employment) practices, and the political dynamics 
between the rule-makers and the rule-takers within the system. 
In this research, the concept of the employment system could show that the labour market 
is a socio-political institution in which a variety of labour flexibility can be found. The 
labour market is neither just an accounting of technological and budget constraints nor a 
formal mechanism used simply to ensure equilibrium between supply and demand. The 
labour market, like other economic markets, is a vehicle for the exercise of forms of social 
authority originating outside the market, and operating both outside and inside the market. 
The labour market is a bundle of institutions and these are nested, rather than performing 
as a ‘subject to’ other institutions (Harriss-White 2003: 481). In this way, the labour 
market as a social institution allows for a variety of motives and interactions (Bronk 2009: 
2; Solow 1990: 31) and is one of the arenas for struggles between political interests. Thus, 
71	  
this research presumes that the political dynamics between institutional actors and real 
changes are nested in complicated institutional sets, as presented in the next section. 
 
3.1.2 Actors and conditions in employment system transformation28 
 
While the focal point of the analysis must lie in the modes of institutional change and its 
dynamics—the five modes of incremental institutional change being displacement, 
layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 31; and see Section 2.3 
in Chapter 2)—these modes should be examined by focusing on the actors that are 
restricted within the institution and who are willing to change the institution in order to 
meet both their own interests and the changes in the actors’ circumstances within the 
institution (Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Streeck 2009; 2010; Thelen 2004). This analytical 
approach is in line with the traditional analytical focus of the historical institutional 
approach, which examines how complex institutions structure social conflicts by 
privileging some interests while disadvantaging others (Hall & Taylor 1996: 954).  
By bringing the role of institutional sets, and the interaction between the state and society, 
to a research centre while rejecting the image of a ‘neutral’ state (as the developmental 
state that theorists frequently argue for in the case of classical developmental state 
studies),29this approach has become an advanced form of the state-centred theorising 
approach for overcoming the statists’ restriction that assumes the overwhelming role and 
capacity of the state. Although this research follows and adopts (at least, partly) the 
developmental state theses, the problems associated with this way of thinking are 
fundamentally caused by two critiques. First, the relationship of the state to business tends 
to be seen as a panacea to provide a sole problem-solving platform. In other words, it 
should be considered that there are many ‘other factors’ conducive to progress, 
independently or synergistically (Chan, Clark, & Lam 1998: 3). In fact, due to over-
emphasising the relationship between the state and business, there is no inner connection 
with society (especially labour) and no politics in the developmental states. Theoretically, 
in this approach, the state is viewed as just a neutral and rational thing. Second, due to the 
challenges of coping with the developmental state’s dynamics, the thesis of the paradox of 
                                                
28 	  The	   theoretical	   implications	   of	   the	   transformation	   mechanism	   in	   the	   employment	   system	   and	   its	  
contribution	   to	   this	   research	  are	  examined	  again	   in	   the	  conclusion	  chapter	  of	   this	   thesis	   (see	  Section	  9.2	  
and	  Section	  9.4	  in	  Chapter	  9).	  
29	  See	  footnote	  20	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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success (Evans 1995: 229) has been generally adopted by many theorists. That thesis posits 
that state-led development has given rise to the growth of social forces, such as the 
working class and the capitalist class, which challenges the state itself. For instance, an 
enlarged labour force on a fast track, and economically satisfied but politically dissatisfied 
citizens that resulted through a rapid economic growth period in Korea, resisted a unilateral 
way imposed by the state (Korean democratisation in 1987). In addition, a labour force and 
thorough democratisation enabled the government to shift to Kim Dae-jung in 1997 (Song 
2003: 415–425). 
Under the perspective of a historical institutional approach, the political orientation of a 
ruling coalition that refers to the relational structure between the state and business is 
highlighted as a critical variable involving the institutional implementation of labour, firms 
and employment. While the neo-classical assessment is that the state is identified as the 
origin of ‘rent’, with the consequence that the solid bond between the state and business 
causes the retrenchment of welfare in the whole society, the historical institutional 
approach argues that the rigid relationship between the state and business could comprise a 
development-oriented policy coalition, so as to be beneficial for economic development. 
This argument has critical implications related to the developmental state theses that are 
placed on the centre that studies Korean economic growth in the historical context, since 
the role of the developmental state lies not only in the degree to which it corrects the 
market failure but also in the extent to which it brings about the emergence of institutional 
basis.  
In the case of the Korean employment system, for instance, such an emergence of socio-
political institutions brought about by the state appeared with the formation of the LMGTC 
in 1998. The LMGTC was initiated with tripartite elements, responding to the national 
crisis in 1997; however, it could be seen as an institutional successor of the previous 
government’s attempts to build a corporatist’s practice (e.g. collective bargaining at the 
national level) within an institutional setting, in which business organisations and trade 
unions had failed to make any significant compromise until 1998 (see Chapter 5). The 
difference between the LMGTC and the previous government’s institutional attempts lies 
in the fact that the state actively sought to reshape the relationships between the state and 
business and between the state and labour. Institutional interests might be generated by the 
state as well as the internal demands of the institutional actors (e.g. the labour union’s 
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empowerment in 1997) and the response to and reaction against surrounding conditions, 
such as international pressure (e.g. the IMF’s demand for industrial reform in exchange for 
the rescue loan). 
Consequently, other actors (e.g. the business and labour) and conditions should be 
considered when creating a model for institutional change. The international environment, 
as an external factor, and the politics among the actors (the state, business and labour), as 
an internal factor, are the objectives we should apply to an inquiry that examines how these 
factors affect the relationship between the state and business and the mode by which these 
two actors are inter-related. In this context, the most significant part of this analytical 
model might be to allocate the actors’ roles (such as the political elite, business and labour) 
in the process of (re-) constructing the employment system (see Figure.3.2). Figure.3.2 
shows the impact that globalisation and political demand had on the labour sector, the state 
and business with regard to institutional changes in the employment system in the 
transition period of 1998. 
 
Figure 3.2: Change in the Employment System 
 
 
Globalisation is a trend that is increasing the mobility of products, services and the factors 
of production across national borders (Shin 2004: 123). In applying this brief definition to 
the model used in this thesis, this research focuses on the importance of mobility across 
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national borders, which makes it possible for the factors of production and services to be 
exchanged not just within national economies but across more than two countries. 
Globalisation and economic liberalisation do influence the state. National competitiveness 
is redefined as having competent firms or a strong business sector with stable financial 
fluidity. When this occurs, the investment coordination mechanism of the state is 
dismantled, and the state is required to access a select-and-concentrate mechanism. During 
the 1997 crisis, the IMF repressed the Korean state, ordering it to decrease the state-centred 
management and the strategies of the financial market and industrial policy and to enlarge 
the way that direct foreign investment occurred at the institutional level. This is how the 
national government accelerated the reform of institutional sets for resolving globalisation. 
The role of the state is confined to supervising financial institutions and maintaining a 
competitive market order. At the institutional level, the state provided easier firing and 
hiring regulation sets and extended a social protection program, i.e. the employment 
insurance scheme (EI), the National Basic Living Security scheme (NBLS), Etc.  
However, it is problematic to accept that only economic liberalisation of the globalised 
world results in a complete re-arrangement of the social structure (for instance, Cho (2002) 
and Lee and Moon (2008)), although it is true that world financial architectures, like the 
IMF and World Bank, did so more or less during and after the crisis. The focal point of this 
theoretical evolution for this thesis centres on a longer-term historical viewpoint; as such, it 
matters whether or not various institutional implementations (the establishment of the 
LMGTC and labour policy and social policy reforms) were contingent and exogenously 
motivated (i.e. 1997 financial crisis) or necessarily incremental and endogenously 
motivated (i.e. developmental legacy and dynamics of democratisation and presidential 
power shift).  
Nevertheless, this thesis presumes that change in the employment system occurs as a result 
of the complex causal connections among the state, business, labour and globalisation. If 
this assumption is correct, the state-business relationship should be re-illuminated in light 
of the questions about how they progressed and the major factors that led to such a change 
in the employment system. Second, in Korea, the innovative change in the employment 
system has occurred as a result of a long trajectory of institutional transformation along 
with economic liberalisation; it is not a sudden result from the 1997 financial crisis. If this 
is correct, this research should be able to pinpoint the factors that enabled this institutional 
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transformation to occur and identify how this happened in relation to the inter-relationships 
between the other actors and factors. This research especially seeks to determine whether 
or not globalisation has any effect on creating this change, and identifying the role it 
played in triggering or originating the entire financial crisis explosion. 
In this vein, the embedded role of the state, as well as the role played by business and 
labour, lies in the employment practices, which act as a highly informal mechanism. A set 
of shared understanding about what other actors are likely to do is what leads the actors to 
a specific equilibrium, and that is often rooted in a sense of what behaviour is appropriate 
in such circumstances (Hall & Soskice 2001: 13). Furthermore, historically the actors have 
built up a set of common expectations, which have been learned and reinforced by repeated 
practice in line with a priori. For instance, the Korean state derived full mileage out of 
informal administrative guidance, which is known as Haengjong Chido in Korean (Woo-
Cumings 2007: 158), and acted as a conflict manager (Chang 2003a: 69-70); firms tried to 
exercise an alternative way of internally moving within the firm rather than imposing 
massive lay-offs (Haagh 2004: 157-169). For these reasons, this thesis presumes that the 
institutional change in the employment system, before and after the crisis, generated new 
practices within the formal employment system in which the interests, preferences and 
various practices at work were put into place.  
In summary, the focus of this research lies in investigating impact that the role and 
function of each actor has on the process of employment system change, and the way in 
which each actor interacts to reform the employment system within the institutional 
restrictions.  
The following sections present the research methods used in this study and the fieldwork 
research that was conducted within that conceptual framework. 
 
 
 
3.2 Research method 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the research method adopted for this study, 
including the field research. This thesis uses two research methods: content analysis and 
semi-structured in-depth interviews.  
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Content Analysis 
Methodologically, this thesis uses the historically-oriented interpretive policy analysis on 
the basis of the historical-descriptive method. Ragin (1987: 3) argues that this is a ‘type of 
empirical study in a way that it attempts to account for specific historical outcomes or 
processes chosen for study because of their significance for current institutional 
arrangements or for social life in general.’ Castles (1989: 12) also makes plain that: 
‘[A] historical approach is essential not merely in providing analytical leverage on 
the role of human agency in the public policy equation but, not less important, in 
making it possible to treat structural contexts as a totality, rather than as mere 
rankings or weights on a series of discrete variables. History reveals the one sense 
in which it is meaningful to say that the sum is more than its parts: the sense in 
which human action is embedded in its particular context.’ 
Given the historiographic nature of this research, its use of diachronic analysis (i.e. based 
on time series data) rather than synchronic analysis is of central use in order to benefit 
from secondary analysis by analysing data on similar issues that was collected at different 
times. This secondary analysis enables the researcher to employ longitudinal research 
designs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimias 2000: 278). At the same time, the 
‘documentative method,’ using both primary (official and other records) and secondary 
documentary sources (constructive descriptions included), are used for ‘conceptual 
(armchair) theorising,’ the usefulness of which is pointed out by Jones (1985: 29): 
‘the value lies not so much in whether any particular theory is considered to be 
right or wrong, but in the extent to which various of the conceptual frameworks put 
forward turn out to be useful aids to the interpretation of social policy material.’ 
The historiographic material used in this thesis is obtained through documentary research 
and interviews. As a secondary analysis, and as a part of the unobtrusive (non-reactive) 
measures used for data collection, documentary research is carried out by using archival 
records, including actuarial records and judicial records, government documents, the mass 
media and private records, such as autobiographies.30 For the analysis of the sociopolitical 
conditions examined in this thesis, this study makes extensive use of political and 
diplomatic records, including reports of proceedings from the National Assembly 
                                                
30	  For	  documentary	  research,	  see	  Frankfort-­‐Nachimias	  and	  Nachimias	  (2000:	  Ch.	  13).	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(equivalent to ‘Hansard’ in Britain), content analysis of presidential speeches, newspaper 
articles, monthly periodicals and related laws and regulations. Scott (1990: 59) argues that 
these administrative papers are ‘the single most important category of documentary 
sources used in social research.’ Furthermore, official statistics produced by the 
government, government-affiliated organisations and national research organisations, such 
as the Korea Labour Institute, are collected for a longitudinal and nationwide analysis. 
 
Semi-Structured In-depth Interviews 
In addition to these secondary sources and documents, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews were conducted using the elite-interviewing techniques31. There are several 
reasons why a qualitative research methodology is selected for this study. Most 
importantly, understanding and exploring the ideas and the experiences of political elites, 
bureaucrats, labour leaders, business leaders and scholars in national research organisations 
is a core component of this research, and the decision to adopt a qualitative methodology is 
closely linked to the research study’s central goals and concerns. A qualitative research 
methodology is far more appropriate and useful than a quantitative methodology for 
focussing on the in-depth experiences and voices of people (Arksey & Knight 1999: 38; 
Bryman 2004; Mason 2002). Qualitative research also offers ‘richness’ of information 
because of its attention to detail. This thesis, therefore, deems a qualitative approach 
appropriate for this exploratory study of the Korean developmental welfare state, an area 
where relatively little research has been previously conducted. 
Specifically, the semi-structured in-depth interview method is adopted for this research 
because it provides enough freedom for the interviewees to speak freely about the topics 
related to their interests (Hakim 2000: 35). Thus, this method is more likely to elicit the 
issues that are of greatest importance to the respondents (Barbour 2008: 119). The semi-
structured interview also assists the researcher in maintaining sufficient structure to 
address the topics that relate to the research (Bailey 2007). In addition, this provides the 
researcher with the opportunity to compare and contrast the different perspectives of the 
interviewees. For instance, it is possible to examine how and why bureaucrats (or political 
elites), business and labour leaders thought similarly or differently about the same topics. 
                                                
31	  For	  elite-­‐interviewing	  techniques,	  see	  Dexter	  (2006).	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Nonetheless, this method also has certain limitations, such as access to data and the 
possibility of insufficient information about the ways in which the data is collected. More 
importantly, there is likely to be an inevitable gap between the use of primary data and its 
secondary use as far as the specific research purposes and intentions behind the data 
collection are concerned.32 For this reason, the analysis of primary data is used in order to 
bridge any potential gaps and also to determine the officially unknown ideas and processes 
that sometimes are hidden within the findings obtained from administrative records.  
The interviewees are selected on the basis of their possession of expertise in the arenas of 
government, labour and business; the interview participants are high-ranking officials who 
have either been involved in the design and (re-) creation of the employment system and or 
those who have been involved in the implementation of a specific policy. Scholars of 
national and private academic institutes are also interviewed, since the influence of their 
involvement in policymaking has changed and has been considered to be of great 
significance. All the interviews are recorded, transcribed and translated. A topic guide of a 
core list of questions used at each of the interviews is prepared. Although all the interviews 
are conducted based on a different list of questions, some of the questions are posed to 
more than one interviewee if the interviewees are thought to be in possession of similar 
knowledge. 
Overall, the use of the qualitative semi-structured interview is both an appropriate and 
useful tool for gaining an understanding of the political processes, changing preferences 
and practices involved in shaping institutional policy implementation. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that since qualitative research emphasises ‘context,’ ‘culture’ 
and ‘meanings’ (Howe 1992; Mason 2002; Maynard 1989), the resultant knowledge is 
‘situational and conditional’ rather than universally applicable to all situations and 
circumstances (Rubin & Rubin 1995: 38). Given this, this thesis attempts to understand the 
research issues from the perspectives of the interviewees within the particular situations 
they faced. 
 
Reliability and Validity of the Research 
In the qualitative research methodology, defining the concepts of reliability and validity is 
problematic. As noted by many scholars (Bryman 2004; Crabtree & Miller 1999; Creswell 
                                                
32	  For	  this	  concern,	  see	  Frankfort-­‐Nachimias	  and	  Nachimias	  (2000:279).	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2008; Golafshani 2003; Long & Johnson 2000; Whittemoreet al. 2001), this is because 
such concepts are derived from quantitative research methodology, which advocates for 
the measurement and standardisation of data. Furthermore, different philosophical 
traditions underpin the two methodologies: positivism and interpretivism. Therefore, the 
concepts have been defined and used in a variety of ways by scholars using qualitative 
methodology. Moreover, it appears that the two concepts have often overlapped or have 
been closely linked in qualitative research methodology rather than treated as being 
mutually exclusive.  
Although defining reliability and validity precisely has proven to be troublesome, during 
the course of research reliability can be taken to mean ‘to ensure that data collection is 
undertaken in a consistent manner’(Long & Johnson 2000: 31). In order to establish the 
reliability of this research, this thesis particularly seeks to ensure the ‘transparency’ of 
processes (Flick 2006; Mason 2002) by presenting, in detail, the processes used in this 
research. The method used to conduct this research is firmly based on the aims and 
questions relevant to the study. In terms of the data collection process, the differences 
between the initial plan and the actual work carried out in the field should be clearly 
illustrated. In addition, this thesis explains in detail how the analysis of the collected data 
was carried out. The processes of analysis shall be ‘iterative,’ involving going back and 
forth between the coded original data and the issues studied (Flick 2006; Mason 2002). 
Above all, this research pays particular attention to consistency throughout the entire 
research process—from designing the research to presenting the data findings.   
The validity of research can be examined in many ways. However, this research seeks to 
assess validity by adopting the arguments of Crabtree and Miller (1999: 193) concerning 
depth of description, rigour and reflexivity. Although they have mentioned other aspects of 
validity, such as accuracy, intellectual honesty and searching for alternative hypotheses 
and interpretations, these aspects are not included in this research for the following reasons. 
To some extent, accuracy can be viewed differently depending on the positions taken by 
researchers and the different contexts of the research. Intellectual honesty can be included 
with reflexivity. Searching for alternative hypotheses and interpretations does allow for the 
possibility of diverse interpretations. Therefore, it is important to consider the three aspects 
of Crabtree and Miller’s position that are relevant to this study and that have been adopted 
by the researcher. First, in terms of depth of description, this research supplies detailed 
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information about the issues by providing richness in the form of collected data. In 
presenting its findings, this research focuses on including ample comments from 
interviewees and delivering the contextual conditions related to the comments in the 
empirical findings chapters. Second, in terms of the rigour of the research, the data is 
collected strategically, and the collected data is systematically coded and analysed by using 
ATLAS-ti software. In other words, this thesis seeks to ensure that the processes of data 
collection and analysis is carried out in a systematic and integrated way (Crabtree & Miller 
1999: 194). Finally, reflexivity is concerned with the researcher’s influence on the study’s 
findings and interpretations (Crabtree & Miller 1999). As Malterud (2001: 484) points out, 
qualitative research does not deny the researcher’s influence on a study. However, 
researchers should reflectively examine their influences during the research processes. 
Given this, this thesis pays particular attention to reflexively examining the researcher’s 
influence on the processes of analysing and presenting the research findings.  
 
3.3 Fieldwork research 
 
The main objective of the fieldwork is to understand the experience of political 
elites/bureaucrats, business leaders and labour leaders in terms of the employment system 
(and its changes), in order to support the main arguments of this research. The rationale for 
selecting individuals from these groups as interviewees is that they are the main players 
and stakeholders in both institutional implementation and enactment. 
 
3.3.1 Unit of analysis 
 
A total of 22 participants were interviewed. Of those, 13 interviewees were bureaucrats 
and (ex-) politicians, four were executive members of a business organisation and a private 
company and five were members of labour unions (see Table 3.1). The interviewees were 
selected on the basis of their expertise in government, labour and business and they were 
chosen from among high-ranking officials who were involved in the design of institutional 
sets or specific policies. 
 
Interviewee Selection 
First, this project makes every effort to identify and analyse the role and function of state 
in the institutional implementations of the Korean employment system and its changes. 
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Toward this end, this research views the Korean state as a mixture of political elites 
(presidents and executive members of the ruling party in the Blue House, Cheongwadae, 
which refers to the Korean presidential residence), members of the ruling party and the 
bureaucrats in the central government (see Section 6.3 in Chapter 6). The state’s power can 
be activated by and derived from the combination of these three parts with ideological and 
functional cohesiveness between them (see the discussion in Chapters 6 and 8). This 
research specifically followed the tradition of the developmental state theses in that is 
emphasises the role elite bureaucrats play in the institutional implementation of the 
employment system. Thus, a critical purpose of this fieldwork research lies in capturing 
narratives of the elite bureaucrats’ personal experiences, which include policy origin, 
preference, cooperation and conflict between the elites and other actors (i.e. business and 
labour), internal power struggles between each of the bureaus within the central 
government and the influence of political leadership and international pressure. For 
instance, the bureaucrats are categorised by bureaus (e.g. the Ministry of Labour and the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy), and the politicians are treated separately, as seen 
below, since this research assumes that diverse interests, preferences, motivations and 
responsibilities appear differently not only within the state entities (i.e. Blue House, ruling 
party and bureaucrats) but also within the types of bureaucrats (e.g. within economic 
bureaucrats and social bureaucrats), with the result that institutional implementation can be 
accomplished through the political process of negotiation and compromise among 
divergent interest groups.    
Second, executive members of the Korean Employers Federation (KEF) were interviewed 
because they have represented the side of (business) management in the LMGTC since 
LMGTC’s formation in 1998, and they comprise one of the two competing member groups 
of the Labour Relations Reform Commission, which was established in 1996 prior to the 
LMGTC.33 They also perform the function of acting as a counterpart to the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), both within and outside of the LMGTC. KEF’s 
historical dynamics, i.e. its conflicts with labour within the LMGTC and other institutional 
                                                
33 The	   other	   member	   group	   of	   the	   Labour	   Relations	   Reforming	   Commission	   was	   composed	   of	  
representatives	   of	   labour.	   Labour	   representation	   was	   split	   between	   the	   Korean	   Confederation	   of	   Trade	  
Unions	  (KCTU)	  and	  the	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Trade	  Unions	  (FKTU).	  By	  participating	  on	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  
Reforming	  Commission	  alongside	  the	  FKTU	  (at	  the	  invitation	  of	  the	  government),	  the	  KCTU	  was	  recognised	  
for	   the	   first	   time	   as	   a	   representative	   of	   labour,	   although	   it	   was	   not	   formally	   legalised	   until	   1999.	   See	  
Chapter	  5	  and	  Chapter	  6.	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realms (and mediation in these conflicts by the state), is analysed in terms of the 
employment system. 
 
Table 3.1: List of the organisations and actors interviewed 
Type Organisation Working career 
State MoL A director of the Employment Policy Division 
 MoL A chief officer of the Equal Employment Bureau 
 MoL A chief officer of the Industrial Policy Bureau 
 MoL A officer in the local Employment Security Centre 
 MoL/KLI A former government officer and senior 
researcher/university professor 
 
 MoL/KLI A former government officer and senior 
researcher/university professor  
 
 MoL/KLI A former member of the Consultative to the Minister 
of Labour and senior researcher 
 
 EPB/MoL/KLI A former government officer and 
researcher/university professor  
 
 MoFE A chief officer in the Policy Coordination Bureau 
 MoFE A chief officer in the Financial Policy Bureau 
 Ruling party A senior researcher in the ruling party  
 Ruling party A researcher in the ruling party  
 Ruling party/Blue 
House 
A former politician and a member of the presidential 
transition team (1997-1998)/a university professor 
Business KEF A vice president 
 KEF A chief officer 
 Hyundai Motors  An officer of the Parliament Cooperation Bureau 
 Hyundai Motors An officer of the Labour and Welfare Bureau 
Labour KCTU/Hyundai 
Motors Union 
A former head of the Hyundai Motors union 
 KCTU A former executive member  
 KCTU An executive member of Korean Metal Workers Union 
under KCTU 
 FKTU An executive member 
 FKTU/Blue House  A former Presidential aide in Blue House/ an 
executive member of FKTU 
* MoL: the Ministry of Labour/ KLI: Korea Labour Institute/ EPB: the Economic Planning Board/ 
MoFE: the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
 
In addition, Hyundai Motors, which is representative of the multinational corporations that 
are key contributors to the Korean economy, is investigated as a case study at the 
individual company level. Hyundai Motors was selected for study because its labour union 
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has been at the centre of the Korean labour movement since 1987. Both labour leaders and 
members of the Hyundai Motors management bureau were interviewed. From their 
accounts, this research expected to gain quality information about the real changes that 
occurred in labour relations and in the practices of adopting flexibility and security in the 
workplace. For example, it was expected that the interviewees could provide evidence of 
the way in which employers brought about structural reform by means of massive layoffs, 
dispatching workers, the introduction of flexible working hours, early retirement, internal 
replacement, the replacement of the seniority-based salary system with an annual salary 
system, the way in which employers dealt with the union, Etc. 
Third, in parallel with interviewees reflecting the opinions and experiences of business 
leaders, union leaders were interviewed to investigate the role that labour played in 
reforming institutional arrangements and the union’s contribution to the changes of 
employment system. In the case of the LMGTC, executive members of two competing 
unions, the KCTU and the FKTU, were interviewed. Both the KCTU and the FKTU were 
involved in drawing up the first LMGTC agreement in February 1998. However, while the 
FKTU has continued to participate in the LMGTC since that time, the KCTU has not done 
so. Thus, in the interviews the executive members of these unions were asked questions 
about what differentiates these two unions, what caused the split in the labour movement, 
and what effect this split in labour representation has had on the reform of institutional 
arrangements. 
 
Participant Recruitment 
To recruit interviewees, the researcher approached a former LMGTC committee member 
and a vice-head of the research institute of the Min Ju Dang (Democratic Party, the former 
ruling party during the period upon which this research focuses, 1997-2007) to arrange 
appropriate interviewees. The researcher had requested that these contacts could recruit 
experienced bureaucrats, business managers and labour leaders who had served on the 
LMGTC or who had played a role in the reform of the EI scheme. Potential interviewees 
were approached by sending a letter of invitation, an information sheet and a consent form 
via e-mail34; the researcher then contacted potential interviewees by phone to determine if 
they were interested in participating in the research. Single interviews were conducted and 
                                                
34	  See	  Appendix	  9.	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each interview took about two hours. Before the interview, the participants were asked to 
sign the consent form that they had received by e-mail.35 
In addition to utilising the assistance of both a former LMGTC committee member and a 
vice-head of the former ruling party’s research institute, the researcher of this thesis also 
hoped to employ a ‘snowball’ sampling method. The rationale for this is that it would not 
be beneficial to depend entirely on the assistance of these two sources because some of the 
interviewees, in particular members of the business sector and labour, seem to be in close 
contact with these sources. These two sources were interviewed by the researcher as part of 
a pilot interview project in December 2010, and it was felt that they were likely to 
introduce prospective interviewees whose experiences and thoughts were similar to theirs. 
Indeed, the former LMGTC committee member arranged meetings with two bureaucrats 
from the Ministry of Labour and an ex-political bureaucrat. However, they were somewhat 
reluctant to criticise the government, political elites, labour or even institutions, such as the 
LMGTC and the EI scheme, although they did raise other important issues. Thus, to attain 
a variety of opinions and experiences and to cross-check the facts and history, snowball 
sampling was useful in achieving data reliability and objectivity.  
All the interviews were audio-recorded using a digital recorder and then transcribed and 
translated. A topic guide of a core list of questions used at each of the interviews was 
prepared.36 Although all the interviews employed a list of questions specifically tailored to 
the interviewee, where interviewees were believed to be in possession of similar 
knowledge, some overlapping of questions occurred between the interviewees. 
 
3.3.2 Data protection 
 
This section presents the way in which the data obtained through interviewing was dealt 
with in accordance with the data protection scheme of the UK. 
Before conducting the fieldwork research, methodological disciplines and actual ways of 
data protection, through and after the fieldwork, were reviewed and confirmed thoroughly 
by the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee of the University of York. On the 
Fieldwork Research Declaration form that the researcher submitted to the committee, the 
                                                
	  35See	  Appendix	  10.	  
	  36See	  Appendix	  11.	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researcher noted that the fieldwork research was guided and restricted so as to meet the 
following requirements that ‘all personal and sensitive data must be collected and stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998’ of the UK. Above all, this research strictly 
adhered to the guidelines for conducting the field work and safeguarding the protection of 
the data that was collected.  
 
Anonymity 
Ensuring the ‘anonymity’ of the data is a core component of any data protection scheme. 
Toward this end, the researcher ensured the anonymity of interviewees by re-labelling their 
names. Initially, all the interviewees were received the following information about the 
study’s anonymity: “Your name will not be used in my thesis or in other papers. Your 
name will be written as A, B, C or P1, P2, P3”. All the interviewees were briefed as to how 
the data would be collected and stored in accordance with Data Protection Legislation: All 
published data would use these codes and the participant’s identity would not appear in any 
published work.  
During and after the fieldwork, the digital recorder audio recordings were transferred to the 
researcher’s laptop computer and they were encrypted with a personal identification 
number immediately after each interview was completed. The audio recording on the 
digital recorder was then removed. The audio recordings held on the researcher’s laptop 
computer were also deleted once they have were transferred and stored onto the York 
University’s Filestore (personalised data storing system with encryption) after returning to 
York. 
Furthermore, the audio recordings on the laptop were transcribed into Korean using MS 
Word and then translated into English. During this process, no printed copies of these 
audio recordings were made, and only the electronic versions of transcripts, translations 
and code sheets were stored on the researcher’s secured laptop computer. All field notes 
made during the interviews were scanned and stored as PDF files, and the original field 
notes were destroyed. During the journey from Seoul to York, all the research materials 
remained in the researcher’s possession at all times and were checked-in as hand baggage. 
For organising the audio recordings into written data, each interviewee was given an 
individual code number, which is printed on a separate sheet, and only the researcher could 
have access to this coding sheet. All written data were presented using these codes, and no 
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reference to a participant’s actual identity appears in any of the written material. All data, 
related documents and transcripts were kept in electronic form on the researcher’s laptop. 
As with the audio recordings, all data and documents in electronic form were encrypted 
and stored on the University’s central storage drive, Filestore, and the files originally 
stored on the laptop were totally deleted.  
Finally, written forms of data have been printed out and used only in the researcher’s office 
at the University of York and have been stored in a locked drawer in the office. The key to 
the locked drawer is accessible only to the researcher. The building in which the office is 
located is open from 8.00 to 18.00, and the office is secured by a key-number lock. It can 
only be opened with the researcher’s key-number. 
 
3.3.3 Analysis and presentation of the collected data 
 
This section discusses the way in which the data collected for this research was analysed 
and presented. 
 
Thematic Analysis: Coding and using ATLAS-ti Software 
During the field research, the researcher began transcribing the collected interview data in 
order to interpret correctly what had been related by the interviewees. After returning to 
the UK, the researcher began to transcribe the collected data in earnest into Korean. This 
produced around 400 pages of transcribed text. The collected data was analysed through 
the qualitative data analysis software ATLAS-ti (Version 7.0.2). Since the software 
permitted data entry in Korean, it was possible to analyse the original Korean transcripts, 
although the software required that the concepts and themes be coded in English in order to 
conduct the analysis. Nevertheless, that software program was useful for analysing the 
Korean data as the researcher was able to detect the delicate nuances and the meanings of 
the words that the interviewees used.  
Before beginning the detailed analysis, some methodological issues had to be considered 
and addressed in order to conduct the analysis based on informed knowledge and to 
ascertain the most appropriate way of approaching the analysis. Herein, this researcher 
then decided to adopt ‘thematic analysis’(Flick 2006) to systematically analyse the 
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transcribed data. In order to carry out the thematic analysis, three types of coding were 
employed: open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Flick 2006; Neuman 2006). In 
the original data, the open coding was first employed. As such, the codes were created 
openly in terms of concepts, happenings and the various issues, rather than adhering to any 
particular theoretical thinking or any concept of a specific destination for the coding. When 
the data analysis reached its final stage, it is important to note that the open coding 
uncovered unexpected new themes, as Neuman (2006) predicts. Initially, there was little 
expectation that open coding would contribute to the unveiling of the new findings. 
However, by further carrying out axial coding and selective coding, these themes were 
gradually revealed in the data. Secondly, axial coding was carried out by linking the open 
codes and attempting to find the concepts or themes that were relevant to the research. In 
order to perform the axial coding, all the data with open codes were printed out and 
divided into groups according to similar coded topics or concepts. By grouping the open 
codes, the researcher aimed to discover where the similarities between them lay. Through 
this process, some potential thematic linkages between the codes were discovered. Thirdly, 
after detecting a number of core themes, selective coding was carried out. The coding 
‘involves scanning all the data and previous codes’ and looks ‘selectively for cases that 
illustrate themes and make comparisons and contrasts after most or all data collection is 
complete’ (Neuman 2006: 464). Selective coding was the final stage of the data analysis.  
Over the course of the analysis, it should be noted that these three types of coding are 
closely related to each other rather than being mutually exclusive (Flick 2006). Moreover, 
the coding was an on-going process, as the researcher had to move back and forth between 
the coded data and the issues this study wanted to explore (Flick 2006; Mason 2002). Even 
when the research findings were revealed, it was necessary to keep returning to the coded 
data in order to check and examine if there were other data relating to the findings. In 
particular, as the in-depth analysis of data was being carried out, unexpected meanings and 
findings freshly emerged. The researcher has since continued to check to establish if there 
are missing items or un-coded data that might await further analysis.  
It is obvious that this thematic analysis with the ATLAS-ti software has proven to be 
useful in identifying some of the themes and concepts arising from the collected data. 
Furthermore, the software enabled all the coded data to be very accessible through 
Microsoft Word. However, there were some practical challenges involved in conducting 
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the analysis. As the 400 pages of original data had to be performed using open coding, it 
took a long time to complete that stage of the process. In addition, although the software 
effectively provided the coded data for all the interviewees, it appeared that over-reliance 
on the coded data alone would obscure or neglect the distinctive contexts that each 
interviewee faced. Therefore, it was necessary to return to the original data in order to 
understand the coded data from the perspectives and contexts of each interviewee.  
Additionally, the field notes that were taken in Korea left the researcher with a vivid 
memory of the interviewees’ nuances and thoughts when the interviews were conducted. 
The field notes helped the researcher to distinctly remember the interviewees’ emotional 
and functional interests, motives and responsibilities on every policy implementation. In 
particular, the atmosphere in the places where the interviews took place and the perceptive 
remarks that the interviewees made were written in the field notes, and they provided 
insights into understanding and analysing the interviewees’ responses in depth.  
 
Quotes and Language Issues  
When the findings from the data were presented, including the conflicting perspectives and 
accounts of the interviewees, this research adhered to the following principles. First, this 
research paid particular attention to choosing and using the quotations that would be most 
relevant to the specific issues and would best explain those issues. Second, this research 
sought to use the quotes of as many interviewees as possible. Even if issues were identified 
by only a small number of the interviewees, the researcher paid particular attention to 
using their quotations equally, wherever possible. Finally, this research attempted to 
convey the richness of information. In particular, when some discrepancies in the 
evaluation of the issues existed, the researcher tried to depict this by contrasting the diverse, 
different and conflicting viewpoints of the interviewees (Ritchie et al. 2003). In other 
words, rather than the researcher privileging his/her own perspective as a researcher, this 
researcher tried to demonstrate sensitivity towards simultaneously presenting the range of 
the different or conflicting perspectives of the interviewees (Corbin & Strauss 2008; 
Mason 2002: 185). However, sometimes this researcher had to evaluate the conflicting 
accounts of some of the interviewees. In those instances, the researcher paid particular 
attention to evaluating those accounts or issues in an objective and critical way so as not to 
show bias towards any specific group of interviewees. Based on this, the researcher 
weighted the interviewees’ responses differently in terms of using their quotes. For 
89	  
instance, although a number of important issues were raised by a small number of 
interviewees, since they provided very meaningful points that were worth examining this 
research, the researcher reported them in detail.  
As Temple and Edwards (2002) point out, language serves not only to convey concepts or 
meanings but to deliver particular cultural and social meanings. Therefore, words that 
ostensibly have the same meaning in different languages may, in actuality, be understood 
and interpreted differently. In relation to this, some difficulties in producing accurate and 
meaningful translations were encountered when presenting the quotes. In addition, 
sometimes the meanings of Korean words were unable to be properly presented, 
particularly when the interviewees used demonstrative pronouns. In order to prevent 
misunderstanding, the researcher clarified the meanings of particular demonstrative 
pronouns by providing detailed explanations of their meanings inside brackets. In summary, 
given the differences between Korean and English, the researcher paid attention to 
carefully translating and presenting the quotations. 
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Chapter 4  
Antecedents to the Critical Juncture: Between Legacy and 
Innovation	  
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
In explaining the Korean state during the period ranging from 1970 to 1980, most studies 
use the concept of the developmental state. The success of the developmental state was 
founded on the following three prerequisites: a huge reservoir of cheap labour (Jang 2010: 
206), the reshaped international division of labour since the Second World War, and the 
national “Growth-First” consensus (B-K Kim 2003: 54; S-Y Kim 2008: 72; S. Kwon & 
Holliday 2007: 242).37Although Korea’s phenomenal economic growth was partly due to 
an abundance of cheap labour, it should also be noted that the Korean state possessed a 
relatively fair distribution structure (Pempel 1999a: 155-156; Wade 1990: 38), evidenced 
by the fact that wage disparities among workers were relatively small and the level of 
income inequality was very close to that of advanced countries until the 1997 financial 
crisis (Croissant 2004: 515). As Haggard’s (2000) study shows, Korea’s Gini coefficient of 
urban wage income inequality (38.6 in 1980, 31.0 in 1993 and 29.5 in 1996) was much 
lower than Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Haggard 2000: 
188). 
While the term, developmental state has been defined in many ways, (and there have been 
many economic explanations for the success of Korea’s developmental state), a 
developmental state can be summarised as a state’s entire institutional and socio-structural 
focus on economic growth, aiming for maximum output through the mobilisation of all 
available resources. It can also be defined as the distinct political configurations (e.g. the 
close bond between the state and business and the exclusion of labour) in which elite 
bureaucrats play a critical role in designing and implementing the institutional arrangement 
for economic growth (Chang 2003c; Evans 2005; Leftwich 2009; Woo-Cumings 1991). 
                                                
37	  For	  more	  on	  the	  international	  division	  of	  labour	  in	  the	  1970s,	  see	  the	  early	  studies	  by	  Frobel,	  Heinrichs,	  
and	  Kreye	  (1978)	  and	  Wallerstein	  (1979).	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However, in Korea, by the 1980s these economic and political conditions had ceased to 
exist, and the state-led strategy for economic growth had run into difficulties due to 
increasing pressure from the international wave of neo-liberalism. Most importantly, the 
change in the Korean socio-economic situation at that time was strongly derived from the 
democratisation movement and from labour’s empowerment in 1987. The Great Workers’ 
Struggle of 1987 marked a watershed for Korea’s employment practices, including the 
labour market, labour relations and labour protection, with the accompanying 6.29 
Declaration of Democracy by the leader of the ruling party in June 1987, symbolising the 
democratisation of Korean society.  
In light of the significance of these developments, this chapter examines the employment 
system from the 1980s until 1993, the period in which quasi-military regimes governed the 
country. The focus of this chapter lies in investigating the changes that have taken place in 
the employment system since 1980, when the traditional developmental state (Park Chung-
hee government, 1963-1979) ended. Therefore, this study takes the Chun Doo-hwan 
government (1980-1988) as its starting point. Under the Chun Doo-hwan administration, 
the liberalisation of financial, economic and social sectors emerged and the Korea 
developmental state began to change. However, those changes come to an end with the 
Roh Tae-woo government (1988-1993), when the quasi-military dictatorship began to be 
dismantled after democratisation in June 1987. 
 
4.1 The developmental state’s legacy during the Chun government (1980-1988) 
 
Until the middle of the 1980s, the general theme of labour laws was that the state legally 
guaranteed the unions’ right to take limited action as long as they did not influence 
economic policy and corporate management. By repeatedly revising labour laws, the state 
sought to restrict the systematic development of unions and to prevent the labour 
movement from developing into a more radical political movement. What is of particular 
note is that while the state blocked all demands for the legalisation of political activity by 
the unions during this period, labour steadily acquired greater organisational power and 
became increasingly ideological. In short, to the state, labour was not a social partner in the 
efforts to ensure socio-economic development; rather, labour was a target group over 
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which the state should have control, as was the approach taken by the state in the past, 
during the Park government. 
Furthermore, policy interests and preferences of political elites and bureaucrats were still 
subject to the national goal of economic growth, and the policy issues of labour were not 
an exception. For instance, the Chun Doo-hwan government (1980-1988) acknowledged 
that stabilisation of labour relations was essential if sustainable economic growth was to be 
achieved. Regarding stabilisation as Korea’s first priority, Chun initiated a three-way 
reform process that included financial liberalisation, enterprise unionism and industrial 
rationalisation. Moreover, during the course of these reforms, Chun never gave up state (or 
Blue House) control over the reform process, which remained firmly in his hands as was 
also the case with his predecessor (Park). 
The following section will examine how the state controlled and steered business and 
labour during the changes to the employment system during the Chun Era. In order to do 
this, it is first necessary to clarify the institutional arrangement that existed in the 1980s. 
 
4.1.1 The state’s institutional measures against labour 
 
As a result of the economic downturn that began in late 1978, many companies were 
unable to avoid temporary closure, shutdown or short-term working, with the consequence 
that there was a significant increase in the unemployment rate and frequent late payment of 
wages.38 This economic unrest undermined labour relations, which emerged as the crucial 
social issue of that time.39 The industrial dispute at the Y.H. Trading Company, where 
workers occupied the offices of ShinMin Dang (the official opposition party, the New 
Democratic Party), became a critical social issue and, ultimately, provided the seed for the 
assassination of President Park on 26 October 1979 (also known as 10.26).40 However, at 
                                                
38 	  The	   employment	   rate	   increased	   from	   3.2%	   in	   1978	   to	   5.2%	   in	   1980	   (Source:	   Korean	   Statistical	  
Information	  Service	  (http://kosis.kr/);	  Data	  accessed	  on	  14/08/2012,	  17:54	  UTC	  (GMT)).	  
39 	  Oil	   price	   increases	   and	   the	   Korean	   government’s	   tight	   fiscal	   policy	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   mass	  
redundancies	  and	  overdue	  wages.	  According	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  (2006a,	  76),	  there	  were	  7,300	  labour	  
disputes	   in	   5,286	   workplaces	   between	   January	   and	   May	   1979,	   of	   which	   82.5%	   stemmed	   from	   overdue	  
wages.	  	  
	  40In	  1979,	  the	  CEO	  of	  the	  Y.H.	  Trading	  Company	  fired	  187	  female	  trade	  union	  members	  under	  the	  pretext	  
of	  poor	  management.	  Those	  workers	  protested	  and	  staged	  a	  sit-­‐in	  at	  the	  offices	  of	  Shin	  Min	  Dang	  (the	  New	  
Democratic	  Party),	  which	  was	  the	  official	  opposition	  party.	  The	  government	  mobilised	  the	  police	  to	  break	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that time the labour movements failed to systematically organise a united and coordinated 
effort at unionising (whether at the industrial level or at the enterprise level), and strikes 
remained localised and confined to individual workplaces. 
 
The 1980 amendment of the labour laws  
Due to economic decline and the political vacuum that had existed since late 1979, labour 
relations in Korea worsened and neither employers nor workers appeared to possess the 
ability to resolve the conflict. Thus, between May and November 1980, Chun Doo-hwan’s 
National Defence Emergency Policy Committee, the junta that formed after his coup d’état, 
conducted the Trade Union Purification Action (nojo-junghwajochi), employing the 
Special Rules for the National Emergency Measure, which dismissed 12 leaders of 
industrial unions and devised strict regulations for full-time union officials.  
Following this, in December 1980, Chun pushed for an amendment to Korea’s labour laws 
that was intended to transform Korea’s union system from an industrial union system 
(although very weak) into an enterprise union system (enterprise unionism), and which 
became the origin of the Korean practice of enterprise (firm-based) unionism, which is still 
in place today. Other significant restrictions on labour relations and the basic rights of 
workers were enacted through this amendment: third-party intervention in workplace 
industrial relations was outlawed; the constitutional mandate on the right to collective 
bargaining was removed; the rules governing the establishment of unions were 
strengthened; restrictions on union officials were introduced; the union shop system was 
eliminated; and unions’ finances were opened to public scrutiny (Kyunghyang-Shinmun 26 
December 1980). The state’s actions were intended to suppress the labour movement, 
minimise the number of labour disputes through strict regulation and, ultimately, paralyse 
labour unions. 
Changes in governmental organisation also occurred. The Chun government, which was 
formed after the (indirect) presidential election in December 1980, brought the National 
Labour Office under the control of the Ministry of Labour in March 1981 (Dong-A Ilbo 10 
                                                                                                                                              
up	  this	  protest,	  and	  the	  police	  did	  so	  with	  ruthless	  force,	  illegally	  detaining	  many	  of	  the	  protestors.	  At	  that	  
time,	   police	   violence	   against	   workers,	   journalists,	   and	   opposition	   National	   Assembly	   members	   and	  
members	  of	  Shin	  Min	  Dang	  was	  widespread	  and	  commonplace,	  and	  one	   female	  worker	   fell	   to	  her	  death	  
from	  a	  Shin	  Min	  Dang	  office	  building	  window.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  brutal	  suppression	  of	  the	  protest	  and	  
the	  illegal	  detentions,	  protests	  spread	  throughout	  the	  country,	  and	  the	  leader	  of	  Shin	  Min	  Dang,	  Kim	  Young-­‐
sam	  (who	  became	  president	  in	  1993)	  was	  expelled	  from	  the	  National	  Assembly.	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March 1981). In keeping with the Ministry of Labour’s elevated status as a major 
government department, the National Labour Office’s promotion in status reflected the 
Chun government’s determination to reshape Korean labour relations. However, it is 
misguided to assume that this organisational change was an attempt by the state to develop 
labour relations, increase employment or improve labour practices. Rather, it is more 
persuasive to view this organisational change and the 1980 amendment of Korea’s labour 
laws as an institutional means for suppressing the labour movement. 
 
The Works Council Act 
Simultaneously, the Chun government adopted a carrot-and stick approach towards labour 
and restricted the scope of the labour movement’s struggles to issues, such as wage 
increases and workers’ welfare. In this regard, strengthening the works council system in 
individual companies was a critical institutional development for labour relations. On 31 
December 1980, the Works Council Act was enacted with the aim of encouraging both 
employers and workers to consult with one another in order to promote the welfare of 
workers and increase the profitability of corporations.41 In so doing, the state’s objective 
was to improve industrial relations in a way that favoured the government. While the Act 
gave works councils the authority to manage working conditions within the individual 
workplace, that did not result in the practice of collective bargaining between employers 
and workers in Korean labour relations. First, in order for the works councils to have 
developed and operated successfully, the collective bargaining principle that upheld the 
equal rights of the employer and employees should have been established in practice; the 
reality was very different. Second, the Works Council Act itself placed severe restrictions 
on the basic rights of workers, including restricting their right to organise, to collective 
bargaining and to collective action. Third, employers and workers had little practical 
experience with, or a tradition of, any type of cooperation between workers and 
management or of workers’ participating in the decision-making process with management. 
Moreover, the Works Council Art failed to provide any concrete guidance about how to 
establish and run the works councils or any details about the role of the actors.  
To summarise, it is true that the state endeavoured to install a new employment system. 
The real effect of institutional implementation, however, was not so different from the 
                                                
41	  See	  Appendix	  1	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previous pattern of the traditional developmental state. The state had a dominant role and 
function in changing the employment system (especially with regard to labour relations), 
by providing labour with restricted rights and obligations. A more persuasive explanation 
is that, in this period, the institutional changes in the employment system were steered 
solely by the state, which desired to enhance the perception of socio-economic 
development in the eyes of the public in order to smother the real problem, which was a 
lack of political legitimacy. Furthermore, both business and labour were not strong enough 
to demand and integrate their policy preferences into institutions. Although institutional 
measures for enhancing flexibility in the labour market were implemented, this can also be 
seen as a result of the institutional legacy of the developmental state, which gave policy 
priority to economic growth, rather than a result of a political agreement between the state 
and business. 
 
4.1.2 Blue House leadership 
 
This section will provide evidence showing that business was not an autonomous actor 
under the Chun government, even though the Korean developmental state was strongly 
pro-business and anti-labour in the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, a state-led economic 
growth strategy lay at the heart of the East Asian developmental states (including Korea). 
With direct control over the financial sector, the state supported specific industries and 
businesses that could then exploit resources exclusively and enhance their competitiveness 
in the international market. Throughout the period of the developmental state, the state, 
characterised by its high cohesiveness and its tendency to sequester planning within the 
state bodies (i.e. the Blue House, bureaucracy and ruling party), took the lead in the 
mobilisation and distribution of internal and external resources for economic growth. In 
turn, the economic growth during the industrialisation period explicitly legitimatised the 
political elites’ political power.  
For business, the core areas of industry that the state focused on became a crucial issue, 
since a business in the ‘right industry’ could take a commanding position in terms of 
industrial development and capital accumulation. Hence, the argument that the state and 
business shared a symbiotic relationship is highly persuasive, or as B-K Kim (2003: 53) 
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notes, ‘Korea’s ruling political elite saw the chaebol as both a liability and an asset in its 
quest for economic growth and political legitimacy’. 
Although Chun succeeded in the institutional implementation of both labour laws (as seen 
in the previous section) and industrial policies, his origin of industrial reforms appeared, at 
least ostensibly, to be innovative and path-breaking. However, these reforms were not 
always successful. For instance, he enacted the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act 
as an industrial rationalisation and financial liberalisation measure, but it was initially 
ineffective in enhancing market competition. Furthermore, although he repeatedly stated 
his slogan of ‘social justice’ and ‘economic liberalisation’ in public, his approach remained 
firmly tied to President Park’s growth model and it did not amount to a fundamental 
‘neoliberal’ overhaul of Korea’s financial and industrial policies (Moon 1994: 142, 145; E-
M Kim 1997: 167-211). Chun’s privatisation drive, launched in 1981, is another example 
of his attempts to liberalise Korea’s economy. However, fearing capital flight, Chun’s Min 
Jung Dang (Democratic Justice Party) refused to endorse the wholesale privatisation of 
Korean banks. The party’s rejection of wholesale financial liberalisation reflected its 
concerns about abandoning the Ministry of Finance’s traditional dual strategy of state 
control over the major commercial banks and private ownership of provincial banks and 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), such as finance companies, insurance companies 
and mutual saving banks. According to newspaper reports, the failure to implement 
genuine financial liberalisation meant that monopolistic control of capital remained firmly 
in the hands of chaebol, thereby hindering competition rather than reinforcing it 
(Kyunghyang-Shinmun 5 October 1982; Dong-A Ilbo 11 October 1982). 
From this perspective, then, it is misleading to regard the Chun government as being 
neoliberal, although there was a massive influx of foreign capital during its tenure. Upon 
taking office in 1980, the Chun government’s institutional implementation of economic 
stabilisation and economic liberalisation resulted from the state’s autonomous decision to 
solve the structural difficulties that had stemmed from the strong drive to foster the heavy 
chemical industry in 1970s, on the one hand (Haggard & Moon 1990: 219), and, on the 
other hand, from the external pressure of multilateral agencies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and donor 
governments, such as the United States (Chang 2003a: 1). During the early stages of the 
Chun administration, the IMF and the IBRD demanded the liberalisation of imports, 
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reform of the tariff system, deregulation of foreign exchange and the reduction of guidance 
policy finance, and the Chun government sought enormous sums in foreign loans in order 
to resolve the economic recession during that period (Yoon 2006: 87-88).  
However, it is an oversimplification to regard the Chun government as being neo-liberal 
because correctly identifying the nature and behaviour of the state involves far more than a 
mere analysis of economic indicators. In the case of Chun’s government, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the state relinquished control over labour policy, or even industrial 
or financial policy. Shin and Chang (2003) describe the Chun government as follows: 
‘General Chun was by no means a neo-liberal himself, but he allied himself with Neo-
Liberal bureaucrats and implemented a series of institutional changes that signalled the 
start of a Neo-Liberal offensive against the developmental state […] While its force was 
somewhat diminished, developmentalism still remained the overarching ideology of the 
regime, and proved formidably effective in the development of certain industries, 
especially information technology industries. Many of the formal institutional changes in 
Neo-Liberal direction made under Chun, such as financial liberalization and the 
introduction of Industrial Development Law, were limited in scope and had their 
effectiveness curtailed by the inertia stemming from the more slowly changing informal 
institutions such as bureaucratic convention and business practice’ (67).  
In order to stabilise the economy without completely overhauling Korea’s financial and 
industrial structures, at last, Chun relied heavily on labour control. The rhetoric of 
‘corporatist’ bargaining evaporated as he explicitly codified all informal practices and 
customs into formal institutions through the amendment of Korea’s labour laws in 1980, 
with the result that labour lost its collective power.  
 
4.1.3 The rising force of labour 
 
Labour disputes before 1987 
The deficiencies of both the formal institution and the lack of practice with regard to 
collective bargaining worsened labour relations and employment practices, as did the 
state’s direct repression of labour movements. Although the workers’ collective 
movements expressed their discontent about poor working conditions, low wages and 
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flaws in labour institutions more intensely from 1983 onwards, at that time, labour disputes 
remained fragmented and sporadic rather than cohesive and systematic. In fact, as seen in 
Table 4.1, the number of cases of labour disputes was not particularly high before 1987. 
Before 1987, the number of labour dispute cases that concerned wage increases was low; 
however, in 1987, the rate of disputes peaked at 70%. This was likely due to labour at last 
venting its pent-up discontent about the wage restriction policy during the wave of 
democratisation in 1987.  
 
Table 4.1: The number of disputes by reason (%) 
Year Total Wage 
Increases 
Unpaid 
Wages 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Working 
Conditions 
Dismissal Others 
1979 105 31(29.5) 26(34.3) - - 6(5.7) 27(25.7) 
1980 206 58(27.2) 68(33.0) - 16(7.8) 15(9.3) 42(25.7) 
1981 186 38(20.4) 69(37.1) 1(0.5) 36(19.4) 9(4.8) 23(12.6) 
1982 88 7(8.0) 26(29.5) 5(5.7) 21(23.9) 2(2.3) 23(26.1) 
1983 98 7(7.1) 36(36.7) 6(6.1) 19(19.4) 6(6.1) 15(15.4) 
1984 113 17(15.0) 39(34.5) - 14(12.4) 5(4.4) 36(31.8) 
1985 265 62(23.4) 61(23.0) - 47(17.7) 22(8.3) 61(23.0) 
1986 276 62(22.5) 48(17.4) - 48(17.4) 34(12.3) 73(26.4) 
1987 3,749 2613(69.7) 45(1.2) 170(4.5) 566(15.1) 51(1.4) 293(7.8) 
1988 1,873 946(50.5) 59(3.2) 328(17.5) 136(7.3) 110(5.3) 274(14.6) 
*Source: Ministry of Labour (2006a: 90). 
 
Another significant feature from this data is that the increasing trend toward dismissal 
appeared during this period, but it not was determinative, while the wage increase was 
much higher, as shown in this table. This means that the institutional pillars of the system 
were quite stable, but the traditional low wage system in the labour market was about to 
change due to significant demands from labour. In fact, at this time, the core feature of the 
traditional Korean employment system, which embodied a high level of job security and a 
relatively very low level of wages, was faced with the challenge of changing into a system 
of high security and high wages. 
 
The 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle  
The wave of strikes (also known as ‘the Great Workers’ Struggle’) that accompanied the 
6.29 Declaration of Democracy in 1987 was a stepping stone to the wholesale 
transformation of the labour movement; the scale and the nature of labour disputes, the 
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types and the scale of organisation, and the nature of the labour movement itself were all 
about to change.  
The 6.29 Declaration of Democracy is a symbolic moment in the course of Korea’s 
democratisation and it is often identified as the turning point for the military authoritarian 
regime (Chun government). On 29 June 1987, Roh Tae Woo, the leader of the ruling party 
(later, he was president between 1988 and 1993), announced that the government had 
accepted the public’s demands for a direct presidential election system and democratisation 
throughout society. 
Even before 1987 there had been intense pressure for democratisation. Chun reinstituted 
the political rights of ‘old’ opposition politicians and dissident (chaeya) leaders in 1984 
and, in doing so, he unleashed a powerful force for democratisation that would culminate 
in the June Uprising of 1987. On 13 April 1987, Chun announced the Protection of the 
Constitution Action, which banned all discourse about the constitutional amendment. As a 
result, further deterioration of the situation was unavoidable, and the torture and death of a 
Yonsei University student in police custody led to historic rallies on the streets from 10 
June to 27 June (also known as the June Uprising), which at their peak numbered about 
one million participants in 37 cities. The Chun government finally accepted the public’s 
demands, although it had previously considered crushing the demonstrations with the army 
(by that time the police were paralysed). 
After the declaration, the Constitution was amended on 27 October 1987, introducing a 
direct presidential election, and the presidential election was held on 16 December 1987. 
Thanks largely to the June Uprising in 1987, great development occurred in Korean 
democracy; however, labour relations and income distribution typically remained 
undemocratic and unequal. From 1986, there was an economic upturn that led to a 12-13% 
annual rate of economic growth and a national trade surplus of USD 4.6 billion dollars in 
1986, 9.9 billion dollars in 1987, and 14.2 billion dollars in 1988. By contrast, however, 
real wage rates had decreased continually from 1980 to 1986, and the working 
environment remained harsh, with long work hours, poor working conditions and frequent 
industrial accidents. For instance, although labour productivity rates increased by 12.5% 
every year from 1980 to 1987, wage increases remained fixed at 5.0% during the same 
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period (Ministry of Labour 2006a: 272) and workers’ income levels were frozen by 1987, 
as shown in Chart 4.1. 
 
Chart 4.1: Unit Labour Costs, and Labour Productivity per Unit Labour Input 
(index OECD base year (2005=100) 
 
*Source: OECD Stat: Data accessed on 14/ 08/ 2012, 21:07 UTC (GMT). 
*Note: data for Japan 1980-1989 are estimated values. 
 
As is generally known, unit labour cost (ULC) measures the average cost of labour per unit 
of output and is calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to real input. Thus, ULCs 
represent a direct link between productivity and the cost of labour used in generating 
output. A rise in an economy’s unit labour costs represents an increased reward for 
labour’s contribution to output.42 As shown in Chart 4.1, ULC in Korea for the period 
ranging from 1982 to 1987 averaged around 40 against the 2005 mark of 100, although the 
level of labour productivity per unit labour input was continually increasing during the 
                                                
42	  In	  broad	  terms,	  the	  OECD	  and	  the	  ILO	  regard	  unit	  labour	  costs	  as	  showing	  how	  much	  output	  an	  economy	  
produces	  relative	  to	  wages,	  or	  labour	  cost	  per	  unit	  of	  output.	  ULCs	  can	  be	  calculated	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  labour	  
compensation	  to	  real	  GDP.	  Thus,	  the	  concept	  of	  labour	  cost	  is	  broader	  than	  compensation	  of	  employees,	  as	  
it	   includes	   expenditures	   on	   welfare	   services,	   recruitment	   and	   training,	   and	   other	   miscellaneous	   costs,	  
including	   work	   clothes	   and	   taxes	   on	   employment	   (International	   Labour	   Organization	   (ILO)	   Resolutions	  
Concerning	  Statistics	  of	  Labour	  Cost	  Adopted	  by	  the	  11th	  International	  Conference	  of	  Labour	  Statisticians,	  
October	  1966,	  para.	  3).	  	  
The	   statistical	   concept	   of	   ULC	   is	   associated	   with	   four	   indicators:	   wage	   rates,	   earnings,	   compensation	   of	  
employers	  and	  labour	  costs,	  and	  are	  defined,	  by	  the	  International	  Conference	  of	  Labour	  Statisticians	  (ICLS),	  
as	  total	  labour	  costs	  expended	  in	  the	  production	  of	  one	  unit	  of	  output	  	  
(http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.asp?lang=e&subject=11).	  
0.00	  	  
50.00	  	  
100.00	  	  
0.00	  	  
50.00	  	  
100.00	  	  
150.00	  	  
Labour	  produclvity	  per	  unit	  labour	  input	   Denmark	  
Japan	   Korea	  
OECD	  -­‐	  Total	  
101	  
same period.43 After 1987, Korea’s ULC saw a trend of gradual, slight increases; however, 
there remained a substantial gap between the ULC levels of Korea and Denmark, one of 
the most advanced countries in the world, and an even greater gap between the ULC levels 
of Korea and Japan, the economic leader in the region. These figures demonstrate that 
Korean labour practices during this era were characterised by the maximum possible 
extraction of labour; workers earned low incomes but generated high productivity. Further 
evidence of the poor condition of working practices during this period is provided by the 
index of average working hours per week, which stood at around 51 hours during the 
period of 1980-1987 (Ministry of Labour 2006a: 272). As seen in Chart 4.2, which 
compares the incidence of the working hours of selected OECD countries, Korea’s real 
working hours per individual worker in one year were almost twice those of individual 
workers in Denmark, especially during the period ranging from 1980 to 1987, although 
there was a declining pattern after 1988. 
 
Chart 4.2: Average annual hours actually worked per worker (hours) 
 
*Source: OECD Stat: Data accessedon 09/ 02/ 2012, 17:27 UTC (GMT). 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that there was an upsurge in worker’s discontent and 
industrial action. Beginning with the strike at the Hyundai Engine factory on 5 July 1987, 
the Great Workers’ Struggle spread throughout the Masan Free Export Zone, with strike 
action taking place at 41 of the 75 companies in that area. In Changwon, 80,000 workers 
                                                
43	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  Labour	  Productivity	  measure	  compiled	  through	  the	  OECD	  System	  of	  Unit	  Labour	  
Cost	   Indicators	   is	   to	   enable	   users	   to	   decompose	   movements	   in	   the	   annual	   Unit	   Labour	   Cost	   into	   a	  
numerator	  that	  shows	  Labour	  Compensation	  per	  Unit	  Labour	  Input	  and	  a	  denominator	  that	  shows	  Labour	  
Productivity.	  For	  details,	  see	  OECD	  Productivity	  Database	  
	  (http://www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal/0,2647,en_2825_30453906_1_1_1_1_1,00.html#30453948).	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(out of a total of 150,000) participated in the strike action, and, nationally, 3,341 strikes 
occurred from July to September.44 
The Great Workers’ Struggle marked a watershed in the development of the labour 
movement in Korea and led to increased democratisation of the workplace, the widespread 
emergence of legal unions (see Appendix 2), large wage increase, and improvements in 
working conditions.45 According to an interviewee from a Korean employers’ organisation, 
the Great Workers’ Struggle was the seed for the democratic unions that were later 
organised into the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions(KCTU)46 (interviewee P147). 
It should be noted that, the militant ‘struggle-first and negotiation-later’ approach to labour 
disputes, which would come to characterise subsequent Korean industrial relations, was 
shaped by the Great Workers’ Struggle. For the state and employers, an awareness that 
labour disputes posed a severe risk to stability in terms of business management, and 
ultimately to economic development, took root (H.-J. Kim 1990: 58). Finally, it was 
recognised that heteronomous control over labour relations was unsustainable because it 
would lead only to more unrest and worsening labour relations. In other words, while the 
state’s labour policies, which were implemented mainly to secure business interests and 
employers’ absolute dominance over workers, could be seen superficially as attempts to 
promote stable labour relations, they in fact fostered instability and unbalanced labour 
relations, a fact that was clearly exposed by the June Uprising and the 6.29 Declaration of 
Democracy. Therefore, after the Great Workers’ Struggle, the state sought a dual strategy 
of guaranteeing the labour unions’ legal activities and prohibiting the growth of 
ideologically-oriented labour movements.  
In December 1986 and December 1987, the government made drastic amendments to the 
labour laws, which included major changes to the Labour Standards Act, the Trade Union 
                                                
44	  This	  struggle	  soon	  faced	  a	  concerted	  crackdown	  by	  the	  Chun	  government,	  which	  began	  on	  28	  August	  at	  
the	   funeral	  of	  Lee	  Suk-­‐kyu,	  a	  worker	  at	  Dae-­‐Woo	  Shipbuilding.	  At	   that	   funeral,	  933	  people	  were	  arrested	  
and	  67	  dissident	  leaders	  (including	  a	  solicitor,	  Roh	  Moo-­‐hyun,	  later	  to	  assume	  the	  presidency	  in	  2003)	  were	  
placed	  under	  arrest	  (Dong-­‐A	  Ilbo,	  3	  September	  1987).	  	  
45	  During	   that	  period,	  1,361	  unions	  were	  organised	  nationally	   for	   six	  months	  and	   the	   rate	  of	  unionisation	  
increased	  from	  14.35%	  to	  17.3%	  (Ministry	  of	  Labour	  2006a:	  100).	  	  
46	  The	  Korean	  Confederation	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  (KCTU)	  (or	  its	  antecedent,	  the	  Consociation	  of	  National	  Labour	  
Unions	  (CNLU)	  established	  in	  1994)	  is	  regarded	  as	  holding	  more	  radical	  views	  than	  the	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  
Trade	   Unions	   (FKTU),	   which	   was	   founded	   in	   1961	   and	   which	   was	   widely	   regarded	   as	   a	   government-­‐
controlled	  union.	  	  
47	  A	  KEF	  executive	  who	  had	  participated	  in	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Reforming	  Commission	  (LRRC)	  and	  LMGTC	  
negotiations	  since	  1996	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Act, the Conciliation Act and the Works Council Act (see Appendix 1). These efforts to 
establish balance in labour relations reflected the need to create an institutional setting for 
autonomous bargaining between employers and workers and to rule out intervention by the 
state. More specifically, these amendments recognised the need for greater freedom to 
form and operate unions and the need to alter the balance of power between employers and 
workers. However, obstacles to the transformation of labour relations still remained, such 
as the bans on third-party intervention, establishing multiple unions within the same 
company and political action by labour unions, as well as restrictions on the right of public 
officials to organise. For those issues, the discourse on institutional change to the labour 
laws took place during the Roh Tae-woo government, as will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
4.2 The zenith of organised labour movements under the Roh government 
(1988-1993) 
 
Under the Roh Tae-woo government, the core of the institutional reform of the 
employment system centred on establishing enterprise unionism, focusing particularly on 
providing guarantees that workers’ actions for wage increases would be legally protected; 
however, if disputes took a political form, the workers would face strong legal action. To 
do this, the Roh government’s basic policy was presented in a document by the Ministry of 
Labour as follows: building up the infrastructure in order to minimise state intervention in 
disputes between employers and workers and to ensure autonomous negotiation and 
resolution between employers and workers; promoting ‘healthy unions’ by restricting the 
influence of political movements on unionism; transforming previous labour relations 
riddled with distrust and antagonism into healthy labour practices through mutual 
understanding and reconciliation; strengthening labour representation; ensuring the internal 
stability of unions through union management training and financial support; reshaping 
institutional arrangements; and preventing the infiltration of unions by ‘impure forces’48 
(Ministry of Labour 1988: 3). How, then, did these policies differ from those of the 
previous Chun government, and what changes did the Great Workers’ Struggle bring to the 
employment system? 
                                                
48	  The	  impure	  force	  is	  assumed	  to	  refer	  to	  leftist,	  pro-­‐communist	  groups.	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The following section, first examines the change in the political configuration between the 
state, business and labour, and its impact on the employment system during this period. 
 
4.2.1 Challenging labour and Roh’s veto 
 
After the Great Workers’ Struggle and the 6.29 Declaration of Democracy, the discourse 
on the amendment of labour laws to reform Korea’s distribution structure was prevalent 
among political parties, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and even business 
organisations, including the Korean Employers Federation (KEF), in late 1987.49 On 27 
September 1987, constitutional reforms were passed by referendum, and the Labour 
Standards Act, the Labour Union Act, the Conciliation Act and the Workers Council Act 
were revised on November 1987.50 
 
The 1987 amendment of the labour laws 
Under the new Ninth Constitution, which introduced a minimum wage system, equal 
employment opportunities, and the rights to organise, conduct collective action and 
undertake collective bargaining, the labour laws were amended. First, the flexible working-
hours system, which allowed employers to demand that employees work more than 8 hours 
per day and more than 48 hours per week, was abolished. Moreover, the coverage of this 
Act was extended to companies with more than 10 workers. Second, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law was passed, providing female workers with equal 
opportunity to find employment, outlawing discrimination in job training, posting and 
promotion, and proscribing gender discrimination in terms of retirement and dismissal. 
                                                
49	  The	  Korea	  Employers	  Federation	  (KEF),	  which	  was	  established	  in	  1970,	  currently	  negotiates	  on	  behalf	  of	  
management	   in	   the	   Labour-­‐Management-­‐Government	   Tripartite	   Commission	   (LMGTC).	   Personnel	  
management,	   labour	   relations,	  workers	  welfare	  and	   industrial	   safety	  are	   their	  major	   concerns.	  The	  other	  
four	  organisations	  (of	  the	  Five	  Economic	  Organisations)	  that	  represent	  business	  interests	  as	  pressure	  groups	  
in	   Korea	   are	   the	   Federation	   of	   Korean	   Industries	   (FKI),	   the	   Korean	   Chamber	   of	   Commerce	   and	   Industry	  
(KCCI),	  the	  Korean	  International	  Trade	  Association	  (KITA)	  and	  the	  Korean	  Federation	  of	  Small	  and	  Medium	  
Businesses	  (KBIZ).	  	  
Of	  these,	  the	  FKI,	  established	  voluntarily	  by	  private	  businessmen	  in	  1961,	  has	  the	  most	  influence	  on	  society	  
and	   over	   employers	   in	   business	   and	   it	   aims	   to	   encourage	   further	   development	   of	   the	   liberal	   market	  
economy	  by	  promoting	  various	  economic	  policies.	  	  
50	  The	  Ninth	  Constitution	  (1987-­‐present)	  established	  the	  direct	  presidential	  election	  system	  and	  the	  single	  
five-­‐year	   presidential	   term	   as	  measures	   to	   prevent	   the	  monopolisation	   of	   power	   that	   had	   existed	   under	  
previous	  authoritarian	  governments.	  Under	  the	  Ninth	  Constitution,	  Roh	  Tae-­‐woo	  (the	  former	  leader	  of	  the	  
ruling	  party	  in	  the	  Chun	  government)	  was	  elected	  president	  in	  December	  1987.	  
105	  
Third, the Trade Union Act was revised to reduce restrictions on the formation of unions, 
such that larger trade unions and industrial unions would be able to be established.51 In 
addition, the restrictions on union officials were lifted, and the union shop system, which 
made membership in the union compulsory if the union represented more than two-thirds 
of the workforce, was legalised. Fourth, the Conciliation Act reduced the range of 
enterprises to which the term ‘public corporation’ could be applied, which meant that 
transactions on the Stock Exchange, mining companies and industrial energy businesses 
were removed from the public corporation sector; therefore, the rule that dictated that 
workers in those industries could not become union members was lifted. More importantly, 
an arbitration system was implemented so as to encourage independent negotiation 
between employers and workers at the enterprise level before applying the Conciliation 
Act. Fifth, notable amendments to the Workers Council Act, which contributed to 
providing works councils with greater autonomy and the ability to operate, helped to 
eliminate some of the grounds for disqualifying workers’ membership on works councils 
and removing the right of bureaucrats to dissolve a council.  
However, the labour laws that were revised in December 1987 mostly aimed to suppress 
the further advancement of labour mobilisation and the union movement, while just 
making unionisation and collective bargaining easier at the enterprise level. The so-called 
‘three prohibitions (Samkeum)’ in the labour law largely constrained labour. That is, the 
ban on multiple unions intended to prevent further unionisation, and the prohibition of 
‘third-party intervention’ kept the independent unions within the enterprise level isolated, 
while suppressing their horizontal and vertical network and solidarity. Under the two 
provisions, the national centre of democratic unions was long denied by the state and 
business. The ban on a union’s political activities effectively suppressed the workers’ 
political mobilisation and engagement in institutional politics. In the long run, while unions 
could mobilise at least on the enterprise level, the prohibition of the unions’ political 
activities became a more severe hindrance to the future consolidation of the Korean labour 
movement. Thus, after the democratic transition, the labour laws functioned as a weapon to 
suppress organised labour and the labour movement, moving it onto a kind of political path, 
while keeping it within the realm of industrial relations and market confrontation.  
                                                
51	  Before	  the	  Trade	  Union	  Act,	  unions	  could	  be	  formed	  by	  the	  approval	  of	  more	  than	  30	  workers	  or	  more	  
than	  1/5	  of	  workers,	  but	  only	  at	  the	  enterprise	  level.	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To summarise, the historical legacy of the exclusionary, market-oriented employment 
system pushed the unions towards a militant unionism, unlike the Western experience in 
which (trade) unions have underpinned the labour-centred political party in major politics 
and have influenced the political bargaining system between business and labour on the 
whole. As the developmental state required only economic mobilisation of labour while 
suppressing political mobilisation of labour, the Korean employment system was 
dominated by ‘market policy’ and the growth-first discipline rather than state corporatism. 
That is, labour’s condition was mainly determined by its market position instead of 
politically accommodating labour into state corporatism. Labour hardly had experienced 
political bargaining under the developmental state (at least, before the LMGTC agreement 
in 1998). 
This is quite different from Latin America where political inclusion of labour coincided 
with the development strategy of an import-substitution phase of industrialisation, which 
for many countries began in the 1930s. Securing the adherence of labour unions to the state 
or to political parties in power, the authoritarian regimes, thus, prevented labour 
mobilisation against the state. Consequently, labour relations in Latin American countries 
had already been characterised by the prevalence of political bargaining and the historical 
weakness of collective bargaining as a regional characteristic before transitions to formal 
democracy occurred (Cook 1998). The Brazilian labour unions, for example, had been 
deprived from being able to engage in collective bargaining and all bargaining was carried 
out at the individual level and through legal courts using labour lawyers (Kweon 2010: 81). 
On the contrary, unions in Korea preserved collective bargaining at the enterprise level. 
 
Roh’s veto of the 1988 amendment bill 
This explanation that the traditional idea and function of the developmental state had an 
impact on creating a labour exclusive employment system can be supported by the fact that 
President Roh vetoed the 1998 amendment bill.  
After the labour law amendments in 1987, a vigorous discourse about further labour law 
amendments occurred throughout 1988. The FKTU was not satisfied with the 1987 
amendments and petitioned the National Assembly to introduce further amendments that 
would permit the establishment of multiple unions within the same company, entitle unions 
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to engage in political activity (Kyunghyang-Shinmun 20 July 1988) and lift the ‘three 
prohibitions’. Opposition parties also held a ‘Hearing of Three Opposition Parties for 
Amendment of Labour Laws’ in order to draw up a common bill (Dong-A Ilbo 30 July 
1988). Furthermore, the newly emerging labour unions (later the KCTU) submitted a draft 
proposal to amend the labour laws (Kyunghyang-Shinmun, 16 July 1988). The common 
issues between the three opposition parties and the new labour unions were the right to 
establish multiple unions within the same company, the right of governmental officials to 
organise, the right for unions to engage in political activity and the elimination of third-
party intervention.  
Contrary to the moves of the opposition parties and labour, the Korea Employers 
Federation (KEF) appealed to political parties and the government with its ‘Statements on 
the Movement for Amendment of the Labour Laws’ (in August) and the ‘Opinion of 
Business on the Opposition Parties’ Proposal for Amendment of the Labour Laws’ (in 
December) (KEF 1989: 64).  
Through the allied power of labour and the opposition parties, and especially since the 
official opposition party had secured a parliamentary majority in the 13th general election 
(April 1988), in December 1988 the National Assembly passed legislation that sanctioned 
the establishment of a governmental officials’ union and a teachers’ union, eliminating the 
ban on political activity by unions. However, President Roh exercised his power of veto 
over the National Assembly’s amendments, except where they applied to the Labour 
Standards Act (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 1-1).52 Ultimately, the amendments of 1988 
were not implemented.  
 
4.2.2 Flexibility and dualism in the labour market 
 
In 1987, labour had secured the institutionalisation of collective bargaining, resulting in a 
more than 10% increase in real wages for whose employed in chaebol, and it had become 
increasingly difficult for businesses to continue their labour-exclusion strategy when 
workers belonged to unions that based their strategies on strong collective bargaining 
power. However, labour flexibility began to be introduced in the late 1980s, and from early 
                                                
52	  See	  the	  amendment	  to	  the	  Labour	  Standards	  Act	  (March	  1989)	  in	  Appendix	  1.	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1990 it became common for businesses to restructure personnel within individual 
companies. 
 
Deregulation of labour policy  
The deregulation of labour policy involves the withdrawal of state protection for workers 
against the excesses of the market, although the Korean state’s protection of labour rights 
had been minimal.53 From 1990, the Roh administration continually attempted to abolish 
various regulations on labour relations and the labour market, something that business had 
long demanded, and it promoted autonomous labour relations. Initially, the Roh 
government relaxed the conditions governing layoffs in order to support industrial reform 
and industrial rationalisation, which required a reduction in the number of jobs in declining 
industries. 
A Supreme Court ruling in 1991 sparked the end of job security. This ruling stipulated that 
it was reasonable for companies to make redundancies in cases that involved a change in 
work organisation in order to restore competitiveness, restructure the company or introduce 
the latest technology (Supreme Court, Ruling No.91Da8647). This ruling extended the 
1989 provision that such mass redundancies could be made only if there was an urgent 
managerial need to make them in order to prevent the business operation from being 
jeopardised (Supreme Court, Ruling No.87DaKa2132)54. This 1991 ruling effectively 
provided legitimacy to companies that wished to restructure personnel on the basis of a 
managerial risk assessment. 
Following this ruling, on 1 July 1992 the Ministry of Labour decided that the recent 
Supreme Court rulings should be applied to all workplaces through Haengjong Chido 
(administrative guidance),55 even if employees did not agree with the need to make 
redundancies, the procedure to be used, or the scale of the layoffs (Maeil Business 
Newspaper 7 January 1992). The state’s rapid response to the 1991 Supreme Court ruling 
                                                
53	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  1987	  amendment	  to	  Korea’s	   labour	  laws	  (see	  Appendix	  1),	  which	  
was	  derived	  from	  the	  political	  dynamics	  among	  the	  state,	  business	  and	  labour,	  had	  taken	  some	  measures	  to	  
provide	  some	  labour	  protection	  (certainly	  much	  more	  than	  in	  the	  past).	  	  
54	  Article	  27	  of	   the	  1987	  Labour	  Standards	  Act	  outlawed	   the	  dismissal,	   layoff,	   suspension	  or	   transfer	  of	  a	  
worker	  or	  a	  reduction	  in	  his/her	  wage	  without	  justifiable	  reason.	  In	  light	  of	  previous	  Supreme	  Court	  rulings,	  
the	  justifiable	  reason	  was	  restricted	  to	  instances	  of	  acute	  managerial	  need,	  such	  as	  bankruptcy,	  temporary	  
closure	  or	  shut	  down.	  
55Woo-­‐Cumings	  (2007:158)	  identifies	  this	  administrative	  guidance	  (Haengjong	  Chido	  in	  Korean)	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  
informal	  institution.	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was due to its intent to foster the market competitiveness of companies through increased 
labour flexibility. For instance, the state’s determination to deregulate labour relations and 
the labour market was demonstrated by the Economic Planning Board’s (EPB) statement 
that the relaxation of the restrictions on layoffs was inevitable if the problem of inefficient 
distribution of human resources were to be resolved (Maeil Business Newspaper 25 
January 1992).56 
 
Chart 4.3: Employees placed/ displaced rate (Manufacturing, %) 
 
*Source: Ministry of Labour (http://laborstat.molab.go.kr/): Data accessed on 15/08/ 2012, 
15:42 UTC (GMT). 
*Note: 1) data from companies with 10 and more employees. 
2) employees placed = employees hired that month/ employees in the previous month X 100. 
3) employees displaced = employees displaced that month/ employees in the previous month X 
100. 
 
This trend of pursuing numerical flexibility in the labour market can be represented by 
examining the changing trend of labour elasticity, as seen in Chart 4.3 and Chart 4.4. 
For manufacturing industries, which are more sensitive than other industries to changes in 
economic conditions, the ratio of employees placed was more than or equal to the ratio of 
employees displaced, up to 1988. However, from 1988 this pattern was reversed and the 
ratio of employees who were displaced far exceeded the ratio of those who were placed.  
                                                
56	  Many	  developmental	  state	  studies	  view	  the	  EPB	  as	  the	  pilot	  agent	  in	  the	  Korean	  developmental	  state	  (see,	  
for	  example,	  Choi	  1987;	  Haggard	  1990;	  Minns	  2001;	  etc.).	  Many	  scholars	  point	   to	  the	  1994	  absorption	  of	  
the	  EPB	   into	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Economy	  under	  the	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  government	  as	  marking	  the	  
official	  abandonment	  of	  the	  developmental	  state	  model.	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By examining the GDP elasticity of employment (Chart 4.4), a more dramatic change in 
the labour market becomes apparent. A basic definition of employment elasticity is ‘the 
percentage change in the number of employed persons in an economy or region associated 
with a percentage change in economic output, measured by gross domestic product’ 
(Kapsos 2005: 2). Thus, this represents the extent to which an increase in employment 
accompanies an increase in GDP. In general terms, employment is identified as elastic 
when the rate is over 1, while employment is inelastic when the rate is under 1.57 From the 
chart in footnote 57, it can be seen that the rates of elasticity of total employment during 
this period show a fluctuation around the 0.3 point. Compared to the rates for Western 
Europe for the period ranging from 1991 to 1995, Korea’s rates of employment elasticity 
have remained more consistent, suggesting that the labour market in Korea is more flexible 
than the labour market in Western Europe, but more strict than the labour market in North 
America (see footnote 57).  
A more important figure is the decline in the rate of employment elasticity in 
manufacturing industries, which increased rapidly between 1988 and 1989, but which 
began a major downturn after 1990. This can be explained by the large numbers of 
employee dismissals from major manufacturing companies in the early 1990s. By contrast, 
service industries, which were generally run by small-medium size businesses, maintained 
                                                
57	  Within	   this	   broad	   definition,	   the	   indicator	   of	   the	   employment	   growth	   associated	   with	   a	   given	   output	  
growth	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   employment	   elasticity	   of	   output	   growth	   (for	   overall	   GDP,	   measured	   as	   the	  
proportionate	  change	   in	  employment	  divided	  by	  the	  proportionate	  change	   in	  GDP	  during	  a	  given	  period).	  
Therefore,	   employment	   elasticity	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	   alternative	   term	   for	   employment	   intensity	   of	  
growth.	   Employment	   elasticity	   reflects	   the	   inverse	   of	   labour	   productivity.	  While	   an	   elasticity	   higher	   than	  
unity	   implies	  a	  decline	   in	  productivity,	   a	   lower	   than	  unity	  elasticity	  means	   that	  employment	  expansion	   is	  
taking	   place	   along	   with	   an	   increase	   in	   productivity.	   A	   rise	   in	   productivity	   would	   lead	   to	   a	   reduction	   in	  
employment	   elasticity.	   Therefore,	   raising	   employment	   elasticity	   in	   individual	   activities	   should	   not	   be	   an	  
objective,	   as	   this	   would	   mean	   a	   further	   lowering	   of	   productivity	   in	   economies	   that	   may	   already	   be	  
characterised	   by	   widespread	   low-­‐productivity	   employment	   (Islam	   2004:	   4-­‐5).	   A	   new	   methodological	  
approach	  to	  GDP	  elasticity	  of	  employment	  has	  been	  used	  in	  recent	  research	  by	  the	  ILO,	  and	  an	  index	  of	  the	  
employment	   elasticity	   of	   countries	   has	   been	  produced	   (see	   Kapsos	   2005).	   The	   employment	   elasticity	   for	  
selected	   regions	  and	  countries	  according	   to	  Kapsos’s	  new	  model	  are	  given	  below.	  As	   can	  be	   seen,	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  Korea,	  the	  difference	  in	  employment	  elasticity	  over	  the	  periods	  covered	  by	  the	  research	  is	  not	  large.	  	  
	   1991-­‐1995	   1995-­‐1999	   1999-­‐2003	  
Western	  Europe	   -­‐0.09	  	   0.36	  	   0.42	  	  
North	  America	   0.67	  	   0.44	  	   0.23	  	  
Denmark	   -­‐0.02	  	   0.42	  	   -­‐0.04	  	  
Japan	   0.34	  	   0.20	  	   -­‐0.24	  	  
Korea	   0.30	  	   0.17	  	   0.38	  	  
UK	   0.12	  	   0.43	  	   0.37	  	  
*Source: Kapsos (2005). 
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an employee level of around 0.7 throughout the 1990s. This phenomenon implies that the 
labour market of companies in the manufacturing industries, which were generally run by 
large firms, has become more rigid, but the labour market of service industries (which were 
mainly SMEs) has remained flexible, and unions at the big manufacturing companies still 
successfully maintained the stability of the labour market at that time. In fact, the dualism 
of the labour market can be confirmed by the fact that the rates of GDP elasticity in the 
manufacturing industries has been significantly lower than the rates of GDP elasticity in 
industry as a whole since 1992, except during the 1997 Asian crisis (see Chart 4.4 and 
Appendix 3). 
 
Chart 4.4: GDP elasticity of employment by industry 
 
*Source: Department of Statistics, Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
*Note: GDP elasticity of employment = rate of employment/rate of GDP.  
 
To summarise, it is true that labour was under the control of the state and business with 
various institutional measures such as those implemented during the past developmental 
era; however, the traditional employment system of a high level of job stability (and even 
high wage gains) were successfully maintained after the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle. 
More importantly, those measures also contributed to ensuring the dualism in the Korean 
employment system. While the movement for the establishment of democratic trade unions 
from the 1970s onwards, and the changes in the industrial structure during the 1980s, were 
actually blocked by the state’s institutional measures, some unions (in the big firms or 
chaebols in the manufacturing industry) with militant unionism that were invigorated since 
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the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle, resulted in the segmentation of workers and the 
breaking of labour homogeneity by firm size and by industry. 
This segmentation of the Korean labour market was due to the combined effect of the 
Supreme Court’s rulings, which allowed higher labour flexibility—as an institutional 
measure for rapidly increasing labour costs since the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle—and 
the militant unionism of core insider workers’ unions, which were derived from the 
tradition of a labour exclusive-employment system (e.g. the absence of a labour-centred 
political party or the lack of practice of collective bargaining). This situation, then, has 
been reinforced through the early 1990s, as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2.3 Complementary effects of militant unionism and state’s wage regulations 
 
In the early 1990s, the labour movement that had emerged and grown as a consequence of 
the Great Workers’ Struggle sought to apply pressure on businesses for wage increases and 
pushed ahead with establishing a nationwide alliance of unions. At the same time, pressure 
from businesses pushed through an amendment of the labour laws that mainly focused on 
the provision of an institutional guarantee for the diversification of employment types 
(functional flexibility). Facing an international recession, concerted pressure by businesses 
for revision of the labour laws, and escalating wage demands, the state was confronted 
with the dilemma of continuing its previous form of involvement and modus operandi in 
labour relations or adopting a new approach. In the early phase of this confusing period, 
the state unsurprisingly chose to pursue its familiar and well-trodden path, which sought to 
resolve the crisis by repressing labour while simultaneously maintaining a business-
friendly position. In fact, the Roh government attempted to pass a labour law bill in 1991-
1992 in response to the demands of business, the core point of which was the Total Wage 
Payment System, an aggressive state policy that endeavoured to change the wage system 
so as to suppress labour by unifying the wage structure (merging all types of extra pay or 
benefits) and to pay bonuses in line with company performance (Jang 2010: 218).  
 
Total Wage Payment System  
After democratisation in 1987, the annual wage gain rates increased sharply to 13.6% in 
1988 and 17.5% in 1989, and more significantly, the wage gain rate increases for 
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production workers were 15.5% in 1988 and 20.0% in 1989 (Ministry of Labour 1989: 5). 
To counter this, the state introduced a wage stabilisation programme in 1991. This wage 
stabilisation programme involved the government imposing aggressive wage controls on 
public enterprises and the 30 largest business groups.  
As a result, the annual wage gains for workers in the 30 largest business groups decreased 
from 18.8% in 1990 to 17.5% in 1991; however, the rate was still high in comparison to 
the rates of the OECDs and the region and it remained above government expectations. In 
addition, wage stabilisation in other business groups or small and medium enterprises was 
unsustainable due to the strong demands by workers for wage increases in those business 
groups, which had generally seen lower wage increase than big businesses since 1987 
(KEF 1992: 62-63). Despite the state’s aggressive measures to bring about wage restriction, 
Korea’s real wage growth rates were 10.1% in 1987, 21.1% in 1989, 18.8% in 1990, and 
17.5% in 1991 (Ministry of Labour 2006a: 122). Hence, the Roh government implemented 
the Total Wage Payment System in 1992. 
The Total Wage Payment System is a wage-decision system that determines the annual 
rate of wage gains by dividing a worker’s total yearly wage (the sum of all forms of salary, 
extra payments and bonuses) by twelve. Via this system, the government expected to 
simplify and rationalise the wage system, a system complicated by various kinds of extra 
payments, and which also incurred the transaction costs of individual bargaining on these 
payments. This policy also aimed to reduce the wage gains gap between workers in large, 
medium and small businesses. In addition, the government ordered that the bonus pay 
practice, through which various bonuses had been paid regularly, be changed to a company 
performance-based or workers’ merit-based bonus system.   
Despite the implementation of the Total Wage Payment System, which had pronounced 
that wage gains for 1992 should not exceed 5%, the rate of wage gain in 1992 was 15.2%. 
Ironically, one of the reasons for the failure of this policy was that the company 
performance-based bonus system introduced by the government brought about wage 
increases as companies passed on some of their gains to workers. In particular, in the case 
of public enterprises and the 30 big business groups, large extra payments were made 
under the result-based and long-service (seniority) systems, which led to substantial real 
wage gains (KEF 1993: 155-156).  
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This phenomenon can be identified as a result of the conflict between institutions with 
regards to labour laws, which may produce unexpected institutional outputs as a result of 
institutional complementarity. In this case, the intertwining of the Total Wage Payment 
System with the performance-based wage system and the seniority wage systems ran 
contrary to the original purpose of the institution(s). 
In addition, business failed to persuade workers to accept lower wage increases. Labour 
resisted and criticised this policy as a dirigiste measure aimed at weakening the rights of 
collective bargaining and equality in labour practice (Dong-A-Ilbo 24 March 1992). 
Furthermore, the unions pointed out that government employees were excluded from the 
Total Wage Payment System, even though the wages of government officials had 
increased significantly (Ministry of Labour 2006a: 124). 
In short, the wage struggle resulted more in concentrating the economic gains on workers 
in large firms rather than in equalising the impact upon the labour as a whole. One main 
reason for this is that the wage increase of workers was not based on an institutional 
consensus through a collective bargaining structure; instead, it was based on implicit 
acceptance by the employers of the relatively strong disruptive power of workers, which 
was strongest in the conglomerate company unions. The different degree of economic 
accommodation reflects the difference in the ‘power of capital in the market’ rather than 
the labour’s institutionalised power. As a result, the uneven accommodation of the unions’ 
demands, depending on the respective market position of the business, became the source 
of a new kind of inequality and dualism in the labour market. Ironically, in this context, the 
more the workers engaged in the wage struggle, the wider the gap would be within the 
working class. This was an unintended consequence of militant unionism and the state’s 
institutional measurements. 
 
4.3 Concluding remarks 
 
According to S-E Park’s study (1992) the change in the mode of authoritarian control over 
labour from 1987 switched from being one of despotic-authoritarianism to being one of 
negotiated-authoritarianism and hegemonic control, by which the institutional reforms for 
enhancing labour flexibility in favour of business and for securing the right of collective 
bargaining in favour of labour, were implemented. 
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Although the despotic-authoritarian and the negotiated-authoritarian systems shared a 
common feature, in that the labour movement was severely restricted and the interests of 
labour were excluded, the latter differed from the former in that it was business that took 
the initiative in the introduction of labour flexibility measures, such as the flexible labour 
market (numerical flexibility) and the flexible working hours system, diversification of 
contract type and wage system and workforce outsourcing (functional flexibility). What 
this study adds to Park’s study is that the negotiated-authoritarian system, therefore, was 
characterised by the continued exclusion of labour, as evidenced by the outlawing of the 
Consociation of National Labour Unions (CNLU), which was the forerunner of the KCTU, 
and the state’s policy of labour flexibility. Consequently, the market logic that gave full 
priority to economic growth and enhancing productivity began to assume control over 
shaping the employment system.  
In combination with enterprise unionism and militant unionism, especially of unions in the 
core insider labour market, these institutional reforms negatively affected workers by 
preventing them from developing a wider class consciousness and leading them to 
increasingly identify themselves as being employees of a company rather than being part 
of the wider working class. More importantly, due to the rivalry between the national-level 
unions (the KCTU and FKTU), labour disunity made it more difficult for workers to 
coalesce and for the unions to become a strong political actor. Furthermore, the embedded 
practice of a labour exclusive-employment system contributed to a break in labour 
homogeneity. For instance, there were no institutional channels for labour to present its 
political and socio-economic interests, due to the absence of a labour-centred political 
party and the lack of collective bargaining.  
As a result, labour’s responses to the strategies of the state and business were improvised 
and uncoordinated (and frequently militant), and in making distribution issues (wage 
increases, etc.) its top priority, the labour movement after 1987 failed to produce its own 
long-term strategy to cope with the new and elaborate strategies of the state and business. 
The focus here is on the institutional arrangement that restricted labour’s capacity to 
organise and accommodate itself into state corporatism. The institutional conditions of this 
capacity were also affected by labour’s unity and the resources that it could mobilise. This 
chapter reveals that, around the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggles, the dual union system 
(enterprise unionism and industrial unionism), the competing two national-level trade 
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unions, and the cleavage of the labour movement’s ideological cohesiveness (business 
unionism) appeared to play a role in affecting labour’s capacity to organise, and this 
institutional mixture is a critical factor of the employment system changes that lie ahead.58 
                                                
58	  For	  more	  about	  business	  unionism,	  see	  Chapter	  7	  in	  this	  thesis.	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Chapter 5  
Precursor to the New Employment System: A Corporatist 
Approach in the Kim Government (1993-1997)	  
	  
	  
5.0 Introduction 
	  
Korea’s first civilian government took office in February 1993, ending 30 years of 
authoritarian military regimes. The Kim Young-sam government implemented wide-
ranging economic, political and social reform programmes under the slogans of openness, 
democratisation and internationalisation. The so-called ‘Five-Year New Economy Plan’, 
which stressed civic participation and creativity, was one of those reform programmes 
(Republic of Korea Government 1993: 5-10). The Ministry of Labour’s Five-Year New 
Economy Plan: Reform of Labour Relations, 1993-1997, set out its position that ‘the 
impetus for economic development lies in the people’s voluntary participation and active 
creativeness, not in the government’s guidance and control’ (Ministry of Labour 1993: 4-5). 
This statement points to the Kim government’s effort to distance itself from the previous 
military governments. To achieve the ends set out in the five-year plan, the government 
stressed the implementation of institutional changes to foster rational labour relations and 
mutual trust between employers and workers, which would provide workers with enhanced 
opportunities to participate in the policy-making process in government and within 
companies. 
Although the manifesto laid out in the government documents sought to project the Kim 
Young-sam government as the architect and protector of Korean democracy and as 
marking the end of authoritarian practice in politics and governing, the government still 
faced a problem of political legitimacy. In the run up to 1992 presidential election, Kim 
Young-sam, the leader of the second-largest opposition party and one of strongest 
candidates for the presidency at that time, agreed to merge his political party with the third-
largest opposition party and the ruling party, entirely excluding the main opposition party, 
whose leader was Kim Dae-jung (who was president from 25 February 1998- 24 February 
2003). For President Roh and the ruling party, which did not hold a majority in the 
National Assembly, the merger was an opportunity to regain a parliamentary majority, 
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seize the initiative and secure their retirement. For Kim Young-sam, it provided the 
opportunity to secure the strong support of the ruling party in the upcoming presidential 
election and to overtake his long-time rival, Kim Dae-jung, who was the leader of the main 
opposition party at that time.  
This is known as the Samdang-Hapdang (the Three Party Merger), and in this research, 
rather than marking a shift from authoritarianism to democracy, it is considered to be an 
authoritarian pact because the liberal-democratic blocs, including Kim Dae-jung and his 
party, and the democratic unions bloc (i.e. the CNLU) were totally excluded. This political 
merger can be regarded as a coalition without a policy and the result of the overlapping 
interests of the (traditional) major politicians.  
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Kim Young-sam government from the outset continued on 
the path of state interventionism, maintaining a close bond with business and excluding 
labour. The difference between Kim Young-sam’s government and previous governments 
lies in the fact that the Kim government moved forward with institutional plans to enhance 
corporatist practices at individual workplaces and to steer the employment system at the 
national level. In regards to wage policy, the government prescribed ‘autonomous wage 
bargaining between employers and workers’ as the way forward; in regards to the 
employment system reform, it built a corporatist’s institutional body, the Labour Relations 
Reforming Commission (LRRC). To what extent, then, did the state intervene to promote 
an ‘autonomous relationship’ between business and labour, and what was the institutional 
output from this change in the employment system? 
The focus of this chapter lies in investigating the Korean (developmental) state’s changing 
role towards the employment system, in line with Korean democratisation since 1987. For 
example, did Korea’s path towards democratisation bring about a new type of rule-making 
process in the employment system and, if so, what form did it take (i.e. a tripartite system, 
a corporatist model or a new hybrid system)? Furthermore, how did the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis affect the change that occurred in the institutional policy regarding the 
Korean employment system, and how did that contribute to bringing about the critical 
juncture in the Korean employment system during the period of 1997-1999, with its 
combination of the endogenous elements of political dynamics and the mechanisms of 
institutional change?  
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Thus, this chapter addresses the political determinants that affected the restructuring of the 
Korean employment system: How did the transformation in the roles, functions, 
responsibilities and the capacity of the state (political elites and the bureaucracy), business 
and labour, manifest in the new employment system? This question focuses on how the 
change in the political configuration between political actors could serve to lead to the 
Korean developmental state’s transition into a new approach to economic growth and 
employment system. In answering this question, two elements must be considered. First, in 
employing the developmental state thesis, how did the embedded roles of the state 
(especially the roles of the elite bureaucrats), business and labour, which had persisted 
throughout the developmental state era, change and to what extent did this influence the 
transformation of the employment system and the developmental state’s transformation? 
Second, employing the fact that institutional changes are interactive (i.e. they involve inter-
factor relationships), multilateral (i.e. they involve the relationships between the actors and 
their interests and preferences, and their reactions to the institutions), and multidimensional 
(i.e. they involve the labour market, labour relations and labour protection), one must 
examine whether the restructuring of the employment system was derived from a mixture 
of domestic political conditions and external pressures, the competing interests and 
preferences of the actors and the combined effect of diverse policy implementations. For 
instance, can the labour flexibility in the Korean labour market be better understood by 
considering how the socio-democratic movements in Korean politics and the neo-liberal 
pressures from the international market, business’ policy preference for greater flexibility 
in response to liberal reform of the economic system and labour’s resistance, and the 
complementary effect of labour laws and socio-economic reforms, were combined and 
how they interacted? 
Toward this end, this chapter begins by examining the impact that the Korean state’s new 
institutional challenge of corporatism has had on the employment system. 
 
5.1 A period of corporatist fervour 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, the wage gains after the 1987 democratisation struggle and 
the rising power of the labour movement were the result of power struggles between 
chaebol employers and workers; they were not the result of a national economic situation 
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or individual companies’ managerial conditions. Until 1991, the government’s wage policy 
was focused on a wage stabilisation strategy that aimed to stimulate the national economy, 
curb prices and improve labour productivity. However, that policy failed. During the 
period ranging from 1989 to 1991, annual wage increases remained at over 18% and, more 
significantly, the wage gap between large corporations and small and medium businesses 
showed no signs of reduction. Therefore, in 1992 the government implemented the Total 
Wage Payment System. Nevertheless, it too failed, in part as a result of institutional 
complementarity (inverted against the original policy object) between the newly 
implemented measures and the embedded practices of the wage system (e.g. the seniority-
based wage system and the result-based wage system). 
 
Chart 5.1: Unit Labour Costs, and Labour Productivity per Unit Labour Input	  
(index	  OECD	  base	  year	  (2005=100))	  
	  
*Source: OECD Stat: Data accessed on 14/ 08/ 2012, 21:07 UTC (GMT) 
*Note: 1) data for Japan 1980-1989 is estimated. 
2) for terminology, see footnote 42 in Chapter 4.  
 
As seen in Chart 5.1, the unit labour cost (ULC) continually increased after 1987 and 
exceeded the increases in the labour productivity per unit labour input from 1992. This 
trend is significant in that Korea’s ULC overtook the ULCs of the OECD, as a whole, and 
the ULC of one of the most advanced countries, Denmark, after 1995. Although this 
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upward trend began to slow after 1996, the significance of these figures is that they 
indicate that Korea experienced high rates of wage increases from 1992 to1996, but labour 
productivity increases fell short of wage increases during this period. 
In this context, the newly launched Kim Young-sam government implemented a series of 
institutional measures to stabilise wages. As will be discussed below, such a strategy was, 
in effect, a means of forming the corporatist’s practice of collective bargaining at each 
workplace and at the national level, without the state’s direct intervention. 
 
5.1.1 Wage bargaining between labour and business 
 
The real practice of establishing collective agreements on wage issues occurred between 
labour and business, not among the labour-business-government tripartite arrangement. 
The Kim government pressed ahead with the following plan, which was announced as part 
of the Economic Management Plan (28 December 1992), and confirmed that the wage 
policy would be determined through a labour-business consultation process.59 The FKTU-
KEF Wage Consultation was created to negotiate a standard rate of annual wage increases 
and to recommend that rate to individual companies. From that point, other than the 
government setting the institutional setting for wage bargaining, the entire process was to 
occur without any direct state intervention.  
It is clear that collective efforts were made to reach collective agreements during the period 
ranging from 1993 to 1995. This involved two rounds of FKTU-KEF Wage Consultation 
(1993, 1994) and two FKTU-KEF joint declarations (1993, 1995). The first wage 
bargaining in 1993 was notable for being the first time in Korean history than an attempt 
was made to reach a collective agreement on wage bargaining. It was also the first time 
that a plan was derived not from the state but from the KEF, whose suggestion was 
accepted by the FKTU. This marks the point at which the government withdrew from the 
use of authoritarian wage controls, such as its wage guideline scheme and the Total Wage 
Payment System.  
                                                
59	  In	  order	  to	  secure	  sustainable	  economic	  development	  in	  light	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  were	  anticipated	  due	  
to	   the	   international	   and	   national	   economic	   situation,	   the	   government	   was	   to	   construct	   a	   basic	   policy	  
direction	   for	   fiscal	   health,	   financial	   growth,	   foreign	   exchange	   and	   social	   development.	   The	   Ministry	   of	  
Strategy	   and	   Finance	   was	   to	   produce	   a	   draft	   policy	   and,	   through	   consultation	   with	   other	   economic	  
departments	  of	  the	  government,	  this	  would	  be	  finalised	  and	  made	  public	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.	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However, this first consultation faced criticism because the pact involved only two high-
ranking organisations. The behind-the-scenes negotiations did not involve the democratic 
union blocs or even the FKTU’s member unions. In particular, the FKTU faced criticism 
over its wage restriction policy, with critics arguing that it was effectively acting in 
collusion with the state to limit wage increases. In other words, the bottom-up approach 
advocated by the corporatists was never present during this consultation.  
Another important aspect of the FKTU-KEF negotiations during this period was that the 
FKTU stressed the need for third-party involvement in the FKTU-KEF wage bargaining 
process. Although the FKTU had positively reviewed the 1993 wage consultation process, 
it felt that it would be beneficial for the government to be involved in debating the 
implementation of the FKTU-KEF recommendations and their policy implications. The 
FKTU’s insistence on a tripartite arrangement that included the government led to the 
government’s participation in consultation on the issues of policy and regulation reform. 
Thus, the 1994 FKTU-KEF Wage Consultation had two negotiation groups: (1) labour and 
business on wage bargaining itself and (2) labour, business and government on policy and 
regulation reform. As a result of this consultation, the FKTU and KEF agreed on wage 
increases of 5.0–8.7% and made 13 recommendations to the government.  
The FKTU’s assertive approach to tripartite consultation, however, provoked antipathy 
from the Consociation of National Labour Unions (CNLU) and democratic labour blocs, 
and this hostility was ultimately directed against the FKTU-KEF-Kim government 
tripartite arrangement.60 In early 1994, the CNLU targeted the dismantling of the FKTU-
KEF Wage Consultation. In 1995, the FKTU-KEF Wage Consultation foundered in the 
face of the CNLU’s resistance and the strong opposition from FKTU’s member unions. In 
particular, a group of CNLU and democratic labour bloc members, who would go on to 
establish the KCTU, began to gain greater support from various local and industrial unions 
and began to expand its influence over the labour movement. The leadership of the FKTU, 
in turn, held a closed debate on the social pact issue, but they decided not to gather the 
opinions of member unions (Hankyoreh 7 March 1995; Kyunghyang Shinmun 13 March 
1995). The government acquiesced to the FKTU leadership’s assertive stance on the 
decision-making process within the FKTU, because the Kim government began to be 
                                                
60	  For	  details	  of	  CNLU	  and	  KCTU,	  see	  footnote	  46	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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concerned that the FKTU’s weakening influence over labour would lead to the more 
radical KCTU further increasing its influence over labour, with subsequent repercussions 
for both the state and business. 
This implies that a dissymmetry of political power existed between business and labour at 
that time. Although labour could act effectively to resist government-imposed wage 
controls that does not mean that labour had strong political power in the institutional 
implementation of the entire employment system. Key political rights, such as political 
activity by unions and third-party intervention, were not granted until a decade later, and 
labour was not formally and openly consulted on labour policy until then (Haagh & Cook 
2005: 189). The rivalry and antagonism that existed between the KCTU and the FKTU was 
one of the reasons that labour failed to establish itself as a significant actor in the political 
arena. 
To labour, therefore, the state’s meditation was necessary because labour was not able to 
mobilise political resources due to segmented unions or to obtain support from major 
political parties, while business utilised the political superiority that had been embedded in 
the state-business relationship through the past developmental era.  
Finally, in 1995, the Wage Consultation broke down due to KEF’s refusal to accept the 
formation of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) (Ministry of Labour 1996: 
57-58). In 1996, annual wage increases (5.1-8.1%) were set by the government because the 
labour-business consultation on wage bargaining failed to agree on a standing rate. By that 
time, the labour-business consultation process was beginning to show severe signs of strain, 
despite the government’s efforts to restore faith in the process through initiatives, such as 
the ‘Labour-Business-Government Indaba’ (23 March 1995; 20 July 1995; 24 April 1996). 
Moreover, the likelihood of achieving consensus between labour and business was 
diminished by the on-going conflict that existed between the two national unions (FKTU 
and KCTU) and the struggles in the motor industry, the metal industry and the public 
sector (Ministry of Labour 1997a: 41).  
The government finally gave up the idea of a standing rate for wage increases in 1997. 
According to the Ministry of Labour (2006a: 134), the government recognised that its 
policy of inducing wage stabilisation through the labour-business consultation process and 
its announcement of a standing rate was ineffective in bridging the wage gap and 
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reforming the wage system. Moreover, although it had partly contributed to ensuring wage 
stabilisation, wages had been tending towards stabilisation since 1990 (there was 11.9% 
real wage growth in 1997). 
To summarise, the FKTU-KEF Wage Consultation processes of 1993 and 1994 provided 
important lessons for labour, business and the state regarding further developments in 
social consensus approaches to labour relations. Nevertheless, as an exercise in producing 
a consensus on labour relations, those wage consultation processes must be viewed as a 
failure. In particular, the ‘social consensus’ reached by the FKTU-KEF consultations refers 
not to a consensus approach to labour relations per se, but to the strategic (or ideological) 
means by which the state and business attempted to restrict wage increases and the means 
by which labour attempted to gain wage increases. Another problem for this wage 
consultation process was that it excluded the democratic labour blocs; consequently, the 
consultations lacked legitimacy and reinforced factionalism within the labour movement.  
 
5.1.2 The Labour Relations Reforming Commission (LRRC) 
 
In this changing situation, the government reinvented itself as a mediator in the 
employment system. In April 1996, Kim Young-sam announced the ‘Idea for New Labour 
Relations’ (Hankook Business Newspaper 25 April 1996), which was to be accompanied 
by a reform-minded set of new institutions, a new approach to the employment system and 
the formation of a presidential committee for labour policy. However, despite the official 
rhetoric from the Kim Young-sam government, there was no political consensus on the 
specific direction that these labour practices should take. Even within the ruling party, 
criticism of the ‘Idea for New Labour Relations’ was prevalent, with critics dismissing it as 
little more than idealism and bearing no relation to the realities of labour practice. For 
instance, while critics regarded the lifting of the bans on third-party intervention, multiple 
unions and political activity by unions (the three prohibitions) as unacceptable, they 
viewed the implementation of flexible working hours and the temporary employment 
agency system as positive measures for enhancing industries’ competitiveness in the 
international market. In contrast, the leading opposition party approved of the ‘Idea for 
New Labour Relations’, but it took a different stance on the issues of dismissal, temporary 
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employment agencies and flexible working hours, and it was opposed to fundamental 
changes to the existing system (Maeil Business Newspaper 4 May 1996).  
With this fragmented situation existing in the main political arena, and even within the 
state entities (the Blue House, government and ruling party), the government sought new 
ways to press forward with the implementation of institutional reforms, such as amending 
the labour laws. To accomplish this, the Labour Relations Reforming Commission was 
launched after the announcement of the government’s declaration of the ‘Idea for New 
Labour Relations’.  
 
Origin of the LRRC 
From the ‘Idea for New Labour Relations’, and its fifth principle in particular, it is clear 
that the Kim government recognised that institutional reform of the labour laws was 
inevitable. Thus, the Labour Relations Reforming Commission (LRRC) was established on 
9 May 1996 with the purpose of conducting a discourse on how to amend the labour laws. 
The process that led to the amendment of Korea’s labour laws should not be seen simply as 
a state-led affair; rather it was a complex process that included dialogue among business, 
labour and the state about the Korean employment system and international pressure to 
reform labour relations in Korea (Hankyoreh 2 April 1996). For instance, the prime movers 
within the government, Park Se-il (a senior presidential secretary) and Jin Nyum (head of 
the Ministry of Labour) brought up the issue of labour law amendment as a way of 
improving standards of living and as a response to globalisation. In particular, they 
emphasised the importance of labour law reform in order to meet the conditions for 
admittance to international organisations, pointing to the ILO’s pressure for labour practice 
reform and the conditions for joining the OECD (Maeil Business Newspaper 16 April 
1996).61 From interviews with officials from the Ministry of Labour, it becomes clear that 
the LRRC was founded as a means of convincing the OECD that Korea was taking the 
                                                
61	  Within	  the	  academic	  literature,	  there	  is	  little	  discussion	  about	  why	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  so	  strongly	  wished	  to	  
join	  the	  OECD,	  although	  a	  commonly	  held	  view	  is	  that	  he	  wished	  to	  make	  a	  notable	  achievement	  during	  his	  
reign	  and	  that	  joining	  the	  OECD	  would	  accomplish	  that;	  thus,	  making	  Korea	  one	  of	  the	  advanced	  countries	  
would	   reflect	   positively	   on	   his	   leadership.	  Most	   researchers	   agree	   that	   Korea’s	   entry	   into	   the	  OECD	  was	  
premature,	  given	  the	  country’s	  economic	  and	  social	  conditions	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  that	  this	  led	  to	  Korea	  being	  
stricken	  by	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  one	  year	  later.	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necessary steps to meet the OECD’s conditions for admittance, rather than for building a 
social consensus system.62 
The LRRC was established for the purpose of convincing the OECD to grant membership to 
Korea. At the time, I was participating in OECD meetings and attempting to persuade the 
representatives from other countries to approve Korea’s admission to the OECD. Before my 
meeting, there had been discussion within the OECD for many years about Korea joining, but 
Korean representatives had failed to prove that Korea met the institutional standards for 
OECD membership. Discussion on Korean membership had, thus, been at an impasse for 
years. When I first attended OECD meetings and met other representatives, they informed me 
that they felt that previous Korean representatives had lied and that they could not believe the 
Korean government’s promises. I, therefore, contacted the Korean government and requested 
that they do something to make the representatives of other OECD members believe that 
Korea was intent upon making the reforms necessary for membership. I received a fax from 
the Korean government informing me that the LRRC had been established to amend Korea’s 
labour laws so as to improve labour standards in Korea. The OECD representatives were 
disbelieving at first, questioning whether it was ‘another lie’. This is the behind-the-scenes 
story of Korea’s entry to the OECD and the establishment of the LRRC, a story not reported 
by the mass media and one that nobody in Korea knows (interviewee  P6).63 
 
The concerns of and conflicts within the LRRC 
The LRRC’s primary concerns were the gaining of approval for multiple unions within the 
same company and the establishment of multiple trade unions at the national level, aims 
that had received considerable attention from business and labour from an early stage. In 
regard to the first objective, establishing multiple unions within the same company, the aim 
                                                
62	  A	   long-­‐servinggovernment	   officer	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Labour,	  who	   participated	   in	   the	   LMGTC,	   and	  who	  
played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  establishing	  and	  developing	  the	  Employment	  Insurance	  system.	  
63	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  LRRC	  lay	  in	  to	  the	  president’s	  desire	  to	  join	  the	  OECD	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  
accounts	   given	   by	   various	   participants	   in	   this	   research,	   including	   government	   officials,	   business	   leaders,	  
labour	  leaders	  and	  researchers	  from	  various	  disciplines.	  Among	  them,	  one	  interviewee	  who	  worked	  for	  the	  
LMGTC	  and	  other	  governmental	  organisations	  argues	  that	  the	  early	  joining	  of	  OECD	  (in	  1996)	  is	  the	  reason	  
for	  all	  other	  affairs,	  such	  as:	  
Korea’s	  entry	  to	  the	  OECD	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  President	  Kim’s	  will	  and	  the	  conditions	  required	  for	  
Korean	   membership,	   which	   were	   the	   reform	   of	   labour	   relations	   and	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   financial	  
market.	  These	  two	  reforms	  were	  poorly	  implemented	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  we	  were	  hit	  
by	  the	  financial	  crisis	  a	  year	  later.	  As	  we	  (the	  government)	  had	  dissolved	  the	  entire	  monitoring	  system	  
for	  financial	  flows,	  no	  one	  knew	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Korea	  would	  become	  infected	  by	  the	  South	  Asian	  
financial	  crisis	  in	  early	  1997.	  Before	  that,	  we	  had	  thorough	  control	  over	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  market.	  
In	  short,	  I	  believe	  that	  joining	  the	  OECD	  was	  the	  immediate	  cause	  of	  Korea’s	  financial	  crisis	  1997.	  The	  
dismantlement	  of	  the	  centrally	  controlled	  financial	  system	  began	  at	  that	  time	  (interviewee	  P3).	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was to permit democratic unions (or branches of the KCTU) to be established in individual 
workplaces, even if a union was already in place, without any legal permission. The second 
aim referred to establishing multiple top-level trade unions at the national level, which 
meant that the KCTU would be officially recognised as a union and could take its place 
alongside the FKTU as a national-level union. To the KCTU, therefore, the second 
objective was much more urgent.  
Business organisations declared that managerial innovation and discussion would be 
necessary if labour relations were to escape from the traditional logic of labour repression 
and move towards a more co-operative labour-business relationship. While the FKTU 
made no official announcement about how it viewed the stance held by business 
organisations, the KCTU expressed its concern that, since it had not been invited to join 
the LRRC in its early stages, meaningful discussion on changing labour relations would 
not be possible without its involvement. Here, the Blue House demonstrated its strong 
commitment to changing the pattern of Korean labour relations. ParkSe-il, the senior 
presidential secretary for social welfare, announced the LRRC would discuss both lifting 
of the bans on multiple unions, third-party intervention and political activity by unions, and 
bringing the rights of unions into line with those in advanced countries (Maeil Business 
Newspaper 25 April 1996).  
During the process of gathering opinions within the LRRC system, persistent conflicts 
existed both between and within the business sector, the labour movement and government. 
These conflicts occurred even within the Blue House. For instance, Park Se-il argued that 
multiple national-level trade unions should be allowed and that the KCTU should be 
officially recognised. In doing so, he maintained that arguments by pro-economic growth 
theorists were contrary to the real labour practices at that time and he noted Kim Young-
sam’s desire for greater negotiation between labour and business. On the other, Lee Suk-
chae, a senior presidential secretary for economics, insisted that multiple unions within the 
same company and multiple national-level trade unions would be detrimental to the 
economy. He argued that a layoff system, a temporary employment agency system, a 
flexible working-hours system, a ‘no-work-no-pay’ discipline, a ban on the payment of 
union officials by companies, worker replacement and restrictions on the types of 
workplaces in which labour disputes could take place should be swiftly implemented in 
order to improve Korea’s economic competitiveness (Hankyoreh 4 November 1996).  
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Furthermore, there were clear differences of opinion within the business sector and the 
labour movement. The KEF considered the legalisation of multiple unions within the same 
company acceptable if the payment of union officials was not the responsibility of the 
company, whereas the FKI clung to its position of opposing multiple (trade) unions and 
third-party intervention. This is because that most of KEF membership companies had 
already strong and large-size unions within their workplaces, which were under control of 
the KCTU, so that, to employers of KEF, the legalisation of the multiple unions within the 
same company could serve to weaken the power of sole union in their workplace, by 
allowing other unions forming within the same company but no financial supports to them. 
For the FKI, which were directly influenced by the chaebols, however, the status quo is the 
best policy option. In regard to disputes within the labour movement, while the KCTU 
accepted the employers’ demand for labour market flexibility, via the introduction of a 
flexible working-hours system in return for the recognition of multiple national-level trade 
unions, the FKTU refused to accept any institutional reform aimed at changing recent 
labour-business relations because it was the only legal trade union (Hankook Business 
Newspaper 6 Nov. 1996). However, according to an interview with an FKTU executive 
officer, the FKTU’s position was complicated by intra-union conflict as factions emerged 
within the FKTU on the issue of whether the union should support the moves to permit 
multiple national-level trade unions (interviewee P964). 
From among the various stances of these actors, it is possible to map out two policy 
preference networks: the first preference was for a more liberal bloc comprised of the 
KCTU, the KEF and Park Se-il, which held a shared view on the acceptance of multiple 
(national-level trade) unions and which argued for more labour-inclusive reforms; the 
second preference was for a more conservative bloc, which wanted to keep the status quo 
and which prioritised more flexible labour market reforms. That bloc included the FKTU, 
the FKI and Lee Suk-chae. Although these two policy preference blocs did not officially 
align themselves, as such, during negotiations within the LRRC, it is clear that struggles 
occurred within the Blue House (between the two presidential secretaries), between the 
FKTU and the KCTU, and between the FKI and the KEF.  
 
                                                
64	  An	  executive	  member	  of	  the	  FKTU	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  LRRC	  and	  LMGTC	  and	  who	  worked	  for	  the	  Blue	  
House	  as	  a	  presidential	  aide	  in	  the	  Roh	  Moo-­‐hyun	  government.	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5.2 1996 labour laws and its re-amendment in 1997 
 
Although the LRRC reached an agreement, albeit a partial agreement, on the amendments 
to the labour laws, the political circles did not all look favourably upon the content of the 
agreement. Furthermore, labour and business representatives made it clear that they 
opposed submitting the bill to the National Assembly for one reason or another (Maeil 
Business Newspaper 16 November 1996). However, the government pushed forward with 
the LRRC’s recommendations and announced its proposals for amendments to the labour 
laws on 3 December1996 (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: The Actions of the Labour Relations Reforming Commission (LRRC) 
Date Activity 
24 
14 
April 
May 
Kim Young-sam announces the ‘Idea of New Labour Relations’ 
Opening of an exclusive window for amendment of the labour laws'  
15 
 
Three subcommittees established in the LRRC 
18 May -11June Plenary session (2nd - 5th) 
27 May - 5 June Public hearings in Seoul, Gwangju, and Busan 
14-20 June Workshop (1st-4th) 
15 July Interim report to the Blue House* 
16-31 
 
Open forum on amendment of the labour laws  
6 Aug General discussion on amendment of the labour laws 
13 
 
6th Plenary session and formation of the special subcommittee  
19 Sep 7th Plenary session and the special subcommittee's draft proposal  
1 Oct KCTU's declaration of non-cooperation with the LRRC 
25 
 
First draft agreement of the LRRC passed 
7 Nov 
14th Plenary session and confirmation of the outline of the 
amendments 
10 
 
 
 
Government-ruling party session sets the deadline for amendment 
for the end of the year 
23 
 
Meeting of Vice-Ministers of affiliated government departments 
29 
 
Prime Minister reports government's proposal of amendment to 
President Kim 
3 
26 
Dec 
 
Government's proposal confirmed 
Passed in the National Assembly 
Source:	  Kyunghyang	  Shinmun	  4	  December	  1996;	  Maeil	  Business	  Newspaper	  27	  December	  1996 
On the one hand, the core points of this proposal were the lifting of the bans on third-party 
intervention, multiple union representation within the same company and political activity 
by unions (three prohibitions, samkeum); on the other hand, they also included the 
introduction of a new dismissal system for employees based on ‘urgent business reasons’ 
(which made firing employees easier), a flexible working-hours system and restrictions on 
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the temporary employment agency system (three systems, samje) (Labour Relations 
Reform Commission 1998: 267-269).65 
Interestingly, the fundamental proposals contained in the February 1998 Labour-
Management-Government Tripartite Commission agreement are strikingly similar to the 
previous government’s 1996 proposal for amendment of the labour laws.66Indeed, the 
principle of social consensus that underpinned the agreement had already been established 
two years before with the founding of the LRRC and, in fact, it had its origins in the 
postponed attempt to amend Korean labour law that had occurred a decade earlier (the 
1988 amendment of the labour laws and Roh’s veto).67 What, then, led to the effort to 
revive this principle? The answer lies in the difficulties that were encountered in 
developing a new approach to the employment system due to the political dynamics that 
occurred among the actors: labour, business, the ruling party, the opposition and the Blue 
House. 
 
5.2.1 The 1996 amendment of the labour laws 
	  
The passing of the revised bill 
Both the ruling party and the opposition expressed their concerns about the government’s 
proposed amendments and those concerns were shared by both the labour movement and 
the business sector. Labour made strong protests demanding the rejection of the proposal, 
while the KEF stated that it would continue to rigidly employ the ‘no-work-no-pay’ 
principle and it would take workers to court if they went on strike. 
This impasse, which was derived from the labour movement’s threats to call a general 
strike and the opposition parties’ rejection of further discussion on the bill, led the 
government and the ruling party to rush through a revised bill without the opposition’s 
                                                
65	  The	   temporary	  agency	   system	  refers	   to	  an	  employment	   system	   in	  which	  an	  employment	  agency	   farms	  
out	   its	  workers	   to	   other	   companies	   on	   a	   temporary	   basis	   (dispatched	  work).	   These	   companies	   have	   the	  
right	  to	  control	  and	  monitor	  agency	  workers,	  but	  the	  workers’	  wages	  are	  paid	  by	  the	  employment	  agency.	  
The	   agency	  workers’	  working	  hours	   and	  holiday	   allowances	   comply	  with	   those	  of	   the	   company	   to	  which	  
they	  are	  sent.	  Although	  this	  practice	  is	  restricted	  under	  certain	  articles	  of	  Korean	  labour	  law,	  it	  is	  prevalent	  
in	  the	  secretarial,	  driver,	  cleaning	  and	  security	  businesses.	  	  
66	  See	  Chapter	  6.	  
67	  See	  Section	  4.2.1	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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agreement. At six a.m. on 26 December 1996, the ruling party, Shin Han Kook Dang (New 
Korean Party), opened a plenary session of the National Assembly and presented and 
passed 11 bills, including the labour law amendment bill, within seven minutes without the 
presence of any opposition party legislators. 
However, the government was forced to withdraw those 1996 amendments due to the 
general strike that was called immediately after the laws were passed. The KCTU took the 
lead in that general strike with the wholehearted support of the FKTU. The KCTU, which 
had expected to be made legal through the 1996 amendments to the labour laws, was 
shocked and outraged that its legalisation was to be delayed until 2000.  
The postponement of official recognition of the KCTU ignited the call for action against 
the revised labour laws. In addition, the articles in the revised laws making it easier to lay-
off frightened office workers, who were facing increasing job insecurity (Kyunghyang 
Shinmun 29 December 1996; Dong-A Ilbo 28 December 1996). The KCTU—with 150,000 
members in 88 factories owned by major companies (such as Hyundai Motors, Hyundai 
Heavy Industry and Kia Motors) - called a general strike on 26 December, the first in 
Korean history. On that same day, the FKTU announced that it would join the strike.  
 
Who pushed forward? 
The question remains, why did the revised bill run contrary to the earlier government 
proposal and the LRRC draft and why did it delay approval of the establishment of 
multiple unions? Little indication of the reasons for this can be found in the literature and 
there is little in the way of other documentary evidence. Therefore, this research draws 
upon the accounts of various interviewees who had direct experience of the events at the 
time. Their accounts all point to the change being driven by the business sector’s lobbying 
of the Blue House, but there are small differences between their accounts. For example, an 
FKTU executive asserts that the government’s revised bill was the result of FKI’s strong 
influence on bureaucrats, but he equally emphasised the role played by the president. 
Park Se-il, senior presidential secretary of social welfare, designed the overall planning of the 
reforms, but Lee Suk-chae, senior presidential secretary for economic growth, in arguing 
against the proposal as it stood won the game. Lee’s policy preference reflected the views of 
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the FKI.68 Another aspect to consider is the president’s role. Without his order, nothing can 
proceed further. I believe that the case of the revised labour laws bill fits in with Korea’s 
tradition of reform processes (interviewee P9). 
Another interviewee who worked for the LRRC and LMGTC supports the above argument. 
Yes, the revised bill, which had completely changed from the LRRC’s draft, was the result of 
the chaebols' influence—like Samsung, Hyundai […]—before the bill was submitted to the 
National Assembly (interviewee P5).  
However, a newspaper article at the time expressed doubts that the government had rushed 
through the process of passing the revised bill without the opposition’s agreement due to 
lobbying by business. That article quoted from an interview with a KEF official who 
claimed that, except for changes on a few issues, the modified contents of the revised bill 
could not be understood as a result of lobbying by business interests and that, instead, the 
1996 amendment of the labour laws should be seen as the ruling party’s political decision 
(Maeil Nodong Sinmun 21 February 1997). In order to examine this claim in more detail, 
and to double-check the accuracy of the original press article, the researcher sought out this 
official during the field research for this study. That official’s statement is below: 
On 25 December 1996, leaders of business and KEF executives visited Kim Dae-jung, the 
opposition party leader. We asked for his and the opposition party’s support for the revised 
labour law bill, especially on the issue of permitting mass redundancies for improving 
industrial competitiveness. Well, this is not known to the public, but I believe the time has 
come to reveal the true story. Indeed, I would like to make this public someday. Kim Dae-
jung said that he needed some time to examine this issue more carefully and then he would try 
to persuade labour. This was Kim Dae-jung’s first positive response to business leaders, and 
we were greatly encouraged by this. However, our visit to Kim Dae-jung was reported in 
Dong-A Ilbo (a national newspaper) on 25 December 1996 with an accompanying 
photograph. Now, the ruling party … seemed to consider that now business representatives 
had contacted and visited the opposition party that we were making a deal with the 
opposition. But we, the business leaders, saw little point in treating the opposition party any 
                                                
68	  Another	  participant	  in	  this	  research	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  Kim	  Hyun-­‐chul,	  a	  rising	  political	  star	  and	  a	  son	  of	  
President	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam,	  had	  a	  strong	  friendship	  with	  Lee	  Suk-­‐chae.	  Thus,	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  decided	  in	  Lee	  
Suk-­‐chae’s	   favour.	  However,	   the	  researcher	   is	  unconvinced	  by	  this	  argument	  and	  regards	   it	  as	   little	  more	  
than	  a	  conspiracy	  theory	  because	  Lee	  Suk-­‐chae	  was	  dismissed	  from	  office	  in	  February	  1997	  after	  being	  held	  
responsible	  for	  the	  1996	  amendment	  of	  the	  labour	  laws,	  while	  Park	  Se-­‐il	  continued	  in	  office	  until	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  government.	   If	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  had	  decided	   in	  Lee’s	   favour	  because	  he	  was	  his	   son’s	  
friend,	  then	  why	  was	  he	  immediately	  discharged	  after	  the	  1997	  re-­‐amendment	  of	  labour	  laws?	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differently to the ruling party if the bill were to be passed. We felt that if we met and 
persuaded the opposition party to agree to the passing of the bill, then this would be helpful to 
the government anyway. That was our approach. But the government seemed to interpret this 
more politically. Therefore, the government made a political decision to pass the revised bill 
as soon as possible within that year, with the aim of blocking further business petitions to the 
opposition party. They, therefore, rushed the revised bill through the National Assembly 
without consulting their political opponents (interviewee P1). 
In this statement, it should be noted that the interviewee uses the term ‘government’ in 
reference to the ruling party and the Blue House, which both appeared to be shocked by the 
fact that business sought to gain political support from the opposition party, especially 
from Kim Dae-jung, a long-time opposition leader and the strongest candidate for the 
presidency. In fact, in light of the upcoming presidential election, the opposition party and 
Kim Dae-jung did not conclusively decide in favour of business or labour, although the 
official party line appeared to be in favour of accepting multiple unions, third-party 
intervention and the establishing of public officials (Kukje Shinmun 13 November 1996).  
Nevertheless, the meeting between business leaders and Kim Dae-jung should be seen as 
particularly significant because Kim Dae-jung had been isolated from the major business 
leaders and their financial support during the reign of the authoritarian-military regimes. 
As this research consistently argues and demonstrates, a strong bond had existed between 
business and the state throughout the period of developmental-authoritarian regimes, but 
little contact had occurred between business and opposition parties or liberal blocs. This 
meeting implies that the dismantling of the mutual connection between business and the 
old-state (or authoritarian-conservative blocs) had begun. To put it differently, the 
businesses and chaebols, which had been privileged with selective industrial policy under 
the developmental context, felt the need to create a close relationship with the opposition 
parties or liberal blocs (e.g. Kim Dae-jung) because they recognised that these liberal blocs 
could seize power in the next presidential election. As competitive electoral and pluralistic-
interest politics became the only game in town (Chang & Evans 2005: 109-120), the 
practice in which business gave (political and financial) support to authoritarian-
conservative blocs started to break down, and business sought a way to survive in shifting 
political conditions. 
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The general strike and the re-amendment of labour laws 
After the passing of the revised bill, the opposition parties, Kuk Min Hoe Ui (the National 
Conference for New Politics)69 and Ja Min Ryun (the United Liberal Democrats),70 called 
for the annulment of the 1996 legislation and filed a complaint with the Constitutional 
Court (Kyunghyang Shinmun 27 December 1996; Hankyoreh 17 January 1997). 
The general strike grew at the beginning of 1997 as students, intellectuals and civil rights 
organisations joined the protests after Kim Young-sam’s start-of-the-year press 
conference71 (Kyunghyang Shinmun 8 January 1997; Dong-A Ilbo14 January 1997). The 
number of participants in the general strike reached almost 400,000 per day. Finally, Kim 
invited KCTU union leaders to dinner at the Blue House to canvass their opinions, but this 
in fact signalled informal presidential approval for the existence of the KCTU. In turn, Kim 
met with the leaders of the opposition parties and, finally, the ruling party and the two 
opposition parties reached agreement on the re-amendments of the 1996 labour laws and 
passed the revised laws in the National Assembly on 10 March.  
Thus, the period of labour relations reform that had begun with Kim’s ‘Idea for New 
Labour Relations’ on 24 April 1996 came to an end with the agreement between the ruling 
and the opposition parties and the passing of the revised laws. This period was marked by 
the failure of business and labour to reach an agreement through the LRRC, the rushing 
                                                
69	  Kim	  Dae-­‐jung	  (who	  was	  president	   from	  1998	  to	  2003)	  established	  Sae	  Jung	  Chi	  Kuk	  Min	  Hoe	  Ui	  (or	  Kuk	  
Min	  Hoe	  Ui)	  with	  former	  members	  of	  Pyunghwa	  Minju	  Dang	  (the	  Peaceful	  Democratic	  Party)	  and	  dissidents	  
(chaeya)	  who	  had	  supported	  him	  during	  the	  1987	  presidential	  election.	  With	  the	  formation	  of	  this	  political	  
party,	  Kim	  re-­‐entered	  the	  political	  arena	  after	  having	  announced	  his	  retirement	  from	  politics	   immediately	  
after	  his	   failure	   in	   the	  1992	  presidential	  election,	  and	  the	  party	  became	  the	  main	  opposition	  party	   in	   the	  
National	  Assembly.	  In	  2000,	  this	  party	  was	  renamed	  Sae	  Chun	  Nyun	  Minju	  Dang	  (or	  Min	  Ju	  Dang,	  the	  New	  
Millennium	  Democrat	  Party),	  and	  its	  leader,	  Kim	  Dae-­‐jung,	  was	  elected	  president	  in	  1997.	  
70	  At	  the	  end	  of	  1994,	  democrats	  within	  the	  Minju	  Jayu	  Dang	  (or	  Min	  Ja	  Dang,	  the	  Democratic	  Liberal	  Party),	  
the	  ruling	  party	  from	  1990	  to	  1998,	  pressed	  for	  the	  retirement	  of	  Kim	  Jong-­‐pil	  (a	  party	   leader	  and	  former	  
member	  of	   the	  political	  elite	  during	  the	  Park	  era).	  Kim	  Jong-­‐pil	   then	   left	   the	  party	  along	  with	  republicans	  
from	  Min	  Ja	  Dang	  and	  formed	  the	  Ja	  Min	  Ryun.	  In	  the	  1997	  presidential	  election	  campaign,	  Ja	  Min	  Ryun	  and	  
Kuk	  Min	  Hoe	  Ui	   forged	  a	   single	   candidacy	  agreement	   (also	  known	  as	   the	  DJP	   single	   candidacy),	  with	  Kim	  
Dae-­‐jung	   as	   the	   presidential	   candidate.	   After	   winning	   the	   presidential	   election,	   they	   formed	   a	   coalition	  
government.	  In	  the	  2000	  general	  election,	  however,	  the	  Ja	  Min	  Ryun	  failed	  to	  win	  more	  than	  20	  seats	  in	  the	  
National	   Assembly,	   the	   figure	   required	   to	   form	   a	   parliamentary	   negotiation	   body,	   and	   Kim	   Jong-­‐pil	  
announced	   his	   retirement	   in	   2004.	   In	   2006,	   this	   party	   was	   integrated	   into	   the	  Han	   Na	   Ra	   Dang	   (Grand	  
National	  Party).	  
71	  Kim’s	   press	   conference	   was	   highly	   anticipated	   by	   the	   people	   since	   Korean	   society	   was	   confronting	  
numerous	   issues	   at	   that	   time,	   including	   the	   shock	   of	   the	   1996	   labour	   laws	   amendment	   and	   the	   general	  
strike.	  However,	  the	  press	  conference	  did	   little	  to	  address	  the	  people’s	  concerns,	  and	  they	  rejected	  Kim’s	  
declaration	  as	  perfidious	  (Maeil	  Business	  Newspaper	  8	  January	  1997;	  Dong-­‐A	  Ilbo	  8	  January	  1997).	  
135	  
through of a revised bill without the presence of opposition party legislators in the National 
Assembly, a general strike and popular protest, the withdrawal of the 1996 labour laws and, 
ultimately, the agreement between the ruling and the opposition parties on the re-
legislation of Korea’s labour laws. Three groups of actors within the labour-business-state 
network (the KCTU and the FKTU, the FKI and KEF, and the president and the ruling 
party) and the leaders of the opposition party and the civil groups either clashed with one 
another, contested one another’s positions or combined their efforts, depending on their 
respective interests in regard to the amendment of the labour laws. The 1997 amendment 
of the labour laws, therefore, should be understood as a consequence the struggles and 
negotiations between the various actors. 
 
5.2.2 Implication of 1997 re-amendment of the labour laws 
 
At the heart of these labour law amendments, which introduced considerable changes to 
Korea’s employment system, were provisions for mass redundancies, flexible working 
hours, the hiring of replacement workers during strikes, the prohibition of remuneration of 
full-time union officials by employers, and the lifting of bans on multiple unions, political 
activities by unions and third-party intervention (see Appendix 1). The ruling party went 
beyond the proposals contained in the government’s revised bill and passed a clause that 
would permit the establishment of multiple enterprise unions in the workplace after five 
years (beginning in 2002) and clearly defined the cases that could be considered ‘urgent 
managerial reasons’ for dismissing workers, such as persistent managerial problems, 
restructuring to improve productivity, technological innovation or changing the type of 
enterprise.  
From the fundamental change in the 1997 labour laws, it can be seen that the main changes 
to the employment system resulted in two institutional outcomes: while increased freedoms 
and a number of advances were secured for the labour movement and workers, labour’s 
position, and particularly its right to industrial action, was weakened. 
The withdrawal of the three prohibitions (samkeum) strengthened the union movement and 
labour’s collective rights. However, labour was weakened by the prohibition of 
remuneration of full-time union officials by employers, the formalisation of the ‘no-work-
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no-pay’ doctrine, the permission to hire replacement workers during labour disputes, and 
the new restrictions on labour disputes. To put it more concretely, while the right to engage 
in union activity was extended, the right to strike was curtailed by prohibiting disputes 
other than those that stemmed solely from purely economic motivations. Thus, although it 
became easier to organise union activity beyond the enterprise level, taking industrial 
action became more difficult.   
After multiple unions were permitted, the rivalry between the two legal national unions 
increased. The legalisation of the KCTU was a double-edged sword; the legitimacy that the 
KCTU had gained as a result of the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle meant that it could take 
the initiative and launch a new phase of labour relations in Korea, but simultaneously, the 
Korean labour movement entered a period of division as labour split into two or more 
competing factions. 
Ultimately, Labour market flexibility was reinforced by mass redundancies, 
implementation of a flexible working-hours system and a temporary employment agency 
system, which increased employment flexibility and the flexible use of the labour force, 
respectively. This change was driven by business, which had been seeking to end 
employment rigidity ever since the previous developmental era. The mass redundancies, 
justified as necessary to improve market competitiveness and to reform Korea’s industrial 
structure, were the stepping stones to replacing the ‘job for life’ (life-time employment) 
and seniority-based wage system with a performance-based wage system. Finally, both the 
mass redundancies and the flexible working hours contributed to increasing the flexibility 
of the labour market and job insecurity. 
The most significant feature of labour market reform lies in allowing employers to use 
temporary employment agencies and part-time workers, and the state responded to those 
demands by offering institutional support. For instance, the Ministry of Labour drew up a 
policy on part-time labour and introduced its ‘Guidance on Part-time Workers’ Protection’, 
which stipulated that part-time workers (those working no more than 30.8 hours per week) 
must receive severance pay and the minimum wage, but this freed employers from the 
responsibility of providing paid holidays, monthly holidays or annual holidays (Maeil 
Business Newspaper 10 January 1992).   
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However, the effect of the 1997 labour laws on Korean employment system could not be 
activated in reality, because the Asian financial crisis hit the Korean society at the end of 
that year and the new 1998 labour laws were implemented in early 1998 (see the following 
chapters). 
 
5.3 Dismantling the old-employment system 
 
Under the Kim government, both the business sector’s pressure to reinvigorate the 
economy and reinforce competitiveness and labour’s demands to enhance basic labour 
rights to conform to OECD standards had spurred the state to amend the labour laws. The 
state’s autonomy, however, was not sufficiently strong for it to be able to implement the 
terms of the revised labour laws due to the increased strength of the labour movement 
since 1987 and business’ influence on both labour and politics. In recognition of its 
reduced autonomy, the series of meetings by the ‘Labour-Business-Government Indaba’ 
from 1993 (Dong-A Ilbo 28 October 1993), which led to ‘the FKTU-KEF Wage 
Consultation’ and the establishment of ‘the Labour Relations Reform Commission’ in 1996, 
represented the state’s attempt to develop an alternative strategy towards institutional 
reform. Furthermore, the experience of the failures to reach agreement on the revision of 
the labour laws in late 1996 compounded the state’s recognition that the established 
unilateral decision-making process on labour policy was no longer tenable (Jang 2010: 
218). Reflecting the changing nature of power relations between the state and labour, the 
ban on the political activities of labour unions was lifted in 1996. 
The following section examines the changing mode of the Korean developmental state and 
its impact on the institutional change in the employment system. 
 
5.3.1 The retreat of the developmental state 
 
The state’s insulation from social interests is identified as one of the key features of the 
developmental state. However, social movements in Korea had matured since the 1960s, 
albeit slowly and on a limited scale at first. The movement in the 1970s to establish 
democratic unions broadened the range of social movements to include workers, and that 
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movement gradually gained ground in spite of the labour suppression strategy of the state 
and business. The 1987 June Uprising of university students and dissidents (chaeya) was 
the stepping-stone to the Great Workers’ Struggle. These events are widely recognised as 
the impetus behind Korea’s democratisation and provided both the intelligentsia and 
workers with the opportunity to express their political demands for participation in the 
redistribution of economic wealth. From 1987, the democratic labour movement began to 
exercise increasing leverage over labour unions, with the result that workers secured rapid 
and considerable increases in wages. However, these wage gains led to the weakening of 
Korea’s industrial competitiveness in international markets. While the Korean 
developmental state retained its export-led industrial strategy for economic growth, the 
wage gains had resulted in the disappearance of Korea’s comparative low-wage-advantage. 
Furthermore, with increased democratic competition and the restraining influence of the 
business sector and social groups, the state could no longer enjoy the same degree of 
autonomy that it once had. In early 1997, the general strike and protracted confrontation 
between the ruling party and opposition parties about the labour reform bill symbolised the 
Korean developmental state’s collapse, or transformation.  
However, it is also evident that the state’s traditional strategy of repressing labour had not 
disappeared. Even after the formation of a national-level alliance of unions (the KCTU) in 
1995, the state never gave up its labour-exclusion strategy, pushing through revised labour 
laws without debate at the end of 1996. However, the state’s methods for controlling labour 
had clearly moved on from the past, when the state had intervened directly and 
aggressively in disputes at individual workplaces, even on internal matters such as wages 
and workers welfare. By the 1990s, the role of controlling labour had partly passed into the 
hands of business, which presented itself as an active actor in the control of labour. 
Nevertheless, due to labour’s increased organisational power, neither business nor the state 
was able to succeed entirely in suppressing labour’s demands. 
 
5.3.2 Business’ new strategies on unions 
 
The remarkable development of labour power, the increase in real wages and the economic 
downturn forced businesses to map out a managerial production plan that included 
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consideration of labour relations. They contrived a variety of strategies for labour control, 
thus escaping the monolithic strategy of mere suppression of labour that had been utilised 
in the past, and they designed business rationalisation strategies for raising productivity, 
mirroring the ‘New Management Strategy’ discourse of the Kim government. The essence 
of this discourse was raising efficiency through rationalisation, which involved 
reorganisation of the entire management and production structures, including 
rationalisation of production processes and the wage system, labour mobility within 
companies and changes to corporate culture.  
The changes to the wage system were particularly significant. On the one hand, employers 
endeavoured to increase industrial output in line with wages, recognising that high wages 
could instil in workers the will to work and could encourage them to increase productivity 
and improve the quality of goods produced. Since the existing seniority-based wage system 
was a hindrance to boosting productivity, the new performance-based wage system, which 
had at its core the notion of increasing wage differentials between workers, aimed to reflect 
the performance of individual workers and the enterprise itself; therefore, it spurred on a 
flexible wage system. On the other hand, the performance-based wage system served to 
strengthened the employers’ control over workers through the evaluation system used to 
test the workers’ abilities, skills, and performance, which, although regularly used by 
employers in the past, now took on a new significance as it increased the power of 
employers to control increased in the workers’ wages.  
Furthermore, this wage system served to intensify competition among workers and, thus, 
weaken their solidarity. Consequently, business unionism and the segmentation of workers 
in the labour market (inside regular workers and outside atypical workers) was reinforced 
in accordance with the employers’ new management strategy against unions. For instance, 
business adopted a two-pronged strategy of inclusion of cooperative unions and exclusion 
of uncooperative unions, spreading its argument about the need for labour to take 
responsibility and eulogising cooperative labour relations through a workers’ education 
programme and propaganda about the economic crisis. From the accounts of interviewees 
for this research, this strategy is clear. 
The new management strategy, as it was known generally, began in 1993. Consciousness 
raising education programmes for workers has been prevalent from that year. The 
governments prior to the Kim Young-sam administration and business were determined that 
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the unions should perish. But with the Kim Young-sam government coming to power and the 
new management strategy, business recognised that the unions could not be forced to 
disappear and so changed its strategies so that unions were controlled within the system. 
Thus, the KCTU was legalised under the Kim government. The legalisation of democratic 
unions derived from an idea that democratic union blocs would not disappear, and if they 
existed, they should be in compliant and corporative relations with the state and business. […] 
Thus, the new management strategy arose, and lots of workers and unions were completely 
fooled by business. For instance, the labour union at the Hyundai Heavy Industry was taken in 
by this strategy and became a company-dominated union. A candidate who was in league 
with the employers won the union leadership election with the company directly intervening 
in the voting. Instances such as these were officially denied, but nine out of ten people know 
that this was the case. Workers who do the company’s bidding dominate the union. Such 
practices increased dramatically from the time of the Kim Young-sam government 
(interviewee P4). 
The new management strategy employed various kinds of company-sponsored clubs, such as 
bowling, hiking, etc.as a means of creating new labour relations. Membership in these clubs 
was granted to management and mid-ranking workers. Management staff then forged 
relationships with the other club members, the majority of whom were union members or 
production workers. By establishing a sense of company culture within the clubs, the 
employers sweetened workers and even their families. In contrast to the past, business had 
adopted a conciliatory approach to labour relations, but the weeding out of more radical 
activists still remained. Unlike in the past, business won over workers with financial 
incentives, and then the unions were corrupted (interviewee P1272).  
Through the use of such measures, a new concept of corporate culture, influenced by 
Japanese management strategy, was used as a device to exert hegemonic control over 
labour. This had its origin in the idea that a company culture could function as a bond to 
unite workers through the shared experience of their specific company’s organisational 
characteristics and values, as exemplified by the ‘Hope ’90s Family Training’ of Dae-Woo 
Shipbuilding and the ‘One mind, One Family Campaign’ of Hyundai Motors. Both cases 
show that these programmes had the purpose of establishing cooperative labour relations 
with the specific goals of ‘rebuilding mature values and workers’ spirit, sharing awareness 
about the reality of the company and its prospects, and reinforcing a sense of unity and 
community spirit’ (Park 1992: 313). According to a Korea Labour Institute survey, 90% of 
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100 big businesses in Korea ran this sort of company culture campaign and had a unit in 
charge of it (S-H Kim 1992: 139). In fact, this new conception of corporate culture and the 
dissemination of company values proved to be robust enough to resolve the long-standing 
antagonism between workers and business that arose from the great disputes of the late 
1980s (Yu 1996: 336).  
More importantly, the fact that Korea’s labour unions were founded on enterprise unionism 
was one of the reasons that most Korean workers came to view themselves as employees 
of a company rather than developing class consciousness as workers. According to T-S 
Song’s (2006) study on the labour relations of this time, one labour movement activist 
describes the situation as: ‘Making workers egoistic and indifferent to colleagues and 
collective action by courtesy of a monetary lure was the employers’ new technique of 
controlling workers’ (32). 
Under enterprise unionism, collective bargaining took place within individual workplaces, 
and the atomised nature of enterprise unionism meant that unions were unable to 
effectively challenge the employers. Moreover, since most union members associated 
union campaigns with the issue of wage increases, a long-term plan to oppose the changes 
to labour conditions was not regarded as a pressing concern. In this context, enterprise 
unionism was unfavourable to labour and its development as a major political actor, 
demonstrating that institutional restrictions have an impact on actors and influence or 
determine their goals, their capacity, their interests and even their behaviour. The article 
banning third-party intervention coupled with enterprise unionism severely limited the 
opportunity for joint action by unions and other opponents of government policy, with the 
result that the power of the labour movement was considerably reduced. More importantly, 
the Supreme Court’s broader interpretation of what constituted managerial prerogative 
made it far more difficult for unions to deal with the matters of new technologies and 
(un)employment. 
After Kim Young-sam took power in 1993, labour’s hardships grew, with the major unions 
in big businesses operating independently while remaining loosely involved with the 
declining CNLU. Although these major unions formed a new national body, the National 
Congress of Union Leaders (NCUL), that organisation had an inherent weakness in that it 
was run as a consultative body rather than as an institutional organisation. This was due to 
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the fact that the big business’ unions rejected establishing and participating in what would 
have been an illegal organisation for fear that they would be punished by the state. In fact, 
it is clear that the characteristics of the big business’ unions changed during this period, 
with more cooperative unions emerging at Hyundai Motors, Dae-Woo Motors and Se-Il 
Heavy Industry, and many existing unions adopting a more cooperative stance at these and 
other large enterprises.  
	  
5.4 Concluding remarks: Lessons from the pre-1997 era 
 
Did the financial crisis have an effect? 
The reason that the 1997 financial crisis has been generally regarded as the primary cause 
of the changes in the Korean employment system is that it accelerated the state and 
business’ implementation of a new approach to economic growth. That had an impact on 
the destiny of Korea’s unions and labour and the employment system. This study does not 
deny that the 1997 crisis had a major influence on the employment system in Korea (see 
the following chapters); indeed, this study recognises the crisis as a trigger for the radical 
transformation of Korea’s employment system. Nevertheless, globalisation had already 
contributed to various changes in the employment system prior to 1997. For instance, 
labour flexibility (easier hiring and firing, flexible working hours and the temporary 
employment agency system), changes to the wage system (the establishment of a 
performance-based wage system) and the introduction of employment insurance were 
implemented before the 1997 financial crisis (see Chapter 8). In other words, institutional 
change in terms of labour and employment policies, which sought to secure economic 
growth in the face of pressure from the global economy, occurred long before the 1997 
crisis. Moreover, such institutional changes were not derive solely from changes to the 
labour policy; they also occurred as a result of the inter-connection between labour policy, 
social policy and industrial policy, which was conceptualised earlier in this thesis as 
institutional complementarity. 
Thus, this study’s examination of the changes to Korea’s employment system in the period 
of critical juncture (1997-1999) focuses on the dynamics between the political actors 
dealing with the employment system reforms. As such, this study focuses on who, why and 
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how these political actors (who assumed that the globalisation effect was inevitable but 
nothing new) responded to pressure from the international economy, what institutional 
arrangements arose as a consequence, and the impact that these arrangements had on the 
Korean employment system. This section not only summarises the previous sections 
presented in this chapter, it also proposes the key questions for the following chapters. 
 
Institutional changes 
This chapter highlights a state practice that came to the fore at the beginning of the Kim 
Young-sam government: the promotion of autonomous labour relations (i.e. corporatism). 
This initiative was repeatedly the focus of state propaganda and involved the simultaneous 
reduction of the state’s role in, and the strengthening of business’ control over, labour 
relations. This meant that the state would come to focus much more on establishing, 
running and administering Korea’s institutional (legal and administrative) framework of 
corporatism and it would break away from the path of direct and physical intervention in 
labour relations.  
For instance, both formal institutions (such as the labour relations acts banning third-party 
intervention and political activity by unions) and ideological control through the use of 
political propaganda (such as debates on labour’s responsibility for economic growth and 
on sharing the pain of the economic crisis, and Kim’s rhetoric of Segyewha (globalisation)) 
were frequently used to control labour, and even the middle class. Another characteristic of 
this change was that the state and business selectively adopted a ‘carrot-and-stick’ strategy 
towards the labour movement. Unions that operated within the boundaries defined by the 
state were given the state’s support, whereas strong measures, including the use of military 
force, were taken against unions that challenged those boundaries. While this ‘double-
sidedness’ of labour policy in Korea was nothing new, from the early 1990s the ‘carrot’ 
was employed in a way that was similar to the way in which the ‘stick’ was employed. It 
can be seen, therefore, that the state’s new role of nurturing healthy labour relations 
worked in conjunction with its traditional role of ensuring labour exclusion. This points to 
the state’s recognition that its earlier monolithic strategy of simply suppressing labour had 
become inefficient and was no longer effective. 
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For example, the state’s administrative and financial support for the FKTU and the 
introduction of welfare policies for workers were indicative of the state’s efforts to co-opt 
workers through material inducements, while the administrative and physical repression 
against outsider unions, such as the CNLU and the National Congress of Union Leaders, 
and the use of the Emergency Adjustment Act against militant labour movements (such as 
those that called joint strikes at Hyundai’s affiliates in 1993) demonstrated the state’s 
strategy towards labour groups that it considered to be non-cooperative.73 This new ‘carrot-
and-stick approach’ met with conspicuous and consistent success. 
To summarise, the change in the state’s position with regard to labour relations can be 
understood as its response to two factors: the deregulation of the labour market and the 
decline of the traditional developmental state. The changes in labour relations and labour 
market policies that took place in the early 1990s were primarily driven by business 
interests, which shared a sense of impending economic crisis with the state, and which 
aimed to boost economic growth in the face of greater pressures from the international 
market. Moreover, the decline of the Korean developmental state was the direct result of 
the state’s attempt to overcome the inefficiency of state-led labour control through the use 
of ‘constraints’. Since the selective use of ‘inducements’ was increasingly seen as the best 
way to guarantee a labour force that could improve the market competitiveness of 
individual companies, the state came to recognise that business could deal more effectively 
with labour issues than it could. 
The nature of collective bargaining, the union system and the character of the labour 
organisation are other important aspects of the institutional arrangement that affected the 
ability of labour to organise effectively. As seen above, the method of collective 
bargaining via enterprise unionism severely restricted the capacity of national-level unions 
to establish national-level agreements. Consequently, the individual enterprise-level unions 
were, unsurprisingly, unable to thwart the implementation of labour flexibilisation 
programme, such as those involving mass layoffs, flexible working hours, etc.  
How labour defined its interests and which strategy it chose are notable structural factors to 
consider. For example, many of the important structural features of the labour movement 
were derived from the divisions between the FKTU and the KCTU, which failed to gain 
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sufficient political power to negotiate with the state and business on equal terms and, 
instead, openly competed against each other. The rivalry between the FKTU and the 
KCTU served to constrain their own strategic options and led to business gaining the upper 
hand in labour relations and the employment system–the institutional arrangements that 
served labour to be segmented into two trade unions and organised regular workers and 
atypical workers, and by firm-based, militant- business unionism will be presented in detail 
in Section 7.4 in Chapter 7.  
In the following chapters, this study will examine the LMGTC, a tripartite commission 
established by the state immediately after the 1997 crisis in an attempt to resolve the 
conflicts between the state, business and labour that arose from the financial crisis and its 
impact on the change in the Korean developmental state. The nature, function and 
structural features of the LMGTC are at the centre of the analysis, which will examine the 
following issues: whether this commission was merely a consultative organisation or a 
decision-making body with legal powers; whether the agenda of the LMGTC was limited 
to labour relations and employment or whether it was open to a corporatist agenda, 
including setting macro-economic policy; and whether the structural framework of the 
LMGTC allowed labour to reflect its interests adequately. More significantly, the key 
question is whether the introduction of the institutional measures of the LMGTC could be 
measured as the institutional opening for re-moulding the post-developmental state model, 
in which the relationship and interplay between state, business and labour could be newly 
forged. In order to investigate the character of institutional change, one must examine the 
theoretical coherence and conceptualisation of path-dependency or gradual (dialectical) 
change that occurred in the transformation of the Korean developmental state.	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Chapter 6  
The Emperor’s New Clothes: Building a Tripartite System in 
the Korean Employment System74 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
The demand for greater flexibility in the Korean labour market was not a new phenomenon; 
in fact, the business community had been calling for such measures since the early 1990s.75 
Both the business community’s interest in labour flexibility and labour’s interest in labour 
practice liberalisation (democratisation) were part of the institutional discourse of the 
Labour Relations Reforming Commission (LRRC), established in 1996, and the Labour-
Management-Government Tripartite Commission (LMGTC), established in 1998. While 
the business community pressed for the introduction of a new dismissal system (making it 
easier to fire employees), a flexible working-hours system and a temporary agency system 
(three systems, samje), labour representatives urged the lifting of the bans on third-party 
intervention in labour disputes, multiple union representation and political activity by 
unions (three prohibitions, samkeum). 
The business community’s demands for the reform of working practices were clearly 
incompatible with labour’s demands, and the state ultimately employed tripartism to 
resolve this situation, forming a tripartite committee composed of representatives of the 
state, business and labour. The formation of this body is a critical event in the history of 
the Korean employment system because it indicates that the state no longer had the will or 
the capacity to solely manage the employment system, particularly since the empowerment 
of labour in the wake of the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle meant that the state could no 
longer employ the same authoritarian-developmental means of isolating labour from 
politics and management as it had in the past.  
What, then, happened in Korea? Did Korea’s new institutional challenge of a tripartite 
approach to the employment system succeed after the LMGTC was formed in 1998? 
Employing the critical juncture framework, this chapter assumes that the formation of the 
                                                
74	  The	  title	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  taken	  from	  Louise	  Haagh’s	  article,	  ‘The	  Emperor’s	  New	  Clothes:	  Labor	  Reform	  
and	  Social	  Democratization	  in	  Chile’	  (Haagh	  2002b),	  in	  which	  she	  illustrates	  the	  path-­‐dependent	  process	  of	  
the	  Chilean	  labour	  market	  reform	  and	  its	  long-­‐term	  historical	  trajectory.	  
75	  See	  Chapters4	  and	  5.	  
147	  
LMGTC tripartite system was the seed to producing a new ruling process model in Korea, 
which combined the effect of diverse political and socio-economic conditions that 
permitted room for the existing institutions to manoeuvre (e.g. the 1997 financial crisis, 
labour empowerment after the 1997 general strike and the 1997 presidential election). Thus, 
this chapter aims to examine whether the Korean authoritarian-developmental state model, 
which had been sustained by the state-business coalition, gave way entirely to a new 
institutional approach, the tripartite system, for Korea’s employment system. As seen 
earlier in this thesis, this is because that employment system is designed and shaped by the 
endemic and distinct role and function of political configuration and its impact on the 
policy-making process; additionally, the change in the employment system indicates the 
institutional result of political dynamics (competition, negotiation, compromise) between 
actors under a particular political configuration, in which each actor has the will to change 
and reform the institutional arrangements.76 
 
6.1 Concepts: incremental change thesis 
 
From the new-institutionalist approach used in this research, it is clear that the 
displacement of an existing institution, the LRRC, by a new institution, the LMGTC, 
immediately after Kim Dae-jung’s presidential election victory in December 1997, so as to 
mobilise political resources and support for his strong reform plan, marks the beginning of 
the remoulding of the decision-making process and the development of a new Korean state 
model. On one hand, one could question whether this institutional transition has remained 
stable, whether it has been on a self-reinforcing trajectory, or whether it has contributed to 
dressing up the state in the latest attire (that is to say, the coordinated market economy or 
liberal market economy), as depicted in the Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Hanké, Rhodes & Thatcher 2007). On the other hand one could also 
question whether the Korean state has continued as a form of developmental state, a post-
developmental state, or a hybrid state, as described in the developmental state literature 
(Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Haggard 1990; Johnson 1982; Jones & Sakong 1980; 
Leftwich 1995; Wade 1990; Weiss 1998; Woo-Cumings 1999). What is clear from earlier 
research conducted in a variety of academic disciplines is that the Korean state introduced 
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a new institutional arrangement for its policy decision-making process (especially 
regarding the amendment of the Korean labour laws) and other processes. Nevertheless, 
when considered from a longer-term historical viewpoint, it is not clear whether this 
institutional implementation (the establishment of the LMGTC) was contingent and 
exogenously motivated or necessarily incremental and endogenously motivated at the 
moment of critical juncture (Collier & Collier 1991; Crouch & Farrell 2004; Culpepper 
2005; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; and see Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2). In short, two 
questions arise from the implementation of the LMGTC, which is regarded as the first 
comprehensive tripartite system for the employment system in the history of Korea: (1) 
How did the LMGTC originate, and has it been reinforced or has it decayed? And (2) 
Depending on the answer to the first question, how can the Korean state be characterised 
after the 1998 transformation?  
 
The actor-based approach 
In investigating institutional change, the aim should be to examine the content of 
institutional change (the actors’ various conflicting interests and preferences) rather than 
merely its form (policy outputs), as seen in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2). This task requires an 
exploration of the changing relationship between the institutions and the mediators of 
social action, such as ‘rule-making, rule-taking, and rule-breaking, spelling out what it 
means to follow a rule or not, and how this reflects on the rule itself’ (Streeck 2009: 121). 
Using this interpretation of the incremental change thesis, this chapter assumes that the 
actors have the following characteristics: the actors are not passive entities simply 
influenced by institutional circumstances; the main actors are labour, the state and business; 
and each of these three actors, while distinct from each other, should not be regarded as a 
single actor. First, since the actors are not passive, the primary objective of this research is 
to determine and analyse the actors’ political choices. For instance, why did the state 
establish the LMGTC, and why did business and labour participate in it? Second, although 
the main actor in the employment system is the labour movement (particularly in regard to 
labour relations), merely focusing on the labour movement or the unions ignores the 
interconnection between the state, business and labour. The process that led to the re-
amendment of the 1997 Labour Standards Act clearly demonstrates the dynamics of the 
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interaction between labour, the state and business.77 Third, while it is critically important to 
assume that the three actors are separate, it is equally important to note that each is 
composed of a number of different elements. For instance, labour consists of the unions 
(the two national unions, industrial unions, regional unions and enterprise unions), the 
relationships between union leaders and members, and the relationships between political 
parties and the ideological figures within labour. Similarly, the state consists of the 
political elites in the Blue House, the ruling party and opposition parties, the elite 
bureaucrats (primarily economic technocrats) and other governmental officials. Thus, 
analysing the inner-dynamics within this aggregation of elements is necessary if the actors, 
their roles and their strategies are to be examined properly. For example, in the case of 
labour, the key issues are the relationship between the KCTU and FKTU (whether 
cooperative, competitive or selectively cooperative) and the extent to which the national 
unions predominated over the enterprise unions. In the case of the state, different 
perceptions or institutional aims may have existed between the elite bureaucrats in the 
central government, the president and the people close to the president. This situation 
might also be found within business, where different aims and perceptions were likely to 
arise depending on the industry and the union that operated within that industry. 
The following sections examine the changing role and function of the state after the 1997 
crisis. Here, the key questions are whether or not the employment system reforms that were 
made point to the decline or the re-establishment of the Korean developmental state, which 
type of model of governance was employed to deal with the demands of business and 
labour (a developmental state model, a post-developmental state or something entirely 
different) and how and why the political elites and bureaucrats pursued specific policies. 
To this end, the LMGTC will be used as the organisation through which the state’s 
performance is analysed because it mediated the conflicts between business and labour and 
implemented the institutional arrangements. 
 
6.2 Displacement of the corporatist approach 
 
The first institutional attempt to bring about labour market flexibility and labour practice 
liberalisation began with the establishment of the LRRC in early 1996. As explored in the 
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previous chapter, however, this period is marked by the failure of the state’s corporatist 
approach, since at that stage the practice of collective bargaining between business and 
labour was embryonic. As Haggard and Kaufman (1994: 5-16) argue, the lack of an 
institutionalised consultation process among social partners led to conflict among the 
partners. 
What, then, does the introduction of an institutional measure for resolving the economic 
crisis and boosting economic growth in the face of increasing pressures from the 
international market tell us about the developmental state’s transformation into a different 
state model? As set out below, this research contends that the creation of the LMGTC (and 
its replacement of the LRRC) was driven by the complex situation resulting from the 
challenging circumstances brought about by the economic crisis, the election of a new 
political leadership that was under intense IMF pressure, but which also had its support, 
and the interaction that occurred between social partners (business and labour) during the 
economic crisis (but, the preferences and practices of the social partners had been moulded 
and represented through the past institutional experiences (e.g. the LRRC)). Therefore, this 
section aims to investigate the factors of the institutional change policy-making process 
that had an impact on the employment system (the tripartite system), by examining the 
combined effect of the exogenous and endogenous elements of institutional change. This 
provides an implication for the transition of the employment system in line with the 
Korean developmental state’s transformation. 
 
6.2.1 The path-breaking shock of the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
 
The establishment of the LMGTC in January 1998 and the compact it reached one month 
later were significant because they marked the first time in Korean history that any form of 
social consensus had been reached and this led to policy-makers revising Korea’s labour 
laws and expanding its policy on workers’ protection. The social compact that the LMGTC 
unveiled in February 1998 contained 98 measures, including a revision of the Labour 
Standards Act. It also recommended that the government introduce and expand social 
policy programmes that would protect the livelihoods of those expected to lose their jobs. 
What, then, brought about the establishment of the LMGTC, the agreement that was forged 
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between the social partners of the LMGTC, and the institutional transformation of Korea’s 
employment system that followed from this consensus? 
It is generally accepted that the core issues for the LMGTC, such as greater labour market 
flexibility, privatisation of public firms, the opening up of Korea’s financial market to the 
international market and the restructuring of corporate governance, were reforms that the 
IMF demanded as part of its financial rescue package in the wake of the 1997 economic 
crisis. Furthermore, the fact that the LMGTC’s discussions on issues, such as revision of 
the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (2001-2004), the reduction 
of working hours (1999-2004) and the introduction of a retirement pension system (March-
December 2004) stalled after Korea’s economy began to stabilise, appears to support the 
argument that it was the 1997 economic crisis that directly brought about wholesale 
changes to Korea’s institutional apparatus and the introduction of a raft of institutional 
reforms. 
Interviews with government officials who participated in the LMGTC confirm that it was 
the crisis that ultimately brought the social partners to the table (interviewee P5; 
interviewee P10). A statement by an FKTU executive who participated in the LMGTC 
negotiations in January 1998 clearly demonstrates the role that the state, under intense 
pressure from the IMF, played in bringing the various social actors together. 
There was lots of pressure from the Kim Dae-jung government, even though we still had 
enough time to negotiate with the organised business group and government officials. We 
were told that government officials, who were lobbying in New York, were pressing us to 
reach an agreement, stressing that if we failed to negotiate or reach an agreement, the IMF 
would not provide the loan requested. Even former FKTU members within the ruling party 
pressurised us to reach an agreement, and due to the lack of information on the negotiations 
between the government and the IMF, we could not help but believe their claims that the 
funds would be withheld if we didn’t reach an agreement quickly. We were pressed for time 
so… for instance, when we came to look into the issue of the temporary agency system, we 
did not have enough time to review this issue properly. No alternatives to the government 
proposal were presented or discussed, and the KCTU still steadfastly refused to accept the 
government proposal on the temporary agency system. Lacking the time to review this 
proposal carefully, we simply passed it in the hope that the government would accept all our 
demands (interviewee P9). 
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Some of the bureaucrats who were interviewed supported this economic explanation for 
the creation of the LMGTC and described the 1997-1999 period as being an ‘economic 
colonisation’ by the IMF (interviewee P3; interviewee P6). Indeed, according to the 
Ministry of Labour records (Ministry of Labour 2006c: 68), the IMF demanded greater 
flexibilisation of Korea’s labour market and the granting of greater powers to employers to 
dismiss employees. The IMF also evaluated and supervised the Korean government’s crisis 
management measures, took up residence in a government office building and pushed for 
the loosening of the regulations governing the dismissal of employees. 
However, in its focus on the way in which the LMGTC dealt with the crisis, this account 
does not provide an adequate explanation for the origins, evolution and structure of the 
LMGTC. In other words, it provides no real explanation of how the crisis contributed to 
form the diverse (sometimes contradicting) interests and preferences of the social partners 
within the LMGTC. Since all institutions inherently contain tensions and pressures among 
the rule-makers and rule-takers who interpret the institutional form and are willing to 
change it, the focus of examining the role of crisis in establishing the tripartite system in 
Korea should lie in investigating the shifting and interacting interests and preferences of 
the social partners who are under the pressure of international organisations.  
In addition, contrary to the argument that globalisation undermines the nation-state’s 
autonomy and leads to retrenchment of the state (Mishra 1999: 94-100; Ohmae 1995: 59; 
Strange 1996: 66; Teeple 1995: 55-74; 2000: 188-190), it is noteworthy that the Korean 
developmental state started to ‘bring the state back in’ to various social institutions (Haagh 
2004: 10, 157-169). This occurred because the legacies of the state-led industrialisation in 
Korea had established a different context for social dialogue than was the case in other 
countries; these legacies originated from the developmental alliance between the state and 
chaebols and the exclusion of labour (Han et al. 2010: 291). For instance, during the period 
in which the social pact was unveiled through the LMGTC, the state played a critical role 
in setting up the main agenda and the method used for negotiation between the social 
partners. As seen in the Netherlands’ experience of the dynamics of corporatist politics, 
particularly during periods of reform and fiscal austerity (Hemerijck & Vail 2006: 61-88), 
it is confirmed that the state regains a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis social partners in 
important policy areas because corporatism (and the tripartite system) is a dynamic and 
evolving process of dialogue and political exchange between the state and the social 
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partners rather than a fixed institutional structure producing stable and predictable political 
patterns and policy trajectories. In this vein, this research emphasises that the Korean state 
was brought back into the arena of institutional change, at least at first, while it is 
convincing that the crisis played a triggering role in setting up a new institutional 
implementation of the tripartite system. 
 
6.2.2 Diverse interests combine for a new institution 
 
In January 1998, one year after the 1997 amendment of Korea’s labour laws, the LMGTC 
was established at the suggestion of President-elect Kim Dae-jung. The election of Kim 
Dae-jung and the setting up of the LMGTC marked the start of a power transition from the 
traditional authoritarian-conservative bloc, which had governed Korea since 1948, to a 
liberal-democratic bloc. As Mahoney and Thelen argue (2010: 16), the actor who 
introduced the new institution was a political ‘loser’ under the old system. Even before his 
inauguration, Kim Dae-jung, who had been an opposition leader since 1961, pushed ahead 
with plans to establish the LMGTC, which was to replace (rather than supplement or 
compete with) an older set of institutions: in a narrow sense, the LRRC, and in a broader 
sense, the labour-excluded authoritarian policy-making process. In fact, President-elect 
Kim Dae-jung visited the KCTU and the FKTU in an attempt to persuade them to agree to 
mass layoffs and he also visited the FKI and the KEF to appeal for support for and 
agreement within the LMGTC (Kyunghyang Shinmun 27 December 1997; Maeil Business 
Newspaper 24 December 1997).  
It might seem tempting, therefore, to regard Kim Dae-jung as having played a pivotal role 
in transforming the Korean developmental state into a new mode of governance. However, 
when Kim Dae-jung’s role and performance are compared to those of the presidents of the 
previous authoritarian governments, it is clear that he did not behave fundamentally 
differently from any of his predecessors. Certainly, Kim Dae-jung was prepared to 
intervene aggressively in and exert control over the LMGTC to force its hand. For example, 
he ordered an extra session of the National Assembly to convene on 4 January 1998 to 
resolve the LMGTC’s disagreements on the issue of layoffs in insolvent financial 
institutions (Ministry of Labour 2006c: 68).  
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Another way in which to examine Kim Dae-jung’s role is to consider whether his 
ideological orientation influenced the reform or the content of the LMGTC agreement. 
That is to say, in the face of the national economic crisis, did Kim Dae-jung’s so-called 
left-centre government steer the direction of institutional change? If this were the case, the 
ideological foundation for and the direction of Kim Dae-jung’s institutional transformation 
and reform project would have been in line with the political ideas and ideological 
orientation contained in his book Mass (-participatory) Economics (1986). In that work, he 
set out his political-economic blueprint, which opposed the predominance of chaebols over 
the Korean economy, criticised the neo-liberal economic order and condemned the 
authoritarian policy-making process. However, in contrast to the arguments contained in 
that book, the Kim Dae-jung government and his reforms accelerated the adoption of neo-
liberal economic policy in Korea, including increased flexibilisation in the labour market, 
the opening of Korea’s financial market, the establishment of a shareholder economy, etc. 
Therefore, rather than regarding Kim Dae-jung as being the catalyst for institutional 
change, his role as a long-time opposition party leader against the authoritarian labour-
excluded policy-making process and the sense of comradeship that existed between Kim 
Dae-jung and the labour and liberal blocs should, instead, be regarded as helping to 
expedite the reform process (the formation of the LMGTC and its initial compact). Indeed, 
the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis reveals that some of the elite bureaucrats from the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and government officers from 
the LMGTC speculate that if Kim Dae-jung had failed to win the presidential election and 
a candidate from the former ruling party (a conservative, neoliberal-friendly right wing 
party) had won instead, the direction of the reform would have been the same as that taken 
by Kim Dae-jung (interviewee P2;78 interviewee P3; interviewee P5; interviewee P6; 
interviewee P13).79 To summarise, the argument that the formation of the LMGTC and the 
agreements that it reached are directly attributable to Kim Dae-jung’s political leadership 
and ideology is not convincing. Certainly, it is not a more convincing argument than one 
that contends that the formation of the LMGTC, in the face of IMF pressure and influence, 
marked an attempt to overcome the economic crisis. 
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  A	  former	  researcher	  from	  the	  Korea	  Labour	  Institute	  (KLI)	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  LRRC	  and	  LMGTC	  and	  
who	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   for	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   public	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   and	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79	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Strategy	  and	  Finance	  is	  a	  successor	  of	  the	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  Planning	  Board	  (EPB),	  which	  played	  a	  
critical	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  pilot	  agency	   in	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  of	  economic	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  (1970s-­‐1980s);	   it	  was	  dismantled	  by	  
the	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  government.	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A closer examination of the political circumstances surrounding the formation of the 
LMGTC will serve to make this point clearer. The Korean tripartite system and the 
establishment of the LMGTC were dissimilar to the Western experience of corporatism, 
where the social actors consisted of organised labour, organised capital and social 
democratic governments (Afonso & Papadopoulos 2013; Vatta 1999). While the FKTU 
was willing to participate in a tripartite body so as to represent the collective interests of 
labour, its main competitor within the organised labour movement, the KCTU, strongly 
opposed any labour market flexibilisation measures. Ironically, the KEF, which would 
derive benefit from labour market flexibilisation, also opposed the Kim Dae-jung 
government’s reforms, as the KEF aimed to implement institutional measures for the 
structural reform of the chaebols. Moreover, the political circumstances prevailing at the 
time were not entirely friendly to the Kim government. Although he had won the 
presidential election, the opposition party held the majority of the National Assembly seats. 
To defuse this potentially difficult political situation, Kim Dae-jung chose to invite all 
parties—the FKTU and KCTU, the FKI and KEF, and representatives from the 
government, the ruling party and the opposition party—to  join the LMGTC as a 
presidential advisory body. 
The investigation into why business and labour came to accept Kim Dae-jung’s proposal 
should, therefore, focus on each actor’s calculation of its interests and the gains that it 
expected to make from political exchanges within the LMGTC at the critical moment of 
national crisis. As seen in the previous chapter, the LMGTC was not the first attempt to 
establish consensus by setting up a corporate body. Consensus had already been attempted 
with the LRRC, and each of the actors had already made their positions clear on the main 
issues of greater flexibilisation in the labour market, legalisation of the KCTU and 
permitting political activities by unions.  
Business saw the LMGTC as an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the 1997 labour 
laws amendment, which had granted them the power to implement mass layoffs beginning 
in 1999, and bring forward the mass redundancies permitted by this amendment. In 
addition, business saw the LMGTC as a chance to repair its damaged reputation with the 
public— it had received widespread public condemnation for its role in bringing about the 
financial crisis—by being seen as entering into the negotiations. Thus, business had limited 
room for manoeuvre at that time and it opted to pursue a conciliatory approach towards 
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negotiations, especially as it faced the state’s plan to reform the chaebols. For instance, the 
KEF adopted a passive stance towards the state’s strong drive for reform, including the 
formation of the LMGTC, especially when compared to the rebellious KCTU. Two KEF 
representatives that were interviewed (interviewee P1; interviewee P1180) supported the 
view that Kim Dae-jung and his transition team had played the primary role in bringing 
about KEF’s position. 
Labour also had little room for manoeuvre as it could do little to prevent employers from 
gaining the power to implement immediate mass layoffs because the 1997 Labour Standard 
Act already permitted these to take place beginning in 1999. Therefore, the reason that 
labour organisations agreed to participate in the LMGTC appears to stem from their 
assumption that participating would increase their political power against business; they 
aimed to push for the structural reform of chaebols and the dismantling of the existing 
authoritarian-coercive labour relations through trading an agreement on a more flexible 
labour market in exchange for democratic (liberal) industrial relations. However, events 
would conspire to prevent KCTU’s participation in the LMGTC. Although the KCTU was 
generally hostile to state-led reforms, at that time there were three different factions within 
the organisation. The leadership of the KCTU was held by a moderate faction, the Jung-
ang pa (central party), which believed that it could successfully negotiate the reform of the 
chaebols and industrial relations through collective bargaining within the LMGTC. The 
KCTU leaders felt that negotiation within the LMGTC framework provided an excellent 
opportunity to confront business on these issues, reach a compromise and gain public 
support. However, their ambitions were frustrated by the state and other factions within the 
KCTU at the very moment that the KCTU was deciding upon whether to join the LMGTC. 
A more detailed description of events is provided in the following statement by a former 
executive member of the KCTU: 
In fact, we did not formally agree to the LMGTC’s proposals. Our understanding was that the 
LMGTC was merely a modus vivendi and all official decisions on formalising LMGTC 
agreements were to be put before the board of representatives of the KCTU. However, the 
state claimed that the KCTU had formally agreed to the LMGTC’s proposals because we had 
agreed to the proposals in principle, and it was made public that we had reached consensus on 
this issue. Of course, the KCTU leadership’s decision to provisionally accept the LMGTC 
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  A	  former	  executive	  member	  of	  the	  KCTU.	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proposals was overturned by the board of representatives. After that, although we had not 
formally agreed to the LMGTC proposals, they became known as the LMGTC agreements… 
Meanwhile, within the KCTU, there were strong complaints made to the leadership that they 
(the leadership from Jung-ang pa) had formally accepted the proposed mass layoffs. The 
logic behind the complaints was that even though mass layoffs were inevitable in two years 
(under the terms of the 1997 amendment to the labour laws) regardless of the KCTU’s actions, 
the KCTU was abandoning the principles of the labour movement. Yes, the layoffs would be 
enacted in two years; however, this was driven by the government and the National Assembly 
and had not been agreed to by the KCTU. The argument was that once the KCTU had agreed 
to the layoffs, we could not fight the government on this issue any more (interviewee P12).  
 
The interviewee did not reveal whether this was due to a mutual misunderstanding between 
the state and the KCTU leaders or whether it was the result of the government deliberately 
misrepresenting the KCTU’s intentions; however, the fact that the interviewee shed no 
light on this issue is irrelevant to the point at hand. Here, the point is that there was a 
specific set of contingencies present at the beginning of the institutional transformation: at 
the very moment that agreement on setting up the LMGTC was being sought, the KCTU 
was led by a moderate faction and the state had super-autonomy in the unexpected political 
vacuum that existed, due to the presidential transition and the national crisis.  
As the incremental change thesis argues, institutional change and policy output are shaped 
not so much by the way in which a specific society functions, but by the combination of 
contingencies that exist at the critical juncture, which leads to specific institutional 
arrangements being selected from among other alternatives (Mahoney 2000: 519-520; 527-
538). It is also worth noting that a contingency is considered to be precisely that—that is, 
an unforeseen event—when it lies outside the predictive capacity of a theory. However, 
when viewed from a long-term perspective, the combination of these minor ‘accidents’ 
serves to fundamentally change institutions (and their reproduction mechanisms). For 
example, according to Mahoney and Thelen (2010), Streeck and Thelen (2005) and Thelen 
(2003; 2004), ‘institutional innovation’ can be undertaken by a political coalition with 
‘disparate, even contradictory, concerns’ (Thelen 2004: 33), and although the institution 
will necessarily reflect its asymmetric power relations because it is designed to represent 
the interests of the politically strongest bloc, it will nevertheless also reflect the complex 
and aggregated set of interests derived from existing institutions and the various 
interpretations and wills of the actors. Applying this thesis to the case of the LMGTC and 
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the social partners involved in its formation, it is clear that the coalition of actors had 
highly diverse reasons for participating in the new institution (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 26), 
which included the state’s desire to drive the reform process forward so as to receive IMF 
backing, the desire of business to achieve greater flexibility in the labour market and to 
mitigate the effect of the government’s chaebol reform plans, and labour’s desire to obtain 
industrial relations reform and liberal labour practices. 
To summarise, while the influence of the 1997 economic crisis is not in doubt, a more 
plausible explanation for the institutional changes that took place in Korea at that time is 
that the Kim Dae-jung government pushed forward with reform programmes due to 
international pressure and an unprecedented political coalition between the majority 
opposition party and the presidency. In addition, the following factors also contributed to 
producing a situation in which the establishment of a social consensus and the institution to 
debate and implement it was likely to occur: the state and labour sharing similar views on 
social policy and the need to reform corporate governance (especially the chaebols) and 
labour’s interest in securing the lifting of the ban on establishing multiple unions, political 
activity by unions and third-party intervention in labour disputes. 
For example, the introduction of Article 31 of the Labour Standards Act in the 1998 
amendment of Korea’s labour laws, which permitted businesses to carry out mass layoffs, 
was the result of IMF pressure on the Kim government in return for a three-year stand-by 
credit of US$21 billion (Seo & Lee 2001). However, the principle of social consensus that 
underpinned the Act’s introduction had already been established two years previously with 
the establishment of the LRRC, and the origins of Article 31 lay in the LRRC’s 
unsuccessful attempts to revise the Labour Standards Act in 1996. Indeed, the fundamental 
proposals contained in the February 1998 LMGTC agreement are strikingly similar to the 
previous government’s 1996 proposal for amendment of the labour laws. Moreover, it can 
be seen that the 1998 article on collective layoffs did not differ significantly from the 1991 
Supreme Court ruling that stipulated that it was reasonable for companies to make 
redundancies in cases where changes to a company’s organisation were necessary to 
restore competitiveness, restructure the company or introduce the latest technology 
(Supreme Court, Ruling No.91Da8647), extending the 1989 provision that permitted mass 
redundancies only in cases where without them the business operation would be 
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jeopardised (Supreme Court, Ruling No. 87DaKa2132).81 This 1991 ruling effectively 
provided legitimacy to companies that wished to restructure their workforces on the basis 
of a managerial risk assessment. In short, the lesson that emerges from the introduction of 
Article 31 of the Labour Standards Act (even though it might initially appear to have been 
the direct result of IMF pressure) is that the institutional transformation of Korea’s labour 
market and labour relations was not a one-sided affair; rather, it resulted from a 
combination of the shifting role of the state, the conditions imposed by the IMF and the 
interests of the coalition. 
In conclusion, the rapid and sudden breakdown of the institution (LRRC) and its 
replacement with new organisation (LMGTC) obviously involves the displacement of the 
institution. While the contingent-exogenous shock of the 1997 financial crisis has been 
generally regarded as the primary cause of the state’s new approach to its policy-making 
process—that is, its transition into a tripartite system—this could be regarded as an 
example of critical juncture in that the balance of interests in the decision-making process 
underwent change. However, it is still doubtful that an exogenous shock is sufficient 
enough to precipitate institutional change directly. Rather, a more credible view is that an 
exogenous shock opens the window for an empowered actor or an interest coalition to push 
for institutional change, which, given the legacy of the developmental state in Korea, was 
always likely to be led by the state, and it is only when social actors have journeyed 
through an experimental period in which they try to figure out the implications of 
alternative institutional arrangements (Culpepper 2005: 182) that institutions break down 
or are replaced by new ones, even though the actors’ expectations may differ widely.  
 
6.3 Institutional transformation: rules, preferences, and conflicts 
 
According to the historical institutionalist approach, the newly created LMGTC should 
have been subject to the ‘lock-in’ effects or ‘increasing return’ properties of institutional 
change (Krasner 1984; Pierson 2000; Pierson & Skocpol 2002). However, the tripartite 
system, as expressed through the practice of the LMGTC, can be regarded as having failed, 
as it had little practical impact on the employment system in Korea after the worst of the 
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economic crisis was over. It is certainly the case that after the most severe aspects of the 
crisis had been overcome in 1999,82 the LMGTC, an institutional measure that sought to 
tackle the economic crisis by resolving labour relations issues and that aimed to help 
transform the Korean developmental state into another state model, ceased to function as 
intended and additional institutional rules needed to be added. The evolution of the 
LMGTC, therefore, appears to be inconsistent with the path-dependency thesis as it relates 
to a short-term period, which contends that an institution established in response to a set of 
contingent factors at a historically critical moment will tend towards institutional stability 
due to the institution’s self-reinforcing process of positive feedback until another 
exogenous shock occurs. Rather, based on the path-dependency thesis, in Korea the 
traditional roles and relationships between the social actors and the policy-making process 
have taken a long-term perspective. 
Hence, this section focuses on the institutional change of the tripartite system after the 
unveiling of the 1998 social pact by examining the actors’ interests and preferences and the 
practices they employed to cope with changing circumstances. The following sections 
discuss how the LMGTC tripartite system developed or decayed with the institutional 
evolution, and how this involved the diverse interests and preferences of political actors, 
and the transformation of the developmental state. 
 
6.3.1 Layered, but weakening institutions 
 
In examining the institutional evolution of the LMGTC, it appears that new and supporting 
rules were layered onto the LMGTC’s tripartite system so as to reinforce it and enhance its 
influence on the policy-making process. After his inauguration as president, Kim Dae-jung 
issued a presidential decree in March 1998, the Regulation on the Tripartite Commission, 
which established the LMGTC as a permanent corporatist entity (the second phase of the 
LMGTC). A little over one year later, in May 1999, the Act on Establishment and 
Operation of the Tripartite Commission (Legislation No. 5,990) was passed by the 
National Assembly, granting the LMGTC legal status (the third phase). Finally, the 
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  The	   expectation	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  August	  2000).	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LMGTC was renamed the Economic and Social Development commission (ESDC), a 
change motivated by the amendment of the related Act on Establishment and Operation of 
the Economic and Social Development Commission in January 2007 (fourth phase). While 
the purposes and objectives of these institutional amendments did not differ greatly, and 
certainly did not drive the institution in a fundamentally different direction, the very fact 
that the amendments were made shows that the LMGTC was being revised in line with the 
changing circumstances after Korea had begun to recover from the 1997 economic crisis. 
As for the actual operation of the LMGTC after its initial accord in February 1998, labour 
refused to participate in the LMGTC at the beginning of the second phase. Labour 
demanded in-depth negotiation on the issues of public sector and financial sector structural 
reform and on the eradication of unfair labour practices. The KCTU in particular played a 
prominent role in pushing for a general strike and demanded clarification on the pending 
mass layoffs and temporary employment agency system, employment security and 
dissolution of the chaebols. Thus, in June 1998, the second phase of the LMGTC opened 
without KCTU’s participation. This situation continued until the end of July, when the 
head of the LMGTC promised that he would more seriously address labour’s demands on 
the issue of structural reform (ESDC 2008: 55). However, the Kim Dae-jung government 
then made the decision to revert to a more traditional (in terms of the history of Korean 
developmental state action) unilateral strategy for structural reform of financial institutions 
and chaebols (Choi & Lee 2008: 70-71). As a result, beginning in February 1999, the 
KCTU again withdrew from the LMGTC. To the KCTU, the structural reform of industrial 
relations—including the public sector, the financial sector and the chaebols—was affected 
entirely by means of the mass layoffs by employers. The KEF also withdrew from the 
LMGTC, citing as its reasons its exclusion from the negotiations on the issues of the 
payment of full-time union officials by employers, the voting system within the LMGTC 
and the greater institutional formalisation of the LMGTC (Maeil Business Newspaper 16 
April 1999; Hankyoreh 17 April 1999). The third phase was marked by a shift towards 
normalcy with the return of the FKTU to the LMGTC (but with the KCTU remaining 
outside it) and the National Assembly’s legislation that granted the institution formal legal 
status. Although the LMGTC (minus the KCTU) reached two major agreements during 
this phase (July 1999-August 2007)—putting back into place the legalisation of multiple 
unions within the same enterprise from 2002 to 2007 and delaying the prohibition of the 
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payment of full-time union officials by employers from 2001 to 2007—the LMGTC did 
not make any proposals for significant amendment of the existing labour laws or the 
introduction of new laws. Furthermore, after the inauguration of President Roh Moo-hyun, 
only one major agreement was reached, the Social Pact for Job Creation in February 2004, 
despite Roh Moo-hyun’s desire to reactivate and boost the effectiveness of the LMGTC. 
The fourth phase (from August 2007 to the present) began with revamping both the 
institution’s name and the institutional foundation of the LMGTC. To date, however, the 
ESDC (the LMGTC’s successor) has reached no major accord.  
If the Korean experience of the LMGTC is compared to the Western experience of 
corporatism recounted in the literature (Hibbs 1978; Jessop 1979; Korpi & Shalev 1979; 
Meier 1984), it appears that the stalemate encountered in Korea was a direct result of the 
underdevelopment of the labour movement and the labour (- centred) party. For instance, 
Pempel has argued that Korea was expected to follow Japan’s characteristic pattern of 
industrial relations, which he describes as ‘corporatism without labour’. He anticipated that 
South Korea, like Japan, would strengthen cooperation between the government and 
employers’ associations and restrict labour organisations to gains at the firm-level, gains 
that would be conditional upon productivity increases (Pempel 1999b: 44-46). From this 
perspective, the tradition of enterprise unionism in Korea, as in Japan, has been regarded as 
a fundamental institutional obstacle to the development of corporatism (or the tripartite 
system) because labour has focused on its role as a stakeholder at the individual firm level 
rather than on participation in national-level policy-making and political mobilisation. 
Moreover, a recent investigation by Han et al. (2010) into the LMGTC’s failure to make 
any significant progress on labour relations after 1999 has shed light on previously 
overlooked factors that have contributed to the failure of the tripartite approach in Korea. 
The authors suggest two reasons for the stalemate: first, the failure to construct a peak 
union with authority over individual enterprises in the sectoral bargaining unit, which 
undermined the effort to establish a stable social dialogue framework for discussion on 
enterprise-level industrial relations; and, second, the union’s acceptance of labour market 
flexibility and pay discipline in exchange for enhanced participation in institutional designs 
for macroeconomic stability. They conclude that this situation ultimately arose from the 
embedded influence of state-led economic development (Han et al. 2010: 289; 302). 
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While corporatist arguments provide a functional explanation of institutional change by 
highlighting the prerequisites for tripartism (a powerful and centralised labour 
organisation, a social democratic party, etc.) and the key role of the state, they frequently 
ignore the political dynamics of social partners (especially those of organised business) in 
terms of their own interpretations of and willingness to change existing institutions and 
future policy sets. This research addresses this gap by arguing that formal institutional 
change (the reinforcement or decline of institutions) is caused by the endogenous factors 
within the institutions—the diverse, and even contradictory, tensions, pressures and 
interests that exist between rule-makers and rule-takers—with the complementary effect of 
the exogenous factors that might help to preserve or frustrate the existing institution. These 
endogenous factors are the actors’ interpretations of (compliance or defiance) and their 
attitudes towards (willingness to change) the institution. Therefore, the key to 
understanding the LMGTC institutional innovation lies in examining the differences in the 
actors’ interpretations (interests and preferences) of and attitudes (practice) towards the 
existing institution and the changing circumstances in Korea at that time.  
Indeed, as seen above, the three LMGTC-related institutional amendments cannot be 
regarded as meaningful moves since they did not bring about significant institutional 
change; instead, they may be thought of as adding layers to the institution by the ‘grafting 
of new elements (more restrictive rules, but not so significant) with an objective preference 
for continuity or reinforcement’ (Thelen 2004: 35). Therefore, it appears that while the 
LMGTC remained formally the same, its impact changed as a result of the transformation 
in external conditions (escape from the crisis phase), to which the social partners 
responded in such a way that their interpretations and interactions could combine in new 
ways. This is an institutional conversion (Mahoney &Thelen 2010: 21), and the key to 
analysing the institutional change is found in the gap between the actors who actively 
exploit the inherent ambiguities of the institution.  
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6.3.2 Combining preferences between actors 
 
This research does not emphasise the specifics of the negotiated settlements (the social 
pact or amendment proposals) that the state, business and labour came to within the 
LMGTC. Rather, since institutional change within the LMGTC is reflected in its changing 
impact and the modification or redesign of its institutional goals and functions, this 
research places emphasis on the substantive issues dealt with by the LMGTC and on the 
way in which the negotiations progressed (or ceased to progress).  
From this perspective, it is natural to assume that the agenda of the LMGTC changed in 
response to changes in the socio-economic environment as the interests of the social 
partners started to change after Korea began to emerge from the economic crisis in 1999. 
For the purposes of the analysis, then, the history of the LMGTC can be roughly divided 
into two periods: during the crisis (the first and second phases) and after the crisis (the 
third and fourth phases).  
 
Table 6.1: Negotiated issues within the LMGTC by phases 
Negotiated issues 
1st phase 
(1998.1 - 
1998.2) 
2nd phase 
(1998.6 - 
1999.8) 
3rd phase 
(1999.9–
2007.4) 
4th phase 
(2007.4-
present) 
Structural reform of firms V    
Privatisation  V  
Valorisation V    
Employment and unemployment V  V  
Social protection V  V  
     Workers’ protection  V V 
     EI V  V V 
     Working hours  V  
Wages and labour relations V  V  
Multiple unions and paid officials V  
Basic rights for unions V V   
Labour market flexibilisation V    
Macroeconomic measures V    
Crisis measures V V   
Granting of legal status to the LMGTC V V 	  	  
*Source: ESDC (2008). 
 
As seen in Table 6.1, there were major macro-level issues under negotiation during the 
IMF’s period of control, such as the structural reform of firms, valorisation, 
macroeconomic reform, democratisation of labour relations (basic rights for unions) and 
labour market flexibilisation. After Korea began to recover from the crisis, however, 
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negotiation switched more to micro-level issues (at least compared to the former period) 
such as privatisation of the public sector, atypical workers’ protection, working hours, and 
establishing multiple unions within the same company and ending full-time union officials’ 
payment by employers. Most interestingly, no more issues unfavourable to business—such 
as ‘(1) enhancing ‘transparency’ in management of chaebols and large-scale individual 
firms by introducing mandatory consolidated financial statement for chaebols, (2) 
enhancing the financial structure for chaebols by banning the cross-debt guarantee between 
subsidiaries within chaebols, (3) strengthening responsibility management and (4) 
enhancing competitiveness by avoiding competitive investment in overheated industries 
and concentrating the major industry of each chaebol’ (Chang & Chae 2004: 433)—were 
negotiated, and they have not been discussed since. Thus, it is possible to argue that 
business, after having survived structural reform, low productivity and the public’s 
suspicion about its performance, intended to turn its attack to supporting privatisation of 
the public sector, and, more importantly, to opposing the plan to reform labour relations, 
especially the reform that would permit the establishment of multiple unions within the 
same company, and to pushing for the outlawing of the payment of full-time union 
officials. 
Business 
The opportunistic attitude of business towards the LMGTC can be seen in the statement of 
a former politician and government officer who participated in the LMGTC’s second and 
third phases:  
The LMGTC became enervated from 1999, when labour begun to front it, the government 
went on to the defensive, and business tried to tie down negotiations. Whenever labour or 
civic groups proposed any idea, business attempted to peg it back by opposing it. The issue of 
the reduction of working hours is a case in point. We had already reached the agreement for 
that in principle in early 2000, however, we spent almost four years with settling on a draft 
proposal due to stalemate on specific issues such as the actual hours to be worked and in 
which way we could reduce working times.83Throughout this process, business went on the 
defensive, delayed discussion of the issue (without any proposal), and ultimately tried to 
retain the ‘status quo’. They did not want change. They did not want to show up at the 
LMGTC and actually wanted the LMGTC to cease to exist (interviewee P10). 
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  As	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  1,	  this	  was	  legalised	  in	  September	  2003	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  the	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  of	  the	  Labour	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Act.	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Even though business privately did not want to attend the LMGTC, which they expected to 
be broken up, they were not sufficiently strong to stand against Kim Dae-jung and his 
government for a variety of reasons, most of which were due to the legacy of embedded 
relations from the developmental state, the new environment of the national crisis and the 
change in the nature of presidential power. For example, during negotiations in February 
1998, the KEF was not concerned about negotiating the introduction of mass layoffs at that 
time, because the amendment to the 1997 labour laws (see the Appendix 1) permitted the 
KEF to conduct those layoffs beginning in 1999. In fact, the KEF was concerned that any 
agreement on mass layoffs under the LMGTC framework could make it more difficult in 
practice for employers to dismiss workers. According to KEF’s evaluation, the existing 
legislation and previous court decisions provided greater (business-favourable) room to 
interpret and enforce dismissals in individual firms; ironically, the KEF felt that after the 
LMGTC struck an agreement on mass layoffs, this led to a more rigid interpretation of the 
acceptable grounds for mass redundancies. Nevertheless, the KEF had no option but to 
allow this issue to form part of the LMGTC social pact that was agreed upon in February 
1998, partly because the state pushed very strongly for it, but also because labour strongly 
opposed it. Therefore, the KEF compromised on this issue in an attempt win over the 
nation and the IMF (interviewee P11; Jun 2007: 40).  
In conclusion, the strong veto possibilities that exist, in which actors have access to 
institutional or extra-institutional means of blocking change, were not available to business 
and labour during the formation and evolution of the LMGTC. After the 1998 social pact 
and the conclusion of the structural reform of firms (chaebols), business’ attitudes towards 
the LMGTC again became more opportunistic. It did not actively seek to preserve or try to 
change the LMGTC, because opposing the institutional status quo is costly. Another 
viewpoint from a long-time government servant and participant in the LRRC and LMGTC 
is worth noting: 
… [after the IMF bail-out] the main concern of business was the labour laws, especially the 
issues of multiple unions and payment of full-time union officials. Business leaders paid close 
attention to how the government would act on those issues. It is widely acknowledged that 
business did not raise any questions on labour-related issues other than these. Thus, any 
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movement on the issues of multiple unions and full-time union officials has been postponed 
for 13 years (interviewee P5).84 
 
Simply put, business exploited whatever possibilities existed within the prevailing system 
to achieve its ends, while labour’s moves were more complex. However, like business, 
labour was also a weak veto player in the LMGTC.  
 
Labour 
For the KCTU, the critical issues that ultimately compromised the social pact in February 
1998 were the frustration of its expectations that it would gain the right to organise the 
teachers’ union and unions above the firm level (which it hoped would lead to legislation 
on and the fostering of an industrial union system), to establish multiple unions within the 
same company and to gain legal recognition as a labour organisation (ESDC 2008: 140-
143; interviewee P4; interviewee P11). This point is quite controversial in light of the 
argument that the LMGTC’s agreement was an exchange of equivalents—labour market 
flexibility for workers’ security (flexibility-security payoffs)—as in the Western 
experience. For example, it is an exaggeration to claim that representatives of labour in 
Korea initially opposed the proposed changes to the labour market and labour relations but 
eventually consented to flexibilisation in exchange for the protection of core workers (Peng 
2012: 233; Chang & Chae 2004: 432). As seen in Table 6.1, a compromise on labour 
market flexibilisation formed part of the first LMGTC agreement in 1998, and only a few 
further flexibilisation measures were discussed after that, whereas negotiation on social 
protection issues continued throughout the third and fourth phases of the LMGTC. 
Furthermore, with the exception of a consensus during the third phase, discussion of labour 
relations reform (labour relations democratisation) remained at a standstill during phases 
one, two and four, which delayed the enactment of rules for permitting the establishment of 
multiple unions within the same company and outlawing the payment of full-time union 
officials by employers by five years. According to the government’s records (ESDC 2008: 
54; 220), in exchange for returning to the LMGTC in its second phase labour’s conditions 
included comprehensive discussion about checking the employers’ abuse of mass layoffs, a 
reduction in working hours, the elimination of unfair labour practices, the granting of legal 
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  As	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  1,	  this	  was	  legalised	  in	  January	  2010,	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  the	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  of	  the	  Trade	  Union	  and	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status to the LMGTC and, most importantly, the legalisation of collective bargaining at the 
industrial level and the establishment of a commission on public sector reform. 
This implies that the KCTU’s overriding concern was the social democratic reform of 
Korean society (labour relations and industrial relations) and the governing process of the 
employment system, a concern that was embedded in the role that the union had played in 
bringing about Korean democratisation, its acute sense of justice and its pride at having 
been a principal player in the transition to democracy.85 This phenomenon is strongly 
connected to the theoretical argument that legislative reform of the labour code embodies 
two conflicting demands: the desire to restore a sense of social justice (social democracy in 
a broad sense and workers protection in a narrow sense) and the affirmation of the process 
of marketisation, supported by a powerful group (primarily business) (Haagh 2002b: 87). 
As was found to be the case in the study of labour reform in Chile (Haagh 2002b: 96-97), 
the development (liberalisation) of labour relations and political democracy were the 
central issues to both Korean national unions. In particular, the KCTU’s support for social 
democratic measures that enhanced labour’s power in labour relations and industrial 
relations above all other goals was a constant. Even when further labour market 
flexibilisation issues emerged in the mid-2000s, such as the protection of atypical workers 
and temporary agency employees, the KCTU was less concerned with these issues than 
with strengthening the industrial-level collective bargaining and establishing a labour-
centred political party. Indeed, this was the KCTU’s ultimate aim when it provisionally 
agreed to participate in the LMGTC in 1998. According to an interview with a member of 
the Metal Workers Union, a KCTU affiliate, despite the factions that existed within the 
KCTU, common agreement was reached on participating in the LMGTC and fighting for 
labour’s political empowerment via the mainstream political process (that is, through the 
LMGTC) (interviewee P22). This implies that labour assumed that the LMGTC provided a 
stepping stone to building a labour party and making inroads into the National Assembly, 
thus discarding its previous strategy of concentrating on developing an illegal vanguard 
movement.  
However, KCTU’s ambitions were not to be fulfilled. Contrary to its expectations, the 
political reality was not conducive to its objectives, and its leadership failed to mobilise 
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  Interviewee	  P5,	  a	  long-­‐serving	  government	  officer,	  emphasised	  the	  KCTU’s	  role	  in	  contributing	  to	  bringing	  
about	  Korean	  democracy	  and	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  industrial	  relations	  during	  this	  period	  and	  its	  ‘acute	  sense	  
of	  justice’.	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political support from KCTU members and from the public. After the first LMGTC 
agreement in February 1998, and before the beginning of the second phase of the LMGTC, 
the KCTU repeatedly refused to participate in the LMGTC if its demands for renegotiation 
of the mass layoffs and other labour market flexibilisation measures were not met. Lee 
Gab-yong, the leader of the KCTU, announced that ‘while the KCTU had participated in 
the first phase of the LMGTC to resolve the national crisis, the imposition of the mass 
layoff system and the temporary employment agency system had led to workers suffering 
excessively’ (Mail Lodong Shinmun 23 April 1998) and that the KCTU would not return to 
the LMGTC unless there was a reconsideration of these policies. Behind this official 
position, however, there were serious debates within the KCTU on whether or not the 
KCTU should participate in the LMGTC. Two of the factions within the KCTU, the central 
party and the national party, argued for participation, while its other faction, the workplace 
party, opposed participation. Since then, the conflicts and enmity between these factions 
have continued and have prevented the KCTU from becoming a more politically influential 
entity. For example, on each of the three occasions that the board of representatives of the 
KCTU met after the 1998 agreement to discuss a return to the LMGTC, physical 
confrontations occurred, and the serious violence in 2005 (Hankyoreh 3 February 2005) 
served to further deprive the KCTU of political and public support. Even President Roh 
Moo-hyun criticised the union’s egoism (Kyunghyan Shinmun 26 February 2005).  
In short, labour was no more successful than business in effecting formal institutional 
change in the LMGTC and it was unable to remodel the LMGTC to meet labour-
favourable ends. Although labour was successful in negotiating the formal introduction of 
a five-day working week (a policy officially approved in 2003), it simultaneously 
conceded greater flexibility over working shift patterns to employers. In addition, decisions 
on establishing multiple unions within the same company and prohibiting the payment of 
full-time union officials by employers were twice delayed, first in 2001 and again in 2006. 
Consequently, labour failed to pave the way for a transition from the firm-based union 
system to the industrial union system and, thus, labour’s political empowerment. This was 
mainly due to the combination over time of the characteristics of the decentralised union 
system, the state-led implementation of institutions and the conflicts within labour.  
In sum, labour was insufficiently organised to challenge the LMGTC’s governing process 
and was incapable of devising and operating its own strategy to utilise the LMGTC for its 
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ends. However, it would be a mistake to blame labour for losing control over political 
mobilisation and its role within the LMGTC. Rather, it appears more plausible to conclude 
that labour had little choice but to concentrate on fighting the institutional arrangements 
that had been secured by the first LMGTC agreement, which were labour market 
flexibilisation and employer-favourable labour relations and industrial relations. While it 
might be tempting to conclude that labour appeared to have been too focused on the social 
democratic reform of Korean society to challenge the institutional framework of the 
LMGTC effectively, this line of reasoning ultimately leads to the conclusion that the 
government had failed to fulfil its primary functions as defined by the developmental state 
thesis: being at the centre of the governing process, balancing and mediating the various 
interests of social groups, being insulated from powerful social groups and (re-)arranging 
selective socio-economic resources for development of the country. As resolution of the 
conflicting demands of social democratic reform and labour flexibilisation through labour 
law reform is beyond the remit of labour and instead lies within the developmental state’s 
area of responsibility, it must be concluded that this aspect of developmental state practice 
had ceased to operate effectively. 
 
6.3.3 An ambiguous, incohesive and less autonomous state 
 
As Mahoney and Thelen demonstrate (2010: 21-22), although government capacity 
appears to be important in the process of institutional change even when the institution is 
relatively stable, its impact changes when there is institutional ambiguity and the actors’ 
diverse interpretations and outputs collide and combine, as a lack of veto possibilities can 
create room for strategic openings both for business and labour. 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, the institutional sets for the LMGTC were ambiguous 
enough to lead to the addition of supplementary rules that aimed at enhancing its 
performance and granting it legal status. While the LMGTC’s role and goals during its first 
phase were relatively clear—the legalisation of mass layoffs and the KCTU, structural 
reform of the public sector and chaebols, etc.—its second phase roles and goals, which 
were launched in order to carry through on the 1998 agreement, were more ambiguous. As 
reported in the media, labour and government held divergent opinions about the LMGTC. 
A senior researcher in the FKTU described it as ‘an organisation for discussing present 
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issues with the goal of facilitating negotiation and delivering implementation’, whereas an 
executive of the Ministry of Labour deemed it ‘a consultative body of government’. The 
politicians within the LMGTC depicted it as ‘an organisation for stabilising the political 
situation against labour’s strikes’ (Munhwa Il-bo 9 September 1998). More importantly, 
there was lack of coherent understanding and partnership between the Blue House and the 
government. As seen in the case of the LRRC,86 the bloc of Park Se-il (a senior presidential 
secretary) and Jin Nyum (the head of the Ministry of Labour) had shared policy 
preferences on the reform issues and worked to drive the business-labour negotiations 
forward within the LRRC. However, unlike the LRRC, the LMGTC had no (built-in) 
cohesive force supporting it from within the state, as its first phase had been forced through 
by Kim Dae-jung’s strong drive and the acute sense of national crisis that existed at that 
critical moment. Two interesting statements about this situation are given below:  
We (government officers chiefly from the Ministry of Labour) viewed it (the LMGTC) as a 
temporary body because it did not reflect our actual conditions (the conditions underpinning 
the tripartism and corporatism) and did not have even an official legal basis (interviewee P6). 
 
(After the first agreement in the first phase of the LMGTC,) those who came to head the 
LMGTC were incompetent and had no influence over the government, politics, or labour 
relations… Although the LMGTC was a potential resource for the Ministry of Labour, it was 
not willing to exploit it. The government displayed a lack of understanding about tripartite 
systems of governance, and needless to say, the role and goals of the LMGTC (interviewee 
P9). 
 
Thus, the state’s institutional initiative in establishing the LMGTC was replaced by a 
receptive-passive role. For example, the number of government officers involved in the 
negotiation of labour issues within the LMGTC gradually decreased (Jun 2007: 41), 
reflecting the reduction in government influence over and within the LMGTC, over time. 
Furthermore, after the LMGTC’s agreement in February 1998 had rescued the Korean 
economy, the government began to retreat from using the LMGTC as an institutional 
means of governing its policy process, with the consequence that both the role and the 
impact of the LMGTC declined significantly. In particular, conflicts about the institutional 
outputs of the LMGTC existed among various governmental bodies. For instance, 
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  See	  Chapter	  5.	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agreement on the formation of a special committee within the LMGTC for negotiating the 
reduction of working hours was reached in May 2000, and expectations were raised that 
legislation on this issue would quickly follow. However, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy actively worked to prevent 
agreement and legislation on this issue (ESDC 2008: 404). Similarly, the Ministry of 
Justice delayed the introduction of legislation permitting the establishment of super-firm 
level unions (ESDC 2008: 175). The governmental bodies’ intentional neglect of both the 
LMGTC and its decisions was prevalent throughout all of the LMGTC phases, even when 
individual issues were negotiated and formalised, such as the expansion of eligibility for 
employment insurance (ESDC 2008: 396-397; 399; 404; interviewee P5; interviewee P887; 
interviewee P6). 
It might appear that the elite bureaucrats made an active choice on the basis of their 
preference and that their actions brought about the transition of the Korean developmental 
state (Chang & Evans 2005: 119). Like the ‘Chicago Boys’ in Latin America, it is true that 
most elite bureaucrats in Korea were (and are) educated at universities in the United States 
and had neo-liberal policy preferences, so it is also reasonable to suspect that their 
ideological orientation contributed to the change in socio-economic policy sets. However, 
the role that could be played by (economic) bureaucrats was restricted at the moment of 
crisis by Kim Dae-jung’s strong leadership, the huge public support he experienced (both 
nationally and internationally) and the fact that the national crisis had no precedents. In 
fact, the impact of the elite bureaucrats’ neo-liberal ideology has been significant only 
since the late 2000s, and it is influential with the current Lee Myung-bak government, 
whose policy preferences are clearly business-friendly. Finally, it should be remembered 
that, here, the relevant issue to the examination of the developmental state is the formal 
transformation of the state’s practice for development, rather than the substance of the 
policy inputs.  
Thus, a more credible explanation for this rupture within the state entities lies in the 
democratisation of Korean politics. As competitive electoral and pluralistic-interest politics 
became the only game in town (Chang & Evans 2005: 109-120), the practice of state-led 
coordination—most significantly, the cohesiveness between the ruling party, the 
government and the Blue House (dang-jeong-cheong)—started breaking down. While the 
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  An	  executive	  official	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  in	  charge	  of	  employment	  and	  unemployment	  issues.	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Kim Dae-jung government had a solid cohesiveness within these state entities, this was 
mostly due to Kim Dae-jung’s charismatic (political) leadership and his ability to garner 
the respect and support of (and his respect for) the elite bureaucrats (especially the 
Ministry of Labour) (interviewee P2; interviewee P5; interviewee P6). Moreover, his 
ability to mobilise political support for reform meant that he received backing from both 
the ruling party and the opposition party (interviewee P5). By contrast, Roh Moo-hyun, 
Kim’s successor, won the presidential election by a very narrow margin; he received weak 
political support even from the ruling party and he did not have full confidence in the 
bureaucracy. Consequently, he had frequent trouble with the elite bureaucrats (interviewee 
P2; interviewee P6). This especially occurred at the beginning of the Roh Moo-hyun 
government when his political ideas on labour issues were recognised as being part of a 
social democratic agenda, and he appointed researchers with a leftist policy orientation or 
activists from private organisations as the heads of important bureaus (interviewee P5). 
From then on, elite bureaucrats and government officials became increasingly independent 
of the Blue House. As a result, the cohesiveness of government, as the most critical 
property of governmental capacity (not only of the Korea developmental state, but of other 
developmental states as well), began to be desecrated.  
According to Evans (1995: 249), in developmental state theorising, the state’s capacity is 
moulded by key aspects of the network of ties between social groups, classes and state 
apparatuses. The developmental state maintains a link with the social sector while 
preserving its autonomy from plural interests, but it simultaneously fosters a collaborative 
relationship between the state and business. To make this possible, the internal 
cohesiveness of the state—that is, the extent and strength of the bonds and solidarity 
among members with shared ideas and values within the organisation (Allison & Zelikow 
1999: 153; Oh 1999: 308)—is the most fundamental feature of the state’s capacity 
(Chibber 2002: 961).88 By examining the formation of the LMGTC and its operation, 
however, it can be seen that this requisite characteristic of the developmental state has 
weakened and, consequently, so has the state’s capacity. The institutional ambiguity of the 
LMGTC points to the fragmentation within the state’s understanding of the LMGTC and 
tripartism, and the disintegration of the strong bonds of cohesiveness within the state 
entities.  
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  more	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Moreover, business has begun to penetrate governmental bodies, with the result that the 
state’s autonomy has been undermined. Although it could be argued that there were 
various reasons for the state’s changed role in the employment system and, in terms of the 
developmental state’s transition, this research emphasises the changing relationship 
between the state and business and, in particular, the breakdown in the delicate balance of 
power that had existed between them for decades under the developmental-authoritarian 
regimes. Ironically, it was precisely the economic growth that Korea had experienced 
under the guidance of the developmental state that led to business accumulating the capital 
strength to gain control over the policy realm. As seen in the studies on the change of 
developmental alliance between the state and business after the Kim Young-sam 
government (Kang 2002; Lee 2000; Moon & Mo 2000; Yang 2006a; and see Chapter 5), 
business’ superiority over the state, which it acquired by accumulating capital strength, 
turned into the power to lead the reforms of economic and industrial system that enhanced 
market liberalisation and deregulated the institutional restriction on conglomerates. For 
instance, institutional measures for reinforcing the labour flexibility and suppressing labour 
(unions) were implemented by business through the 1990s, and business organisations 
appeared to play a role in institutional reform (e.g. the 1996 amendment of labour laws).  
This pattern of business-friendly reforms of the employment system, with the collusive 
links between the state and business, has been reinforced through the Roh government. In 
turn, the cracks in the mutual trust and cohesiveness that had existed between the state 
entities brought about the collusion of the elite bureaucrats. In contrast to the 
developmental state thesis, which argues that the bureaucracy is insulated from the private 
sector power group and from short-term political pressures (Cheng, Haggard & Kang 1998: 
87; Evans 1995, 51–53; Ha 2003: 50-51; Kooh 2009: 149; also Johnson 1982: 20; Wade 
1990: 225), bureaucrats began to develop personal links with the private sector 
(interviewee P9).The media called this new phenomenon the ‘Republic of Samsung’ 
(Chosun Il-bo 2 August 2005; Hankyoreh 4 August 2005). Drawing on a report from a 
civic group (PSPD 2005) and President Roh Moo-hyun’s statement that ‘power had 
already transferred to the market, and the fundamental resource for our society’s 
development lies in the market’ (Hankyoreh 17 May 2005), the argument was that notable 
Samsung personnel held key posts in the Korean state and that the agenda discussed in the 
National Assembly was under the control of Samsung, which had effectively seized control 
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over business, politics, the bureaucracy and much of the media. Simultaneously, elite 
bureaucrats made efforts to develop a personal network with Samsung to enhance their 
lives after their retirement (PSPD 2005: 7),89 and this trend was reinforced significantly 
during the Roh Moo-hyun government, a government recognised as leftist (PSPD 2005: 
20-21). While Poulantzas’ criticism of Miliband’s personnel network approach to 
analysing the capitalist state and its relations with capital might raise questions as to the 
actual significance of the bureaucrats’ politicisation, and their much closer affinity with 
private sector interests,90 it is difficult to completely reject the conclusion that bureaucrats 
have played a significant role in protecting the chaebols’ interests (Song 2007: 66), and 
that this tendency has increased during the present Lee Myung-bak government, which has 
a business-friendly policy platform.91 The collusion of the elite bureaucracy and its closer 
ties with private sector interests has resulted in the dilution of state autonomy.  
To sum up this section, the strength of state autonomy declined after the state escaped from 
the worst of the economic crisis in 2000, due to the segmentation of state entities and to the 
increasing influence exerted by business in the institutional implementation of the 
employment system in line with the development of Korean democratisation and the 
pressing impact of globalisation. While there is little doubt that the traditional 
configuration of power between the state and business (and labour) broke down, it is not 
convincing that the traditional developmental state has undergone a wholesale 
transformation into a pro-business state in which business played a dominant role in 
institutional implementation. Instead, this study emphasises that the state’s role, function 
and responsibilities has changed in the post-developmental era (after 1998), and this 
directly affects the character of the employment system (see the following chapters), while 
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  According	   to	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  A	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  was	  Poulantzas’	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He	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  the	  character	  of	  the	  capitalist	  state	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  (could	  only)	  be	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  by	  examining	  the	  state’s	  
structure,	  and	  not	  by	  adopting	  Miliband’s	  personnel	  alliance	  analysis	  (Miliband	  1969;	  Poulantzas	  1969:	  73).	  
91	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  (although	  this	  research	  could	  not	  definitively	  prove	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case)	  that	  
there	  has	  been	  a	  resurgence	  in	  the	  influence	  of	  economic	  bureaucrats	  under	  the	  present	  government,	  and	  
particularly	   of	   those	  who	  were	   former	  members	   of	   the	   Economic	   Planning	  Board	   (EPB)—the	   chief	   policy	  
agency	  within	  the	  Korean	  developmental	  state—and	  	  they	  had	  lost	  their	  positions	  under	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  in	  
1994.	  Although	  Kim	  Dae-­‐jung	  separated	  the	  EPB	  into	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Planning	  and	  Budget	  and	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   Finance	   and	   Economy	   in	   1998,	   so	   as	   to	   rein	   in	   the	   economic	   bureaucrats’	   dominance	   over	   the	   entire	  
policy	   arena,	   their	   power,	   which	   was	   embedded	   during	   the	   authoritarian-­‐developmental	   periods,	   has	  
continued	  to	  the	  present	  (interviewee	  P2).	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the state maintained the traditional relationship with business and labour (although it’s 
autonomous capacity appeared weakened). Thus, even though the state adopted the new 
institutional measures of the tripartite system (although many observers have noted that the 
Korean developmental state escaped from the past experience of governing the 
employment system), the traditional pattern of state-led policy implementation with a state-
business alliance and labour exclusion—that is, the old clothes of the Emperor—still 
remains. 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has shown that the institutional implementation and evolution of the LMGTC 
tripartite system, which can be seen as the beginning of the Korean developmental state 
transition, can be explored by identifying both the combined effect of internal and external 
factors in the institutional change mechanism and the actors’ dynamics that resulted from 
their diverse interests. Whereas existing literatures conclude that Korea’s traditional 
unilateral policy implementation pattern appears to fracture after the establishment of the 
LMGTC (Beeson & Robison 2000; HS Lee 1998; Moon & Rhyu 2000; Pirie 2005b; 2008), 
by closely examining the processes through which the LMGTC was established and 
operated, what this chapter has demonstrated are the following:   
First, it is important to note that the establishment of the LMGTC tripartite system resulted 
from not only the exogenous shock of the economic crisis, but also from the active choices 
made by social actors with diverse and sometimes contradictory interests. Second, the 
impact of the LMGTC changed over time due to the fact that the goals of the actors shifted 
in response to the changing environment, that is, the changing phases of the national crisis.  
Following this understanding of incremental institutional change, the changes in the 
LMGTC’s policy-making process provide the following lessons for understanding the 
transformation of the Korean developmental state. First, ironically, the state’s internal 
autonomy was initially restored due to IMF support, but this was enjoyed only during the 
national crisis phase (1998-1999); second, after Korea had escaped the worst of the crisis, 
business was no longer restricted by the state, its strategy and calculations towards the 
existing institution (the LMGTC) changed over time, and it began chasing its own policy 
objective and trying to restore the political power it had previously held over the social 
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actors; third, the institutional arrangements led to labour losing its political influence over 
and support from union members and the public; fourth, the state, and bureaucrats in 
particular, were less insulated from the private sector, especially the business sector; fifth, 
the shifting goals of business and labour, the state’s segmentation and increasing collusion 
between bureaucrats and business led to the LMGTC becoming increasingly insignificant 
as an institutional apparatus for negotiating the employment system. This resulted in the 
social partners—labour and business—returning to their tradition of confrontational 
relations, a pattern deeply embedded in Korea’s traditional system of a government-led 
strategy for economic and social development.  
Nevertheless, while this chapter does not conclude the matter about the form into which 
the Korean employment system eventually transitioned, it does emphasise the dismantling 
of the traditional relationship between the state and business and the cohesiveness within 
the state entities, which affect the change in the ruling process in the employment system. 
Thus, the following chapters examine the changing feature of the Korean employment 
system and its impact on the changing role of the developmental state. The policy outputs 
and policy outcomes from the LMGTC will be examined in terms of the dualisation in the 
labour market and in labour practice (in Chapter 7) and in terms of the developmental 
welfare state of the social protection system (in Chapter 8).	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Chapter 7  
Dualisation in Korean Labour Markets: Connecting Institutions 
on Labour flexibility	  
 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
At the heart of the current theoretical innovation within comparative labour market 
literature lies the analysis of distinct institutional configurations of labour and social 
policies that generate a particular systemic logic of labour flexibility and inequality in the 
labour market (Esping-Andersen 2000; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Gough, Holland & 
Teicher 2006; Haagh 2006; Haagh & Cook 2005; Molina & Rhodes 2007; Palier & Thelen 
2010; Standing 2011; Streeck & Thelen 2005). While this is associated with the pattern of 
labour decentralisation since the 1990s,92 it is also notable that current labour practice has 
derived from the emergence of institutional responses to the so-called security-flexibility 
trade-off, as explored by Haagh and Cook (2005: 172) in the case of Brazil and South 
Korea. Nevertheless, certain institutional adoption or borrowing practices can result in 
different outcomes in distinct institutional configurations. For instance, the Nordic 
countries accepted greater flexibility in the labour market in return for a high level of 
social protection (Haagh 2004: 154), while Continental Europe and East Asia introduced 
greater flexibility in the labour market and less protection for workers. The consequence is 
that there has been a deepening of dualism in the labour market and increases in inequality 
by employment status and firm size (Barbieri & Scherer 2009; Haagh 2004; Palier & 
Thelen 2010). 
In paying careful attention to the dynamics of institutional adjustment, the discourse on the 
labour market in the literature is underpinned by the theoretical premise that the 
institutional nature of the labour market is defined by a range of formal and informal 
institutions that embody certain rights and obligations (see Section 2.3 in Chapter 2).  
In this vein, the institutional reform that took place in Korea after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis provides important lessons on how labour market institutions shape—and are shaped 
                                                
92	  A	  pattern	  of	  decline	  in	  the	  rates	  of	  trade	  union	  density	  has	  been	  evinced	  since	  1980.	  In	  1988,	  trade	  union	  
density	  was	  18.6%	  in	  Korea	  and	  26.19%	  in	  OECD	  countries.	  In	  2010,	  the	  corresponding	  figures	  were	  9.7%	  in	  
Korea	  and	  17.5%	  in	  OECD	  countries	  (data	  extracted	  from	  OECD.Stat	  on	  14	  Aug	  2012	  16:03	  UTC	  [GMT]).	  See	  
Appendix	  2.	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by—collective action in politics and at work. This chapter focuses on the institutional sets 
that were introduced by the 1998 social pact for the labour market and labour practice. 
Both the crisis itself and the state’s programmes to resolve the crisis under the terms of the 
IMF bailout generated an institutional basis for Korea’s economic transformation towards 
a more flexible labour market in which mass lay-offs, the temporary agency system (the 
use of non-standard, temporary, or fixed-term contracts) and the flexible working hours 
system could be implemented.  
This research, however, assumes that labour market practice took an unexpected path: the 
large (core) firms’ labour market became characterised by greater rigidity 
(closed/impervious), whereas greater flexibility (mobile/permeable) became standard on 
the margins. The key questions for this chapter, therefore, lie in identifying (1) the policy 
output from the 1998 social pact, (2) how each institution worked in relation to other 
institutions (complementarily or contradictorily), and (3) how the outcome of institutional 
implementation conformed to or differed from the original intention of policy-makers. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the macroscopic changes on industrial relations 
contributed to the change in the employment system. For instance, Kim Dae-jung 
government’s reform project of chaebols led the big manufacturing companies to bring 
about the restructuring of the workforce and supply chain so as to reduce labour costs (e.g. 
modular production system, multi-layer subcontracting practices and automation). 
Although these technical innovations on labour process were not new, as seen in the case 
of ‘New Management Strategy’ in the Kim Young-sam government (see Chapter 5), this 
study assumes that the extent of structural reform in Korean industry and its impact on the 
employment system was more significant after the 1998 reforms. 
In short, the changes in labour relations and market after the LMGTC’s formation will be 
analysed in order to further illustrate the transformation of Korea’s employment system. 
The issues of what changed, whether the changes in labour relations and market were a 
result of the decreasing (or increasing) capacity of unions, the inner dynamics within 
labour and the new practices that emerged under new institutional conditions will be at the 
centre of the analysis. Sub-issues related to the changes in labour relations and market will 
also be examined, including the changes to the union system, wage system, company (in-
house) welfare systems and types of contract offered to workers. The results of these 
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changes will also be examined. The question that will be addressed through this analysis is 
the effect of the changes in labour relations and market on the employment system.  
 
7.1 Concepts: dualisation thesis 
 
The comparative political economists exploring the rationale for the recent rises in dualism 
in the labour market and inequality in labour practice in advanced industrialised countries 
can be divided into two groups. First, those subscribing to the political partisanship 
approach stress the role of social democratic governments as a key factor in labour 
relations (Alvarez, Garret & Lange 1991; Garret & Lange 1989; Kim & Fording 2002; 
Korpi 1983; Kwon 2010; Kwon & Pontusson 2010; Kwon & Shin 2007; Pontusson, Rueda 
& Way 2002). For scholars following this approach and in contrast to the assumption that 
social democratic parties represent the interest of labour in general (Iversen & Soskice 
2009), social democratic parties have strong incentives to consider ‘insiders’—mostly 
regular workers employed by large companies—their core constituency. As a result, the 
interests of insiders, who care more about their own employment protection than labour 
market policies that secure the jobs of outsiders, are excessively represented in the political 
process (Rueda 2007: 212).  
The second approach argues that political cooperation between the state, business and 
labour in the form of a social partnership has affected the extent to which dualism in labour 
markets and inequality in labour practice have emerged (Hemerijck & Vail 2006; Rhodes 
2001; Martin & Thelen 2007). In the Netherlands and Denmark where there are strong 
institutional legacies of social partnership, political cooperation between social partners 
sought to reduce the levels of protection for insiders so as to increase flexibility while 
enhancing social protections for outsiders in terms of increased security. This was done via 
a broadening of the ‘flexicurity’ in labour reform packages to include new roles and 
responsibilities for the social partners, and it involved large numbers of firms in retraining 
initiatives (Martin & Thelen 2007: 28).  
The Korean case, however, does not conform to these explanations and the trajectory of 
dualism in the labour market and inequality in labour practice experienced in Korea cannot 
be adequately explained as the result of either social democratic governments’ efforts or 
social partnership. One the one hand, while dualism in the labour market and inequality in 
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labour practice increased under the administration of two centre-left governments (1998–
2007), the expansion of social protection schemes such as Employment Insurance (EI) also 
took place during same period. However, this research could determine that, apart from its 
original goals, the EI partly played a role in exacerbating the income inequality.93 On the 
other hand, the social partnership established by the LMGTC lost its ability to mobilise all 
of Korea’s major social partners, as one of the two national-level trade unions, the KCTU, 
left the LMGTC in late 1998 and has not returned.94 
Before considering an alternative framework to explain labour market dualism and labour 
practice inequality in Korea, a conceptualisation of the dualisation, dualism and divide, and 
the way in which these have mixed should be presented. This research differentiates 
conceptually: dualisation refers to the differential treatment of insiders and outsiders 
(process); dualism takes the institutional form, and can be deepened or widened by the 
dualisation at the output level; and social divides are very likely to be led by the process of 
dualisation at the outcome level (Emmenegger et al. 2012:10–11). To put it differently, 
rather than existing at the outcome level (where the empirical result appears), dualisation 
lies at the policy output level, where political dynamics tend towards institutional forms 
that have certain policy objectives and intentions. The importance of this perspective is that 
the institutional outcomes (i.e. social divides) ‘need not reflect the goals of any particular 
group; they may be the unintended outcome of conflict among groups or the result of 
“ambiguous compromises” among actors who can coordinate on institutional means even 
if they differ on substantive goals (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 8).’ This, in turn, underpins 
the importance of institutional complementarity, as seen in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) and 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.1).  
In academia, a broad and general theorising that aims to reveal the structural complexity of 
the modern capitalist state through the varieties of capitalism framework has recently 
emerged within comparative political economy (Hall & Soskice 2001). Rather than general 
theorising on the complementarity among institutional sets or systems, however, this 
research develops a micro-framework of institutional complementarity. Using Haagh’s 
definition of the employment system as the network among institutions or the institutional 
setting within and between firms and in labour policy (Haagh 2004: 155), real labour 
                                                
93	  See	  Chapter	  8.	  
94	  See	  Chapter	  6.	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practice is seen to be shaped by each individual labour policy. In addition, as Chang (2007: 
5–29) emphasises, an institution has multiple functions and interacts with other institutions. 
Institutions may not function well if they are incompatible with other institutions (Chang 
2007: 6). From this perspective, the emerging and deepening patterns of labour market 
dualism and inequality in Korea can be seen to have been shaped by the 1998 reform of the 
labour laws, the outcome of which runs contrary to the original purpose of the institution(s).  
In sum, this chapter assumes that the dualism of labour market division and increasing 
inequality in Korea was deepened and widened by the 1998 amendments to the labour laws 
and their subsequent revision, which had the explicit policy aims of greater flexibilisation 
(mostly in the core sectors) and of reducing inequality at the margins, but they were biased 
at the output level. In the following sections, the change that occurred in the labour market 
and labour practice will be analysed in line with the dualisation thesis and compared to 
those of past. The key questions, then, are which institutions (or their complementarities) 
played a role in bringing about dualism in the Korean labour market, and how was this 
interpreted and enforced between the business and labour? To answer these questions, a 
case study of Hyundai Motors, which is regarded as a representative of the multinational 
corporations leading the Korean economy, and its labour union, which has been at the core 
of the Korean labour movement since 1987, will be used. 
 
7.2 Unexpected outcome from institutional transformation 
 
The cross-class trend of labour market dualisation and dualism appears not only in 
deindustrialised Western countries but also in the East Asian developmental state. 
According to Peng (2012: 227), as in Germany and France, the pattern of industrial 
relations, which is based on interactions between the state, business, and labour in Korea 
and Japan, has opted to maintain their national competitiveness by saving large firms by 
either reducing the size of the core workforce and raising worker productivity or increasing 
the hiring of atypical workers. The consequence is a contraction and consolidation of the 
core and the expansion of the peripheral labour market. Although her analysis is largely 
persuasive in terms of dualism of insiders and outsiders, there is a misunderstanding that 
the triumvirate of the state, business and labour intentionally selected this dualisation 
process with a shared belief that this was the best way to protect core workers and maintain 
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national competitiveness (Peng 2012: 245). Rather, the dualism should be identified as an 
ex post facto of empirical phenomenon, separate from original intentions of the social pact 
for labour laws amendment in 1998, although the real practice might be displayed as such. 
Real in practice it might be, but it should not be seen as being intrinsically connected to the 
original intention of creating a social pact for labour law amendments in 1998. To explore 
this matter further, this section begins with an examination of Korean employment practice 
and its transformation.  
First, as regards dualism in the labour market in Korea, while the rate of unemployment in 
2010 was fairly low (3.7%) compared to the OECD average (8.3%), the indices for the 
rates of temporary workers (23.0%) in dependent employment and self-employed workers 
(28.8%) in a civilian employment are much higher than those of the OECD as a whole 
(11.9% and 16.0%, respectively).95 This implies that the majority of Korean employees are 
non-regular or self-employed workers rather than regular workers in the labour market. In 
particular, as seen in the Chart 7.1, the share of temporary employment among total 
dependent employment is extremely high compared to other advanced countries and the 
OECD as a whole: 25.73% in 2004 and 23.76% in 2011 compared with an average of 
11.39% (2004) and 11.99% (2011) throughout the OECD. 
As can be seen in Chart 7.1, which uses long-term data from the Korean Statistics 
Information Service, this labour market situation has become more marked since 1998. 
Although the number of regular workers had recovered to pre-1997 levels by 2003—7,499 
thousand (58.1%) in 1995 and 7,269 thousands (50.5%) in 2003—the number of non-
regular workers (temporary workers and on-call workers) increased to about 50% of the 
total paid (non-self-employed) workforce.96 Consequently, as of 2007, the number of non-
regular workers reached about 7.3 million. Although there has been a rising trend in the 
number of regular workers since 2008, this does not mean that there has been a significant 
decrease in the size of the non-regular workforce. Instead, the numbers of temporary 
workers and on-call workers has remained stable at around seven million since 2003, while 
the number of regular workers, which recovered to the pre-1997 level in that year, has 
increased gradually since then. In short, the data from the OECD and the Korean Statistics 
Information Service suggest that the employment divide between regular workers and non-
                                                
95	  Source:	  OECD	  Stat:	  Data	  accessed	  on	  15/08/	  2012	  15:01	  UTC	  (GMT).	  
96	  Korean	  Statistical	  Information	  Service	  (http://kosis.kr/):	  Data	  accessed	  on	  14/08/2012,	  20:59	  UTC	  (GMT).	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regular workers have become permanent, regardless of the 1998 amendments to the labour 
laws. 
 
Chart 7.1: Incidence of temporary employment – Dependent employment (%) 
*Source: OECD Stat: Data accessed on 15/ 08/ 2012, 14:12 UTC (GMT). 
 
Moreover, if the data on the number of workers by firm size is examined, it is clear that the 
core (insiders) labour market has reduced in size since 1997. For instance, while the total 
percentage of workers employed in large companies (those employing 1,000 or more) 
decreased from 12.4% in 1993 to 5.7% in 2006, the percentage employed in SMEs (firms 
employing fewer than 299 people) increased from 79.1% to 87.7% in the same period 
(Choi & Lee 2008: 88–95). 
Another issue to consider here is the average length of job tenure by size of firm; the 
aggregated data for job tenure does indicate that labour mobility is differentiated by firm 
size. As shown in Table 7.1, while the job tenures of regular workers since 1997 have 
averaged 5.6 years overall, those in large firms employing over 500 people have increased 
sharply from 7.4 years in 1997 to 9.2 years in 2007, twice that of firms employing fewer 
than 30 persons. More significantly, the differentiation in job tenure appears to vary 
dramatically by employment type. From 2004 to 2011, the average job duration of regular 
workers has been three times that of non-regular workers (from 70 months in 2004 to 79 
months in 2011 for regular workers and from 24 months in 2004 to 27 months in 2011 for 
non-regular workers). 
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Table 7.1: Average duration of job longevity by firm size (regular workers) 
        (unit: years old, years) 
	  Average age Job tenure 
Corporate size 
5~9 10~29 30~99 100~ 299 
300~ 
499 
500 and 
over 
1993 34.3 4.6 - 3.1  3.8  4.8  5.5  6.4  
1994 34.8 4.8 - 3.5  4.0  5.2  5.8  6.6  
1995 35.1 5.2 - 4.1  4.3  5.4  6.0  6.8  
1996 35.2 5.3 - 4.0  4.8  5.3  6.4  6.9  
1997 35.8 5.6 - 4.4  5.0  5.6  6.9  7.4  
1998 36.2 6.1 - 4.8  5.3  6.1  7.0  8.1  
1999 35.9 (36.0) 5.7 (5.9) 4.0  4.6  5.1  6.1  7.0  8.3  
2000 36.2 (36.3) 5.6 (5.9) 4.0  4.5  5.1  6.1  7.8  8.5  
2001 36.5 (36.6) 5.9 (6.2) 4.2  4.7  5.4  6.6  7.5  8.8  
2002 36.5 (36.7) 5.6 (6.0) 3.5  4.3  4.8  6.2  7.2  9.5  
2003 37.1 (37.2) 5.8 (6.1) 3.9  4.5  5.3  6.4  7.8  9.3  
2004 37.5 (37.6) 5.9 (6.2) 4.1  4.8  5.3  6.6  7.3  9.1  
2005 37.7 (37.6) 5.8 (6.1) 3.9  4.6  5.4  6.6  7.7  8.8  
2006 37.5 (37.5) 5.8 (6.2) 4.1  4.5  5.4  6.8  7.8  9.1  
2007 37.8 (37.7) 5.9 (6.2) 4.3  4.5  5.4  6.7  7.9  9.2  
*Source: Ministry of Labour (http://laborstat.molab.go.kr/): Data accessed on 15/ 08/2012, 
15:42 UTC (GMT). 
*Note: 1) data for 1993-1998 were estimated from firms employing more than 10 workers, and 
those after 1999 were estimated from firms employing more than 5 workers. 
  2) Figures in parentheses refer to the rates estimated from firms employing more than 10 
workers. 
 
This trend is more clearly shown in the differences between the average monthly incidence 
of placed and displaced employees for large and smaller firms (Chart 7.2). For the period 
1993–2007, there has been a steady downward trend in the numbers of employees placed 
in large companies, with a significant drop recorded for 1998. Meanwhile, there has been a 
fluctuating but general upward trend for employees placed in SMEs (small and medium-
sized enterprises). For displacements, contrary to general expectations, the number of 
employees displaced in large firms decreased overall during the period 1993–2007 and has 
remained steady at around 20,000 persons since 1999. In other words, in spite of the 1998 
social pact and the introduction of changes to the Labour Standard Law permitting mass 
layoffs, the labour market in large firms has been more impervious (rigid) than the labour 
market in SMEs. 
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Chart 7.2: Average monthly incidence of employees placed and displaced by firm size 
(persons) 
 
*Source: Ministry of Labour (http://laborstat.molab.go.kr/): Data accessed on 15/08/ 2012, 
15:42 UTC (GMT). 
*Note: 1) Big company refers to firms employing 300 and over persons 
   2) SMEs refers to firms employing 10-299 persons 
 
More surprisingly, the average monthly incidences of fired and retired workers in large 
firms have remained steady at around 18,000 persons since 1999. In contrast to big firms, 
there has been a dramatic increase in these incidences for SMEs in the same period, from 
85,000 in 1993 to 130,000 in 2007.97 This suggests that the labour market in large firms 
has remained impervious (rigid), while that in SMEs has become much more permeable 
(flexible), especially since the 1998 social pact by the LMGTC and the amendments to the 
labour laws. 
This trend of rigidity in large firms and flexibility in smaller firms can be represented by 
examining the changing trend of labour elasticity. By examining the GDP elasticity of 
employment, a dramatic change in the labour market becomes apparent. A basic definition 
of employment elasticity is ‘the percentage change in the number of employed persons in 
an economy or region associated with a percentage change in economic output, measured 
by gross domestic product’ (Kapsos 2005: 2). Thus, this represents the extent to which an 
increase in employment accompanies an increase in GDP. In general terms, employment is 
identified as elastic when the rate is over one, while employment is inelastic when the rate 
                                                
97	  Source:	   Ministry	   of	   Labour	   (http://laborstat.molab.go.kr/):	   Data	   accessed	   on	   15/08/2012,	   15:42	   UTC	  
(GMT).	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is under one.98 From the chart in footnote 98, the rates of elasticity of total employment 
show fluctuation around the 0.3 point. Compared to the rates for other regions (except 
Japan), Korea’s rates of employment elasticity have remained more consistent, suggesting 
that the labour market in Korea is more flexible than that of Western Europe (especially 
Denmark) but more strict than that of North America. Here, it is noteworthy that there was 
drastic up-and-down movement in the rate of employment elasticity in manufacturing 
industries, which decreased rapidly after 1989 (two years after the Great Workers’ Struggle 
of 1987) but suddenly peaked in 1998, as seen in Chart 7.3. However, the trend 
immediately downturned, with points falling to under 0, which indicates considerable 
inelasticity in the labour market. 
 
 
Chart 7.3: GDP elasticity of employment by industry 
 
 
*Source: Department of Statistics, Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) (See Appendix 3). 
*Note: GDP elasticity of employment = rate of employment/rate of GDP. 
                                                
98	  For	   more	   conceptualisations,	   see	   Chapter	   4	   (footnote	   57).	   A	   new	   methodological	   approach	   to	   GDP	  
elasticity	   of	   employment	   has	   been	   used	   in	   recent	   research	   by	   the	   ILO,	   and	   an	   index	   of	   countries’	  
employment	   elasticities	   has	   been	   produced	   (see	   Kapsos	   2005).	   The	   employment	   elasticities	   for	   selected	  
regions	   and	   countries	   according	   to	   Kapsos’s	   new	  model	   are	   given	   below.	   As	   can	   be	   seen,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
Korea,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  large	  difference	  in	  employment	  elasticity	  over	  the	  periods	  covered	  by	  the	  research.	  	  
	  
	   1991–1995	   1995–1999	   1999–2003	  
Western	  Europe	   -­‐0.09	  	   0.36	  	   0.42	  	  
North	  America	   0.67	  	   0.44	  	   0.23	  	  
Denmark	   -­‐0.02	  	   0.42	  	   -­‐0.04	  	  
Japan	   0.34	  	   0.20	  	   -­‐0.24	  	  
Korea	   0.30	  	   0.17	  	   0.38	  	  
UK	   0.12	  	   0.43	  	   0.37	  	  
*Source: Kapsos (2005: 11, 31–35). 
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By contrast, the elasticity in service industries was consistently a little higher than total 
elasticity during the whole period, with a fluctuation in the 2003–2005 period. This 
differentiation can be explained by solid rigidity major manufacturing companies enjoyed 
in 1990s and the large numbers of dismissals in 1998. More importantly, the labour market 
in manufacturing industries returned to rigidity and solidity after 1998, despite the 1998 
labour laws amendment making it easier fire and hire at workplaces. By contrast, service 
industries, which were generally run by small to medium sized businesses, maintained a 
level of around 0.7 throughout the 1990s, without any significant resonance with the 1998 
labour laws amendment. Rather, there was a bounce 2003 and 2004. This phenomenon 
implies that the labour market of manufacturing industries, which were generally run by 
large firms, became more rigid, but that of service industries (which were mainly SMEs) 
remained flexible. In fact, the dualism and divide of the labour market can be confirmed by 
the fact that the rates of GDP elasticity in manufacturing industries has been significantly 
lower than those in industry as a whole since 1992, except during the 1997 Asian crisis, 
and is be stable. 
 
Chart 7.4: Average monthly wage by employment status (10 thousand won, %) 
 
*Source: Korean Contingent Workers’ Centre (http://workingvoice.net/xe/);Korean Statistical 
Information Service 
*Note: Rate = non-regular workers’ wage/ regular workers’ wage X 100 
 
Second, as regards inequality in labour practices, wage discrimination has worsened over 
the last decade. Even after the economy recovered from the economic crisis, positions lost 
by regular workers were filled by non-regular workers in the name of fostering labour 
market flexibility. The wage of non-regular workers was about half that of regular workers 
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(Han et al. 2007: 21). As shown in Chart 7.4, the average monthly wage of non-regular 
workers in 2000 stood at around 800 thousand won (USD 710), which was 53.5% of that 
of regular workers. The income gap between regular and non-regular workers widened 
over the next decade, with non-regular workers’ average monthly wage in 2010 standing at 
1,430 thousand won (USD 1,268), 46.2% of the wage of regular workers. Additionally, 
regular workers’ premium rate for overtime and overnight work reached 350% of standard 
rates, over twice that of non-regular workers (150%) (J.-S. Park 2005: 65). This has also 
deepened the income inequality between regular workers and non-regular workers. 
 
Table 7.2: Composition of low-wage workers (2009, %) 
Total Employment 
Status 
Sex Contract type Social protection 
 Regular Non-
regular 
Male Female Full-
time 
Part-
time 
NPI HCI EI 
26.2 17.3 42.7 16.7 39.1 23.4 55.3 63.3 8.6 67.7 
 
Firm size 
1~4 5~9 10~29 30~99 100~299 >300 
52.1 35.4 25.1 16 10.6 5.5 
*Source: Eun et al. (2011, 118) 
*Note: NPI: National Pension Insurance 
HCI: Health Care Insurance 
EI: Employment Insurance 
 
The relative percentage of regular and non-regular workers covered by social insurance 
schemes provides further evidence of the income inequality between regular workers and 
non-regular workers. In 2010, 98% of regular workers and 33% of non-regular workers 
were covered by national pension insurance, 98.6% of regular workers and 37.2% of non-
regular workers by health care insurance, and 82.2% of regular workers and 35.6% of non-
regular workers by EI (Han 2011: 7). Furthermore, it should be added that 26.2% of 
workers in Korea in 2009 were defined as low-wage workers,99 the highest percentage 
among OECD countries (Table 7.2).100  The most significant wage discrimination is 
revealed by the percentage of low-wage workers by firm size, which shows that the smaller 
the firm size, the higher the percentage of low-wage workers. Of particular note is the fact 
                                                
99	  Low-­‐wage	  workers	   are	   defined	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Labour	   annually.	   In	   2012,	   workers	   who	   earn	   below	  
1,250	  thousand	  won	  (USD	  1,109)	  in	  a	  month	  are	  low-­‐wage	  workers	  
100	  According	  to	  the	  term	  and	  methodology	  of	  EU’s	  LoWER	  (Low	  Wage	  Employment	  Research	  Network)	  for	  
low-­‐wage	  workers,	  the	  result	  is	  not	  so	  different	  in	  that	  26.7%	  of	  total	  wage	  workers	  are	  low-­‐wage	  workers,	  
and	  6.8%	  of	  regular	  workers	  and	  47.0%	  of	  non-­‐regular	  workers	  were	  low-­‐wage	  workers	  in	  2011	  (Y.-­‐S.	  Kim	  
2011:	  21).	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that 42% of wage workers are employed in workplaces with 30 or fewer workers and that 
52.1% of workers in firms employing 1–4 persons and 35.4% of workers in firms 
employing 5–9 persons are low-wage workers (Eun et al. 2011: 118). Moreover, according 
to research conducted by B. Lee (2009), low-wage workers and non-regular workers are 
more likely to lose their jobs than high-wage or regular workers, with 27.1% of temporary 
worker respondents and 53.6% of on-call worker respondents reporting that they had lost 
their jobs on at least one occasion. This compares to only 8.5% for regular workers. This 
implies that greater labour market and wage flexibility is highest among low-wage workers 
in the outsider labour market and much less so in the core-insider labour market. 
This wage flexibilisation and inequality was accompanied by the dismantlement of a quasi-
lifetime commitment and a change in the wage system from a seniority-based to 
performance-based system. Particularly, according to Chang and Chae (Chang & Chae 
2004: 436–437), an annual salary system has been a prevalent measurement of wage 
adjustment, especially in large firms, accounting 94 in 1996 to 1,612 firms (32.4%) among 
4,998 companies surveyed in January 2002. As Haagh and Cook argue, in the mid-1990s, 
employers in larger firms were seeking new ways of adjusting the workforce. After the 
1997 financial crisis, they were offered an opportunity to boost labour market 
flexibilisation through institutional measurements, such as work-size reduction and shifting 
from the seniority-based wage system and lifetime employment to a performance-based 
wage and employment system (Haagh & Cook 2005: 189). With this change of contract 
type and wage system in regular workers, wage discrimination appears not only in 
employment status but also by the firm size in terms of regular workers, as seen in the 
Chart 7.5. Alongside the trend of decreasing working hours, which is more evident among 
large firms, the total wage per month for workers in large firms also increased at a slightly 
faster rate than those in SMEs. Furthermore, the wage disparity between workers in large 
firms and those in SMEs became more marked since the 1998 labour law amendment, even 
though working hours in large firms have decreased more than in SMEs. To sum up, 
although the wage and income inequality between large firms and SMEs and between 
regular workers and irregular workers existed before the 1997 economic crisis, this 
situation deepened and became entrenched after 1998. 
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Chart 7.5: Total payment and working hours per month (won, hours) 
 
*Source: Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/):Data accessedon 14/08/2012, 
18:05 UTC (GMT). 
 
In fact, the rigidity that characterises the Korean labour market has been strongly 
embedded since the authoritarian-development period (1970s–1980s), especially among 
large firms, and this hampered the effectiveness of the 1998 amendments to the labour 
laws that aimed to increase flexibility in the labour market. In 1999, the Kim Dae-jung 
government again revised the Labour Standards Act to maximise the effect of liberalisation. 
The 1999 Labour Standards Act revision made the individual dismissal process easier. 
Nevertheless, since the financial crisis, Korean employers (especially in large firms) have 
not necessarily chosen to employ drastic measures for workforce adjustment, despite 
having the power of collective dismissal in corporate emergencies and other cases, such as 
M&A, takeovers and restructuring (Labour Standards Act, Article 30101). Although more 
frequently used than before, layoffs and compulsory early retirements have not been the 
predominant measures employed for workforce adjustment, and the more moderate options 
of wage adjustment, working hour adjustment and recruitment freezing have been used 
more often (Yun 2008: 230; interviewee P12). This is due to the embedded practice of 
paternalism in the labour market, which has resulted in a growing number of labour market 
entrants (mainly recent university graduates) being pushed into the secondary labour 
market of SMEs (Peng 2012: 229). 
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  This	  appears	  in	  Article	  24	  of	  the	  Labour	  Standards	  Act	  due	  to	  a	  recent	  revision.	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7.3 Complementarity of institutions in labour laws 
 
Returning to the matter of why the dualism in the labour market and the inequality in 
labour practice in Korea emerged, conflict has become commonplace in the age of 
globalisation between the short-term needs of firms for flexibility and the long-term needs 
of individuals to renew their means of mobility (in effect to replenish their human capital) 
(Haagh 2001: 389). In this situation, labour standards in the workplace can be seen as an 
impediment to progress (Standing 1999: 428), and individual firms seek ways to bypass 
minimum labour standards or use an informal workforce that is outside the regulatory 
system in order to keep costs low (Gough et al. 2006: 258). 
As an addition to this macro-explanation for the current trend towards labour flexibility, 
this study advances a micro-framework to explain labour market dualism and labour 
practice inequality, arguing that the conflict between institutions with regard to labour laws 
may produce unexpected institutional outputs as a result of the combined (but, inverted) 
effect of institutions. 
 
7.3.1 Congested flexibility in the core labour market 
 
Focusing on the LMGTC in 1998, the complementarity between Article 31 of the Labour 
Standards Act,102 the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (both 
established in 1998) and the Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act (established in 1984) 
reversed the LMGTC’s original intention to reform Korea’s labour laws. That intention 
was to weaken employment protection for the large firms’ regular workers (insiders), and 
prevent redundancies for workers in SMEs and non-regular workers (outsiders).  
The issue of mass layoffs was the subject at the centre of the discourse between the state, 
business and labour within the LMGTC. The introduction of Article 31 of the Labour 
Standards Act was originally intended to block any increase in the use of non-regular 
workers. According to a former government officer who worked for the LRRC and 
LMGTC, the understanding shared by the social partners in the LMGTC was that mass 
layoffs (greater flexibility) in the core labour market would lead to lower flexibility at the 
margin (the outsiders’ labour market), with the result that the number of non-regular 
workers would decrease (interviewee P5). To them, the high flexibility in the outsiders’ 
                                                
102	  This	  appears	  in	  Article	  24	  of	  the	  Labour	  Standards	  Act	  due	  to	  a	  recent	  revision.	  
193	  
labour market derived from the strong employment protection in the core labour market. 
However, the institutional arrangement that was established for achieving greater 
flexibility in the (core) labour market led to a completely different outcome than that 
intended in regard to labour practice. 
Contrary to the LMGTC’s expectations, the implementation of mass layoffs was to prove 
difficult due to strong resistance by trade unions, which employed strategies including 
occupying workplaces and initiating labour disputes. The case of the dismissal of Hyundai 
Motors workers in 1998, which was enabled by the 1998 labour law amendments and is 
regarded as a highly significant event among the mass layoffs that took place in Korean 
industry, attests to the difficulties that institutional change faces in reality. Since Hyundai 
Motors was closely entwined in the regional economy and community, was serviced by 
many subcontractors in the region and was one of the main players in fostering Korea’s 
global image, the measures taken by Hyundai for workforce adjustment from the end of 
1997, including the proposed dismissal of 2,678 workers of and unpaid leave of absence 
for a further 900 workers, took centre stage as a national issue and led to the union calling 
a strike in August 1998. To resolve this, the LMGTC (the head of the Ministry of Labour, 
and members of the ruling party, the KEF and the KCTU) pushed for an agreement 
between the Hyundai management and the union, with the result that the measures that 
would be taken for workforce adjustment were settled relatively amicably by Hyundai 
Motors’ management and the union (ESDC 2008: 272–273; KCTU 2001: 232–233). 
Layoffs were to be restricted to restaurant employees (277 workers) shared among all 
workplaces, and the workers who had already been served redundancy notices (2,678 
workers) were given unpaid leave instead.103 
Although the unions’ strong resistance against mass layoffs contributed to hindering 
greater flexibilisation in the public sector and at large firms (especially chaebols), it should 
be acknowledged that the Labour Standards Act itself contains provisions that raised 
procedural difficulties for the enactment of mass redundancies. Article 31 of Labour 
Standards Act states that employers must satisfy the following conditions: 
(1) where an employer wishes to dismiss a worker for managerial reasons, there must be an 
urgent managerial necessity; (2) the employer shall make every effort to avoid dismissal; 
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(3) the employer shall establish and follow reasonable and fair criteria for the selection of 
those persons subject to dismissal; and (4) the employer shall inform at least 60 days 
before the intended date of dismissal and consult in good faith with the labour union 
regarding the methods for avoiding dismissals, the criteria for dismissal, etc. (Labour 
Standards Act, Article 31104) 
In effect, the 1998 institutional measures for greater flexibility in labour market and the 
conditions of 1998 Labour Standards Act were counterproductive, making it more difficult 
for employers to dismiss workers, and it eventually increased labour market rigidity (Choi 
& Lee 2008: 17), especially in large manufacturing firms (mostly chaebols) where unions 
were strong enough to hamper the dismissals process via the consultation with the 
employer stipulated in condition (4) of Article 31. In fact, during the interview with a vice 
president of the KEF, he stated: 
There was discontentment among employers because we felt that it would be better if the 
Labour Standards Act were not made law. Nevertheless, we expected that this law would 
make firing much easier. In reality, however, there were lots of tricky procedures on the law, 
and unions’ resistance was still there. (interviewee P1)  
 
Similar views were expressed by other interviewees, including executive members of two 
national unions and a former politician who participated in the labour law amendment 
process in 1998.105 
 
7.3.2 New trend of in-house subcontracting 
 
The strategy that employers settled upon to create a more flexible labour force was to use 
more non-regular workers (interviewee P1; interviewee P22). Gough et al. note that this is 
a tactic commonly used to keep costs low because informal workers fall outside the 
regulatory system (2006: 258). For instance, the use of in-house subcontracting and fixed-
term contracts became increasingly prevalent so as to increase labour flexibility, especially 
by large firms. 
                                                
104	  This	  appears	  in	  Article	  24	  of	  the	  Labour	  Standards	  Act	  due	  to	  a	  recent	  revision.	  
105	  Interviewee	  P9	  (of	  FKTU),	  Interviewee	  P22	  (of	  KCTU)	  and	  interviewee	  P10,	  respectively.	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The term ‘in-house subcontracting’ differs from traditional subcontracting in which an 
independent subcontractor procures components for the final product from vendors; in-
house subcontracting is a de facto measure of the use of non-regular workers. To be more 
specific, as the in-house subcontractor itself makes one-, two-, or three-year contracts with 
the prime contractor, employees of an in-house subcontractor are fixed-term workers with 
no long-term job security. Thus, it is worth noting that while few new regular workers 
were hired by Hyundai Motors between 1999 and 2002, in-house subcontracting resulted 
in a significant increase in non-regular workers at the company (interviewee P4; 
interviewee P9), a figure that reached a peak of 9,246 workers in 2004 (see Table 7.3).106 
 
Table 7.3: Change of workforces by using in-house subcontracting by workplaces of 
Hyundai Motors 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Nov. 2005 
Ulsan 4,868 5,934 6,975 7,409 7,686 7,043 
Jeonju 658 622 703 824 848 740 
Asan 789 825 903 1,013 1,037 1,034 
Total 6,315 7,381 8,581 9,246 9,571 8,817 
*Source: T.-J. Park (2005: 15). 
 
The important point here is that since the in-house subcontractor that employs these 
workers makes contracts with the prime contractor (Hyundai Motors) for a fixed term (at 
best three years, but usually one year107), in practice, these workers were being employed 
on fixed-term (three years at best) or other unstable contracts. For example, a Hyundai 
Mobis plant, one of the largest affiliates of the Hyundai Motors group, was composed 
almost entirely of non-regular workers. Of the 3,148 workers at the plant, only 76 workers 
were employed on regular contracts, with 2,390 workers employed on non-regular 
contracts via in-house subcontracting or temporary agency contracting. At Hyundai Mobis’ 
Asan plant, all employees, except for 16 people working for the company’s executives, 
were non-regular workers (389 workers) with the status of subcontracted employees 
(KMWU 2006: 122–124). 
 
  
                                                
106	  In	  this	  section,	  the	  discussion	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  in-­‐house	  subcontracting	  at	  Hyundai	  Motors.	  	  
107	  KMWU	  2006:	  123	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Figure 7.1: Change of subcontracting system 
 
 
Again, this form of workforce adjustment and increasing use of non-regular workers by in-
house subcontracting occurred after the 1998 amendments to the labour laws (Figure 7.1). 
The management of Hyundai Motors consciously selected in-house subcontracting as a 
means of increasing labour flexibility and productivity, resulting in the labour market 
divide deepening and widening. In terms of inequality in labour practices, in-house 
subcontracted workers are not protected by the prime contractor’s union in terms of 
income equality, which has led to severe wage discrimination between regular workers for 
the prime contractor and non-regular workers for the in-house subcontractor. For instance, 
the Hyundai Motors’ union struck a collective agreement with management in 2000 that 
allowed the use of in-house subcontracting for 16.9% of the entire production process in 
return for a guarantee that union members would receive their regular retirement 
entitlements (Joo 2002: 88–90). Since then, the Hyundai Motors’ union has on three 
occasions rejected a one company, one union proposal (ilsa-iljojik) that would accept non-
regular workers (mostly workers for the in-house subcontractor) as union members.108 
These examples show that the yearly wage bargaining between Hyundai Motors’ union and 
the employer has not applied to in-house subcontracting workers, meaning that (regular) 
workers at Hyundai Motors have enjoyed wage increases and job security, whereas the 
                                                
108	  This	   strategy	   by	   large	   unions	   to	   resist	   any	   change	   to	   employment	   practice	   and	   industrial	   relations	   is	  
generally	   regarded	   as	   ‘business	   unionism’	   (Park	   2009:	   110;	   Bae	   et	   al.	   2008:	   166;	   see	   Section	   7.4	   in	   this	  
chapter).	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wages of in-house subcontractor workers has remained low. This is reflected in the similar 
figures for wage inequality given in Chart 7.4  
As one of the biggest manufacturing firms in Korea, the aftermath of this collective 
bargaining at Hyundai Motors has meant that the use of in-house subcontracting has spread 
to other large companies. According to research by the Ministry of Labour in 2001 on 
firms employing over 300 people, 41.2% of firms operate in-house subcontracting 
(shipbuilding [61.3%], steel manufacturing [43.7%], the chemical industry [28.8%], and 
automobile production [16.3%]). Of the entire workforce of these firms, 24.6% (320,000 
people) are in-house subcontracted workers (Hankook Business Newspaper 21 February 
2012). A consequence of the spread of in-house subcontracting has been that the numerical 
flexibility in this core-insider labour market has decreased. The rates of hiring new 
employees, displacement, and replacement by firms employing in-house subcontractors are 
lower than those in firms not using in-house subcontractors (Eun et al. 2011: 33–34). 
 
7.3.3 Conflicting interpretations on in-house subcontracting 
 
The use of in-house subcontracting by large firms, while not illegal under the terms of the 
1998 labour law amendments, which introduced the Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers and the Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act (established 
in 1984), is still criticised as having provoked the increase in the use of non-regular 
workers since they secured job stability for core regular workers and weakened job 
security at the margin. The most important point, however, is that the policy outcome of 
the institutional arrangements for balancing labour flexibility and protection for non-
regular workers in a divided labour market did not match the original intention and goals 
of the institutional innovation.  
In a capitalist setting the functioning of social order is typically biased by a differential 
endowment of classes with resources enabling actors to calculate their interests and 
challenge or circumvent received interpretations of institutionalised social obligations 
(Streeck 2010: 13). The institutional genesis of the Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers was proposed by the Ministry of Labour with the purpose of 
advancing labour market reform (higher flexibility) in 1993 (Ministry of Labour 2006c: 
76). However, its introduction was delayed until 1998 due to labour’s strong opposition, 
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with the unions, arguing that it would legalise intermediary exploitation, negatively affect 
workers’ job security and debilitate the unions’ (labour) movement.109 When the act was 
introduced on 20 February 1998 (immediately after the LMGTC had reached its landmark 
agreement), its purpose was to allow the use of temporary agency workers while protecting 
them from illegal and unfair labour practices. To this end, the law set regulations on which 
types of work were open to the use of temporary agency workers and which were 
prohibited, with jobs directly related to production in manufacturing industries prohibited 
for temporary agency workers (Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency Workers, 
Article 5).  
As for enforcement of its rules in practice, however, the use of temporary agency workers 
has been prevalent in every industry, including manufacturing, and it has been extremely 
difficult to judge whether the employer is using temporary agency workers in accordance 
with the act or whether they are employing an illegal labour force of temporary agency 
workers disguised under the subcontracting system regulated by the Fair Transactions in 
Subcontracting Act (established in 1984). In short, this points to an interpretational 
ambiguity at the heart of the institution: whether the use in-house subcontracting in real 
workplace practice should be seen as legitimate according to the Fair Transaction in 
Subcontracting Act or as illegal according to the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary 
Agency Workers.  
The unions’ understanding of this kind of labour practice of in-house subcontracting is in 
direct conflict with that of employers. For employers, the use of labour force outsourcing 
such as in-house subcontracting is legitimate under the terms of the Fair Transactions in 
Subcontracting Act 1984. In practice, however, in-house subcontracting is largely the same 
as that of temporary agency contracting. According to the Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers, the use of temporary agency workers is restricted to 
workplaces outside manufacturing industries, and the prime contractor has authority over 
the work arrangements, replacement, work directions, supervision, and working hours of 
agency workers, which is not the case for subcontracted workers (under the Fair 
Transactions in Subcontracting Act, Article 18). However, in-house subcontracting is 
prevalent in major manufacturing industries and can be regarded as being largely 
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  The	  1997	  re-­‐proposal	  by	  the	  state	  was	  backed	  by	  the	  IMF	  (Chosunilbo,	  8	  December	  1997).	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indistinguishable from the use of temporary agency workers because the prime contractor 
has control over the labour of subcontracted workers.  
According to a former leader of Hyundai Motors, the work arrangements, replacement, 
work directions, supervision, and working hours of agency workers, which is not the case 
for subcontracted workers (under the Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act), these 
workers are not commissioned by Hyundai Motors, but instead are directly managed by the 
company, every day, every hour (interviewee P4).  
The Ministry of Labour reached the decision in 2004 that Hyundai Motors’ in-house 
subcontracting, which employed 10,000 workers at that time, was an illegal use of 
temporary agency workers. Until recently, a series of ongoing court cases attempted to 
determine whether Hyundai Motor’s labour practices were legal. On 23 February 2012, the 
Supreme Court finally announced its ruling that the in-house subcontracting at Hyundai 
Motors was illegal (Supreme Court, Ruling No.11Du7076). This ruling meant that in-
house subcontracted workers at Hyundai Motors should be treated in the same way as 
regular workers according to the 2006 amendments to the Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers, which can compel a prime contractor to hire on a permanent 
basis non-regular workers who have worked for more than two years and have been subject 
to the same working standards as regular workers.  
One of reasons for the use of in-house subcontracting by employers lies in the 
government’s industrial policy in the 1960–1970 period, when in-house subcontracting 
was made a standard means of managing the labour force. In the 1970s, while training the 
insiders within the core labour market, the use of in-house subcontracting, which 
outsources outsiders’ labour, became a standard model at the largest firms, such as 
Hyundai Heavy Industry and POSCO. This trend continued during the 1980s and 1990s, 
by which time in-house subcontracting had spread throughout manufacturing industries 
(Eun et al. 2011: 120; Lee 2007: 108).  
The changing labour practice in Korean industry derives from the original intention of each 
institution to enhance flexibility in the insiders’ labour market. However, the inverted 
complementarity among institutions in fact led to the combination of institutions 
strengthening the rigidity of the insiders’ labour market and bringing about the illegal use 
of non-regular workers and increased flexibility in the outsiders’ labour market. More 
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specifically, by introducing the Labour Standards Act and the Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers, policy makers (or social partners within the LMGTC) 
believed that the traditional rigid (closed/impervious) insiders’ labour market would be 
dismantled, with the consequence that the labour market for non-regular workers at the 
margin would become more flexible (mobile/ permeable) into the core labour market 
through the effect of former and that they would be protected by the latter. 
In reality, however, the employers’ efforts to increase labour flexibility in workplaces were 
hampered by legalised unions and the 1998 labour law amendments, particularly the web 
of regulations on dismissals contained in Labour Standards Act. As a result, employers 
sought alternative measures for achieving labour flexibility and have been using the in-
house subcontracting system over the past decade, even though it has been ruled an illegal 
use of temporary agency workers by the Supreme Court. This illegal use of temporary 
agency workers can be explained as the result of the fundamental undermining of an 
institution’s original intentions and functions that occurs when rules are ambiguous enough 
to permit different (often contrasting) interpretations among actors (Mahoney & Thelen 
2010: 21). 
 
7.4 Macroscopic changes in industrial relations 
 
Apart from focusing on institutional change at the micro-level and its biased output in 
labour market, it should be not be forgotten that the structural reform of the chaebols, 
which was one of Kim Dae-jung’s four major reform plans, contributed to reinforcing 
labour market dualism. The chaebol system was intertwined with the authoritarian state in 
the developmental state era and was regarded as synonymous with the growth and 
development experienced in Korea from the 1960s. However, with the onset of the 
economic crisis, the chaebol system was condemned as the primary factor responsible for 
bringing about the national crisis. The myth of ‘too big to fail’, authoritarian state-chaebol 
collusion for high-speed economic growth and innumerable instances of mismanagement 
and overinvestment could be ignored no longer. Furthermore, since it was widely 
acknowledged that the crisis in the national economy had arisen not from individual firms 
but rather from structural factors, the demands for industrial reform centred on structural 
reform of the chaebols and the chaebol system (ESDC 2008: 140–142). In particular, Kim 
Dae-jung’s experience and his ideological orientation, which had been formed by serving 
201	  
as a long-time opposition party leader against the authoritarian policy-making process (and 
the collusive ties between the state and business), helped move reform of the chaebol 
system (discussion about measures for breaking up the chaebols) to one of the top issues 
on the LMGTC’s agenda. The Kim Dae-jung government’s position on the structural 
reform included capital liberalisation and fiscal austerity, liquidating insolvent financial 
companies, corporate governance reform and opening of the financial market. These 
reforms necessitated the dismantling of the chaebol system and the transition to a 
shareholder capitalist system; IMF pressure for such reforms was intense at the moment of 
national crisis in 1998.  
Since the financial crisis, developments in the Korean economic system can be depicted as 
the collapse of the Fordist production system and the establishment of a neo-liberal policy 
formula promoted by globalisation. However this does not mean, as some argue (for 
example, Pirie 2006: 58–66), that the entire Korean economic system has necessarily 
followed the Anglo-American model.110 Rather, the importance of domestic variables on 
institutional arrangements (Crotty & Lee 2006: 674; Emmenegger et al. 2012: 10)—that is, 
the matters of ownership of chaebols, foreign capital in the financial markets, and 
subcontracting relations—should also be considered as having significant influence on the 
current Korean employment system. To put it more concretely, it is difficult to argue that 
there has been a full transition to a competitive free-market system since 1998 because the 
chaebol-led industrial policy is still in operation and the bureaucracy retains control over 
economic policy direction. Korea’s economic system under advanced democracy and neo-
liberalism has not changed significantly from its authoritarian past, and it has still operates 
as a chaebol-centred production system (Bae et al. 2008: 31). Thus, it is not surprising that 
with SMEs being located within the hierarchy of chaebol firms and their subcontractors, 
and labour market divide has worsened. 
                                                
110	  Following	  the	  régulation	  school	  (for	  instance,	  Boyer	  &	  Saillard	  1995),	  modern	  capitalism	  can	  be	  named	  as	  
the	  Fordist	  accumulation	  regime,	  in	  which	  mass	  production	  and	  mass	  consumption	  are	  enabled	  with	  stable	  
accumulation.	   In	   terms	   of	   employment,	   full	   employment	   of	   Keynesian	   idea	   and	   high-­‐wage	   system	   are	  
ensured	   in	   exchange	   of	   high	   productivity.	   Perhaps	   most	   importantly,	   wage-­‐labour	   relations	   (labour	  
relations)	  are	  characterised	  by	  a	  compromise	  system	  between	  the	  capital	  and	  labour,	  that	  is	  usually	  social	  
consensus	   system	   (corporatism)	   run	   by	   various	   collective	   bargaining	   at	   industry	   level	   and	   central	   level.	  
People	   eliminated	   from	   this	   system	   can	   be	   cared	   for and	   supported	   by	   the	   welfare	   state.	   In	   peripheral 
countries such as	  Korea,	  however,	   the accumulation	   regime	  and	   the	  structure	  of	  employment	  and	   labour	  
relations	  are	  different	   than	   those	  of	   central,	   advanced	  countries.	   Instead	  of	   Fordist	  mass	  production	  and	  
mass	  consumption,	  the	  accumulation	  system	  relies	  on	  the	  exports	  and	  external	  factors,	  so	  that	  the	  labour	  is	  
under	  the	  condition	  of	  low	  wages	  and	  repression	  by	  the	  capital	  and	  the	  state.	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7.4.1 Reorganising supply chain 
 
Hyundai Motors (group) is a chaebol that emerged from the previous Hyundai Group as a 
separate entity under the 1998 structural reform of the chaebols.111 During the economic 
crisis and structural reform in 1998, the chaebols experienced major changes, and Hyundai 
Motors was no exception. The reorganisation of the automotive group involved improving 
the transparency of its corporate governance, introducing managerial responsibility for 
debt relief, and increasing foreign equity. In sum, the company was reformed largely along 
shareholder capitalist lines (Kang 2010: 538), but, in actuality, the chaebol system and 
shareholder capitalist system has continued to coexist. Thus, it was essential to seek new 
ways of gaining higher labour flexibility with short-term profits during the transition to a 
shareholder system (J.-S. Park 2005: 65). Hyundai Motors’ approach was characterised by 
a strong attachment to numerical flexibility. However, the dismissal of regular workers was 
severely constrained by collective bargaining agreements, so the management at Hyundai 
Motors used alternatives—in-house subcontractors, temporary employment agencies and 
fixed-term workers—to reduce labour costs and increase labour flexibility. 
The pursuit of greater numerical flexibility at Hyundai Motors plants was made possible 
only by an accompanying ‘flexible automation’ system that combined highly automated 
production equipment with a tightly integrated information and communication system. In 
fact, Hyundai Motors had experimented with a variety of flexible production methods in 
the 1990s, but only in some smaller plants. In 2000, the company switched to a full-scale 
modular production system (KMWU 2006: 2). This system involves a flexible automation 
system in which multiple parts or components are integrated and assembled by original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and flexible control over the quality and quantity of 
products is maintained through communication networks. In the modular system that 
Hyundai Motors developed, the shipment of modules from the module supplier (sub-
vendor) to the automobile assembly plant (final vendor, OEM) takes the form of a contract 
between the prime contractor (the final vendor, OEM) and in-house subcontractors or 
subcontractors (the vendor). The assembly of components into modules is completed at the 
                                                
111	  For	  this	  section,	  the	  discussion	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  change	  of	  supply	  chain	  employing	  modular	  production	  
system	  at	  Hyundai	  Motors.	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module supplier’s plant, and the modules are shipped from the module supplier to the 
OEM plant (J.-Y. Kang 2001: 3-4).112 
By employing a modular production system, the OEM (final vendor or prime contractor) 
could expect not only to reduce its investment in facilities and achieve a slimmer 
organisational structure, but also to see improvement in manufacturability and quality due 
to simplification of the assembly line. More significantly, this system opened the door for 
more cost savings due to wage rate differentials between the OEM and the module supplier. 
At this point, the modular production system at Hyundai Motors can be described as 
labour-exclusive because the transition to outsourcing means that each module formerly 
undertaken by Hyundai Motors is outsourced either to another department (the vendor or 
sub-vendor) or to other local workplaces, thus reducing the number of assembly processes 
that Hyundai Motors undertakes and the outsourcing of sub-tasks, task sequences and 
shipment of products (KMWU 2006: 116–117). According to Lee (2007), Hyundai Motors 
founded Hyundai Mobis as a super-supplier of modules and the headquarters of the entire 
modular production system and built the parts procurement system on Hyundai Mobis. As 
the result, the minor parts assembly processes were transferred to module suppliers, such 
as electronic control unit manufacturers or car body frame makers. This ultimately brought 
about a systemic change within Hyundai Motors, which became increasingly geared 
towards subcontracting out the assembly processes before final assembly. As the major 
core components within the modular production system were provided by Hyundai Mobis 
(super-supplier), major parts makers that had previously been subcontracted as primary 
vendors were demoted to secondary vendors, and secondary vendors were demoted to 
tertiary vendors. 
The implication here is that the change in the labour market and labour practices means 
that although these subcontracting vendors may still have exclusive contracts to supply 
higher vendors, it is likely that their contracts are smaller and worth less than they were. 
Since the economic crisis, the competitive bidding system has been usual in the automotive 
industry. In this system, a parts supplier submits a quote that includes a unit price and a 
                                                
112	  For	  Hyundai	  Motors’	  development	  of	  the	  modular	  production	  system,	  see	  Lee	  and	  Jo	  (2007).	  Meanwhile,	  
Hyundai	  Motors	  emulated	   the	  Toyota	  Production	  system,	  a	   lean	  production	  system	   in	  which	   the	  workers	  
participated	   in	   management	   and	   job	   formation	   as	   Lee	   and	   Jo	   argue;	   however,	   they	   have	   never	  
implemented	  this.	  Rather	  they	  developed	  their	  own	  modular	  production	  system	  in	  which	  cooperation	  with	  
unions	  and	  functional	  flexibility	  within	  the	  workplace	  are	  blocked	  (KMWU	  2006:	  115–116).	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three-year price-cut plan. The prime contractor (automobile manufacturers), by calculating 
their purchases for the following three years after examining each quote, awards a contract 
to the company with the best (cheapest) quote. At first glance, this competitive bidding 
system appears similar to that used in the West, but there are important differences. The 
unit price is not determined at the first price bid. Instead, the final price is renegotiated 
after the supplier is selected, and, for any parts selected by the prime contractor, the 
supplier must agree to negotiate on unit price. Furthermore, after a contract is agreed 
between the prime contractor and the vendor, the unit price is cut again. Even after the 
contract has been made, price cuts are made again each year, ostensibly to enhance 
productivity (Lee 2010: 21–26). As a result, with module suppliers (sub-vendors) 
dependent on the higher supplier (higher-vendors) for contracts, they are forced to seek 
ways of reducing unit price to be competitive during the bidding process. It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that sub-contracted vendors seek to reduce labour costs by employing non-
regular workers. 
It should be noted that all module suppliers, including Hyundai Mobis, eventually 
employed non-regular workers by the measure of full-fledged subcontracting (or in-house 
subcontracting) (KMWU 2006: 119; Lee 2007: 110–111; Lee 2010: 25) and therefore sub-
vendors. This has also lowered wages. For instance, in the case of Hyundai Mobis (a sub-
vendor of Hyundai Motors), the wage of workers are 70% of level of workers at Asan 
workplaces of Hyundai Motors, despite both being non-regular workers. More significantly, 
wage of workers in Pyunghwa Engineering, which is one sub-vendor (door module maker) 
of Hyundai Mobis, reaches 70% of that of workers in Hyundai Mobis (KMWU 2006: 123–
125).  
To sum up, the Kim Dae-jung government’s structural reform of the chaebols brought 
about a transformation of large firms and their supply chain structure. Through this process, 
large firms (especially those in manufacturing industries) increasingly began to use an 
outsourcing system that in turn fostered a change in their production systems, resulting in a 
highly stratified subcontracting structure with a distinct vendor hierarchy. Suppliers 
located at the lowest end of the supply chain had no choice but to try to gain a competitive 
edge by paying low wages to workers on temporary or fixed-term contracts, leading to an 
increase in non-regular workers in the labour market. The increase in indirect employment 
due to this expansion of outsourcing, the temporary agency system, and subcontracting and 
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in-house subcontracting used to achieve higher labour flexibility and lower labour costs 
fundamentally changed the previous relatively homogeneous labour market into a highly 
heterogeneous one in which various types of contract existed side by side. The size of the 
core (insiders) market that provided stable jobs at large firms and in the public sector has 
decreased, while the number of unstable and low-paid jobs at the margin has increased. 
These labour market changes have presented a serious challenge to the unions representing 
full-time (regular) workers.113 
 
7.4.2 Trapped labour unions 
 
Recently, much has been written on unions (especially the KCTU and large-firm unions) 
and their impact on labour market divide and the deepening inequality in the Korean 
employment system (Choi & Lee 2008; Peng 2012; Song 2012; Yang 2006b). For instance, 
Peng argues that the increased power that labour gained through democratisation and the 
Great Workers’ Struggle (which was dominated by the large-firm unions) contributed to 
widening the wage gap between employees at large firms and those at SMEs (Peng 2012: 
231). More specifically, the asymmetry of labour’s superiority and business’ inferiority 
since democratisation brought about a sharp increase in nominal wages; workers enjoyed 
high wages and additional income from employers (bonuses and benefits such as in-house 
welfare provisions) in the 1990s. Even after the crisis, unions and workers at large 
companies sought to maintain high wages and job security, ignoring the other workers at 
the margin. This depiction of an asymmetry of power between labour and business is in 
keeping with the following statement by an employer:  
The cause (of market) lies in labour unions’ success in increasing workers’ wages too quickly, 
and the aftermath of this is that other workers at the margin are now having trouble in the job 
market. I believe that it is because the unions focused on protecting themselves within the 
market and raising their own wages [so] employers have been unable to hire more workers. 
However, as we all know, business requires labour flexibility, as business can rise and fall 
depending on seasonal demand, international demand, and the use of new equipment in the 
workplace. As such changes in the economic environment take place, employers should have 
                                                
113	  This	   is	  not	   the	  only	   case	  of	  Korean	   supply	   chain	   reform; it is common	   in	  Germany	   (Kwon	  2012:	  597).	  
German	   companies	   needed	   to	   make	   their	   production	   chains	   and	   working	   conditions	   more	   flexible.	   In	  
particular,	  SMEs	  were	  under	   intense	  pressure	   to	   reduce	   their	   production	   costs.	  However,	   the	  difference	  
between	  two	  cases	   lies	  on	  the	  role	  and	  capacity	  of	  unions	   in	  each	  country	  for	  collective	  action	  to	  make	  a	  
new	  path.	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greater labour flexibility to hire more or fewer workers and so enhance productivity, but in fact, 
the employment practice has been made rigid because labour unions can determine hiring and 
firing rates, and even working hours. More seriously, once workers have been hired, we 
employers must retain these workers, provide set working times, and pay their salaries even if 
they are not actually working due to lack of business, since these rules are set by labour law 
(the 1998 amendments). Therefore, there is only one way that we can adjust labour flexibility to 
remain viable as a business, and that is by hiring temporary workers (interviewee P1). 
 
Furthermore, there is the argument that business unionism underpins the unions’ role in 
labour market dualisation (H. R. Cho 2005; S.-J. Cho et al. 2004). Business (utilitarian) 
unionism refers to a union movement that focuses on the immediate economic interests of 
union members—such as wages, welfare, working conditions, etc.—rather than 
emphasising social and political issues like labour unions in the West or Korean unions 
before the 1998 structural reforms.114 
In fact, there has been a symbiotic relationship between employers and unions over the 
long term that has gone far beyond a formal balance-of-power relationship. Collusion 
between employers and union officials has often led to the targeting of a common 
opponent or scapegoat in order to protect their shared interests or to reduce hostility 
between them. For instance, as described above, at Hyundai Motors during the period of 
workforce adjustment and the union’s strike in 1998, only 277 female workers from the 
company’s in-house restaurants were dismissed, and most of the workers that had been 
selected for redundancies were instead placed on unpaid leave and were gradually re-
employed through collective bargaining. According to a statement by an executive member 
of the KMWU, despite a year of apparently frantic and hostile employer-union negotiation 
at Hyundai at that time, some of the former union leaders and executive officials of 
Hyundai Motors are now jointly running subcontractors for Hyundai Motors, which he 
maintained was a conciliatory gesture by employers after the union officials were made 
redundant (interviewee P22).  
More significantly, these collusive labour relations appear clearly when the issues of non-
regular workers are considered. As seen in the case of a collective agreement brokered 
                                                
114	  Political	   unionism	  pursues	   a	   particular	   political	   ideology	   or	   political	   purposes	   and	   is	   associated	  with	   a	  
particular	  political	  party	  or	  trade	  union	  movement.	  By	  contrast,	  social	  unionism	  seeks	  ways	  to	  promote	  the	  
interests	  of	  wage-­‐workers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  citizenry	  by	  raising	  and	  aiming	  to	  resolve	  not	  only	  the	  union	  
members’	  economic	  interests	  but	  other	  social	  and	  political	  issues.	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between employers and unions in 2000, which guaranteed a fixed-rate of 16.9% of in-
house subcontracting in large firms, the unions regarded non-regular workers as a buffer or 
relief valve against their own dismissal and as a base for keeping their own wages high. 
This is because the increasing use of non-regular workers would help employers meet their 
needs of labour flexibility and lower labour costs at no expense to union members. 
Furthermore, the long-established working practices, the high premium rates for overtime 
working, union officials’ receipt of payment by employers, union officials’ empowerment, 
and the illegal election of union leaders through the intervention of employers can be seen 
as products of collusion between employers and unions under the firm-based unionism 
system.  
However, the existence of a causal relationship between business unionism or collusion 
and the labour market dualisation is debatable. Such a reading of union practices appears to 
be based on scepticism rather than empirical evidence because changes to labour practices 
(or unions’ behaviour and strategic choices) take place due to both the interaction between 
the state, business, and labour and the institutional complementarity (both at macro- and 
micro- levels) induced by institutional transition. These interactions include the move from 
the seniority-based system to a performance-based wage system, the change to an annual 
contract system from the lifetime employment practice and firm-based unionism. Thus, it 
is misleading to conclude that business unionism and collusion derive from the unions’ 
voluntary compliance, abandonment of their fundamental positions or self-interest. Rather, 
it should be identified as a reflection of current institutional arrangements, as this research 
argues.  
The political strikes in the past, including those that derived from conflict between the state 
and labour on institutional amendments, were based on the ideological orientation of social 
transformation. Thus, strikes were led by public sector unions (such as those representing 
railway workers and employees in the telecommunications industry). Additionally, the 
Hyundai Motors’ union played a role in establishing labour standards (wage increases, 
standard working hours, contract types, etc.) that, in turn, were passed on to other 
workplaces and industries and contributed to the development of the labour movement 
(including the KCTU and the industrial union system) in the 1980s and 1990s (Lee et al. 
2005: 13–27). Recently, however, the combination of various labour market institutions 
and changes to industrial relations has restricted unions to bargaining on wage issues alone. 
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In fact, business unionism was reinforced by the collapse of the ‘psychological contract’ 
(such as the ending of the lifetime employment practice) and unions’ experience of the 
workforce adjustment in 1998. In turn, the transformation of the supply structure in pursuit 
of simplifying the production process and the use of more non-regular workers by 
employing a subcontracting system or modular production system has meant that business 
unionism has been embedded. In short, no emergency exists for workers in the core labour 
market under these institutional restrictions. 
In addition, the fragmentation of the labour movement due to firm-based unionism and two 
competing national unions (the KCTU and FKTU) should be noted as a factor in 
weakening labour’s collective bargaining position. In particular, firm-based unionism, 
which, in the main, represents only regular workers at large firms, directly results in the 
isolation of non-regular workers. Under firm-based unionism, non-regular workers are 
necessarily regarded as outsiders, as they do not qualify for union membership. This was 
shown by the union at Hyundai Motors on no less than three occasions rejecting the 
employment of non-regular workers at in-house subcontractors (see section 7.3.2). In this 
respect, firm-based unionism represents only regular workers and inherently excludes 
many atypical workers, such as non-regular workers, subcontractor employees, temporary 
agency workers, and the unemployed, with the result that the interests of regular workers 
are over-represented by such unions. 
Furthermore, the macro-structural reforms that targeted the chaebols in order to reshape 
the Korean economic system into a neo-liberal form contributed not only to the 
restructuring of the supply chain structure in Korean industry, but also to making 
employers value and introduce considerable flexibility at workplaces. At this point, 
however, it is also notable that the labour flexibility at work did not suddenly result from 
this combined set of industrial reforms but had been an everlasting policy preference of 
Korean employers especially since 1980 (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). It is more 
persuasive therefore that large firms survived chaebol reform during the period of 1998–
1999 by re-organising their affiliates and restructuring their workforce and supply chain. 
They could be more vulnerable by financial fluctuation (i.e. national and international 
recession), on the one hand, but could gain more labour flexibility at work, on the other. 
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7.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Dualisation and dualism in the labour market has become increasingly common in the 
West and in Korea. However, there can be significant differences in labour market 
dualisation processes at the policy outcome level, even though there may be an apparent 
convergence between labour market dualism and inequality at the outcome level. This 
diversity comes more from the domestic variables arising from the political dynamics of 
institutional change rather than from the unilateral pressure of globalisation because 
institutions shape and are shaped by political actors.  
In the process of establishing particular institutions, particular actors seek to instil their 
(diverse and sometimes contrasting) interests in the institution. This ultimately means that 
once the institution has been formalised through commitment and compliance by diverse 
(but particular) actors, the institution inherently contains ambiguity over its interpretational 
and enforcement rules. Thus, once the institution has been implemented, that is not the end 
of the matter. The conflicts and struggle over the interpretation of the institution’s rules, its 
enactment and revision will continue. As a result, the implementation of changes to the 
institutional sets on the labour market cause political struggle between business and labour 
(and sometimes the state). Therefore, the gap between the origin and enactment of 
employment system institutions might produce contrasting results due to the institutional 
complementarity and the political struggle over the interpretation and enactment of 
institutions.  
As seen above, Korean labour market dualisation appeared by this character of institutions: 
combined but inverted effect of institutions and a systemic change that aimed at industrial 
reform. The institutional measures that were introduced in an attempt to increase labour 
flexibility in fact produced the opposite effect, leading to a more rigid labour market and 
division of labour market and workers. On the one hand, the Labour Standards Acts 
hampered employers from firing and hiring workers easily, and the Act on the Protection, 
Etc. of Temporary Agency Workers increased the number of non-regular workers at the 
micro level. On the other hand, the structural reform of the chaebols (in terms of industrial 
relations) led to the transformation of the supply chain in industrial relations, with the 
consequence that subcontracting and the employment of non-regular workers increased, 
and firm-based unionism alongside the reorganised production system excluded non-
regular (atypical) workers in the labour market. However, it is inconclusive whether 
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business unionism has been embedded by such complex institutional arrangements or 
whether the institutional and systemic environments ultimately dragged the unions into 
representing only the regular workers in large firms’ core labour market. Regardless of the 
answer, it is clear that apportioning sole blame to the unions for this state of affairs would 
be wrong.  
The practice of labour’s collective bargaining and the way of its political participation has 
been moulded and embedded through the institutional arrangements over time. The 
amendments to Korean labour laws aimed to suppress the advancement of labour 
mobilisation and the union movement, while making unionisation and collective 
bargaining at the enterprise level easier. The so-called ‘three prohibitions’ (Samkeum) in 
the labour law largely constrained unionisation in corporate channels and prohibited the 
labour’s political participation in political channel. That is, the ban of multiple unions 
intended to prevent further unionisation, and the prohibition of ‘third-party intervention’ 
kept the independent unions within the isolated enterprise level while suppressing their 
horizontal and vertical network and solidarity. Under the two provisions, the national 
centre of democratic unions (the KCTU) was long denied by the state and business. 
Meanwhile, the ban on union’s political activities effectively suppressed labour’s political 
mobilisation and engagement into institutional politics. In the long run, while unions could 
mobilise at least on the enterprise level, the prohibition of unions’ political activities 
became a more severe hindrance for the future consolidation of Korean labour movement. 
In sum, the labour law after the democratic transition functioned as a weapon to suppress 
organised labour and the labour movement to move to a kind of political path, while 
keeping it within the realm of industrial relations and market confrontation.  
Furthermore, labour’s exclusion from the political realm was not just caused by a formal 
framework surrounding labour in the post-authoritarian regime, but by an informal 
institution of political configuration, i.e. a unique political coalition crossing institutional 
politics and the social movement field. Historically, labour has forged relationships with 
mainstream politics or political system in two ways, commonly characterised as the British 
(or US) versus the European model. In most English-speaking countries, such as the UK, 
the US and Australia, labour unions developed a strong connection with liberal parties and 
supported them for its class interest representation. In these countries, unions became 
legitimate pressure groups oriented towards pragmatic and immediate economic goals. 
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However, in the European model, the labour movements became autonomous of liberalism 
and engaged in their own class politics by making labour-centred parties and linking them 
to unions; they finally transformed formal democracy into social democracy (Lee 2013: 
621). In Korea, neither way was an option for labour even after the democratic transition. 
Due to the political exclusion of the newly organised unions (the KCTU), labour was 
unable to attempt to establish a labour-centred political party for a long time after the 
transition, and this situation was not so different in the post-1998 labour law periods.  
In sum, the union movement in Korea had no option but to continue along the ‘embedded 
path’ of militant-business unionism due to its lack of citizenship in the institutional sets on 
labour relations and the new political democracy. Although the 1998 labour laws loosened 
institutional restrictions on the union’s political rights, the path of labour-business’ 
confrontational relations, and labour exclusion in the policy-making process (e.g. the 
LMGTC) has remained. The wage struggle therefore resulted in concentrating the 
economic gains of workers in the large firms more than it equalised the impact on labour as 
a whole. One main reason is that the wage increase of workers was not based on an 
institutional consensus through a collective bargaining structure, but on implicit acceptance 
by the employers of the relatively strong disruptive power of workers or unions, which 
were strongest in chaebols’ unions. The different degree of economic accommodation 
reflects the difference in the ‘power of business in the market (D.C. Kim 2001)’ rather than 
the labour’s institutionalised power. As a result, the uneven accommodation of the unions’ 
demands, which depended on the respective market position of capital, became the source 
of a new kind of inequality and labour market dualism. Ironically, in this vein, the more the 
workers engaged in the wage struggle, the wider the gap were within workers. It was an 
unintended consequence of militant unionism and business unionism. 
In response to neoliberal pressure for labour market flexibility, individual unions would 
prioritise job security over flexibility, since losing a job means losing everything in Korean 
labour market practices. Therefore, they are likely to fiercely oppose easing regulation on 
employment and to try their best to protect jobs through collective bargaining. Therefore, a 
chasm appeared between the insider and outsider labour markets, organised and 
unorganised workers. It is likely that unorganised workers in the ever-growing external 
labour markets bear the burden of labour market flexibility. 
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Chapter 8  
A Pathway to Social Protection: Reproducing Dualism in the 
Labour Market and a New Role for the State 
 
 
8.0 Introduction 
	  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, the effect of social policy on the Korean 
employment system will be examined. The questions that will be explored are (1) how the 
worker protection programmes were connected with other emerging (or existing) and 
changing institutions, such as the amended labour laws for greater flexibility in the labour 
market and the firm-based welfare system, and (2) the degree to which the social policy 
that was implemented (and expanded) immediately after the 1997 economic crisis 
contributed to reproducing the cycle of dualism and inequality in the labour market that 
had emerged prior to 1997.  
Second, the political dynamics of the institutional implementation of social protection will 
be illustrated. Here, two questions are explored. (1) Who formulated and evaluated the 
social policy (particularly worker protection) and how? (This question aims to address 
whether the state was still the leading force in institutional implementation.) (2) In the 
course of the Korean developmental state model’s transformation, were there any veto 
possibilities in the policy-making process? To answer these questions, this chapter takes 
the theoretical position that institutional complementarity can lead to outcomes that 
conflict with the policy makers’ original intentions for an institution. This is due to the 
institutional outcome is a consequence of the political conflicts that emerge from the gap 
between actors’ preferences and practice on an institution and its enforcement and which 
reflect the inherent ambiguity and pressures within the institution. 
In much of the social policy and welfare system literature, a conceptual distinction is made 
between social security systems. Three systems are generally identified as a social 
insurance system, a social assistance system, and a social welfare system. Identifying 
which system is applied to a particular employment system requires investigation into the 
nature of that employment system. Simply put, a social insurance system that is resourced 
by insurance premiums or taxes paid by insured persons is generally not for the purpose of 
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income redistribution and universal protection due to its closed eligibility and beneficiary 
criteria. However, social assistance and social welfare systems funded by public finances 
are direct income redistribution (universal protection) plans.  
Evaluating the real effect of social security is an empirical issue (He & Sato 2011: 2). If the 
unemployment rate is fairly low and the restriction on eligibility is generous, and if the 
benefits serve non-tax payers or tax payers with low levels of historical contributions, such 
as new entrants to the labour market, the social insurance system can function as a 
comprehensive compensation system. For instance, during Korea’s period of rapid 
development in which the country enjoyed almost full employment, the Workers’ 
Compensation Insurance acted as an income redistribution and comprehensive 
compensation system, even though there was no formal institutional set for the 
unemployed at that time. Thus, the real impact of social policy (or labour protection 
schemes) on the employment system varies depending on the changing economic 
conditions and the sequence of institutional complementarity of other institutional sets (e.g. 
labour laws). In this vein, this study adopts a theoretical foundation of institutional 
complementarity on the welfare and social policy implementation, which is developed by 
Haagh (2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2013). She presented an analytical lens of looking at the 
combined effects of institutions on individual persons. For instance, she insists that the 
combined effect of schooling, degree of employment insurance (or grant) and length of 
employment (stable employment) affects the quality of individual wage-workers’ well-
being and their sense of welfare (Haagh 2011a: 457–466).  
In turn, the matter of how social policy is combined with other institutions in response to 
changing economic circumstances brings politics into the institutional realm. A political 
approach of institutional complementarity on the labour market and labour protection can 
be seen in a study on labour market transformation in Germany and France (Palier & 
Thelen 2012). The study shows that as the secondary (outsiders’) labour market, consisting 
of the unemployed and workers exempted from contribution for social insurance funds, 
was growing, the state took responsibility for the protection of these non-contributors by 
implementing welfare reforms. However, social partners argued that the increasing number 
of inactive workers who did not contribute enough (or at all) to the insurance funds had to 
be supported by fewer active workers in the insider labour market. The increasing financial 
and political pressure meant that the state would have to assume more responsibility for 
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workers at the margin. As a result, social assistance benefits financed by taxation at the 
national level served atypical workers at the margin, while the contributory benefits 
secured through collective bargaining or firm-level deals on social insurance continued to 
secure regular (insider) worker protection (Palier & Thelen 2012: 203–214). 
In Korea, there was a similar need for the state to play an enhanced role in the protection of 
workers after the onset of the 1997 economic crisis and the subsequent rise in 
unemployment (Haagh 2004: 153). The state expanded the social protection system based 
on an occupational/contributory model. This institutional measure is commonly believed to 
have derived from a combination of the transition in presidential power following Kim 
Dae-jung’s election and strong recommendations on policy reform by the IMF in exchange 
for its rescue package. As state interventionism in social policy has traditionally been 
recognised as a response to and an instrument of economic restructuring (Milner 2001: 
335), the implementation of protection schemes for workers, such as EI, was a state-led 
attempt to minimise the social and economic risk that was likely to result from increasing 
unemployment and the increased use of non-regular workers. 
In light of the formation of the LMGTC in 1998, which implied that a new institutional 
approach to the policy-making process (that is, a move towards tripartism) had been 
adopted in Korea, the reversion to a traditional pattern in which the state assumed the 
primary role in the origin, implementation, enforcement, and reinforcement of institutions 
might appear to be paradoxical. This apparent paradox seems to raise the following 
possibilities: this development either signals the restoration of the state’s embedded 
autonomy, or it indicates that the state was taking on the responsibility for tackling the 
economic crisis (as a last resort) in the face of political pressure from social partners. 
Contrary to these explanations, however, this chapter argues that the traditional 
developmental state transformed itself into an entirely new welfare developmental state 
with the following key characteristics: (1) the main role of this new form of developmental 
state moved from controlling industrial and economic policy to directing social policy, 
although the state’s catch-up strategy remained in place, (2) a new type of technocrat (the 
social bureaucrat) emerged and played a key role in worker protection reform, although the 
economic bureaucrats still held dominant power and (3) there was a fundamental 
breakdown of the cohesiveness within the state (especially within the state).  
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8.1 Concepts: mapping social policy in the employment system 
 
The high degree of labour market dualism and inequality in labour practice in Korea, as 
seen in Chapter 7, means that social policy has become one of the central pillars of the 
Korean employment system, since the role of social policy that aims to redistribute wealth 
and welfare appears to be important factor to investigate a particular employment system. 
Individual workers need to renew their means of replenishing their human capital, and 
social policy plays a key role in establishing these individual workers’ (social) rights to (re) 
enter the labour market easily, secure their job, improve their work skills through training 
and be protected by universal compensation. These factors are key to revealing the 
character of a specific employment system operating under the highly flexible labour 
market of modern capitalism. In particular, current workers’ skill sets must be constantly 
updated in order to meet current requirements and reflect rapid technological development. 
Thus, if individual workers are to gain professional promotion and wage increases, and if 
employers are to secure high workforce standards in their workplaces, it is absolutely 
essential that there is provision for vocational skills development (improvement training) at 
the company level and support for employment stabilisation from outside the firm.  
This theoretical linkage between workers’ economic security (material conditions) and the 
extent of workers welfare is provided by Haagh’s developmental freedom thesis. 
Developmental freedom, which is shaped by institutional sets and is underpinned by 
economic security (which consists of a mixture of social insurance and egalitarian rights 
both inside and outside production), comprises the extent of an individual’s autonomy to 
control their stable working life. Then, the security sets for individuals’ developmental 
freedom is formed with these sources of economic security. These sources include care 
(children/ourselves), education (for life/foundation), work (occupational/standards), 
income (unemployment insurance/basic income), housing (public loans/basic) and health 
(need/prevention) (Haagh 2012: 548–550).  
To put it differently, individuals’ right in stability is socially defined by several forms of 
economic security and the ties between them. Economic security and security sets for 
developmental freedom are ultimately constructed by the complicated (expected or 
unintended, sometimes inverted) complementarities of institutions, and they shift in line 
with the political conflicts that emerge due to the gap between social partners’ preference 
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and the actual enforcement (practice) of policies. Therefore, comprehensive analysis of the 
nature of and changes to a particular institutional set necessarily involves an investigation 
into the role and function of specific social policies and, more importantly, their 
interconnection or combination with labour, economic and industrial policies.  
For instance, in Germany and France, industrial reforms that made use of mass early 
retirements triggered the reinforcement of the status of core workers (although they were 
expected to work harder and more flexibly) by changing the relationship between 
employers and core industries’ unions (Kwon 2012: 590). The result was that workers in 
‘normal employment’ (regular workers) continue to enjoy a wide range of protections 
‘based on the occupational/contributory compensation system’ in both countries (Palier & 
Thelen 2010). Under the occupational/contributory compensation system (which tends to 
play a limited role in income redistribution due to its occupation-based selection on 
eligibility and beneficiaries), worker protection programmes such as unemployment 
benefits or job training schemes are likely to provide social benefits (cash or other types) 
only to resource contributors (i.e. insurance payers).  
Again, what emerges from both the German and French cases is that, as Emmenegger and 
his colleagues (Emmenegger et al. 2012: 17) have stressed, labour market policies and 
social policies cannot be analysed in isolation. Alongside labour policy and economic 
policy (or industrial policy), social policy (more specifically the introduction of labour 
protection schemes) is central to the employment system. Thus, if the Korean employment 
system is to be analysed in a comprehensive way, the extent of the coverage of 
unemployment benefits, job skill training for workers and public subsidies for stable 
employment in individual firms must be examined alongside the social rights of workers 
and the way in which policy outcomes are influenced by policy-making in other policy 
realms. 
 
8.2 A Korean ‘Golden Triangle’ of flexicurity 
 
In the wake of the economic crisis, the Korean state found itself reinvigorated with new 
roles, new networks and new instruments (Song 2003: 406) to protect workers. The Kim 
Dae-jung government’s reform of the institutional set prevented further privatisation of 
social insurance schemes, something that international organisations such as the World 
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Bank favoured. For instance, the state’s reinforcement of social protection schemes, such 
as EI, Workers’ Compensation Insurance, National Pension Insurance and the National 
Basic Living Security scheme (NBLS) left little place for privatisation (H.-K. Lee 2004: 
293-297; Lee & Moon 2008: 18). Nam (2007) agrees with the analysis that the welfare 
reforms achieved quantitative expansion of welfare (although it remained subordinate to 
economic strategy) and succeeded in modifying various laws and regulations (Nam 2007: 
49).115 In order to mitigate the painful social costs of the structural (and by and large 
neoliberal) adjustment brought about by the 1998 social pact and amendment of Korea’s 
labour laws, the Kim Dae-jung government tried to build a stronger and more durable 
social safety net. After the 1997 crisis, the coverage of social insurance schemes expanded 
dramatically and the institutional foundation for a comprehensive social safety net was 
established, although it was at a very embryonic stage (H.-K. Lee 2004: 295; KEIS 2008). 
In fact, the Korean state’s model for its reform of the social security system and labour 
market at the time of the formation of the LMGTC was the Danish model of flexicurity 
(Hankook-ilbo 28 March 2006; Hankyoreh 29 April 2002). A government officer who 
participated in the LRRC and LMGTC stated that the original idea behind the formation of 
the LMGTC was to establish a system emulating the Dutch model of social dialogue. By 
employing this, it was hoped that the contents of the social pact would resemble the New 
Course Agreement of 1993 in the Netherlands116 (interviewee P5117). For instance, the 
1998 social pact agreed between the LMGTC social partners called for the tripartite system 
to be applied at the sectorial and regional level. It included concessions to labour in the 
form of suppression of wage increases. However, compensation for these reforms included 
concessions to business in the form of a reduction in working hours to 36 hours per week 
and promises by the government to lower workers’ tax burden in return for wage restraints 
and to improve the legal status of non-regular workers. Meanwhile, the reform of labour 
                                                
115	  Nam	   (2002)	  also	  argues	   that	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	  Kim	  Dae-­‐jung	  government’s	  welfare	   reforms	  had	   the	  
institutional	   features	   of	   a	   conservative	   model	   and	   will	   eventually	   become	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	   conservative	  
model	  (Nam	  2002:	  164).	  
116	  For	  the	  Dutch	  model	  of	  flexicurity	  and	  the	  New	  Course	  Agreement	  of	  1993,	  see	  Visser	  (1998)	  and	  Meer	  
et	  al.	  (2005).	  
117	  Although	   he	   pointed	   to	   the	   Dutch	   model	   as	   the	   favoured	   model	   for	   Korea’s	   labour	   reforms	   in	   the	  
interview,	   the	  actual	   labour	   law	  and	  EI	   institutional	   sets	  are	  much	  closer	   to	   the	  Danish	  model,	  as	  seen	   in	  
Chapter	   7	   (Section	  7.3.1).	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	   the	  1998	   labour	   reforms	  did	  not	   intend	   to	   increase	   the	  
number	  of	  part-­‐time	  workers	  but	  rather	  reduce	  their	  numbers	  by	  enhancing	  the	  mobility	  of	  regular	  workers	  
in	  the	  core-­‐insider	  labour	  market.	  Furthermore,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  state	  made	  a	  strong	  
drive	  to	  emulate	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  ALMP	  through	  EI.	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protection (social security system) aimed to boost labour flexibility and security in line 
with the Danish model—which makes use of social insurance and an active labour market 
policy (such as employment stabilisation and job skills training)—rather than Dutch model, 
in which labour flexibility primarily derives from the widespread use of part-time workers 
with the same labour standards and social security provisions as regular workers. 
Furthermore, the issue of the ‘Golden Triangle’ of flexicurity in the employment system 
was emphasised by successive Korean governments.118 During their presidencies, both 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun called for flexicurity in the labour market, employing 
their political rhetoric of ‘productive welfare (or workfare)’ (Hankyoreh 4 December 1999) 
and ‘flexible security’ (Hankyoreh 18 August 2003), respectively.119 
Which of the features contained within these state blueprints have come to pass? 
                                                
118	  The	  ‘Golden	  Triangle’	  of	  flexicurity	  refers	  to	  a	  unique	  Danish	  employment	  system	  model	  that	  combines	  a	  
high	  level	  of	  worker	  mobility	  between	  jobs,	  social	  security	  (a	  generous	  system	  of	  social	  welfare	  and	  social	  
insurance,	   such	   as	   unemployment	   benefits/passive	   labour	   market	   policy)	   and	   active	   labour	   market	  
programmes	   (an	   active	   labour	   market	   policy,	   the	   ALMP,	   which	   offers	   skills	   qualification,	   direct	   wage	  
subsidies	  or	   job	  offers	   in	   the	  public	  sector)	   (Bredgaard	  et	  al.	  2006:	  64;	  Haagh	  &	  Cook	  2005:	  173;	  Madsen	  
2004:	   189;	   2007:	   525–527;	   Jochem	   2011:	   139–140).	   All	   three	   programmes	   support	   Denmark’s	   changing	  
economic	   situation.	   As	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Figure	   8.1,	   each	   of	   the	   three	   individual	   programmes	   works	   in	  
combination	  with	  the	  others,	  and	  the	  arrows	  between	  the	  programmes	  depict	  the	  flow	  of	  people	  between	  
employment,	  welfare	  and	  active	   labour	  market	  programmes.	  Under	  this	  system,	  the	  high	  flexibility	   in	   the	  
Danish	  employment	  system	  affords	  workers	   low	  job	  security,	  but	  they	  are	  protected	  by	  universal	  benefits	  
and	   tend	   to	   re-­‐enter	   the	   labour	  market	  after	  only	  a	   short	  period	  of	  unemployment,	  while	   those	  who	  are	  
unemployed	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  receive	  assistance	  from	  the	  ALMP	  to	  re-­‐enter	  employment.	  	  
	  
Figure	  8.:	  A	  Danish	  model	  of	  flexicurity	  	  
	  
*Source:	  Bredgaard	  et	  al.	  (2006:	  64)	  
119	  See	  Kwon	  (2005:	  492)	  to	  confirm	  that	  Kim	  Dae-­‐jung’s	  proclamation	  of	  a	  ‘Productive	  welfare	  state’	  implies	  
the	  adoption	  of	  a	  flexicurity	  model.	  For	  the	  same	  reason,	  see	  Han	  et	  al.	  (2010:	  299)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Roh	  Moo-­‐
hyun.	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8.2.1 Enlargement of comprehensive social security 
 
Of social security benefits, this research focuses on EI because it is considered to have 
played a major role in easing the problems caused by mass unemployment by providing 
cash benefits and job skills training since the economic crisis. It also exhibits a number of 
important features related to the implementation of the institutional reform of the Korean 
employment system. 
EI was introduced in 1995 to provide not only unemployment benefits but also training and 
job security grants. Shortly after its implementation, and although it was in an embryonic 
stage, EI was used to deal with the 1997 crisis; it expanded rapidly as eligibility was 
widened. In the case of the unemployment benefits scheme, in 1995, wage-workers from 
firms employing more than 30 people could apply. In January 1998, this eligibility was 
expanded to firms employing more than ten people and to firms employing more than five 
in March 1998. In October 1998, EI eligibility was expanded to businesses of any size. 
During the same period, eligibility for the employment stabilisation scheme and the job 
skill training scheme expanded alongside that of the unemployment benefits scheme.120 
Despite the fact that EI is the most recently implemented of all the social safety net 
programmes, EI’s coverage was expanded to encompass all sizes of enterprises two years 
earlier than was Workers’ Compensation Insurance. The latter was introduced in 1964 but 
coverage was only extended to all enterprises after 2001. 
Second, as can be seen in Chart 8.1, the expenditure on and coverage of EI has sharply 
expanded. In particular, the expenditure on EI unemployment benefits has increased 
dramatically, from 78,737 million won (USD 686.47 million) in 1997 to 2,434,032 million 
won (USD 2,123.01 million) in 2007. In particular, unemployment insurance for city 
dwellers starts at a maximum of 90% of the previous wage (the average over the period 
being 50%), and the length of coverage is a maximum of six and an average of four months, 
which is generous for a middle-income economy (Haagh 2006: 399). In addition, although 
the expansion of coverage is less marked than the increase in expenditure, the coverage has 
also expanded considerably (see Chart 8.1, and Appendix 4). For instance, it is noteworthy 
that the number of participants as a percentage of the total labour force, who were 
compensated by the unemployment benefits in 1997 was only 0.22%, but that in 2007 was 
                                                
120	  See	  Appendix	  1.	  
220	  
4.17%. When compared to the recent decreasing trend in coverage of the unemployment 
benefits in advanced countries –e.g. participant stocks as a percentage of the labour force 
in Denmark has decreased from 10.07% in 1998 to 4.36% in 2008, and those of OECD 
average also has decreased from 6.33% in 2004 to 4.93% in 2008, the Korea’s expansion 
of coverage of the unemployment benefits scheme appears to be innovative.121 Given that 
EI has been open to all workers since 1998 and that there has been little or no increases in 
taxation or the premium rate and that the employment rate has remained stable at around 
3.0%, the increase in the number of beneficiaries appears to indicate that the state has 
actively sought to bring workers into EI by building an integrated network of employers 
and workers (the Work-Net) and local employment centres. 
 
Chart 8.1: Expenditure on and coverage of Employment Insurance 
 
*Source: Korea Employment Information Service (2008). See Appendix 4. 
 
 
Third, the coverage of the job skill training and the motherhood protection payment has 
expanded as radically as unemployment benefits. While the increase in expenditure on the 
employment stabilisation scheme and the job skill training scheme might not appear to be 
as great as the increase for unemployment benefits, the amount spent on employment 
                                                
121	  Source:	   OECD	   Stat:	   Data	   accessed	   on	   15/08/	   2012	   11:01	   UTC	   (GMT);	   Korean	   Statistical	   Information	  
Service	  (http://kosis.kr/):	  Data	  accessed	  on	  15/08/2012,	  11:20	  UTC	  (GMT).	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stabilisation in 2007 was nevertheless four times that spent in 1998, and the expenditure on 
job skill training in 2006 was three times that spent in 1998.122 EI has a unique role in 
employment stabilisation in Korea, one that is found less in other countries. Separate from 
its social insurance function, EI includes an employment stabilisation programme that 
provides firms with subsidies designed to avoid immediate redundancies, which increased 
dramatically during and after the 1997 economic crisis (Haagh 2004: 184–187). The 
employment stabilisation scheme has played an active role in stabilising the labour market 
through the Employment Adjustment Assistance Programme, the Promotion and 
Employment Programme, and the Employment Creation Programmes. While in the 
immediate aftermath of the economic crisis the majority of the expenditure was focused on 
supporting workplace closures, workforce replacement, or turnover through the 
Employment Adjustment Assistance programme, the main target of expenditure has since 
moved to Promotion and Employment and the Employment Stabilisation Programmes, 
which support vulnerable workers (such as the aged and female workers), provide 
maternity protection, and promote job creation for youth (see Appendix 6). In addition, the 
total expenditure on the job skill training scheme doubled between 2001 and 2007, with 
investment in vocational training programmes accounting for the majority of expenditure 
on training in this period (see Appendix 7).  
It must be stressed that the financial resources for both the employment stabilisation 
scheme and the job skills training scheme are funded exclusively by employers (with no 
financial input from the government), in contrast to the Western advanced countries (e.g. 
Denmark, where the general tax is the only financial resource for those schemes), while the 
unemployment insurance scheme is funded by both employers and employees (50/50 split 
between employer and employee at a rate of 1% of wages).123 In line with the 2–3% 
unemployment rate when the EI was established in 1995, the insurance premiums were 0.6% 
of wages (50/50 split between employer and employee) for unemployment insurance, 0.2% 
of wages (employer only contribution) for the employment stabilisation programme, and 
0.1–0.5% (depending on the size of the firm, employer contribution only) for the job skills 
training scheme. During the period 1999–2002, when Korea was experiencing the worst of 
the economic crisis and the unemployment rate reached 6–7%, the premiums increased in 
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line with the increasing expenditure to 1.0% (50/50 split) for unemployment insurance, 0.3% 
(employer only) for the employment stabilisation scheme, and 0.1–0.7% (depending on the 
size of the firm) for the job skills training programme. After this period, premiums 
decreased to 0.9%, 0.3% and 0.15%, respectively, but with the same employer/employee 
share (Ministry of Labour 2008a: 84). A system in which employers make the entire 
contribution to the employment stabilisation scheme and the job skills training scheme and 
half the contribution to unemployment insurance scheme is unique to Korea. It is also a 
uniquely Korean practice that the state has control over allocating financial resources 
within the system.  
From the increase in expenditure on EI, the coverage of EI and the pattern of mobilising 
and operating its resources, it seems clear that the rapid and systemic reform of the 
institutional set on worker protection was driven by the state’s dominance. Furthermore, 
the real (empirical) practice of developing EI might be viewed as an emerging flexicurity 
model within which three programmes sought to bring about and balance high mobility in 
the labour market, comprehensive unemployment benefits (the unemployment insurance 
scheme), and ALMP (the employment stabilisation scheme and the job skills training 
scheme).  
 
Chart 8.2: Public expenditure compared with the OECD average by active measures 
and passive measures (in percentage of Gross Domestic Product) 
 
*Source: OECD. Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/) (See Appendix 8) 
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Moreover, this contention can be supported by comparing Korea’s public expenditure on 
passive and active measures for worker protection with the OECD average, as seen in 
Chart 8.2. Surprisingly, the level of public expenditure on both active and passive 
measures for worker protection in Korea since 2000 has been catching up with OECD 
averages. In particular, the expenditure on active measures increased sharply after Lee 
Myung-bak’s inauguration in 2008, reaching the OECD average of 0.61% of GDP. In fact, 
Lee Myung-bak’s government pushed forward with a job creation programme immediately 
after his inauguration, with expenditure on direct job creation rising from 0.01% in 2007 to 
0.42% in 2009 (see Appendix 8 [Item 60. Direct job creation]). This challenges the general 
belief that a social democratic government (the two previous governments in Korea were 
centre-left) is more likely to allocate more resources to public expenditure on employment 
measures (especially active measure) than a conservative government. Indeed, the current 
conservative Lee Myung-bak government has further bolstered government support for 
social care, although it is arguable whether this is a result of the government’s genuine 
long-term commitment to such social policy or is due to other factors such as the global 
financial recession that has persisted since 2008. What seems clear is that this is not 
derived by the power of institutional legacy, as public expenditure under the previous Roh 
Moo-hyun government (2003–2008) was significantly lower. Rather, the suspicion is that 
Lee Myung-bak’s government struck a political bargain with the beleaguered construction 
industry prior to the presidential election. In his presidential election commitments, he 
stated that he would push forward with major national-level construction projects to boost 
the economy and create jobs, which he in fact did after his inauguration. However, the 
media and opposition parties have criticised these infrastructure projects, claiming that 
they are actually a way of supporting the construction industry with government subsidies, 
and they amount to political collusion between Lee Myung-bak government and the 
construction industry (or employers of these firms) (Pressian 5 October 2012).124 
 
8.2.2 From firm-based workers’ welfare to statutory welfare? 
 
With the dramatic expansion in the coverage of and expenditure on EI, companies’ 
spending on welfare benefits for workers as a whole has increased. The benefits provided 
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  Lee	  Myung-­‐bak	  was	  a	  chief	  executive	  officer	  of	  Hyundai	  Engineering	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by firms take two forms: those required by law and non-legally required benefits.125 The 
former comprises contributions by employers to various social insurances in accordance 
with legislation, such as Health Care Insurance, Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 
National Pension Insurance, and Employment Insurance. The latter includes housing, 
medical and health care, canteens and other food services, support for childcare expenses, 
and other non-legally required benefits. In the case of non-legally required benefits, from 
1982 to 1989, monthly contributions averaged approximately 27 thousand won (USD 
23.55) per person. However, from 1993, after the Kim Young-sam government came to 
power, this figure began to increase sharply and reached 195.5 thousand won (USD 175.89) 
by 2011, with a peak of 227.3 thousand won (USD 204.50) in 2003. The increase in the 
cost of legally required benefits has been much more dramatic. In 1994, the cost was a 
mere 55.1 thousand won (USD 48.06) per person, but this increased sharply to 280.1 
thousand won (USD 252.00) by 2011 and stands in contrast to the recent decreasing trend 
in expenditure on non-legal benefits (See Chart 8.3). 
 
Chart 8.3: Welfare expenditure on workers (monthly average per head, in thousand 
won) 
*Source: Ministry of Labour (http://laborstat.molab.go.kr/): Data accessed on 07/10/ 2012, 
15:42 UTC (GMT); Ministry of Labour (2008b). 
*Note: average monthly cost per head. 
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This configuration suggests that the commonly held assumption that private companies 
make up for the ‘shortfall in state-led welfare provision’ in East Asian countries needs to 
be re-examined. For example, while there is little doubt that social welfare is provided by a 
combination of a ‘relatively weak’ welfare state, company welfare schemes, family 
provision and other means in East Asia (Chang 2007: 5; emphasis is mine) and that 
business and family played the dominant role in welfare provision during Korea’s period 
of high economic growth (1961–1987) (Song 2003, 411), the various empirical data sets 
contradict the firm-based welfare thesis, which claims that there have been ‘attempts to 
discourage dependence on the state and to encourage private sources of welfare’ (Kwon & 
Holliday 2007, 243). 
The scatter plots for public and private social expenditure among selected OECD countries 
in 1995 and 2009 (Chart 8.4) show that Korea’s public expenditure is the lowest but is 
increasing, although private voluntary expenditure is similar to Portugal and Chile. Of the 
countries in the sample, there are two clear outliers: the US, where there is extremely high 
private expenditure; and Korea and Chile, where private expenditure is similar to other 
OECD countries, but there is an extremely low level of public expenditure. However, it 
should be noted that the level of Korea’s public expenditure during the period 1995-2009, 
has increased dramatically, unlike Chile. Although the increasing pattern of public 
expenditure can be seen as common in some countries, those in Korea, Japan, Portugal and 
Italy appear to be innovative and rapid. This stands in sharp contrast to the staged or 
decreasing pattern in the Nordic welfare states and central European countries including 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, France and German. 
Countries in the sample are clustered, with high public expenditures (around 25% of GDP) 
and low levels of private expenditure (although this varies according to the local 
contexts,126 with private expenditure in the UK and the Netherlands higher than in central 
and southern European countries). In contrast to the assumption that where state-
coordinated provision is low, companies face pressure to make up for the shortfall through 
voluntary measures (Farnsworth 2004: 438), the level of private expenditure in Korea is at 
the OECD average (and even decreasing) even though public expenditure is very low. The 
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  Southern	   European	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   like	   Spain,	   Portugal,	   and	   Greece	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contention that countries with lower levels of statutory provision (i.e. lower levels of 
corporate taxation and state social provision) are more likely to have higher levels of 
private voluntary expenditure for non-statutory provision of social benefits is only seen in 
the case of the US, at least within this sample. If the argument that work-based (formal and 
informal work) social protections serve to address the shortfall in statutory provisions were 
true in the Korean case (Peng & Wong 2008: 62), then Korea’s private voluntary 
expenditure on social protection would be expected to be considerably higher. More 
surprisingly, in this sample, the level of Korea’s private expenditure is shown as 
decreasing (similar to the UK, and only two countries in this sample), while those of others 
are commonly increasing (particularly, see Japan, US and Chile).  
 
Chart 8.4: Social expenditure by public and private voluntary expenditure (selected 
OECD countries) by percentage of GDP in 1995 and 2009 
 
 
*Source: OECD. Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/), OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), from 
www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure) (see Appendix 5) 
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Chart 8.5: Social expenditure by statutory (public and mandatory private) and 
private in Korea (1990-2009, as a percentage of GDP) 
 
*Source: OECD. Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/), OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) via 
www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure) (see Appendix 5); Korean Statistical Information Service 
(http://kosis.kr/): Accessed 07/10/2012, 20:59:02 
*Note: the data for mandatory private expenditure (in Public and mandatory private 
expenditure) is unavailable for 2008 and 2009. 
 
Where then is Korea’s expenditure on social protection going? Chart 8.5 (see Appendix 5), 
which shows the patterns of statutory expenditure and private voluntary expenditure per 
GDP between 1990 and 2009, provides the answer. Since 1990, statutory expenditure, both 
public and mandatory private (that is, legally required benefits), has increased steadily 
(with the notable peak around 1998 marking the worst phase of Korea’s economic crisis), 
while the level of private voluntary expenditure has remained at around 2.0% since 
1995.127 As was seen in Chart 8.3, the state’s continued expenditure on social protection 
has remained firm even after the recent 2008 global financial recession, while private 
voluntary expenditure (which includes non-legally required benefits from firms and the 
private insurance market) has been vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Therefore, it is an 
exaggeration to claim that the Korean welfare state has become Anglo-American or liberal 
in form (employing Esping-Andersen’s terminology) and that firm-based workers’ welfare 
remains at the centre of the Korean social welfare system. More significantly, the argument 
that the traditional developmental state transformed into a neo-liberal state after the 1998 
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reform projects is misleading, i.e. introducing a more market-centred economic system did 
not put greater pressure on Korean companies in a globalised market, leading to an 
increase in firm-base welfare provision (Hundt 2009: 99–101). 
Instead, it is more convincing to view the Korean state as having adopted a new 
interventionist role in the social protection realm, as having developed new institutional 
sets, and as having taken on new responsibilities (although it seems quite limited). In sum, 
as recent research on the changes in the East Asian welfare model suggests (Li 2012), the 
Korean welfare system has continued in the form of a state-centred and state-controlled 
welfare system. The rapid and systematic development of statutory social provision since 
the 1997 crisis is reminiscent of the critical role played by the developmental state in the 
period of most rapid economic development (1970–1980). Moreover, as seen above, the 
institutional arrangements for worker protection in the labour market is characteristic of a 
flexicurity model—where workers are compensated, trained and motivated to become re-
employed in a highly mobile labour market—that appears to be in its infancy. The state’s 
intervention and investment in labour protection has followed a self-reinforcing path.  
 
8.2.3 Reproducing dualism in the labour market 
 
The development of EI has followed its own self-reinforcing trajectory, as seen above and 
in Appendix 1 (see the history of Employment Insurance Act amendments). However, it is 
crucial to note at this point that the initial form taken by EI (when it was established in 
1995) has also restricted its progress. Although the enforcement and the impact of an 
institution generally changes in line with the political conflicts between the rule-makers 
and rule-takers, a contingency at the point of institution building can serve to constrain the 
role and function of an institution and its potential path for change. For instance, it was 
elite bureaucrats with growth-oriented policy preferences that precluded the EI scheme 
from being designed originally as a non-occupational (universal)/non-contributory 
compensation system.128 Thus, the fact that the EI was launched as an occupational/ 
contributory compensation system implies that the institutional set for social security has a 
built-in predisposition towards the exclusion of atypical workers and labour market 
entrants. In fact, it is undeniable that the Korean social security system, and EI in particular, 
is underpinned by the assumption that the labour force is divided into a core labour force 
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and a peripheral labour force; the former will be protected by the social insurance system, 
while the latter will be excluded or receive only minimal protection. As a result, the ‘two 
nations hegemonic project’ (Jessop 2003: 139) character of the social security system in 
Korea was embedded in its institutional sets from the beginning. In selectively providing 
social protection for regular workers, EI can be seen to have been founded upon an implicit 
acceptance and affirmation of the current fragmentation of the labour market structure in 
Korea. Its function is not to fill the gap between the wages and working conditions of 
regular workers and atypical workers, but to increase the gap. 
 
Chart 8.6: Welfare expenditure on workers by firm size (thousand won) 
 
*Source: Ministry of Labour (http://laborstat.molab.go.kr/): Data accessed on 07/10/ 2012, 
15:42 UTC (GMT); Ministry of Labour (2008b). 
*Note: average monthly cost per head. 
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welfare expenditure gap between workers in large companies and SMEs has been 
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the welfare expenditure of large companies significantly exceeding that of SMEs. The 
average monthly in-house welfare expenditure per worker in SMEs (employing fewer than 
300 persons) in 2009 was 345,000 won (USD 306), which was 62% of the 561,000 won 
(USD 497) spent by large firms (employing 300 and more persons).129 More significantly, 
when the increasing gap in welfare expenditure between large firms and SMEs is examined 
(see Chart 8.6), it is clear that income equality has worsened since 1993, particularly since 
the LMGTC’s social pact was established in 1998. In particular, if the expenditure on 
legally required benefits (including EI) by large companies is compared to that of SMEs 
over time, the difference between them can be seen to have increasingly widened since 
1999. When the same figures are compared non-legally required benefits, the difference is 
somewhat less pronounced, although it had begun to grow from 1993. 
Even though the state approached the development of its flexicurity model by including 
provisions for ALMP, the inequality between the beneficiaries of training under EI is 
significant. In fact, the participation rate in vocational skills development programmes 
stood at only 14.1% in 2004, the lowest rate among the OECD countries (37.1% was the 
OECD average in 2002) (Lee & Jeong 2007, 48). Although the overall participation rate is 
increasing, the gap in the participation rate by firm size and by employment status is 
deepening, and there is very low participation by vulnerable groups such as SME workers 
and temporary, daily workers. 
 
Table 8.1: Wage workers’ participation in Job Skills Training schemes by firm size 
(%) 
	  
1-4 
workers 
employed	  
5-9 
 
10-29 
 
 
30-99 
 
 
100-299 
 
 
Over 300 
 
 
2007. 08  7.5 10.8 22.6 34.3 39.2 52.5 
2008. 03  7.3 13.6 24.9 37.3 40.8 54.0 
2009. 08 9.5 16.0 29.2 39.8 46.5 58.3 
2010. 08 10.7 16.5 28.9 41.0 48.8 58.3 
*Source: Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/) 
 
 
In the case of job skills training schemes by firm size, it can be seen that workers in larger 
firms are more likely to be able to participate in job training programmes (Table 8.2). The 
larger firm in which the workers are employed the higher the participation rate in education 
                                                
129	  Source:	  Ministry	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and training. In 2010, 58.3% of workers in larger firms (those employing more than 300 
persons) participated in the job skills training scheme during the previous year, whereas 
10.7% of workers in small firms (employing fewer than five persons) participated.  
The disparity in participation in job skills training schemes is even more apparent when the 
employment status of participants is taken into consideration (see Table 8.3). Between 
2007 and 2010, the participation rate of wage workers as a whole increased by 6.3%—
from 24.9% in 2007 to 31.2% in 2010. However, when these figures are examined by 
employment status, there is a clear and stable disparity in participation rates between 
regular and non-regular workers. In 2011, 39.5% of regular workers participated in the job 
skills training scheme, while only 27.8% of non-regular workers did. The percentage gap 
between regular workers and non-regular workers has remained at 10% or more since 2007. 
 
Table 8.2: Wage workers’ participation in Job Skills Training schemes by 
employment status (%) 
	  Total 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  Regular workers Non-
regular 
workers 
	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  Temporary Fixed-term 
Non-
fixed 
term 
Part-
time on call 
2007. 08  24.9  28.4  18.6  21.3  22.5  18.4  8.6  18.1  
2008. 03  24.5  28.4  17.5  19.0  22.1  11.6  7.9  18.3  
2008. 08  26.8  30.4  19.8  21.2  23.8  14.6  8.4  20.6  
2009. 03  30.8  34.6  23.4  25.6  29.4  9.9  13.2  24.6  
2009. 08  30.8  34.7  23.5  25.2  28.0  13.5  14.9  24.8  
2010. 03  32.7  36.3  25.5  29.1  32.5  19.0  15.6  26.3  
2010. 08  31.2  34.6  24.4  28.4  32.3  16.4  14.5  24.4  
2011. 03  35.4  39.1  28.1  32.3  35.8  22.6  17.2  28.0  
2011. 08  35.5  39.5  27.8  32.5  35.9  20.6  16.5  27.8  
2012. 03  37.5  41.1  30.1  34.9  39.1  22.1  18.1  29.4  
*Source: Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/) 
	  
In addition, expenditure on training by employers for incumbent workers is much greater 
than that for the unemployed and vulnerable workers. A pattern of increasing disparity in 
employers’ expenditure on training for these groups is evident: the former has increased 
from 180.7 billion won (USD 161.84 million) in 2000 to 581 billion won (USD 520.37) in 
2011, whereas the latter has decreased from 278.3 billion won (USD 249.26 million) in 
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2000 to 269 billion won (USD 240.93 million) in 2011, with a low of 191 billion won 
(USD 171.07 million) in 2006.130 
This increase in the inequality in welfare expenditure between larger firms and SMEs 
implies that, despite the dramatic expansion of EI, welfare provision inequality between 
regular workers and non-regular workers has also increased given that workers in large 
firms are mainly regular workers and those in SMEs are non-regular workers. More 
seriously, as seen in Chapter 7 (Section 7.2), while the percentage of regular workers 
benefitting from the statutory social provisions of national pension insurance, national 
health care, and EI is very high (82%–99%), the percentage for non-regular workers is very 
low (29%–35%) (Han 2011: 7; Kim 2011: 26). 
More importantly, it should be noted that despite EI covering all workers, including on-call 
workers, EI does not provide low-income workers with tax credits or any payments to top-
up earnings. Although Korea’s unemployment rate is low compared to other OECD 
countries (around 3%), low-income workers account for 25.4% of all paid workers, and EI 
appears to be failing in reducing the number of ‘working poor’ and welfare income 
inequality for workers. 
While it is true that income and welfare provision inequalities were magnified by the 1997 
crisis and the subsequent amendment of the labour laws, the trend towards income 
inequality and job insecurity actually started to appear at the beginning of the 1990s as a 
result of the various liberalisation policies (You & Lee 2001). However, the social 
insurance programmes introduced to protect the victims of labour market flexibility do not 
effectively cover them. Unfortunately, this paradox is reproduced within Korea’s approach 
to ALMP, especially as regards job skills training schemes. Since ALMP is run as a part of 
the employment insurance program, most non-regular workers and employees in 
unorganised small firms are excluded from the benefits and various services of ALMP, as 
are new labour market entrants such as young workers (university graduates), who do not 
yet contribute to the insurance funds. Expenditure on training for skill upgrading still 
suffers from underinvestment and is differentiated by firm size and the employment status 
of workers. 
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It is clear, therefore, that Korea’s attempt to build a flexicurity model where all workers are 
covered by either unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance has led to a 
different institutional outcome than that of the Danish system, the flexicurity model upon 
which it drew. This is mainly because the institutional sets that were developed for it 
contained the legacy of ‘contributivity’ from the original formulation of EI, and this has 
‘strengthened the link between the amount of contribution and the volume of the benefits’ 
(Palier & Thelen 2012: 218). This means that being a citizen of Korea is not enough in 
itself to guarantee protection under EI and that direct contribution to the insurance funds is 
necessary. As seen above, however, low-income non-regular workers, who are rarely 
organised but make up half the total wage workers in the Korean labour market, are 
excluded from the social security system. In sum, the attributes of the occupational 
compensation system under EI reinforces labour market dualism by drawing a sharp line 
between the contributor and non-contributor, between the large premium payer and the 
small premium payer and between regular workers and non-regular workers. In so doing, it 
pushes outsider workers to the boundary of EI, and there emerges a new role, new 
responsibilities and a new kind of welfare funding (taxation) for the developmental welfare 
state. This policy outcome is not the one that the state expected when it designed EI, and it 
results from shifting economic circumstances and unforeseen changes in other policy 
realms. When the state initially considered the formation and the design of EI, no one 
could have foreseen the coming economic crisis, the resultant unprecedented levels of 
unemployment and the failure of EI’s occupational/contributory compensation system to 
address the levels of unemployment, meet non-regular workers’ needs and function as a 
means of building a golden triangle of flexicurity. 
 
8.3 Transformation of the developmental welfare state 
 
Economic and industrial explanations for the increasing inequality in the social security 
system in Korea have focused on the dominance of firm-based unionism in Korea. For 
theorists subscribing to this explanation, the greater power of chaebol unions relative to 
other unions was central to the failure to design and implement an EI system that afforded 
comprehensive (universal) welfare provision for workers (Koh 2004; Lee & Jeong 2007: 
48–49; Ma 2002; Yang 2006: 206–216). Assuming the Western experience of welfare 
development as a standard, these theorists have sought to investigate the extent of certain 
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welfare developments by examining the competency of labour (unions) or simply the 
implementation of institutions, and they hold that when labour (or a labour-based political 
party) has sufficiently strong capacity and democratisation matures in Korea, then type and 
quality of welfare institutions in Korea will be similar to other welfare states. However, as 
seen in Chapter 7 (Section 7.4.2), the primary concerns of Korea’s militant labour 
movement, which is led by the chaebol unions, are employment stability, wage increases 
and more welfare provision by employers, so firm-based unions have no incentive to 
intervene in social issues to improve the lot of the non-unionised unemployed and non-
regular workers. It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest that labour is at least partly 
responsible for the fact that EI was set up as, and has continued to be, a contribution-based 
rather than citizenship-based system. Consequently, there is no provision within EI for a 
universal unemployment assistance programme (that is, universal income assistance from 
national taxation); instead, EI provides only unemployment insurance, and compensation is 
determined solely by one’s work-based insurance contributions. Similarly, the motherhood 
protection scheme provides compensation only based on one’s employment career (that is 
to say, a person’s taxpaying history). As a result, the EI system is unlikely to promote or 
facilitate income redistribution and is instead more likely to compensate regular-wage 
workers in larger firms.  
Since the unions played little role in the social policy-making process, they were 
determined to protect their minimal (but basic) political rights under the authoritarian-
conservative governments and even after the 1998 labour laws amendment. There was no 
room for unions to contribute actively to building the institutional sets for worker 
protection and welfare provision, especially in the face of the introduction of multiple 
reforms affecting labour rights and the labour market. These include the labour laws 
amendment (for higher flexibility in the labour market), the structural reorganisation of the 
chaebol production system (for lower labour costs) and changing employment practices 
(the introduction of a performance-based and annual contract system for greater labour 
flexibility).131 Although the state sought to bring unions into the policy domain through the 
LRRC in 1996 and the LMGTC in 1998, the former was frustrated by the developmental 
state’s unilateral state-led reforms and the dominance of the policy coalition of economic 
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bureaucrats and business organisations,132 while the latter has been declining in importance 
since the 1998 social pact and structural reform project in 1998–1999.133 Furthermore, 
given that the discussions on the design and implementation of EI took place in 1990–1995 
without input from the strongest labour organisation, the KCTU, which was not a legal 
organisation until the end of 1999, it is natural that the realistic goal of labour organisations 
in that period was to survive, protect their rights, and strive to gain parliamentary 
representation through a labour-centred political party.134 To them, in turn, the 1998 
enhanced social policy, including EI, was ‘recompense from the state’ (interviewee P6) for 
assenting to mass layoffs.  
In sum, Korea’s firm-based, militant-business unionism, characterised by the strong 
collective bargaining power of chaebol unions relative to the weak capacity of labour as a 
whole, was unable to shape the original design or evolution of EI. Instead, the Korean 
state’s developmental orientation ensured that EI was enacted (Haagh & Cook 2005: 191). 
The following section examines the role of the state, and particularly the way in which the 
state implemented institutional sets for worker protection and welfare provision. The issue 
here is to determine whether the Korean developmental state changed, and if so, how it 
changed. To do this, the institutional origin and evolution of EI is examined with a 
particular focus on the roles of the state and social partners, the fragmentation of elite 
bureaucrats and the emerging prominence of a new group of social bureaucrats. 
  
8.3.1 The diehard developmentalist approach to guiding the EI 
 
Historically, demands on the state from a newly emergent social class, first the bourgeoisie 
and then the urban working class, played a role in the gradual extension of the democratic 
franchise. In a similar vein, the new distributive conflict models of regime change have 
focused on the demands on the state ‘from more diverse and combined interests across the 
social class’ as central to regime change (Haggard & Kaufman 2012: 512). Korea’s current 
social policy-making regime appears to have been designed based on an adoption of the 
politics of inclusion (tripartite system), the rise of social bureaucrats and a bottom-up 
approach that included civic movement groups and labour after the 1998 reform projects. It 
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might therefore appear that the Korean state has undergone a wholesale transformation into 
a pro-welfare state in which a ruling coalition between social bureaucrats, labour-centred 
political party, unions and civic groups dominates the policy agenda and policy-making 
process, producing an interconnected social policy preference network (Yang 2004: 194–
200). 
Before attempting to determine whether this apparent transformation in the Korean 
developmental state was merely a brief and transitional phenomenon during and 
immediately after the moment of crisis or whether it has become a new developmental 
state model since then, it should be determined whether the argument that the ruling 
coalition and policy preference network should be at the centre of the analysis on the 
change in the institutions and welfare system is in fact valid. Although it is the case that in 
the traditional Korean developmental state, the ruling coalition of economic bureaucrats 
(technocrats), business, the president and the authoritarian-conservative ruling party was 
the single authority over institutional arrangements in almost every policy area (Hundt 
2009: 38; Yang 2004: 196) and that this ruling coalition, with its catch-up strategy, had 
control over all national resource mobilisation and institutional arrangements during 
Korea’s economic development era (1970s–1990s), it is nevertheless an exaggeration to 
claim that the central factor that led to policy reform was a battle between confrontational 
policy coalitions within the bureaucracy in an attempt to strengthen support for their 
respective positions ‘outside’ the state apparatus. However, this desire to achieve popular 
support undoubtedly contributed to the struggle between the segregated policy blocs 
‘within’ the state, and more specifically within the bureaucracy (the conservative 
neoliberal economic bloc vs. the reform-minded economic bureaucrats and social 
bureaucrats).135 
Rather, the political dynamics of the social policy reforms were confined to ‘within’ the 
state. While it is true that the Bureau of Employment Policy of the Ministry of Labour and 
the Employment Insurance Study Task Force (henceforth EISTF) held discussions with 
other government bureaus in 1993 on EI and sought feedback from labour representatives 
and academics, and the FKTU and KEF each made their recommendations on EI to the 
Ministry of Labour in June 1993 (Ministry of Labour 2006b: 329), this cannot be regarded 
as active bottom-up participation of labour, business and civic groups in the decision-
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making process. Instead, it appears more reasonable to regard the social bureaucrats of the 
Ministry of Labour and EISTF as having utilised the official demands from labour, civic 
groups and even business as a means of garnering support to counter the hostility that their 
rival bloc (the elite economic bureaucrats within the Economic Planning Board [EPB] and 
other economic and financial bureaus) displayed towards welfare reform. For example, 
although the EISTF, which led the EI building process within the Ministry of Labour, 
allowed representatives of business and labour to participate in their committee meetings, 
they took part only as observers and were not given the chance to submit their own 
proposals to the committee (interviewee P6). Furthermore, the EISTF used a collective 
bargaining agreement between the KEF and FKTU as a means of mobilising support for its 
policy. When negotiation on the issue of EI eligibility reached an impasse in early 1994, an 
agreement struck between the KEF and FKTU on EI eligibility at the Central Committee of 
Labour and Management (CCLM) enabled EI to be enacted in 1995.136 This negotiated 
settlement struck a balance between the competing proposals of the EISTF, which held that 
the initial eligibility of the EI’s unemployment insurance scheme should cover firms 
employing five persons or more, the Ministry of Labour’s proposal for coverage to start 
with firms employing over 30 persons, the EPB compromise plan for coverage for firms 
employing 50 persons (Ministry of Labour 2006b: 333–335), and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry’s position, which was that EI eligibility should start from 1995 
with firms employing 150 persons. The EISTF contacted labour representatives (the FKTU) 
and recommended that the Ministry of Labour’s recommendation should be accepted. The 
former head of the EISTF interviewed during the field research depicted this situation as 
follows: 
There were intense debates on the matter of EI eligibility in early 1994: the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry insisted on eligibility for firms employing 150 persons; the Ministry of 
Labour called for eligibility for firms employing 30 persons; and I wanted eligibility for firms 
employing [five] persons. I called an executive member of the FKTU and convinced them to 
compromise and accept the Ministry of Labour’s proposal, and this was the plan that the CCLM 
ultimately agreed upon [in April 1994]. Thus, with this agreement between labour and business, 
we could go ahead with implementing EI with firms employing 30 persons eligible for the 
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  The	   CCLM,	   a	   business-­‐labour	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Unemployment Insurance scheme and firms employing 70 persons eligible for the Employment 
Stabilisation scheme and Job Skills Training schemes [in October 1994] (interviewee P6).  
The EISTF’s efforts to persuade the KEF and the FKTU to agree to support the proposal to 
make wage workers in firms employing more than 30 persons eligible for support under 
the unemployment insurance scheme meant that the EI could be enacted in 1995. This 
compromise agreement was a direct consequence of the EISTF’s efforts to gain the support 
of business and labour in order to challenge the economic bureaucrats. Labour’s support 
for the proposals was strengthened by the announcement of the commitment to expand 
eligibility to firms employing more than 10 persons in 1998.  
The EISTF’s guiding role and responsibility to build labour protection scheme in Korea 
and the development of policy idea by researching various labour protection schemes in 
advanced countries started much earlier. During the developmentalist era in the 1980s, 
discussion on building social security institutional measures was vigorous but in its infancy. 
However, these discussions among a few elite bureaucrats on preparing the ground for EI 
were not sanctioned by political elites in the Blue House under the authoritarian-
developmental regime (at least not until a year prior to the 1992 presidential election). It 
was precisely this disregard for social welfare (or even discussion of welfare issues) by 
developmentalists that was responsible for the underdevelopment of Korea’s welfare 
system.  
The change of orientation on social protection (and more specifically, EI) within the 
bureaucracy occurred in 1991, a year prior to the 1992 presidential election and general 
election and during the Roh Tae-woo government’s discussion on the seventh five-year 
economic development plan.137 There was no consensus within the EPB, which was 
responsible for drafting the plan, on the need to introduce EI because its members had an 
insufficient understanding of the issues involved. Key executives from the Ministry of 
Labour and the KLI—who accumulated learning from advanced countries like the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Japan over time (interviewee P5; interviewee P6)—visited the 
EPB on 27 March 1991 to discuss the need to introduce an EI system. This discussion led 
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  The	   five-­‐year	   economic	   development	   plan	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   the	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   institutional	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   Korean	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to key EPB executives becoming sympathetic to idea of introducing EI, and they agreed to 
the introduction of EI during the seventh five-year economic development plan (Ministry 
of Labour 2006b: 327). During its election campaign in the run up to the 1992 general 
election and presidential election, the ruling party pledged to introduce EI in 1995, with the 
opposition party subsequently making a similar commitment. On 25 February 1993, the 
FKTU’s board of representatives adopted the ‘EI resolutions’ and called on the newly 
elected Kim Young-sam government to introduce EI. As part of its five-year economic 
development plan, the Kim Young-sam government began implementation of EI in 1995 
(Ministry of Labour 2006b: 327–328). 
To sum up, the EISTF tried to gather support from labour and to expand its alliances 
within the state to overcome the strong opposition to welfare reform from the economic 
bureaus and elite economic bureaucrats. The policy initiative was taken not by the policy 
preference network or ruling coalition in concert with labour and civic groups, but by the 
social bureaucrats (interviewee P5138). Significantly, the KCTU, which was the strongest 
labour organisation but was not legally recognised, was almost entirely absent during the 
opinion gathering phase on EI implementation, whereas the FKTU, which consistently 
opposed universal welfare provision schemes (such as integration of regional medical 
insurance and workplace medical insurance) and the expansion of eligibility (the inclusion 
of regional subscribers into the national pension scheme), did participate in the 
consultation process. After being brought into the LMGTC in 1998, the KCTU was finally 
able to become involved in discussions on integrating medical insurance and expanding the 
coverage of the national pension. Along with civic groups, it began to call for increases in 
public welfare provision through national budget reform. However, this should not be 
viewed as the emergence of a welfare alliance of wage earners, as will be seen in following 
section. 
 
8.3.2 Continuity of role and function of social bureaucrats on behalf of labour 
As regards the 1998 expansion of EI and the various newly introduced social protection 
schemes, it is a misunderstanding to claim that representatives of labour in Korea 
ultimately consented to labour flexibilisation as a quid pro quo for the welfare state 
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  A	  long-­‐serving	  government	  officer	  who	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  in	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expansion and the protection of core workers (Peng 2012: 233–238; Chang & Chae 2004: 
432). While it is true that the 1998 social pact promised significant labour protection and 
welfare provision, labour did not take the lead in pressing for these measures, but rather 
focused on the legalisation of the KCTU and other political rights for unions. To the 
KCTU, the expansion of EI in the moment of crisis (1998–1999) was regarded as a short-
term project and of relatively minor importance. A former executive member of the KCTU 
provides a clear statement as to the union’s immediate concerns and its lack of a clear 
vision and strategy on the direction of future worker protection reforms. 
It was not that we were indifferent towards the institutional implementation of measures for 
social security and the protection of workers’ welfare, but rather that EI, as an issue that was 
not part of the KCTU’s strategic goals and was regarded as a short-term project, was not our 
major concern. The main focus of our struggle at the time was guaranteeing wage increases and 
job security at the individual firm-level through collective bargaining. Another point is that we 
were not actually strong enough to press for worker protection reform … We constantly raised 
the issues of EI and Workers’ Compensation Insurance, but we gradually tired of pressing these 
points … As for the 1998 amendment of EI, we participated in the LMGTC discussions on EI 
reform, but we did not have major disagreements with the proposed amendments, except for the 
increases in workers’ insurance rates. (interviewee P12) 
Thus, the overhaul of EI and its considerable expansion should not be viewed as the result 
of a trade-off between the state and labour on labour protection and labour flexibility, but 
as a continuity of state dominance in policy making process at social protection realm. This 
research could find no evidence whatsoever of political (or any type of) exchange between 
the state and labour on the expansion of welfare provision. In particular, the four 
amendments in a single year (1998) that led to the expansion of eligibility for all EI three 
schemes (unemployment insurance, employment stabilisation and job skills training) to 
firms of any size should be understood not as the result of a state-labour bargain but as a 
consequence of a combination of factors: (1) the self-reinforcing factor—a commitment to 
expand EI eligibility had already been made in 1994 and the system was designed to 
incorporate this expansion; (2) the functional factor of increased funding for EI 
programmes as a result of increasing the number of tax payers to cover rising 
241	  
unemployment in 1998 (interviewee P5); and (3), President Kim Dae-jung’s will and 
leadership (interviewee P2; interviewee P5; interviewee P6).139 
After the worst of the economic crisis had passed (by the end of 1999), the traditional 
pattern of state intervention in labour protection continued under the Kim Dae-jung and 
Roh Moo-hyun governments, despite the fact that the LMGTC had been established. For 
example, on the issue of a reduction in working hours, no significant agreement was struck 
between labour and business within the LMGTC for four years (see Chapter 6). With the 
special committee discussions between labour and business on this issue deadlocked, the 
Head of the Ministry of Labour and researchers from the Korean Labour Institute (KLI140) 
tried to mediate between the opposing sides. Finally, the Ministry of Labour proposed 
amending the Labour Standards Act in late 2002 (which became the 2003 amendment of 
the Labour Standards Act) (ESDC 2008: 301–306; Ministry of Labour 2006c: 91–92). The 
case of implementation of labour protection for non-regular workers (introduction of the 
Act on the Protection, Etc. of Fixed-term and Part-time Workers and the Act on the 
Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency Workers in 2006), which included increasing the 
scope of EI eligibility, was similar. Demands from the KCTU, FKTU and other civic 
groups led to discussions on this issue within the LMGTC from July 2001. While business 
and labour eventually managed to reach an agreement, it was actually the government 
officers of the committee who led the discussions due to the continuous confrontation and 
contestation between labour and business on every aspect of the issue (ESDC 2008: 309–
312). More importantly, the strongest labour organisation, the KCTU was mostly absent 
from the negotiations in both cases.  
What is clear is that the development of EI and labour protection regulations since 1998 is 
the result of the combination of state interventionism and the ‘low level of social cohesion’ 
within labour, which is common in ‘developmental contexts’ (Haagh 2006: 417). Contrary 
to the thesis that the development of social rights is steered by the rise of civil and political 
citizenship, in the Korean case, elite bureaucrats insulated from social interest groups still 
have dominant power over setting the social rights agenda and development of social 
welfare. 
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In short, it was the social bureaucrats in the Ministry of Labour and the KLI that led the 
policy initiatives on EI and its expansion, and met the demands of the Korean society for 
labour protection. Although there were internal veto possibilities on EI implementation 
within the bureaucracy (from economic bureaucrats), the economic bureaucrats’ veto 
possibilities were ultimately not strong enough to block or mediate the setting of policy 
either during the phase in which EI emerged or during the phase in which EI was expanded. 
Instead, the social bureaucrats took on the responsibility for the institutional arrangements 
on labour protection and sought to persuade their opponents and expand their alliances 
(within and outside the state).  
To put it differently, the social bureaucrat-led pattern of shaping the course of EI, including 
the four amendments in 1998, did not differ significantly from the initial EI enactment in 
1994–1995 in the sense that the elite bureaucrats and a pilot agency (the EISTF) were 
insulated from social groups and had sufficient autonomy and capacity to play a key role in 
directing the development of EI. The expansion of EI eligibility had been designed from 
the outset and was due to take place in 1998 regardless of the social pact of the same year 
and the existence of any policy coalition network outside the state. In the case of EI reform, 
the Ministry of Labour supported increasing subsidies and broadening the coverage of the 
job skills training scheme, whereas business called for reducing the tax rate for employers 
or abolishing it altogether, with the aim of reducing labour costs (ESDC 2008: 277–278). 
The same pattern is seen in the case of implementation of the EI employment stabilisation 
schemes, where the Ministry of Labour was determined to include this scheme as an active 
labour market policy in EI in 1993, whereas business called for no widening in the 
coverage of EI (Ministry of Labour 2006b: 331). 
It is convincing, therefore, that the social bureaucrats who sprang forth from within the 
economic bureaucratic bloc took on a new responsibility and institutional initiative towards 
social protection in the developmental era. During the moment of crisis in 1997–1999, the 
economic bureaucrats lost their previously dominant organisational power within the 
bureaucracy and their control over the policy-making process due to Kim Young-sam’s 
attempts to dissolve the EPB and reorganise economic bureaus (see Chapter 6). The elite 
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Labour, who had been emasculated under the economic 
bureaucrats’ dominance over the policy arena, emerged at the centre of the policy-making 
process and, in fact, led the institutional arrangements for Kim Dae-jung’s labour and 
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employment reform projects and industrial (chaebols) structural reforms. Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to regard the transformations of the Korean developmental state, social 
(workers) protection and the employment system during the 1998 reforms as having 
derived from the emerging ‘policy advocates of welfare idealists’ (Kwon 2005: 491). The 
points to examine further are whether this pro-welfare bloc was able to maintain its policy 
dominance after the crisis phase (after 2000) and whether it was able to mobilise policy 
support from within and outside the state. The answers to these points will demonstrate 
whether, as democratisation theorists argue, the Korean developmental state has been 
dismantled as a result of social bureaucrats and a policy network (or ruling coalition) 
working in combination with labour and civic groups to inform the policy-making arena 
and control the social policy-making process (Kwon 2005; Wong & Peng 2008; Peng 
2012). 
These democratisation theorists aim to explain the transformation of the Korean 
employment system and the Korean developmental state by bringing civil society back into 
political research. For them, the historical moments of Korean democratisation (e.g. 1987 
Great Workers’ Struggle, the first civilian presidency of Kim Young-sam and the ruling 
coalition transition from an authoritarian-conservative bloc to a liberal-democratic bloc 
with Kim Dae-jung’s inauguration) contributed to fostering the innovative changes in the 
policy sets for the economy, labour, welfare and the policy-making process. They also led 
the way to the traditional Korean developmental state’s metamorphosis. For instance, 
Kwon maintains that the prime factor in the Korean state’s transformation was the 
confrontation between the welfare idealists’ advocacy coalition and the economic 
pragmatists who had played the key role in the pro-growth productivist system (Kwon 
2005: 491; similarly, Yang 2004: 194–200). However, as was seen earlier in this section, 
the economic bureaucrats’ dominant influence over policy implementation had already 
been seriously undermined before the social bureaucrats became involved with the pro-
welfare coalition of Kim Dae-jung and his political colleagues.  
Moreover, the argument that a new developmental state pattern has appeared is a 
somewhat hasty generalisation, especially when the focus of analysis moves on to the way 
of ruling process in the employment system. The almost complete absence of the strongest 
labour organisation, the KCTU, from the policy-making process means that it cannot be 
argued that there has been a strong policy coalition or policy advocate network, at least 
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regarding the reform of social (labour) protection and the employment system. Although it 
is true that civic groups have made a range of demands on other welfare policy issues, such 
as the national pension, health care, gender equality in the workplace and equal 
employment rights for the disabled, these were single-issue demands and were short-term 
and temporary; it is therefore difficult to regard these individual demands as forming part 
of an integrated policy coalition. On labour and employment issues, labour, the KCTU in 
particular, did not play a leading role despite the existence of a tripartite organisation, the 
LMGTC. 
A more plausible explanation, therefore, is that, unlike the Western corporatist experience 
of collective bargaining between the labour and business or the democratisation argument 
of the emergence of policy preference networks (see Section 7.4.2 in Chapter 7), the state 
(social bureaucrats) took on the role and responsibility for labour protection and 
employment reform on behalf of labour in the developmental context. 
 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The scope of social protection in Korea has certainly broadened, and the institutional 
purpose of Korea’s social polices is no longer subject to an economic rationale. Moreover, 
the active labour market policies of EI have contributed to bringing about a more 
protective employment system, which is based on the social bureaucrats’ conception of a 
flexicurity model. However, the EI institutional sets for labour protection have not 
produced the results that were originally intended and adopted, largely due to the 
combination of the unprecedented unemployment during the economic crisis and the 
transformation in employment practices (increasing numbers of non-regular workers, an 
annual salary system and performance-based contracting). Thus, the occupation-based 
beneficiary system of EI selectively served regular workers in larger firms and fostered the 
increasing inequality in welfare provision and ALMP for workers.  
The common belief that firm-based workers welfare is still the dominant form in the 
Korean welfare system is also misleading. The expenditure on and expansion of labour 
protection via statutory institutional arrangements demonstrates the increased role and 
function of the Korean developmental welfare state in welfare provision. It should be noted 
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that labour has had little impact on this development due to the fact that corporatism has 
not been embedded in Korean society to any great degree. 
In this vein, the democratisation theorists’ argument that, as with the advanced 
democracies in Europe, the emergence of a policy network and coalition brought about the 
development of a Korean welfare state is at best superficial; when the institutional 
arrangements and their origin and evolution are analysed, they reveal that what is 
happening below the surface actually represents greater continuity with the tradition of 
state intervention in Korea rather than constituting any substantial change. However, the 
Korean state reinvented and reinvigorated itself by taking on the role and responsibility for 
enhancing social (worker) protection by nurturing social bureaucrats. A more plausible 
explanation, therefore, is that, unlike the Western corporatist experience of collective 
bargaining between the labour and business or the democratisation argument of the 
emergence of policy preference networks, the state (social bureaucrats) took on the role 
and responsibility for labour protection on behalf of labour in the developmental context. 
This is the reason that this study labels this revised form of state as the transformation of 
Korean developmental welfare state, unlike the recent developmental welfare state thesis 
emphasises the submission of social policy to economic growth and the role of democratic 
policy network or coalition in welfare development. 
	   	  
246	  
Chapter 9  
Conclusion	  
	  
9.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the theoretical implications and contribution of the term 
‘employment system’ as the analytical framework used in this study to examine the change 
and continuity of Korean development welfare state. The findings and arguments of the 
previous chapters are comprehensively reviewed by employing an analytically refined 
version of the critical juncture framework incorporating the logic of incremental change. 
This chapter also suggests new research questions by analysing what is not addressed by 
the study.  
The purpose of this study has been to examine the transformation of the Korean 
employment system since 1980, when the country was released from military dictatorship 
and its rapid economic development began to lag for the first time in its economic 
developmental trajectory (although this was temporary). Between 1997 and 1999, the 
trajectory of the Korean employment system experienced a critical juncture. The study has 
therefore investigated the three major labour policy reforms in this period – which afforded 
greater labour flexibility, more comprehensive labour protection schemes, and significant 
political rights to unions – in order to illustrate the transformation of the employment 
system and to situate the institutional outcomes within a formal conceptual setting, thereby 
contributing to the debate on the transformation (or transition) of the Korean 
developmental welfare state. Furthermore, this study has explored the state-driven 
structural reforms to the chaebol and industrial system during this period because it 
presumes that the employment system consists not only of labour policies, but also other 
formal and informal sets of institutional constraints that directly and indirectly influence 
the design and the results of institutional arrangements. 
 
9.1 The employment system and its implications 
 
In this research, the employment system is conceptualised as a set of institutions 
combining labour policy, industrial policy, financial policy, and economic policy, which 
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directly and indirectly affect the character and transformation of employment practices at 
the empirical level. In addition, the informal institutions embedded in employment 
practices through past practices are also regarded as factors responsible for the 
transformation of the employment system.  
The conceptualisation of ‘employment system’ used in this study was first presented by 
Madsen (1999) and was further theoretically developed by Haagh (2004: 155). In this 
research, it has been used as an analytical lens to detect the changes in the labour market, 
labour relations, and labour protection, which have been termed employment practices. It 
has been used to understand the institutional adaptation of the developmental welfare state 
and entails four theoretical implications. First, the term employment system explicitly 
entails the notion of institutional complementarity (Boyer 2005; Bronk 2009; Chang 2007; 
Haagh 2012; Hall & Soskice 2001; Streeck 2009), which refers to how the contribution of 
each individual institution is enhanced by mutual co-operation with other institutions. For 
example, the combination of a labour policy that aims to foster greater flexibility in the 
labour market and a financial policy whose objective is to reform the shareholder financial 
market is expected to impart greater labour flexibility than if each element were considered 
separately. When these policies are combined with the occupational/contributory 
compensation system of an employment insurance scheme, which tends to provide social 
benefits only to resource contributors (due to its occupation-based selection on eligibility 
and beneficiaries), the resulting welfare provision is more likely to contribute to an 
increasing pattern of income and welfare inequalities. Therefore, to illustrate the 
comprehensive nature of the employment system and its transformation, it is necessary to 
explore not only labour policy, but also other affiliated policies such as social policy, 
industrial policy, and financial policy.  
Second, it is also noticeable that the performance of the complementary or combined 
sequence of rules enacted by individual institutions sharing similar policy goals and policy 
direction does not always produce positive sum policy outcomes. Rather, due to 
institutional complementarity, the result could be unstable, unexpected and inverted or a 
negative sum policy outcome. For instance, when Article 31 of the Labour Standards Act – 
intended non-regular-outsider labour market (more flexibility in the insider labour market 
and more security at the margins) – was combined with the Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers – introduced with the aim of securing the jobs and working 
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conditions of non-regular workers at the margins – the policy outcome that emerged from 
these rules ran counter to the original intention of each rule: the dualism of rigidity in the 
insider labour market and the numerical flexibility at the margins was reproduced (see 
Section 7.3 in Chapter 7 and the following sections). 
The fact that institutional change not only alters the constraints within which actors make 
strategic choices, but also ultimately reshapes the very goals and ideas that animate 
political action (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 27) means that it is possible to explain this 
phenomenon. Unless it is accepted that the only mechanism in operation is self-
reinforcement, it is not surprising that institutional change results in policy outcomes that 
derive from the inputs of complementary institutions over time, which themselves are the 
result of the actors’ diverse and sometimes contradictory interpretations of the institutions 
themselves and their enactment. Thus, the logic of the employment system brings our 
analytical scope down to an actor-based approach in which the diverse and competitive 
interests (goals and ideas) of political actors matter when examining institutional change 
and its impact, and ultimately brings the analytical compass back to the realm of politics. 
Hence, the third theoretical implication of the actor-based conceptualisation of the 
employment system used in this thesis lies in the fact that institutional change is more 
likely to be motivated by endogenous and slow-moving causal processes than exogenous 
shock or contingency (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: Streeck 2009). 
For instance, this study has identified the creation of the Labour-Management-Government 
Tripartite Commission (LMGTC, established in 1998) as a watershed moment in the 
dismantling of the Korean developmental state and the opening up of the starting point for 
institutional innovation in the formation of a new form of Korean state (i.e. a tripartite 
system, as evidenced by the 1998 labour law amendments based on the 1998 social pact 
agreed upon by the LMGTC), even though it failed to incorporate effective self-reinforcing 
or self-reproducing mechanisms. Although institutional measures to support the operation 
and reinforcement of the LMGTC have existed for a decade, the LMGTC has not brought 
about a break from Korea’s traditional state-led policy-making process, in which the 
bureaucrats have a central role and responsibility for decision making on policy. This can 
be explained by the way in which the new relationship forged between the traditional state-
business partnership, which had long controlled the shaping of policy, and labour broke 
down, with each actor pursuing different goals. On the one hand, this was due to Korea’s 
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lack of experience in creating a corporatist social consensus and the embedded practice of 
collective bargaining and, on the other, each actor’s widely differing interests in and 
interpretations of the LMGTC and its enactments and the huge asymmetric configuration 
of their power. In effect, the LMGTC’s weak and ambiguous institutional foundations, 
poorly defined organisational and functional objectives, and the lack of practice and 
embeddedness of collective bargaining in less formal institutional sets meant that the actors’ 
interpretations of the purpose and the enactments of the LMGTC differed considerably 
from each other. While the state wished to draw up social agreements through the LMGTC 
so as to demonstrate tangible results to the international community in order to secure the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) loan deal for economic rescue, business saw the 
LMGTC as a means to achieving its aim of securing greater flexibility in the labour market 
and mitigating the effect of the government’s chaebol reform plans. Labour viewed the 
newly implemented tripartite system as an instrument for pushing forward industrial 
relations reform (the structural reform of chaebols) and gaining political rights for unions. 
Furthermore, even within the government, perceptions on the LMGTC and its role in the 
policy-making process differed. Ultimately, by 2000, when Korea had overcome the worst 
of the economic crisis, the LMGTC lost its institutional power over the actors, and its role 
and function in the policy-making process declined.  
A clear lesson derived from this case is that the diverse factors motivating actors’ 
participation in and compliance with a particular institutional implementation (or change) 
lead to inherent dynamic tensions and pressures that cement the potential for further 
institutional change. In fact, the institutional adjustments that were made to facilitate the 
operation of the LMGTC (i.e. the series of regulations and acts introduced to normalise and 
enhance the constitutional role and function of the LMGTC since March 1998) not only 
failed to bolster the functioning of the LMGTC but also to mediate and abate the 
conflicting interests and power struggle between social partners. The term employment 
system, which refers to a combined set of institutions, therefore needs to examine not only 
the policy outcomes of a particular employment system, but also the roles, interests, and 
responsibilities of actors, because the policy outcomes, which are fraught with the tension 
and pressure of the institutional actors, both make room for further institutional change and 
constrain actors’ policy preferences and responsibilities. This is the fourth implication of 
the employment system. 
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To sum up, a change in the employment system may be largely dependent on the politics 
that shape institutional arrangements within the employment system, and change may be 
effected by mediating the diverse and competitive interests of political actors. While, on 
the one hand, increasing pressure from international markets and the international 
community’s demand for a genuinely democratic society have ushered the Korean state to 
follow the ‘best practice’ (in Anglo-American neo-liberal terms) in various policy areas, on 
the other hand, the alternative explanation that domestic politics and embedded practice in 
labour market steer policy implementations in response to changes in internal and external 
environments should be highlighted.  
	  
9.2 Critical juncture and its conditions 
 
With the theoretical implications of the employment system now outlined, the causal 
factors (and the sequence in which they occurred) in the transformation of the Korean 
employment system and its policy outcomes will be identified through the perspective of 
institutional continuity and change. The primary feature of the historical institutionalist 
approach, that of the path-dependency thesis and the critical juncture framework, may be 
represented by the logic that the previous period’s policy implementation and its continuity 
(or institutional legacy) affects present institutions (and their change) over time, and the 
goals, means, and interests of actors are bound by the framework of the previous 
institutional sets. In this vein, classic examples of the critical juncture framework (e.g. 
Collier & Collier 1991) argue that the legacy and influence of institutional and 
organisational systems are long term when the formation of a specific institutional 
arrangement takes place at a decisive moment and in a relatively short time (the critical 
juncture). Thus, it is important to draw a conceptual distinction between the path of the 
first phase and the institutional constraints (that is, the mechanisms of increasing returns, 
self-reinforcement, or lock-in effect) in order to examine the change in institutional 
arrangements under the critical juncture framework. However, sometimes any discussion 
on institutional change within classical theorising about critical junctures over-emphasises 
the role of external shock, which means that the responsibility for institutional change is 
placed somewhere outside the existing political structure (for example, economic crisis, 
war, or the emergence of a ‘political giant’). It is unsurprising, therefore, that despite the 
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critical juncture framework’s ability to recognise clearly the institutional policy inputs and 
outcomes (although they are identified ex post facto, at least in the labour market and 
welfare literature), there is little agreement on which political contexts provide the 
preconditions for institutional change and how they function as part of the causal 
mechanisms at the critical juncture. 
Thus, on the one hand, this study adopts the historical institutionalist approach as its main 
research framework and, on the other, tries to open the ‘black box’ (Falleti & Lynch 2009: 
1145) between policy inputs and outcomes in the critical juncture framework. This implies 
that the analytical strategy used in this study is underpinned by a presumption that not only 
affects labour policies directly, but also the process and results of conflicts, negotiations, 
and compromise. For instance, this study investigates an endogenous mechanism (i.e. the 
role, motivation, and responsibility of elite-bureaucrats in the developmental state context, 
their insulation and autonomy, and their commitment to economic (and in this thesis, social) 
growth via a catching-up strategy) in its analysis of the origin, implementation, and 
expansion of the Employment Insurance scheme and its consequence for labour and 
industrial policies, all of which contributed to the transformation of the employment 
system regardless of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The economic crisis can at best be 
regarded as a trigger for fostering the (smooth) institutional expansion of labour protection.  
The focal points of this chapter examine the transformation of the employment system 
through focusing on two pivotal phases within the critical juncture framework: first, it 
examines the causal conditions at work, along with how the political actors selectively 
chose a certain policy among the various policy options. To do this, this study 
distinguishes between two types of causal conditions: permissive conditions and 
productive conditions. The former represents the easing of constraints around the 
institutional structure to make room for actors to move and fill the institutional vacuum 
with alternatives. The latter, in the presence of the permissive conditions, produces the 
institutional outputs that are (initially) locked in when the window of opportunity marked 
by the permissive conditions disappears and the juncture comes to a close (Soifer 2012: 
1573-1576). For instance, examining the effect that the transition in the rule-making 
process had on the employment system, labour’s empowerment from the 1997 general 
strike, the economic crisis, and the presidential elections of 1997 created permissive 
conditions for reshaping the state-led policy-making process. The productive conditions of 
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President Kim Dae-jung’s labour-friendly gestures and his social democratic leadership 
helped to restore state autonomy and allowed his government to push forward with 
industrial reform plans (which were backed by the IMF) and the creation of a tripartite 
system (LMGTC) for the policy-making process, which can be considered a symbol of the 
dismantlement of Korea’s traditional developmental strategy on policy-making and paving 
the way for the Korean state’s transformation. The outcome of these productive conditions 
can be regarded as a Korean form of tripartite system coming into play, and the 1998 
amendment of Korea’s labour laws, which was enacted without delay in accordance with 
the 1998 social pact. And the juncture phase concluded in 2000, when the influence of the 
permissive conditions (i.e. the national crisis and the transition of presidential power) 
waned (see Section 9.3.1 in this chapter). 
The second focal point to be examined is the period of institutional legacy, where the 
mechanisms of reproduction endow institutional stability. If the outcomes from the critical 
juncture extend over time and various counter mechanisms to change (i.e. increasing 
returns) function well, then the legacy of the critical juncture outcomes may be institutional 
stability. However, this study demonstrates that the emergence of effective reproduction 
mechanisms is not automatic. In other words, the logic of the accumulated conflicts and 
pressures during the antecedent and cleavage stages inherently leads to new branches at the 
tipping point, and the argument that the outcome from the juncture is necessarily set to 
continue over time due to the evolution of self-reinforcing mechanisms is shown by this 
study to be unconvincing. Instead, the outcomes from the juncture can be re-directed, re-
shaped, become deadlocked, or decay in the on-going process of institutional change due 
to the complex interdependence of actors and institutions, in which integrated units 
(markets or system) are more than the simple sum of their parts. For example, in the case 
of the LMGTC – a tripartite system created to reform the policy-making process – has 
been in deadlock and decay for the last decade, as can be seen through the LMGTC’s 
diminishing influence: the impact of its institutional and organisational functions of 
encouraging collective bargaining between business and labour has declined, and although 
state autonomy was initially regained through the outcome of the juncture, some of the 
state’s newly found power was lost after the worst of the economic situation was over. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that this tripartite system was not supported by a well-
established practice of corporatism between social partners in Korea and was undermined 
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by the pressure from the world capitalist system in the form of economic globalisation (see 
next section in this chapter and Section 6.3 in Chapter 6). 
To sum up, the critical juncture framework as used in this study provides not only an 
analytical means of exploring the transformation of the Korean employment system from a 
historical viewpoint, but also an opportunity to refine the critical juncture framework itself 
by applying it to the transformation of the Korean employment system. This study 
contributes to the refinement of the critical juncture thesis via a more detailed elaboration 
of the causal factors (and the sequence in which they occurred) underpinning the 
institutional change in the Korean employment system.  
In the next section, by employing the theoretical implications and contributions of the 
incremental change thesis and the conceptualisation of the employment system that the 
previous two sections have elaborated upon, the reshaping of the rule-making process in 
labour and social policy and the changes to labour market flexibilisation and labour 
protection in Korea are presented.  
 
9.3 Transformation: rule-making process, labour market, and the 
developmental welfare state 
 
The purpose of this section is to review the main arguments and to consider the interplay of 
the different factors presented in each chapter in this dissertation. 
 
9.3.1 Developmental strategy on rule-making for the employment system 
 
The first subject of this study is the issue of the (institutional) changes in (or continuity of) 
the Korean developmental state’s approach to reform of the employment system over time. 
Since this study assumes that the transformation of Korea’s employment system was 
steered by an endogenous mechanism rather than by exogenous factors, the political 
configuration and struggles of each actor within the diversity of political and economic 
interests and their efforts to change the rule-making process with the purpose of instilling 
their own interests into the institutional reform are the focal points in this study. Thus, 
examining whether the reforms point to the decline or the re-establishment of the Korean 
developmental state, which type of model of governance was employed to deal with the 
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demands of business and labour (a developmental state model, a post-developmental state, 
or something entirely different), and how and why the political elites and bureaucrats 
pursued specific policies is equivalent to exploring what and who enabled the reform of the 
employment system.  
To this end, the tripartite system (the LMGTC in this case) is analysed because its role, by 
definition and in the Western experience, is to mediate the conflicts between business and 
labour and to implement institutional arrangements. The experience of drawing up the 
1998 social pact between business and labour through the LMGTC is treated in this study 
as a critical juncture in the Korean state’s policy-making process, thereby providing a 
foundation for the breaking away from the traditional developmental strategy of the state 
assuming the rule-making role over business and labour. This implies that rather than 
employing its past unilateral policy-implementation pattern, the state felt that the reform of 
the employment system could be handled autonomously through collective bargaining 
between business and labour. However, as shown in the case of the LMGTC, this study 
does not confirm the argument of the mechanical explanation that, once implemented, the 
institution will automatically continue to function as intended or be reinforced. Rather, the 
critical juncture in which a new institutional arrangement is established should be re-
examined by investigating the emergence of the causal factors before and during the 
critical juncture and the reproducing mechanisms after the juncture. The main subjects on 
this subject, therefore, are: (1) How did the LMGTC originate, and has it been reinforced 
or has it decayed? (2) Depending on the answer to the first question, how can the Korean 
state be characterised after its transformation in 1998? 
As seen in Table 9.1, the state’s efforts to form a corporatist policy-making system with 
regard to the employment system were not unprecedented. From the early 1990s, political 
and economic conditions that predated the critical juncture – the existence of mobilised 
labour from the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle, the organised businesses of the KEF 
(Korea Employers Federation), and corporatist attempts by the state (the LRRC and so 
forth) – acted as a critical antecedents to the creation of the LMGTC. It is also noteworthy 
that the first civilian government (that of Kim Young-sam and formed in 1992) sought to 
differ from the past authoritarian governments by beginning the dismantling of Korea’s 
pattern of developmental rule over society (for instance, it dissolved the Economic 
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Planning Board (EPB)141) and thus its overwhelming power over business and labour. In 
addition, labour’s general strike in 1997 (the first in Korean history) acted as a permissive 
condition that, within the critical juncture, shaped the extent to which the tripartite model 
was implemented. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the public’s criticism of 
the Korean developmental model and its expectation of reforms by the new government 
increased the opportunity for the establishment of a tripartite body to reform the 
employment system. 
The institutional implementation of the LMGTC and the industrial reform projects, which 
suppressed the power of business and the chaebols and ultimately reformed Korean 
industrial relations in line with a more liberal market economy, during the critical juncture 
were shaped by a combination of political leadership, international pressure, and the state’s 
restored autonomy. The change in the relationship between empowered labour and 
weakened business, complemented by the state’s enhanced autonomy and reform projects, 
offered productive conditions at the juncture, with the result that the social pact that was 
arrived at through the LMGTC could be revealed in February 1998.  
The factor that constrained each actor (the state, business and labour) within the LMGTC 
at that moment was a political configuration structured by the interactions between them 
(conflict, meditation, and compliance) based on their political interests and calculations. 
President Kim Dae-jung, an opposition leader since 1961 and political ‘loser’ under the old 
system (the traditional labour-excluded authoritarian process), tried to introduce a new 
ruling system with support from a liberal-democratic bloc, which included the KCTU, by 
replacing the LRRC with the LMGTC. However, the major policy issues for the LMGTC 
(higher labour flexibilisation and greater political rights for unions) were inherited from the 
LRRC, and all actors already had fixed positions on them. While labour opposed any type 
of institutional measures for labour flexibilisation, business opposed the granting of 
political rights to unions. 
 
                                                
141	  The	  EPB,	  with	  the	  absolute	  confidence	  of	  successive	  presidents,	  planned	  comprehensive	  economic	  and	  
industrial	  policy	  and	  controlled	  the	  policy	  implementation	  of	  every	  bureau	  in	  the	  government.	  The	  EPB	  was	  
regarded	  as	  the	  pilot	  agency	  of	  the	  Korean	  developmental	  state	  (like	  MITI	  in	  Japan),	  and	  its	  dismantlement	  
by	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  in	  1995	  was	  recognised	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  Korean	  developmental	  state.	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Table 9.1: Inward-Looking Korean tripartite system as a critical juncture142 
Critical antecedent Empowerment of labour from the 1987 Great Workers’ struggle 
and democratisation movement First civilian government (of Kim 
Young-sam) launched in 1992 and its attempts to dismantle the 
developmental state model (i.e. dissolution of the EPB)  
 
The state’s corporatist attempts (i.e. LRRC)  
 
Permissive conditions Labour’s general strike in early 1997 due to state’s unilateral 
amendment of labour laws at the end of 1996 (following re-
amendment of labour laws in March 1997) 
 
Economic crisis due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis (contingent-
exogenous shock) 
 
Political vacuum in the 1997 presidential election phase 
Productive conditions Incorporation of labour through Kim Dae-jung’s inauguration, and 
his social democratic position and leadership 
 
(Initial) Restoration of state autonomy by Kim Dae-Jung 
government’s industrial reforms plan (structural reform of 
chaebols, financial reform, public sector and labour relations) and 
backing from the IMF 
 
Institutional replacement of the LRRC with the LMGTC 
 
Outcome The LMGTC’s 1998 social pact (Korean tripartite system launching) 
1998 amendment of labour laws 
 
End of critical juncture End of the national crisis phase in 2000 
(failing) Mechanisms 
of reproduction 
Decline of the LMGTC: end of the organisational phase within state 
entities and the loss of its functional role in bringing about 
collective bargaining 
 
Retrenchment of social bureaucrats due to loss of support of 
political elites and improvements in the economic and employment 
situation 
 
Business, status quo (no more motivation for participation in the 
LMGTC) 
 
Labour’s discontent over the LMGTC and the 1998 amendment of 
Korea’s labour laws, its failure to achieve political mobilisation due 
to the decentralised union system, and internal factionalism in the 
KCTU 
 
 
Consequences Deadlocked tripartite system 
 
Continuity of state intervention in economic-social development 
(but with a modified role, ideas, motivations, and responsibilities) 
 
Relapse into the traditional pattern of confrontation between 
business and labour 
 
 
                                                
142	  The	  form	  of	  this	  table	  (especially	  the	  vertical	  entries)	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Soifer	  (2012:	  1579).	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At the time of the LMGTC’s launch, business, which would derive economic benefit from 
labour market flexibilisation, opposed Kim Dae-jung government’s attempt to bring about 
reforms through the LMGTC because the government simultaneously aimed to implement 
institutional measures for the structural reform of the chaebols (towards a more liberal 
(shareholder) market economy). However, the veto possibilities of business were relatively 
weak vis-a-vis the state because of its need to repair its reputation in the eyes of the public 
and its political influence in the policy realm – it had received widespread public 
condemnation for its role in bringing about the financial crisis.  
Labour also had little room for manoeuvre. The KCTU, in particular, assumed that it could 
increase its political power against business by participating in the LMGTC; it aimed to 
push for the structural reform of the chaebols and the dismantling of the existing 
authoritarian-coercive labour relations through trading agreement on a more flexible labour 
market in exchange for democratic (liberal) industrial relations.  
However, the institutional implementation of the tripartite policy-making process was not 
‘locked in’; rather it provided room, albeit with ambiguities, in which actors could shape 
the impact of the LMGTC because the goals and preferences of the state and social 
partners differed widely from its inception. After Korea had escaped from the worst of the 
economic situation in 2000, the LMGTC began to lose its stature and organisational status, 
a status that became quite ambiguous within the state entities (and even within government 
bureaus) despite a series of institutional measures to reinforce the LMGTC. Thus, as set 
out below, the institutional mechanisms of reproduction in Korea’s tripartite system appear 
to have failed, 
After the 1998 social pact and the conclusion of the structural reform of the chaebols, the 
attitude of business towards the LMGTC became more opportunistic. Since the 
institutional measures for labour market flexibilisation were enacted immediately after the 
1998 social pact was agreed, business did not have any further motives that would lead it 
to participate constructively in the LMGTC, especially given that changing the institutional 
status quo is costly. For instance, the issues of union’s political rights (i.e. allowing 
multiple unions and banning payment to union officials) were not the policy preferences of 
business, but those of labour. As a result, due to the continuous resistance by the KEF, 
discussion of the issues on this matter within the LMGTC were delayed and deadlocked up 
to 2012.  
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For labour, there was huge discontent about the tripartite system due to the government’s 
refusal to immediately legalise the KCTU after the agreement of the 1998 social pact and 
the LMGTC’s deferring of action on labour’s interests on most reform issues (employers’ 
abuse of mass layoffs, a reduction in working hours, the elimination of unfair labour 
practices, the granting of legal status to the LMGTC, and, most importantly, the 
legalisation of collective bargaining at the industrial level and the setting up of a 
commission on public sector reform). Furthermore, the KCTU, which had played the 
(embedded) role of social democratic reformist in recent Korean history, failed to enhance 
its political power against business and over the public, and its internal factionalism and 
political corruption was self-defeating. In short, labour was less successful than business in 
effecting formal institutional change through the LMGTC and was unable to remodel the 
LMGTC to meet labour-favourable ends. Furthermore, labour failed to pave the way for a 
transition from the firm-based union system to the industrial union system and thus 
labour’s political empowerment. The KCTU, the largest and strongest national union, 
refused to rejoin the LMGTC after its withdrawal in 1998. As a result, the ‘tripartite 
system’ failed to include the principal representative of labour, and the traditional pattern 
of confrontation between business and labour continued. This was mainly due to the 
combination over time of the decentralised union system, the state-led implementation of 
institutions, and the conflicts within labour, which were all embedded in the Korean 
policy- making process on reform of the employment system.  
At this point, it should be noted that the elite-bureaucrats (especially the social bureaucrats 
in the Ministry of Labour, the KLI, and the Blue House) played a significant role in social 
policy expansion and urged greater representation of the interests of labour on behalf of the 
unions in the LMGTC. The collective bargaining that took place on the 1998 social pact 
within the LMGTC was not an exchange of equivalents – labour market flexibility for 
workers’ security (flexibility-security payoffs) – as seen in the case of the West, but an 
exchange of flexibility for the unions’ political rights to organise unions in every industrial 
sector, to undertake political activity, and ultimately establish the institutional foundations 
to build a labour-centred political party. In the 2000s, the overriding concerns of labour, as 
evidenced via two amendments to the labour laws, was not to enhance the labour 
protection schemes for workers or to reduce income and welfare inequalities, but to gain 
institutional guarantees for liberal labour relations and union officials’ statuses and 
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payments. Thus, the Western experience of the roles, motivations, concerns, and 
responsibilities of labour were taken up by the social bureaucrats in the Ministry of Labour, 
the KLI, or other elite-bureaucrats in the government.  
On the other hand, while the social bureaucrats in the LMGTC took on responsibility and 
played a traditional (state-led) role in the labour market and social policy reforms, it should 
be noted that there were conflicts between the governmental bodies on the institutional 
outputs of the LMGTC. For instance, agreements struck by the LMGTC (i.e. the May 2000 
agreement on the reduction of working hours) were often blocked by economic bureaus in 
the government. This intentional neglect of the both the LMGTC and its decisions by 
governmental bodies was prevalent throughout all its phases, including when individual 
issues were negotiated and formalised, such as the expansion of eligibility for employment 
insurance.  
This implies two things: first, embedded interests and the practices of economic 
bureaucrats fostered the decline in the role and function of the LMGTC; second, the 
breakdown in internal cohesiveness within the state entities led to a decrease in state 
capacity. While it is evident that the LMGTC appears to have declined as a functioning 
institution due to the combined result of its institutional ambiguity, conflicts between elite 
bureaus, and the lack of support from political elites (especially since Roh Moo-hyun’s 
inauguration), it is far less clear that the policy advocate coalitions (the social bureaucrats 
and reformist block, and the neo-liberal-economic-conservative bloc) and the rivalry 
between them played a key role in the policy-making process. Instead, it appears that the 
dominance of social bureaucrats over the policy reform process was temporary, as 
evidenced by the far less clear distinction between social bureaucrats and economic 
bureaucrats under the Roh Moo-hyun government (2003-2007) and the Lee Myung-bak 
government (2008-2012). As seen in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.3), with the escape from the 
worst of the economic and employment situation in around 2000 and Kim Dae-jung’s 
stepping down from the presidency, the dominant role of social bureaucrats in the policy-
making process came to an end, and the traditional configuration in which the economic 
bureaucrats’ held dominance over the policy arena was restored. In short, the policy-
making process for the employment system, even within the LMGTC, returned to the 
pattern that had operated under the developmental state, with elite-bureaucrats that favour 
the traditional policy preference of growth playing the key role in policy reform.  
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However, to view the development of the Korean employment system since then as having 
conformed entirely to Korea’s traditional pro-growth productivist and developmentalist 
system would be a misinterpretation. Instead, a more convincing argument is that the ideas 
and preferences of economic bureaucrats were both shaped and restricted by the labour and 
social policy institutional sets that were implemented at this critical juncture. As seen 
during the implementation process of EI, non-regular workers’ protection schemes, and the 
increasing pattern of welfare provision (see Chapter 8), the Korean state re-invented and 
re-invigorated itself by taking on the responsibility for enhancing labour (worker) 
protection by nurturing social bureaucrats. This explains why this study labels this revised 
form of state as the Korean developmental welfare state. 
In sum, despite the introduction of layered institutional supports (due to the demands of 
left-centred political elites and labour) over the course of a decade, the LMGTC has 
become deadlocked and is a tripartite system in name only. By examining the formation, 
operation, and decay of the LMGTC over time, it can be seen that the requisite 
characteristics of the developmental state seemed at first to disappear, but then re-emerge. 
The next section therefore examines the impact of the developmental state’s features on the 
labour market and labour practice institutional reforms.  
	  
9.3.2 Labour market flexibilisation and labour relations liberalisation: endogenous 
and exogenous, and reinforcing or deadlock 
	  
This section deals directly with the institutional changes in the employment system 
between 1980 and 2010. In this study, the 1998 amendment of Korea’s labour laws is 
regarded as the institutional product of the continuous and dialectical process of 
democratisation and economic liberalisation that took place from the 1980s, but also 
marking the starting point of a new phase of pressure and tension, at which rule-makers 
and rule-takers compete, negotiate and compromise the main issues under consideration: 
greater flexibilisation in the labour market, legalisation of the KCTU, and the permitting of 
political activities by unions.  
The significance of the 1998 amendment lay in its permitting the immediate 
implementation of these measures, which had already been authorised by the 1997 
amendment of labour laws but whose implementation was to be delayed until 1999 or the 
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2000s. It is important to note here that the principle of the 1998 social pact struck within 
the LMGTC, which underpinned the 1998 amendment of the labour laws, had also already 
been established two years previously with the creation of the LRRC. Furthermore, the 
origins of Article 31 in the Labour Standards Act (for greater labour flexibility) lay in the 
LRRC’s unsuccessful attempts to revise the Labour Standards Act in 1996 and in fact had 
its origins in the postponed attempt to amend Korean labour law a decade earlier 
(Parliament’s proposal in 1988 for amendment of the labour laws and President Roh Tae-
woo’s veto). Indeed, the fundamental proposals contained in the February 1998 LMGTC 
agreement (the 1998 social pact) were strikingly similar to the previous government’s 1996 
proposal for the amendment of the labour laws. Moreover, it can be seen that the 1998 
article on collective layoffs did not differ significantly from the 1991 Supreme Court ruling 
that extended the 1989 provision that permitted mass redundancies only in cases where the 
business operation would be jeopardised without the imposition of mass layoffs (Supreme 
Court, Ruling No. 87DaKa2132). 
It seems clear, therefore, that it was the economic crisis that drew the actors together to sit 
at this new negotiating table, the LMGTC, and provoked the immediate enactment of the 
already amended labour laws. Nevertheless, the principles underpinning the institutional 
change and its subsequent direction were not remoulded by the crisis but locked in by the 
legacy of the institutional trajectory. 
Another instance of institutional transformation due to endogenous factors is EI, whose 
origins, implementation, and development effected by the elite-bureaucrats and a pilot 
agency in the Ministry of Labour and KLI, actors who were insulated from social groups 
and had sufficient autonomy and the capacity to play a key role in shaping the initial EI 
enactment in 1994-1995 (see Section 8.3 in Chapter 8). The bureaucrat-led pattern of 
shaping and developing the course that EI would take, including the four amendments in 
1998 and the worker protection regulations, continued after 1998 (see third column in 
Table 9.2). This pattern was the result of the combination of state interventionism and the 
‘low level of social cohesion’ within labour, which is common in ‘developmental contexts’ 
(Haagh 2006: 417). In this regard, the case study of EI presented two important findings: 
first, contrary to the democratisation thesis, which contends that the development of social 
rights was the result of the rise of civil and political citizenships, in the Korean case, elite-
bureaucrats insulated from social interest groups still had dominant power over the setting 
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of the social rights agenda and the development of social welfare; second, in contrast to the 
productivity welfare theorists’ assertion that social welfare provision by the developmental 
state was driven by an economic motive, the institutional purpose of Korea’s social polices 
was no longer subject to an economic rationale. Although it is an exaggeration to see the 
Korean state as having undergone a wholesale transformation into a pro-welfare state, the 
traditional policy preference, with its dichotomous logic that social-welfare policy is 
(should be) subordinate to economic growth and that social welfare is not compatible with 
socio-economic development, has been less in evidence since the 1998 reform of labour 
and social policy. 
Through the previous chapters, this thesis focuses on the matter of institutional continuity 
on the Korean welfare system by examining the transformation of the employment system: 
whether welfare provision by firms has noticeably declined over recent decades, whether 
the role of elite bureaucrats and the traditional policy preference for economic growth 
contributed to reinforcing the role of the Korean state in welfare development, and whether 
the social and political configuration lasted long enough to label the birth of a (distinct) 
Korean welfare state. This study argues that the Korean developmental welfare state has 
remodelled itself with the tradition of state intervention and investment, which has 
followed a self-reinforcing path in labour protection. The state took on the role and 
responsibility for labour protection on behalf of labour in the developmental context 
(strong bureaucratic organisation, cohesiveness within the organisation, and its 
connectedness with business). This is the reason that this study labels this revised form of 
state as the transformation of Korean developmental welfare state, unlike the recent 
developmental welfare state thesis emphasises the submission of social policy to economic 
growth and the role of democratic policy network or coalition in welfare development. 
Over the past two decades, the state’s interventionism in conjunction with the shifting role 
and responsibilities of elite bureaucrats (less-involved social actors), on the one hand, and 
the developmental principle of policy reform involving a catching-up strategy for welfare 
development, on the other hand, appear as major factors in the Korean developmental 
welfare state’s transformation. In this regard, the argument that the traditional 
developmental state had transformed into a neo-liberal state after 1998 reform projects, 
leading to an increase in firm-based welfare provision (for example, see, Hundt 2009: 99-
101), and the widely held belief that firm-based worker welfare was still the dominant 
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form in the Korean welfare system are also misleading.143 A more convincing conclusion is 
that the Korean state adopted a new interventionist role in the realm of social protection, 
developed new institutional sets, and took on new responsibilities, although the social 
protection had a very limited function and coverage. The expenditure on and expansion of 
worker protection via statutory institutional arrangements demonstrated the increased role 
and function of the Korean state in welfare provision. It should be noted that labour had 
little impact on this development due to the fact that corporatism had not been embedded 
in Korean society to any great degree. The rapid and systematic development of statutory 
social provision since the 1997 crisis is reminiscent of the critical role played by the 
developmental state in the period of Korea’s fastest economic development (1970-1980), 
although the level of public welfare expenditure is still lower than in advanced welfare 
states, and it is doubtful whether the development of welfare provision contributed to any 
change in the productive system. Moreover, as seen above, the institutional arrangements 
for worker protection in the labour market are characteristic of a flexicurity model – where 
workers are compensated, trained, and motivated to become re-employed in a highly 
mobile labour market – even though the model might appear to be in its infancy. 
Returning to the issue of innovation and continuity in the employment system, while the 
triumvirate of labour, business, and the state within the LMGTC failed to reinforce their 
institutional and political status and function from 2000 after the worst of the economic 
crisis was over (as examined by the critical juncture framework in previous section), the 
institutional sets on the labour market flexibilisation has been in the path of self-
reinforcing after the 1998 amendment. As seen in first column of Table 9.2, further 
institutional measures for labour flexibilisation including the greater flexibility in the 
working-hours system and greater allowance on using temporary agency workers and 
fixed-term and part-time workers were enacted in the 2000s. In addition, diverse informal 
measures for achieving higher labour flexibility and lower labour costs including the 
outsourcing and in-house subcontracting, the annual salary system, and performance-based 
contracting were brought into practice.  
This was largely due to business superiority over labour, which was gained after the end of 
national crisis phase and simultaneously contributed to the deadlock of labour relations 
reform. As seen in second column of Table 9.2, measures to reform labour relations, such 
                                                
143	  See	  Chapter	  2	  (Section	  2.1)	  and	  Chapter	  8	  (Section	  8.2.2)	  in	  this	  thesis.	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as the prohibition of the payment of full-time union officials by employers and legalisation 
of multiple unions, remained unaddressed until 2010.144 This state of affairs was strongly 
connected to the theoretical argument that legislative reform of the labour code embodies 
two conflicting demands: the desire to restore a sense of social justice (social democracy in 
a broad sense, and workers protection in a narrow sense) and the affirmation of the process 
of marketisation supported by a powerful group (primarily business) (Haagh 2002b: 87). 
As with Haagh’s study (Haagh 2002b: 96-97), the development (liberalisation) of labour 
relations and political democracy in Korea were issues central to labour. In particular, the 
KCTU’s support for social democratic measures that enhanced labour’s power in labour 
and industrial relations above all other goals proved to be a constant. Even when further 
labour market flexibilisation issues such as the protection of non-regular workers and 
temporary agency employees re-emerged in the mid-2000s, the KCTU was less concerned 
with these than with the strengthening of industrial-level collective bargaining and the 
establishment of a labour-centred political party. Indeed, this was the KCTU’s ultimate aim 
when it provisionally agreed to participate in the LMGTC in 1998. This confirms, 
therefore, that the collective agreement struck between business and labour in 1998 was a 
political exchange not of flexibility for security, as is commonly seen in the West, but of 
flexibility for political rights. 
In sum, although the 1998 amendment embodied a fundamental restriction on the extent 
and scope of future reforms of the employment system, it contained substantial room for 
institutional ambiguity and thus for each actor to renegotiate, recreate, and re-form (or 
delay) the institutions. Therefore, the real practice of transformation of the employment 
system was not as simple as the rule-makers expected, but instead complicated or 
sometimes inverted to the original intentions.  
 
                                                
144	  This	  was	  due	   to	   the	  conflict	  between	  business	  and	   labour.	  On	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  banning	  of	  payment	   to	  
unions	   officials,	   business	   approved	   of	   the	   plan,	   while	   labour	   opposed	   it,	   arguing	   that	   this	   regulation	  
threatened	   the	   power	   of	   labour.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   on	   the	  matter	   of	   approving	  multiple	   unions	   at	   the	  
enterprise	  level,	  business	  opposed	  the	  measure,	  while	  labour	  supported	  it.	  
Table 9.2: Changes in labour laws and labour protection legislation (selected, 1980-2010)145 
 
 
Year Labour market/ Labour standards Labour relations Labour protection 
1987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1989 
 
 
 
1995 
 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduction in working hours (48 hours) 
 
Abolition of the flexible working hours 
system 
 
 
 
Creation of industrial maintenance by the 
Labour Relations Commission for unfair 
layoffs and time-offs 
Reduction in working hours (44hours) 
 
 
 
Greater flexibility in the working-hours 
system 
 
Facilitation of ‘part-time’ work 
 
Introduction of layoffs in cases of urgent 
business reasons (starting from 1999) 
 
Elimination of the Labour Relations 
Commission’s approval for mass layoffs 
 
Elimination of priority re-hiring of former 
workers 
 
 
Immediate effect of layoffs in cases of 
urgent business reasons 
Broader re-definition of “urgent business 
reasons” for mass redundancies 
(including cases of sell offs and M&A) 
 
Reduction in the restrictions on the 
formation of unions  
Elimination of the restrictions on union 
officials  
Re-establishment of the union shop system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prohibition on the payment of full-time 
union officials by employers (starting from 
2001) 
Legalisation of multiple unions (with 
immediate effect for sectoral or national 
unions, with enterprise unions starting 
from 2002) 
No responsibility on employers to pay 
during labour disputes 
Ban on political activities by unions lifted 
Ban on third-party intervention lifted 
 
 
Reduction in the restrictions on the 
formation of unions 
 
 
 
 
Creation of minimum wage system 
(1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
Priority given to wage payments in cases 
of bankruptcy (last three months’ wages) 
 
 
Creation of the Employment Insurance 
Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creation of the Act on the Protection, Etc. 
of Temporary Agency Workers 
(determining allowed industries, 
restriction on the contract type, and 
making clear the legal relations between 
prime employer, sub-employer and 
                                                
145	  For	  more	  details,	  see	  Appendix	  1	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
Greater flexibility in the working-hours 
system and the permitting of mass 
redundancies (part removal of the 
restriction on dismissal exceptions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduction in working hours (40 hours, 
starting from 2004 and annually 
expanding its coverage by firm size) 
 
Greater flexibility in the working-hours 
system 
 
Greater allowance on using temporary 
agency workers 
 
 
 
Greater allowance on using fixed-term 
and part-time workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legalisation of multiple enterprise unions 
put back from 2002 to 2007, and 
prohibition on the payment of full-time 
union officials by employers put back from 
2001 to 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legalisation of multiple enterprise unions 
put back from 2007 to 2010, and 
prohibition on the payment of full-time 
union officials by employers put back from 
2007 to 2010 
 
 
 
Legalisation of multiple unions (with 
enterprise unions starting from 2011) 
 
Ban on payment to unions officials 
 
agency worker) 
 
 
Four amendments to the EI act  
(increasing eligibility) 
 
 
 
Creation of Motherhood Protection 
(compensation for maternity leave and 
paternity leave) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creation of the Act on the Protection, Etc. 
of Fixed-term and Part-time Workers 
(prohibition on using fixed-term and part-
time contract for more than two years, 
effective as from July 1 2007) 
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9.3.3 System and practice: unstable complementarity of institutions 
	  
The transformation of an employment system is an on-going process, and the labour 
market and labour practices are ultimately constructed by the complicated (expected or 
unintended, sometimes inverted or biased) complementarities of the institutions and the 
shifts in line with the political conflicts that emerge due to the gap between actors’ 
interpretations and the actual enforcement of labour and economic policies. As seen in the 
previous sections, the institutional outputs (the LMGTC and its tripartite configuration) 
and the outcomes from the (formal) institutional reforms to the policy-making (rule-
making) process on the employment system (policy outcomes) appeared to differ from the 
original intentions of the rule-makers (state-led, but business and labour organisations 
approved this) because each actor’s preference and their purpose for participating in the 
LMGTC differed. In a similar vein, as seen in Table 9.3, the practices of the labour market, 
labour relations, and labour protection (the policy outcomes) can also be considered as 
being due to the combined effect of each policy implementation, in which the actors’ 
diverse and conflicting interests, preferences, interpretations, and actions are inherently 
instilled and which this thesis calls institutional complementarity.  
First, the dualism in the labour market increased and broadened after the 1998 amendment 
of Korea’s labour laws. Although the original intention of the amendment had been to 
enhance (numerical) flexibility in the insiders’ labour market so as to balance the degree of 
flexibility between the (regular workers) insiders’ market and the (non-regular or atypical 
workers) outsiders’ market, the combined effect of institutions in fact led to inverted 
outcomes: a weakening of the numerical flexibility of the insiders’ labour market (but 
increased functional flexibility such as more flexible job placement and a flexible wage 
and contract system); the massive illegal use of non-regular workers; and increased 
(numerical and functional) flexibility in the outsiders’ labour market. More specifically, by 
introducing the Labour Standards Act and the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary 
Agency Workers in 1998, policy makers (or social partners within the LMGTC) believed 
that the traditional rigid (closed/impervious) insiders’ labour market would be dismantled, 
with the consequence that the insiders’ labour market would become more flexible 
(mobile/ permeable) for non-regular workers at the margins. The hope was that outsiders 
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would be able to enter the core labour market through the effect of the former act (the 
Labour Standards Act) and that they would be protected by the latter (see Chapter 7). 
 
Table 9.3: Transformation of the employment system as a result of unstable 
complementarity 
 
  
 Policy output Policy outcomes (employment 
practices) 
Rule- 
making 
process 
Tripartite system of the LMGTC ‘Tripartite system’ without labour (due 
to withdrawal of the KCTU) 
 
Role and responsibility of Social 
bureaucrats acting on behalf of labour 
(modified developmental context) 
 
Labour 
market I: 
Flexibility 
 
1998 amendment of labour laws 
(Greater flexibility in the working- 
hours system, in using of ‘part-
time’ work, and in layoffs in cases 
of urgent business reasons) 
 
Greater rigidity in the core-regular 
workers labour market, and greater 
(numerical) flexibility at the margins 
 
 
Labour 
market II: 
Security 
 
1995 EI act 
 
 
1998 Act for the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers 
2006 Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Fixed-term and Part-time Workers 
 
Increasing statutory welfare and 
stagnant firm-based welfare 
 
Broadening and deepening of income 
inequality in wages and compensation 
Increasing gap in the application of the 
ALMP between regular workers and 
non-regular workers 
 
Labour 
relations 
 
Legalisation of multiple unions 
 
 
 
Ban on political activities by unions 
lifted 
 
Ban on third-party intervention 
lifted 
 
Legalisation of the KCTU and the 
formation of a labour party (which 
failed soon after) 
 
Continuing dominant power of 
chaebolunions (for regular workers) 
 
The continuance and reinforcement of 
firm-based unionism and business 
unionism 
 
Industrial 
reforms 
 
Structural reforming of chaebols 
 
 
 
Financial reform for shareholder 
economic system 
 
Restructuring of the supply chain with 
strong vertical hierarchy (more flexible 
and competitive) 
 
Needed for short-term profit based 
management and flexible contracts 
(removal of lifetime employment 
practices and seniority-based contracts) 
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In reality, however, the employers’ efforts to increase labour flexibility in workplaces by 
employing the Labour Standards Act were hampered by the legalised unions and the web 
of regulations on dismissals contained in the Act itself. As a result, employers sought 
alternative measures for achieving labour flexibility. For the past decade, therefore, they 
have been using the in-house subcontracting system, even though the Supreme Court has 
ruled that this constitutes an illegal use of temporary agency workers.146 This illegal use of 
temporary agency workers can be understood as the result of the fundamental undermining 
of an institution’s original intentions and functions that occurs when rules are ambiguous 
enough to permit different (often contrasting) interests, preferences, interpretations, and 
practices among actors.  
In addition, the macro-structural reforms that reshape the Korean economic system into a 
neo-liberal form contributed not only to the restructuring of the supply chain structure in 
Korean industry, but also to making employers pursue considerable flexibility in the 
workplace. The large firms including chaebols survived the chaebol reform project during 
the period 1998-1999 by re-organising their workforce and supply chain.147 Outsourcing 
and in-house subcontracting system that were used by large firms to restructure their 
workforce and supply chain, served not only to achieve higher labour flexibility and lower 
labour costs, but also to increase the part-time workers and fixed-term workers in Korean 
labour market. With a result, relatively homogeneous labour market transformed into a 
highly heterogeneous one in which various types of contracts existed side by side (see 
Section 7.4 in Chapter 7).  
Second, these changes in the labour market presented a serious challenge to the unions 
representing full-time (regular) workers, and coupled with the prevalence of firm-based 
unionism, unions at chaebols and large firms became trapped in a cycle of business 
(utilitarian) unionism, which refers to a union movement that focuses on the immediate 
economic interests of union members – such as wages, welfare, working conditions, etc. – 
rather than emphasising social and political issues as do labour unions in the West148 or as 
                                                
146	  See	  Chapter	  7	  (section	  7.3.3)	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
147	  During	   this	   period,	   eight	   of	   the	   chaebols	   that	  were	   listed	   among	   Korea’s	   biggest	   30	   conglomerates	   in	  
1997	  were	   taken	  out	  of	   founding-­‐family	  ownership	  and	   their	  management	  placed	  under	   the	   control	  of	   a	  
parent	  company	  and	  its	  affiliates.	  
148	  Political	   unionism	  pursues	   a	   particular	   political	   ideology	   or	   political	   purposes	   and	   is	   associated	  with	   a	  
particular	   political	   party	   or	   trade	   union	   movement.	   The	   most	   typical	   political	   unionism	   is	   revolutionary	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Korean unions did before the 1998 structural reforms. In particular, firm-based unionism, 
which in the main represented only regular workers at large firms, directly resulted in the 
isolation of non-regular workers. Under firm-based unionism, non-regular workers were 
necessarily regarded as outsiders as they did not qualify for union membership. In this 
respect, firm-based unionism represented only regular workers and inherently excluded 
many atypical workers and the unemployed, with the result that the interests of regular 
workers were over-represented by the such unions, whereas non-regular workers had no 
legalised and organised power or collective action channel for presenting their interests (i.e. 
wages, working-hours, contracts, welfare provision, and so on) to employers.  
In addition, the fragmentation of the labour movement due to firm-based unionism and two 
competing national unions (the KCTU and the FKTU) should be noted as factors that 
weakened labour’s collective bargaining position. The KCTU’s failure to establish a 
labour-centred political party due to collusion between union officials at large firms and 
employers, the intense friction between rival factions in the KCTU, and the political 
scandals in which the union was implicated contributed to the decline of labour power. 
Third, a combination of labour market dualisation, firm-based unionism (particularly in 
large firms employing many regular workers), the industrial reforms to create a liberal 
market economy, and the active labour market policies (ALMP) of EI contributed to 
reinforcing income and welfare provision inequalities. For instance, low-income non-
regular workers, who are rarely organised but make up half the total wage workers in the 
Korean labour market, are excluded by the social security system. Although EI provided a 
more protective employment system with its expanded coverage and expenditures, due to 
its occupation-based beneficiary system, it selectively served regular workers in larger 
firms (large premium payer) and pushed outsider workers (non-contributor or tax payers 
with low levels of historical contributions) to the boundary of EI, with a result that it 
fostered the increasing inequality. 
                                                                                                                                              
unionism,	  which	  is	  founded	  on	  Marxist	  (Leninist)	  ideology	  or	  another	  such	  radical	  ideology,	  and	  whose	  top	  
priority	   is	  the	  transformation	  of	  capitalist	  society.	  By	  contrast,	  social	  unionism	  seeks	  ways	  to	  promote	  the	  
interests	  of	  wage-­‐workers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  citizenry	  by	  raising	  and	  aiming	  to	  resolve	  not	  only	  the	  union	  
members’	  economic	  interests	  but	  other	  social	  and	  political	  issues.	  The	  philosophy	  of	  unions	  in	  Germany	  and	  
the	  Nordic	  countries	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  social	  unionism.	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To summarise, in the case of Korean employment system, the institutions did not play out 
in the complementary way. Rather, the results of combined effects of each institution in the 
reforms of employment system were unstable and sometimes inverted to the original 
intentions of the rule-makers. This is due to the change of political configuration over time 
between institutional actors, whose preference and purpose for participating in various 
institutional reforms differed. For instance, the restored power of business over labour 
(sometimes the state) after the escape from the national crisis enabled business to block the 
enactment of labour-friendly institutions via LMGTC or to abuse the institutional 
regulations on the labour market (e.g. illegal use of subcontracting system). In short, the 
practices of the labour market, labour relations, and labour protection can be considered as 
being due to the combined effect of each policy implementation, on the one hand, and this 
also implies that the political configuration and relationship between the state, business and 
labour matters in examining the institutional complementarity, on the other hand, since the 
competition and negotiation between actors’ diverse and conflicting interests and 
preferences play a role in affecting the interpretation and enactment of institutions. 
	  
9.4 Causal mechanisms in the transformation of the employment system 
	  
As alluded to in the previous section,149 the causal mechanisms in the transformation of the 
employment system appear to intertwine between the policy outputs and outcomes, 
mediated by actors over time. The institutions were the products of the actors’ compromise 
and defiance, reflecting their social divisions, and the ideas and preferences of actors were 
embedded in the (formal and informal) institutions. The explanations that either a single 
exogenous shock or contingent event was the critical factor that gave rise to the wholesale 
transformation of the institution cannot account for the causal factors that have been 
revealed in this study on the transformation of Korea’s employment system, which have 
been shown to be interactive (i.e. inter-factor relationships), multilateral (i.e. relations 
between actors and their interests in, preferences for, and reactions to the institutions), and 
multidimensional (i.e. the labour market, labour relations, and labour protection). 
Furthermore, since the direction of causality varied, the distinction between independent 
                                                
149	  In	  Table	  9.3,	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  appear	  across	  the	  rows	  and	  columns.	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factors and dependent factors became less meaningful over the course of the historical 
process.  
The institutional change over time was therefore continuous, endogenous, and dialectical. 
Through the perspective of path dependency (whether in its classical or newly theorised 
forms), we are able to view how institutions play an important role at the meso-level of 
political decision making, as they function as filters for the individual actors’ 
interpretations of the specific contexts and thus structure not only the strategies but also the 
goals pursued by actors. It is these institutionally constructed preferences that directly 
underpin the historical institutionalist claims that institutions should be treated as 
endogenous, causal variables, which when understood in this way add substantially to our 
understanding of contemporary societies; they are also closely related to claims suggesting 
that employment institutions only matter in interaction with other factors. ‘[A]s a result it 
is impossible to make predictions of individual instances of policy outcomes solely on their 
basis’ (Bonoli 2001: 264). In this sense, at the heart of the current theoretical innovation 
within the comparative labour market literature lies the distinct institutional configurations 
of industrial and social policies that generate a particular systemic logic of labour 
(flexibility). Thus, the various performances of particular institutional adoptions or 
borrowing practices can be derived from the distinct institutional configurations in each 
country. 
However, the methodological matter of measuring institutional complementarity is not as 
straightforward a task as Boyer’s simple equation appears to suggest.150 As this study has 
shown in its analysis of the Korean employment system, on the one hand, labour policy, 
industrial policy, and social policy interact with each other at the level of formal 
institutions; on the other, employment practices interact with the state’s embedded role 
towards business and labour, and the roles, capacity, preferences (motivation), and 
responsibilities of political elites and bureaucrats, business and labour interact at the level 
of empirical policy outcomes. The dialectical pattern of change between the formal 
institutional sets of the employment system and the empirical outcomes of employment 
practices has been shown as being a continuous and slow-moving process. 
                                                
150	  Boyer	   formalised	   the	   concept	   of	   institutional	   complementarities	   in	   a	   straightforward	   manner:	   two	  
elements,	   E	   and	   E’,	   are	   said	   to	   be	   complementary	   if	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   conjunction	   of	   E	   and	   E’	   is	  
superior	   to	   the	   performance	   of	   each	   element	   considered	   separately;	   i.e.	   R(E,E’)>R(E)	   and	   R(E,E’)>R(E’)	  
(Boyer	  2005:	  44-­‐80).	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9.5 Concluding remarks: unraised questions 
 
Through analysing the institutional transformation of its employment system, this study 
has attempted to provide a comprehensive illustration of how the Korean developmental 
welfare state has undergone the transformation. In this research, the formal institutional 
arrangements of the employment system and the empirical employment practice outcomes 
have been brought to light along with an in-depth analysis of the political dynamics in the 
process of the institutional change.  
The common themes in the study of the comparative political economy of capitalist states 
deal with the restructuring of the democratic nation-state, the liberalisation of national 
economies, and the concurrent globalisation of markets and of the political institutions that 
regulate them. To address these issues, this study has explored, on the one hand, the 
overhauling of Korea’s labour laws in the direction of greater labour flexibility, the 
changes in collective labour relations, and the policy innovations on labour protection, and 
on the other, the transformation in Korea’s traditional rule-making process to include both 
the government and social groups, the restructuring of industrial relations (particularly as 
regards changes to the supply chain structure), and the embedded role of the state and 
labour practices in workplaces.  
In so doing, the role and capacity of the state to shape social relations and the institutional 
arrangements for the capitalist economy under conditions of increased globalisation 
emerge as the central factor. In order to discuss the state’s capacity, one needs to 
understand the cohesiveness within the state. This study conceptualises the Korean state as 
a combination of the state entities of the ruling party, the government, and the Blue House 
(dang-jeoung-cheong), and emphasises the change in the relationship and cohesiveness 
between them.  
However, the following question that has not been raised in this study: how did ‘the 
restructuring of the Korean democratic nation-state’ affect the transformation of the 
employment system? This study has focused on examining the process of rule-making and 
the establishment of working practices within the Korean nation-state, but it does not shed 
light on how Korea’s distinctive political and institutional contexts, such as its political 
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system, electoral system, political party structure, parliament, and the judiciary, affected 
the transformation of the employment system.  
In addition, while recent political economy studies address the convergence and divergence 
of different national models of modern capitalism as well as the possibilities for a regional 
model of a socially regulated market economy (for example, a European or Nordic model), 
this research does not go beyond the Korean context to conceptualise and analyse the wider 
regional contexts of East Asia. While it is generally held that the East Asian developmental 
states (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and in similar vein, Hong Kong and Singapore) present 
common political and cultural contexts on labour market regulation and labour protection 
practices and although this study has pointed to the paternalism in this policy realm in 
areas such as life-time contracts, the seniority-based salary system in the labour market, 
and family-oriented and firm-based welfare provision, it has been shown that the continued 
prevalence in Korea of these ‘common East Asian political and cultural contexts’ needs to 
be re-examined in light of the huge changes that have occurred because of the combined 
effects of diverse institutional regulations. However, it remains inconclusive whether these 
changes can be regarded as being convergent in this region (or internationally), or as 
divergent for each nation-state in the region, or as yet another regional exceptionality. 	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Appendices 
	  
Appendix 1: Changes in labour laws and labour protection regulations (1980-2010)	  
 
Date Legal act Amendments 
Dec 1980 Labour Standards Act Ban on graded severance pay within the same workplace 
Creation of a flexible working-hours system 
 
 Trade Union Act Ban on third-party intervention 
  Annual inspection of unions’ finances 
  Union dues to be used partly for worker welfare 
  Extension of the valid term of a collective agreement 
arrived at by collective bargaining (1 year to 3 years) 
  Elimination of the union shop system 
  Removal of the constitutional mandate on the right to 
collective bargaining 
Strengthening of the restrictions on organising unions 
 
 Conciliation Act Ban on labour disputes within state organisations, local 
government, public corporations, and military corporations 
  Ban on labour disputes outside the workplace 
Increase in the time allowed for completion of mediation 
 
 Works Council Act Created to reinforce the works council system before the 
enactment of the Trade Union Act 
Increase in the number of personnel and representation on 
works council 
   
Dec 1981 Government 
Organisation Act 
The Ministry of Labour replaces the National Labour Office 
   
Dec 1986 Minimum Wage Act Minimum wage to be determined by the Minimum Wage 
Inquiry Committee 
 
 Trade Union Act Removal of national unions from parties covered by the 
term “third party” 
  Elimination of the use of union dues for worker welfare 
  Change from the approval system to a reporting system, 
whereby a union delegates the right to collective bargaining 
to a higher union 
 
 Conciliation Act Removal of national unions from parties covered by the 
term “third party” 
Decrease in the time allowed for mediation (20 days, and 
30 days for the public sector) 
 
Dec 1987 Labour Standards Act Reduction in working hours/abolition of the system of 
flexible working hours 
  Priority given to wage payments in cases of bankruptcy 
(last three months’ wages) 
Extension of the coverage of the Act to companies with 
more than 10 employees 
   
 Trade Union Act Reduction in the restrictions on the formation of unions 
  Elimination of the restrictions on union officials 
Reduction of the bargaining period 
  Re-establishment of the union shop system 
Strengthening of the annual inspection of unions’ finances 
 
 Conciliation Act Reduction in the types of companies deemed public 
corporations 
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Creation of an arbitration system 
  Reduction in the time allowed for completion of mediation 
(10 days, and 15 days for public sector 
 
 Works Council Act Elimination of the restrictions on worker membership on 
works councils and bureaucrats’ right to dissolve councils 
   
March 1989 Labour Standards Act Priority given to wage payments in cases of bankruptcy 
(industrial accident, compensation, and retirement pay) 
  Extension of the coverage of the Act to companies 
employing more than 5 employee 
  Creation of industrial maintenance by the Labour Relations 
Commission for unfair layoffs and time-off 
  Reduction in working hours (44hours) 
 
 July 1995 
 
 
Employment Insurance 
Act 
 
Creation of the Employment Insurance Act 
(eligibility of unemployment benefits – firms employing 
more than 30 workers; eligibility of employment 
stabilisation and job skill training – firms employing more 
than 70 workers) 
   
March 1997 Trade Union and 
Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act 
Merging of the Trade Union Act and the Conciliation Act 
Act replaced by two separate pieces of legislation: Act on 
the Promotion of Workers’ Participation and Cooperation 
 Workers Council Act  
   
 Labour Standards Act Greater flexibility in the working hours system 
  Facilitation of ‘part-time’ work 
  Introduction of layoffs in cases of urgent business reasons 
(starting from 1999) 
Definition of cases that can be deemed “urgent business 
reasons” for mass redundancies 
Elimination of the Labour Relations Commission’s approval 
for mass layoffs 
Elimination of priority re-hiring of former workers 
 
 Trade Union and 
Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act 
 
Prohibition on the payment of full-time union officials by 
employers (starting from 2001) 
Legalisation of multiple unions (with immediate effect for 
sectoral or national unions, with enterprise unions starting 
from 2002) 
Restriction on worker replacement due to the labour 
disputes 
No responsibility on employers to pay during labour 
disputes 
Ban on political activities by unions lifted 
Ban on third-party intervention lifted 
Removal of ceiling on union membership dues 
Establishment of a system of mediation 
 
Changes to the electoral rules for Works Councils 
Expansion of coverage under consideration by works 
councils 
The status of the Labour Relations Commission 
strengthened 
 Act on the Promotion 
of Workers’ 
Participation and 
Cooperation 
   
Feb 1998 Labour Standards Act Introduction of layoffs in cases of urgent business reasons 
(with immediate effect) 
Broader redefinition of cases that can be deemed “urgent 
business reasons” for mass redundancies (including the 
cases of selling offs and M&A) 
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Creation of restrictions on mass redundancies (employer’s 
efforts to avoid dismissal; reasonable and fair criteria for 
selecting persons subject to dismissal; requirement for 
termination of employment notices to be given at least 60 
days before the intended date of dismissal and consultation 
with the labour union to be undertaken; prohibition on 
gender discrimination in layoffs; reporting to the Ministry of 
Labour) 
Re-establishment of priority rehiring of former workers 
 
 Trade Union and 
Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act 
 
Reduction in the restrictions on the formation of unions 
(transfer of the superintendence to mayor or governor from 
the Ministry of Labour) 
 Act on the Protection, 
Etc. of Temporary 
Agency Workers 
Creation of the Act (determining allowed industries, 
restriction on the contract type, and making clear the legal 
relations between the prime employer, sub employer, and 
agency worker) 
 
(Jan 1998) 
 
Employment Insurance 
Act 
 
Increased the eligibility of unemployment benefits, firms 
employing more than 10 workers 
Increased the eligibility of employment stabilisation and Job 
skill training, firms employing more than 50 workers 
 
Mar 1998 Employment Insurance 
Act 
Increased the eligibility of unemployment benefits, firms 
employing more than 5 workers 
 
July 1998 Employment Insurance 
Act 
 
Increased the eligibility of employment stabilisation and Job 
skill training, firms employing more than 5 workers. 
Oct 1998 Employment Insurance 
Act 
Increase the eligibility of unemployment benefits, 
employment stabilisation and job skill training, firms of any 
size 
 
Feb 1999 Labour Standards Act Greater flexibility in the working-hours system and mass 
layoffs (part removal of restrictions on dismissal exception) 
 
 National Health 
Insurance Act 
Creation of the National Health Insurance Act (amended 
every year until 2011) 
 
Sep 1999 National Basic Living 
Security Act 
 
Creation of the National Basic Living Security Act 
 
March 2001 
 
 
 
 
Aug 2001 
Trade Union and 
Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act 
 
 
Framework Act on 
Workers’ Welfare 
 
Delayed the due date of the legalisation of multiple 
enterprise unions (from 2002 to 2007) and the prohibition 
of the payment of full-time union officials by employers 
(from 2001 to 2007) 
 
Introduction of Employee Ownership System 
 
 Employment Insurance 
Act 
Creation of Motherhood Protection (compensation for 
maternity leave and paternity leave) 
 
Oct 2001 Labour Standards Act Protection on pregnant women and nursing mothers 
   
Sep 2003 Labour Standards Act Reduction in working hours (40hours, starting from 2004 
and to expand its coverage annually by firm size) 
  Greater flexibility in the working hours system 
  
 
May 2005 Labour Standard Acts Greater protection for pregnant women and nursing 
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mothers 
   
Dec 2006 Act on the Protection, 
Etc. of Fixed-term and 
Part-time Workers 
 
Creation of Act on the Protection, Etc. of Fixed-term and 
Part-time Workers (prohibition on using fixed-term and 
part-time contracts for more than two years, effective from 
July 1 2007) 
 Act on the Protection, 
Etc. of Temporary 
Agency Workers 
 
Greater allowance on using temporary agency workers 
 Trade Union and 
Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act 
 
Delayed the due date of the legalisation of multiple 
enterprise unions (from 2007 to 2010) and the prohibition 
of the payment of full-time union officials by employers 
(from 2007 to 2010) 
 
April 2007 Act on the Protection, 
Etc. of Fixed-term and 
Part-time Workers 
 
Greater allowance of the use of fixed-term and part-time 
workers 
July 2007 Labour Standards Act 
 
 
 
 
Act on the Protection, 
Etc. of Fixed-term and 
Part-time Workers 
 
Reduction in the number of days required for termination of 
employment notices and consulting with the labour union to 
50 days  
Compulsory priority re-hiring of former workers 
 
Applied to workplaces with more than 300 employees from 
1 July 2007 
(workplaces with more than 100 employees from 1 July 
2008; workplaces with more than 5 employees from 1 July 
2009) 
 
March 2008 Trade Union and 
Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act 
 
Increase on union membership dues (no discrimination by 
race, religion, sex, political party or status -> race, religion, 
sex, age, physical condition, employment status, political 
party or social status) 
 
Jan 2010 Trade Union and 
Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act 
Legalisation of multiple unions (with enterprise unions 
starting from 2011) 
Ban on payment to unions officials 
   
*Note: revised from Haagh (2004, 198), with additions from the Ministry of Labour (2006a; 2006b;2006c; 
2008a; 2008b; 2009), Economic and Social Development Commission (2008).  	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Appendix 1-1: Major changes in political configuration in line with labour law 
reforms (1980-2010)	  
 
Date Political affairs Labour laws reforms 
Oct 1979 
Dec 
 
Aug 1980 
 
Nov 
Dec 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan 1981 
 
 
Feb  
 
 
 
Mar 
 
 
 
 
Jan 1985 
 
Feb 
 
 
 
 
Apr 1986 
 
June 
 
 
Oct 
 
Dec 
 
 
 
Dec 1987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apr 1988 
 
 
 
Assassination of President Park (10.26) 
10th presidential election  
Chun’s Military Coup (12.12) 
11th presidential election and the Chun 
government launched 
Media integration and abolition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forming the Min Jung Dang (or Minju-
Jeongui Dang, the Democratic Justice Party, 
and the ruling party)  
12th presidential election (Chun’s remaining 
in office, and revision of the Constitution 
including the single-term president system 
of seven years by indirect election system) 
11th General election (Min Jung Dang 
151/276, Min Han Dang 81, Han Kuk Dang 
25, others 19) 
The ruling party won a majority 
 
Forming the Shin Han Min Ju Dang (with 
Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) 
12th general election (Min Jung Dang 
148/276, Shin Han Min Ju Dang 67, Min Han 
Dang 35, Han Kuk Dang 20, others 6)  
The ruling party won a majority 
 
Chun’s announcement of the Protection of 
the Constitution Action (4.13 Act) 
June Uprising 
6.29 Declaration of Democratisation 
Great Workers Struggle 
Referendum on the direct presidential 
election system (93% of yes vote) 
13th presidential election by direct election 
system, and Roh government launched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13th general election (Min Jung Dang 
125/299, Pyunghwa Minju Dang (of Kim 
Dae-jung) 71, Tong Il Minju Dang (of Kim 
Young-sam) 59, Shin Minju Gonghwa Dang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flexible working-hours system 
Ban on third-party intervention 
Elimination of the union shop system 
Ban on labour disputes within state 
organisations, local government, public 
corporations, and military corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Removal of national unions from parties 
covered by the term “third party” 
 
Reduction in working hours/abolition of 
the system of flexible working hours 
Extension of the coverage of the Labour 
Standard Act to companies with more 
than 10 employees 
Reduction in the restrictions on the 
formation of unions 
Elimination of the restrictions on union 
officials 
Re-establishment of the union shop 
system 
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Mar 1989 
 
 
 
 
Jan 1990 
 
 
 
 
Sep 1991 
  
 
Mar 1992 
 
 
Dec 
 
 
Feb 1993 
 
July 1995 
 
 
Apr 1996 
 
 
 
 
Dec 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan 1997 
Mar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nov 
 
Dec 
 
 
Feb 1998 
 
 
(of Kim Jong-pil) 35, others 9) 
The opposition won a majority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samdang-Hapdang (the Three Party Merger 
of Min Jung Dang, Tong Il Minju Dang and 
Shin Minju Gonghwa Dang), then Min Ja 
Dang (the Democratic Liberal Party) 
launched 
Forming Min Ju Dang (the Democratic Party, 
with Kim Dae-jung) from the Pyunghwa 
Minju Dang  
14th general election (Min Ja Dang 149/299, 
Min Ju Dang 97, others 53) 
The ruling party won a majority 
14th presidential election and Kim Young-sam 
elected 
 
Kim Young-sam government launched 
 
 
 
 
15th general election (Shin Han Kook Dang 
(re-named from Min Ja Dang) 139/299, Sae 
Jung Chi Kuk Min Hoe Ui (or Kuk Min Hoe Ui, 
of Kim Dae-jung) 79, Ja Min Ryun 50, others 
31)*  
The opposition won a majority 
Joining the OECD 
Rushing through of a revised bill (1996 
labour laws) without the presence of 
opposition party legislators in the National 
Assembly 
 
1997 general strike 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applied to the IMF for a bailout 
 
15th presidential election and Kim Dae-jung 
elected (first transfer of presidential power) 
 
The LMGTC launched 
Kim Dae-jung government launched 
 
 
 
 
Extension of the coverage of the Labour 
Standard Act to companies employing 
more than 5 employee 
Reduction in working hours (44hours) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creation of the Employment Insurance 
Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greater flexibility in the working hours 
system 
Facilitation of ‘part-time’ work 
Introduction of layoffs in cases of urgent 
business reasons (starting from 1999) 
Prohibition on the payment of full-time 
union officials by employers (starting 
from 2001) 
Legalisation of multiple unions (with 
immediate effect for sectoral or national 
unions, with enterprise unions starting 
from 2002) 
No responsibility on employers to pay 
during labour disputes 
Ban on political activities by unions and 
third-party intervention lifted 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction of layoffs in cases of urgent 
business reasons (with immediate 
effect) 
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Jan - Oct 
 
Feb 1999 
 
 
Sep  
 
Apr 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
Mar 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
Aug 
Nov  
 
Dec 2002 
 
Feb 2003 
Seb 
 
 
Apr 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Dec 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dec 2007 
 
Apr 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16th general election (Han Na Ra Dang 
(Grand National Party) 133/ 273, Sae Chun 
Nyun Minju Dang (or Min Ju Dang, the New 
Millennium Democrat Party) 115, Ja Min 
Ryun 17, others 8) 
The opposition won a majority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kim Dae-jung’s defection form his party 
(Min Ju Dang) 
16th presidential election and Roh Moo-hyun 
elected 
Roh Moo-hyun government launched 
 
 
 
17th general election (Han Na Ra Dang 121/ 
299, Sae Chun Nyun Minju Dang 9, Uri Dang 
(the ruling parth) 152, Ja Min Ryun 4, Minju 
Nodong Dang (Democratic Labour party) 10, 
others 3) 
The ruling party won a majority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17th presidential election and Lee Myung-bak 
elected (transfer of presidential power) 
18th general election (Han Na Ra Dang 153/ 
299, Min Ju Dang (previous ruling party) 81, 
Jayu Sunjin Dang 4, Minju Nodong Dang 5, 
others 56) 
The ruling party won a majority 
 
 
 
 
Broader redefinition of cases that can be 
deemed “urgent business reasons” for 
mass redundancies  
Reduction in the restrictions on the 
formation of unions  
Creation of Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers 
 
Four times of EI coverage 
 
Greater flexibility in the working-hours 
system and mass layoffs (part removal 
of restrictions on dismissal exception) 
 
Creation of the National Basic Living 
Security Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delayed the due date of the legalisation 
of multiple enterprise unions (from 2002 
to 2007) and the prohibition of the 
payment of full-time union officials by 
employers (from 2001 to 2007) 
 
Creation of Motherhood Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduction in working hours  
Greater flexibility in the working hours 
system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creation of Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Fixed-term and Part-time Workers 
(prohibition on using fixed-term and 
part-time contracts for more than two 
years, effective from July 1 2007) 
Delayed the due date of the legalisation 
of multiple enterprise unions (from 2007 
to 2010) and the prohibition of the 
payment of full-time union officials by 
employers (from 2007 to 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legalisation of multiple unions (with 
enterprise unions starting from 2011) 
Ban on payment to unions officials 
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Apr 2012 
 
 
 
Dec 
19th general election (Sae Nu Ri Dang 
(renamed from the Han Na Ra Dang) 152/ 
300, Min Ju Dang 127, others 21) 
The ruling party won a majority 
18th presidential election and Park Geun-hye 
elected 
 
* See footnote 70 
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Appendix 2: Union membership rates, number of labour disputes and working days 
lost in South Korea 
 
 
Year Unit unions  
(In 
establishment) 
Union 
members  
(In 1,000 
persons) 
Density 
(%) 
No. of 
labour 
disputes 
(Cases) 
Working 
days lost 
(Days) 
1983 2 238 1 010 19.4 - - 
1984 2 365 1 011 18.1 - - 
1985 2 534 1 004 16.9 - - 
1986 2 658 1 036 16.8 - - 
1987 4 086 1 267 18.5 3 749 - 
1988 5 598 1 707 19.5 1 873 5 400 837 
1989 7 861 1 932 19.8 1 616 6 351 443 
1990 7 698 1 887 18.4 322 4 487 151 
1991 7 656 1 803 17.2 234 3 271 334 
1992 7 531 1 735 16.4 235 1 527 612 
1993 7 147 1 667 15.6 144 1 308 326 
1994 7 025 1 659 14.5 121 1 484 368 
1995 6 606 1 615 13.8 88 392 581 
1996 6 424 1 599 13.3 85 892 987 
1997 5 733 1 484 12.2 78 444 720 
1998 5 560 1 402 12.6 129 1 452 096 
1999 5 637 1 481 11.9 198 1 366 281 
2000 5 698 1 527 12.0 250 1 893 563 
2001 6 150 1 569 12.0 235 1 083 079 
2002 6 506 1 606 11.6 322 1 580 404 
2003 6 257 1 550 11.0 320 1 298 663 
2004 6 017 1 537 10.6 462 1 198 779 
2005 5 971 1 506 10.3 287 847 697 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
5 889 
5 099 
4 886 
4 689 
4 420 
1 559 
1 688 
1 666 
1 640 
1 643 
10.3  
10.8 
10.5 
10.1 
9.8 
138 
115 
108 
121 
86 
1 200 567 
536 285 
809 402 
626 921 
511 307 
*Source: Ministry of Employment and Labour, Yearbook of Employment and Labour Statistics 
*Note: Changed method No. of labour disputes from 2006(ILO) 
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Appendix 3: GDP	  elasticity	  of	  employment	  by	  industry 
 
	 	  Total Agr. Fishery Manf. 
Elec., gas 
& water Construction 
	                                    Service total	  
 
Retail & 
restaurant Logistics 
Finance & 
insurance Others 
1980 - - - - - - - - - - 
1981 0.403  0.172  -0.302  -1.722  -0.608  1.110  0.872  -0.164  3.432  1.110  
1982 0.347  -0.747  0.945  0.000  -0.306  1.160  1.772  -0.146  0.068  0.439  
1983 0.081  -1.069  0.490  -0.116  -0.065  0.452  0.181  0.465  1.829  0.612  
1984 -0.065  4.464  0.146  0.883  2.081  0.261  -0.316  0.518  1.324  1.301  
1985 0.551  -1.024  0.712  0.976  0.156  1.121  1.003  1.386  0.978  2.025  
1986 0.337  -0.393  0.454  -0.096  -0.911  0.464  0.197  0.592  0.889  0.836  
1987 0.493  0.511  0.805  0.948  0.273  0.439  0.275  0.376  0.771  0.737  
1988 0.296  -0.332  0.477  1.783  1.168  0.399  0.094  0.721  0.677  0.963  
1989 0.607  1.313  1.344  1.157  0.801  0.796  0.540  0.771  1.546  1.206  
1990 0.327  0.901  0.065  1.096  0.696  0.791  0.581  0.632  1.075  1.114  
1991 0.332  -7.776  0.550  -0.426  1.242  0.852  0.727  1.055  0.976  1.302  
1992 0.329  -0.228  -0.827  0.000  -61.339  0.762  1.893  0.269  1.957  -0.479  
1993 0.193  0.471  -1.015  -0.120  0.112  0.853  1.746  -0.310  0.946  0.312  
1994 0.374  -9.788  0.071  0.689  1.017  0.753  0.899  0.020  1.023  0.549  
1995 0.311  -0.671  0.108  -0.459  0.780  0.583  0.400  0.496  0.879  1.045  
1996 0.307  -1.445  -0.300  0.693  0.411  0.777  0.761  0.449  1.139  0.703  
1997 0.372  -0.354  -0.818  0.401  0.785  0.906  1.315  0.437  1.277  1.392  
1998 0.878  -0.768  1.731  64.185  2.203  0.621  0.432  0.576  1.428  -0.985  
1999 0.187  -0.673  0.129  0.182  0.837  0.569  0.194  0.251  1.413  1.235  
2000 0.502  -2.117  0.390  0.251  -2.105  0.718  0.485  0.256  2.046  1.153  
2001 0.513  -3.794  -0.292  -1.295  0.035  0.865  -0.334  0.336  2.580  4.071  
2002 0.397  1.049  -0.080  -1.346  3.678  0.517  0.388  0.405  0.428  1.354  
2003 -0.044  1.094  -0.154  9.736  0.464  0.142  0.859  -0.582  2.191  1.070  
2004 0.399  -0.700  0.182  -0.798  0.122  1.705  -1.100  0.461  11.252  2.272  
2005 0.316  -0.736  -0.185  -0.179  3.680  0.752  -0.467  0.785  1.260  1.907  
2006 0.251  1.109  -0.187  2.052  3.590  0.591  -0.215  0.658  1.421  0.965  
2007 0.245  -3.047  -0.178  3.280  0.446  0.496  -0.179  0.343  1.113  0.958  
*Source: Department of Statistics, Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) : Data accessed on 15/ 08/2012, 15:42 UTC (GMT) 
*Note: GDP elasticity of employment = rate of employment/rate of GDP 
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Appendix 4: Employment	  Insurance	  coverage	  
 
 
Person and expenditure 
(thousand workplaces, thousand persons) 
 Persons (thousand persons) Expenditure (million won) 
	  Employment Stabilisation 
Job Skill 
Training 
Motherhood 
Protection 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Employment 
Stabilisation 
Job Skill 
Training 
Motherhood 
Protection 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
	  	  	  Maternity leave 
Paternity 
leave 	  	  	  
Maternity 
leave 
Paternity 
leave 	  
1997 123.0  200.0  - - 49.2 12,245 58,873 - - 78,737 
1998 784.0  588.0  - - 411.7 97,449 257,671 - - 799,416 
1999 669.0  1,030.0  - - 484.8 184,304 418,184 - - 936,163 
2000 450.0  1,367.0  - - 332.7 113,809 404,238 - - 470,793 
2001 570.0  1,730.0  - - 327.3 128,751 386,977 - - 845,116 
2002 476.0  1,836.0  23.0  4.0  416 90,052 392,239 22,601 3,087 839,315 
2003 507.0  1,794.0  32.0  7.0  502.2 91,573 474,940 33,522 10,576 1,030,304 
2004 415.0  2,104.0  39.0  9.0  707.4 97,006 524,232 41,610 20,803 1,448,306 
2005 510.0  2,535.0  41.0  11 812.8 202,081 564,116 46,041 28,242 1,751,974 
2006 708.0  3,017.0  50.0  14 943.5 374,985 733,875 90,886 34,521 2,074,004 
2007 - - 61.0  21 1009.2 448,657 - 132,412 60,989 2,434,032 
*Source: Korea Employment Information Service (2008)  
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Appendix 5: Social Expenditure (in selected OECD countries, in percentage of Gross Domestic Product) 
 
Public expenditure 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Country                                       
Chile   10.17  10.15  9.69  9.81  9.54  11.39  12.22  11.87  12.22  13.05  13.18  13.38  13.37  12.80  11.75  11.16  10.49  10.56  
Denmark   25.14  25.92  26.39  28.13  29.45  28.92  28.20  27.18  26.50  26.44  25.68  26.11  26.63  27.86  27.68  27.21  26.59  26.10  
Japan   11.28  11.46  12.07  12.78  13.40  14.28  14.54  14.69  15.46  16.12  16.54  17.42  17.82  18.09  18.22  18.59  18.44  18.70  
Korea   2.83  2.73  2.95  3.03  3.05  3.24  3.41  3.68  5.09  6.12  4.80  5.25  5.11  5.37  6.02  6.45  7.37  7.57  
UK   16.75  18.18  19.92  20.54  20.09  19.91  19.61  18.68  18.87  18.55  18.60  19.32  19.37  19.82  20.45  20.57  20.36  20.54  
US   13.46  14.45  15.13  15.41  15.34  15.38  15.20  14.77  14.77  14.50  14.46  15.27  15.86  15.97  15.88  15.83  15.99  16.20  
OECD   17.60  18.50  19.39  19.90  19.67  19.44  19.51  19.21  19.24  19.22  18.88  19.21  19.69  20.06  19.89  19.77  19.51  19.24  
 
Public and mandatory private 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Country                                       
Chile   10.73  10.83  10.49  10.73  10.65  12.62  13.52  13.24  13.60  14.58  14.39  14.68  14.71  14.13  13.24  12.60  11.81  11.76  
Denmark   25.60  26.33  26.79  28.55  29.80  29.42  28.63  27.54  26.79  26.77  25.96  26.37  26.87  28.09  27.89  27.44  26.82  26.35  
Japan   11.62  11.81  12.44  13.17  13.81  14.72  15.00  15.19  16.03  16.75  17.24  18.21  18.70  18.84  18.81  19.12  18.97  19.26  
Korea   3.09  2.99  3.22  3.30  3.34  3.55  3.72  4.15  6.06  6.73  5.54  5.84  5.62  5.93  6.62  7.02  7.95  8.15  
UK   17.07  18.72  20.49  21.18  20.71  20.46  20.24  19.32  19.50  19.22  19.30  20.06  20.13  20.60  21.25  21.38  21.16  21.32  
US   13.99  15.01  15.69  15.90  15.85  15.84  15.61  15.17  15.16  14.90  14.85  15.67  16.26  16.35  16.25  16.17  16.31  16.50  
OECD   18.10  19.03  19.95  20.50  20.26  20.09  20.11  19.80  19.85  19.84  19.50  19.84  20.32  20.68  20.50  20.37  20.10  19.83  
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Voluntary private 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Country                                       
Chile   .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Denmark   1.65  1.66  1.65  1.72  2.01  1.93  1.95  2.01  2.02  2.09  2.09  2.17  2.22  2.32  2.38  2.39  2.25  2.33  
Japan   .. .. .. .. .. 0.03  0.02  2.94  3.14  3.19  3.05  3.35  3.37  2.94  2.88  2.49  2.40  3.09  
Korea   0.12  0.11  0.11  0.13  0.14  1.96  2.03  2.04  1.79  2.10  2.04  2.01  2.02  2.19  1.64  1.76  1.95  2.04  
UK   4.75  5.50  6.07  6.16  6.25  6.06  6.00  6.11  5.84  5.90  6.82  6.16  5.40  5.31  5.15  5.31  5.33  5.01  
US   7.09  7.38  7.66  7.69  7.69  7.85  8.18  8.24  8.29  8.49  8.69  8.94  9.31  9.53  9.59  9.66  9.93  10.18  
OECD   .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
*Source: OECD Stat: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX): Data accessed on 03/ 10/ 2012, 16:04 UTC (GMT) 
 
Public social spending in other OECD countries, 1980-2012 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Country                                     
Denmark   24.8 24.8 24.8 25.0 23.8 23.2 23.1 23.8 25.1 25.3 25.1 25.9 26.4 28.1 29.4 28.9 28.2 
Finland   18.1 18.5 19.5 20.5 21.5 22.6 23.0 23.6 23.0 22.7 24.3 29.4 33.4 33.4 32.8 30.9 30.8 
France   20.8 21.8 22.3 22.6 22.8 26.0 25.8 25.9 25.7 24.8 24.9 25.5 26.3 27.8 27.8 28.5 28.8 
Germany   22.1 22.8 22.8 22.5 22.2 22.5 22.5 23.0 23.0 21.9 21.7 23.7 25.6 26.3 26.3 26.8 27.4 
Japan   10.4 10.8 11.2 11.5 11.3 11.2 11.6 11.7 11.4 11.1 11.3 11.5 12.1 12.8 13.4 14.3 14.5 
Korea   
          
2.8 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.4 
Netherlands   24.8 25.5 27.0 27.4 26.0 25.3 24.7 24.7 24.3 24.0 25.6 25.5 26.0 26.1 24.7 23.8 22.6 
New Zealand   17.0 17.2 18.1 17.8 17.2 17.7 17.6 18.4 19.8 21.1 21.5 21.9 21.8 20.0 19.2 18.7 18.6 
United 
Kingdom   16.5 18.0 18.5 19.3 19.3 19.4 19.5 18.8 17.5 16.9 16.7 18.2 19.9 20.5 20.1 19.9 19.6 
United States   13.2 13.5 13.9 14.1 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.5 14.4 15.1 15.4 15.3 15.4 15.2 
Chile   
               
11.4 12.2 
OECD-34   15.6 16.2 16.7 17 16.7 17.3 17.3 17.4 17.4 17.3 17.6 18.5 19.4 19.9 19.7 19.4 19.5 
288	  
 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Country                                   
Denmark   27.2 26.5 26.4 25.7 26.1 26.6 27.9 27.7 27.2 26.6 26.0 26.6 30.2 30.1 29.9 29.5 
Finland   28.6 26.4 25.8 24.3 24.3 25.0 25.9 26.0 26.1 25.9 24.9 25.7 29.6 29.1 28.4 28.0 
France   28.6 28.8 28.8 27.7 27.7 28.4 28.9 29.0 29.0 28.6 28.4 28.6 30.7 31.0 30.4 29.9 
Germany   26.7 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.7 27.4 27.7 27.1 27.2 26.1 25.2 25.2 27.6 27.3 26.4 25.8 
Japan   14.7 15.5 16.1 16.5 17.4 17.8 18.1 18.2 18.6 18.4 18.7 20.0 
    Korea   3.7 5.1 6.1 4.8 5.2 5.1 5.4 6.0 6.4 7.4 7.6 8.1 9.0 9.0 9.4 9.7 
Netherlands   21.8 21.4 20.5 19.8 19.7 20.5 21.2 21.1 20.7 20.3 20.1 20.2 22.5 22.6 22.2 21.5 
New Zealand   19.6 20.1 19.4 19.1 18.4 18.5 18.0 17.7 18.1 19.0 18.4 20.1 21.4 21.8 22.1 21.8 
United Kingdom   18.7 18.9 18.6 18.6 19.3 19.4 19.8 20.5 20.6 20.4 20.5 21.5 24.3 24.4 23.7 22.9 
United States   14.8 14.8 14.5 14.5 15.3 15.9 16.0 15.9 15.8 16.0 16.2 16.8 19.5 20.4 20.3 19.5 
Chile   11.9 12.2 13.1 13.2 13.4 13.4 12.8 11.7 11.2 10.5 10.6 10.6 12.5 11.6 
  OECD-34   19.2 19.2 19.2 18.9 19.2 19.7 20.1 19.9 19.8 19.5 19.2 20.2 22.5 22.2 22.1 22.1 
*Source: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX, www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure),“Is the European welfare state really more expensive? Indicators on social 
spending, 1980-2012 and a manual to the OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX)" (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 124) 
*Note: Social spending aggregates based on detailed data for 1980-2007; aggregate spending projections for 2008-2012 
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Appendix 6: Expenditure on Employment Stabilisation scheme 
 
(in million won) 
    1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
 Total 101,621  186,110  114,043  128,970  90,502  93,504  98,377  206,131  378,741  454,032  
E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
A
d
ju
st
m
en
t 
A
ss
is
ta
n
ce
 
sum 80,723  155,191  71,603  77,012  35,039  28,779  33,804  33,180  35,974  35,795  
  79.4% 83.4% 62.8% 59.7% 38.7% 30.8% 34.4% 16.1% 9.5% 7.9% 
Closing 533,442  47,483  21,837  32,234  19,904  21,138  23,760  25,110  23,853  24,580  
Reduction of 
working hours 
566  717  74  185  14  81  65     
Training 15,849  16,506  3,492  12,836  7,122  2,945  2,901  2,292  2,514  2,686  
Outside 
dispatching* 
824  1,118  92  15        
Leave 3,489  13,002  3,251  9,973  5,191  3,015  5,303  3,410  7,105  4,825  
Personnel 
relocation 
484  394  453  547  404  209  17  106  92  442  
Merge  322  200  187  94       
Career change 
grants 
32           
Entrepreneurship 
education & 
training* 
162           
Recruitment 
incentives* 
5,877  75,132  40,780  20,226  1,373  16      
Reemployment 
incentives* 
 517  1,423  766  506  734  329  747  887  821  
Turnover 
supporting 
incentives 
   43  432  641  1,428  1,514  1,522  2,441  
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E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 &
 E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
S
ta
b
il
it
y 
Sum 20,898  30,899  42,184  51,017  54,167  62,563  61,478  135,823  231,389  291,333  
 20.6% 16.6% 37.0% 39.6% 59.9% 66.9% 62.5% 65.9% 61.1% 64.2% 
Support for 
employment of the 
elderly 
12,470  25,474  36,758  41,620  39,980  46,236  41,139  33,098  34,271  38,405  
Support for female 
employment 
2,457  1,541  2,349  3,821  4,099  6,076  7,552  7,446  9,822  12,373  
New employment 
promotion 
  359  2,954  7,154  5,248  6,748  83,439  172,111  218,722  
Adaptive training 
grants* 
106           
Long-term 
unemployed jobs* 
3  49   0        
Mature trained 
graduate careers 
     153  379  615  966  1,825  
Nursery teacher 
wage support 
1,689  2,029  2,483  2,403  2,483  2,918  4,128  5,952  8,106  10,429  
Retirees’ continued 
employment 
      161  1,223  1,764  2,492  
Wage peak 
conservation 
benefits 
        579  1,538  
Support continued 
employment after 
childbirth 
        13  174  
Workplace 
childcare facilities 
installation and 
support 
 
 
4,172  1,806  234  219  450  1,931  1,371  4,050  3,756  5,375  
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E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
cr
ea
ti
o
n
 
Sum             1,657  31,945  95,781  104,272  
             1.7% 15.5% 25.3% 23.0% 
Working hour 
reduction of mid-
term workers 
      1,657  12,110  15,243  11,413  
Shift system 
conversion support 
       6,233  31,583  12,088  
Environment 
improvement for 
mid-term 
employment  
       3,218  8,457  23,188  
Mid-term 
professional 
workforce 
       9,152  38,508  54,922  
Mid-term new 
industries entering 
 
       1,232  1,990  2,661  
  
Construction 
workers retirement 
deductions 
instalment 
  20  256  942  1,295  2,162  812  641  1,437  1,207  
  
Construction 
workers 
employment 
security 
 
            626  4,542  14,160  21,425  
*Source: KEIS (2008). 
*Note: * marked was abolished 
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Appendix 7: Expenditure on Job Skills Training scheme 
 
(in million won) 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
Total 386,977  392,239  474,940  524,232  569,116  733,875  871,273  
Vocational skills training 170,414  170,107  180,838  198,243  236,495  296,864  340,924  
 44.0% 43.4% 38.1% 37.8% 41.6% 40.5% 39.1% 
Paid vacation training 10,145  11,075  6,869  8,021  7,887  10,419  13,823  
 2.6% 2.8% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 
Purchase loans and support for 
vocational training facilities and 
equipment 
 
7,349  3,468  3,671  6,250  9,832  8,000  7,600  
1.9% 0.9% 0.8% 1.2% 1.7% 1.1% 0.9% 
course funding 3,543  3,435  4,224  5,873  11,688  28,851  52,782  
 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.1% 2.1% 3.9% 6.1% 
Training for unemployed 
reemployment (training for former 
unemployed) 
43,016  52,188  63,476  74,799  76,505  81,642  79,851  
11.1% 13.3% 13.4% 14.3% 13.4% 11.1% 9.2% 
Working student loan 43,016  52,188  63,476  74,799  76,505  81,642  79,851  
39.4% 38.7% 27.8% 23.7% 24.0% 17.5% 17.5% 
Government commissioned training 
(first selected occupations, 
training) 
  69,767  89,992  50,071  134,613  149,310  
  14.7% 17.2% 8.8% 18.3% 17.1% 
SME consortium 766  506  14,104  16,848  39,850  45,000  74,379  
      3.0% 3.2% 7.0% 6.1% 8.5% 
*Source: KEIS (2008). 
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Appendix 8: Public Expenditure compared with OECD by selected programmes and total (in percentage of Gross Domestic Product) 
 
Time 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Programmes Country                         
21: Institutional training Korea   0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.07 
OECD   .. .. .. .. 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.11 
41: Recruitment incentives Korea   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
OECD   .. .. .. .. 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.1 
50: Supported employment and 
rehabilitation 
Korea   0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.03 
OECD   0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 
  51: Supported employment Korea   0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.03 
OECD   .. .. .. .. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 
  52: Rehabilitation Korea   0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD   .. .. .. .. 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
60: Direct job creation Korea   0.25 0.1 0.08 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.42 0.28 
OECD   0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 
80:Out-of-work income 
maintenance and support 
Korea   0.08 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.2 0.23 0.25 0.3 0.42 0.34 
OECD   0.8 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.67 0.57 0.6 0.96 0.95 
100: Total Korea   0.46 0.35 0.3 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.61 1.02 0.76 
OECD   1.67 1.62 1.63 1.66 1.51 1.43 1.31 1.17 1.23 1.69 1.72 
  110: Active measures (10-70) Korea   0.38 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.31 0.61 0.42 
OECD   0.68 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.5 0.5 0.61 0.66 
  120: Passive measures (80-90) Korea   0.08 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.2 0.23 0.25 0.3 0.42 0.34 
OECD   0.93 0.9 0.95 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.77 0.67 0.7 1.05 1.03 
*Source: OECD Stat: Data accessed on 07/10/ 2012, 21:10 UTC (GMT) 
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Appendix 9:	  Information	  sheet	  
 
Title: The Nature of and Changes in the Employment System in Korea 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
My name is Sang Hyeb Lee, and I am currently undertaking research for my PhD course at 
the University of York in the UK. If you could take part in this interview, it would be a 
great help in developing my research. In order to assist your understanding my research 
project, I would like to introduce the aims of my research and the purpose of the interview 
in which you will participate.  
 
The Aim of the Research 
 
The main aim of the research is to understand the experience of political elites/bureaucrats, 
business leaders, and labour leaders in terms of the Employment System (henceforth ES). 
The research concerns three aspects of the ES: institutional implementation, labour 
relations, and social protection. The specific aims of the research are as follows: 
 
 
1) How did the current ES in Korea emerge and develop?  
2) Did globalisation bring about changes to the ES, and if so, in what ways? 
3) What role did the state play in resolving political, social, and economic problems in 
the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis under the ES framework? 
4) What did business do to overcome the 1997 financial crisis, and how did business 
meet the challenge of labour under the ES framework? 
5) How did labour confront the restructuring of the labour market in the aftermath of the 
1997 labour laws under the ES framework? 
 
Research Methods 
 
The research is a qualitative study and will primarily comprise face-to-face interviews. 
Political elites, bureaucrats, business leaders, and labour leaders will be interviewed. The 
total number of interviewees will be around 20, composed of 9 bureaucrats, 4 business 
leaders, 5 labour leaders, and an agent and a recipient of local Employment Insurance 
services. 
All interviews will be audio-recorded using a digital recorder. The basic structure of the 
interviews is similar, but the wording of interviews and the questions asked might differ in 
accordance with the differing role of each group or interviewee.  
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Time, Length, and Venue of the Interview 
 
An interview will generally take about an hour, and you have the right to stop the interview 
at any time if you do not wish to continue. You may make your preferred interview venue 
known to the researcher. The only stipulation on the researcher’s part is that it is quiet 
enough to record the interview.  
 
Use of the Interview 
 
The audio recording of the interview will be transcribed, coded, and analysed by the 
researcher. The data generated by this procedure will be primarily used for my PhD Degree 
thesis, which will include findings based on the information collected from you. The 
findings may be used for other academic papers and publications. 
 
There may be times when some of your statements from the interviews will be quoted in 
my thesis and academic articles. However, your anonymity and the security of private 
information will be guaranteed. The transcript and audio recording of the interview will not 
be available to anyone except the researcher. In addition, they will be removed from my 
personal computer and any other memory device after transferring the data to York 
University central storage drive, which is secured and encrypted by private security 
number and the university’s security system. 
 
All data, both written and recorded (including the coded sheets), will be anonymised. Your 
anonymity as an interviewee will be guaranteed by re-labelling your name. The 
interviewee will be given a code number, which will be noted on a separate sheet, and only 
the researcher will have access to this coding sheet. All written data will be presented via 
these codes, and no reference to a participant’s identity will appear in any written material. 
 
Researcher Contact 
 
If you would like to know more about the research and interview, you can contact me by 
any of the following methods: 
 
Telephone:+44-7595-834535 (UK); +82-10-3663-8635 (Korea) 
E-mail: sl588@york.ac.ukezr91@hotmail.com 
Address: 4b Garrowby Way, Heslington, 
York, UK, YO10 5DW 
 
Many thanks and Best wishes 
 
Sang Hyeb Lee 
Ph D candidate 
Department of Politics 
The University of York 
UK 
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Appendix 10: Interview	  consent	  form 
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
인터뷰동의서  
 
The Nature and Change of the Employment System in Korea 
연구제목: 한국고용체계의성격과변화  
 
I consent to participate in an interview for the research project on ‘the nature and change of 
the Employment System in Korea’. 
 
나는  ‘한국고용체계의성격과변화’ 연구를위한인터뷰참여에동의한다  
 
I fully understand that this interview is confidential, and the transcript and tapes will not be 
opened by anyone except by the interviewer, SangHyeb Lee. 
 
나는이인터뷰내용이기밀에부쳐지고, 
인터뷰를정리한내용과녹음한카셋트테이프가연구자이상협씨외에는누구에게도공
개되지않을것임을충분히이해한다.  
 
I agree to the interview being tape-recorded. I can request a copy of the cassette recording 
of the interview and a copy of the interview transcript.  
 
나는이인터뷰를카세트테이프에녹음하는것을허락하지않고, 
인터뷰녹음파일이나그내용을정리한것의복사본을요청할수있다.  
 
In addition, I fully understand that I have the right to withdraw from the interview at any 
time I want, and any data I have provided will be destroyed.  
 
또한, 
나는인터뷰도중에내가원하면어느때든지인터뷰를중지시킬수있으며내가제공한어
떤정보도파기시킬수있음을충분히인지하고있다.  
 
 
 
 
Signed 사인(Interviewee)…………………………. 
 
 
 
Date 날짜………,…………,……….             
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Appendix 11: Topic	  guide	  for	  interviewees 
 
Introduction  
-Introduce myself and the general scheme of the research 
-Explain the interview process and the confidentiality of information 
-Receive approval to record and obtain signature on consent form 
 
 
Personal Information  
-Original working background and period of office 
-His/her major role in the policy reforms 
 
 
Question Contents 
 
1. What were your organisation’s responses to the 1997 financial crisis, the 1998 
institutional reforms, and since then?  
[Probe] 
-Reorganisation or structural reform (in state entities, and business and labour organisations)  
-Institutional reforms impact on your organisation 
-Conflict or confrontation within and between organisations  
-(Changing) Extent of cohesiveness within organisation 
-Path dependency  
-Role and function of leadership 
 
 
2. From where and how did the policy ideas on institutional reform occur? 
[Probe] 
-Role, function, and responsibility of political elite and elite-bureaucrats  
-Role of the Korea Labour Institute on policy adoption, learning, accumulation, and policy implementation 
-Role of unions and business organisations 
 
 
3. What were your expectations and interpretation of the institutional enactment and 
implementation in the case of each policy reform? 
[Probe] 
-On establishing the corporatist system or tripartite system in the policy-making process 
-On reforming labour market policies 
-On designing and expanding social policies 
 
 
4. How did cooperation or conflict between state, business ,and labour manifest itself 
in each institutional reform? 
[Probe] 
-On the LMGTC 
-On the Ministry of Labour (especially since 1998) 
-On the EISTF 
 
5. Suggestions for this research  
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Glossary of Key Terms 
	  
Active	  labour	  market	  policy	  (ALMP)	  government	  programmes	  that	  intervene	  in	  the	  labour	   market	   to	   help	   the	   unemployed	   find	   work.	   There	   are	   three	   main	  categories	   of	   ALMP:	   Public	   employment	   services,	   Training	   schemes,	   and	  Employment	  subsidies. 
Blue	   House the	  executive	  office	   and	  official	   residence	  of	   the	  South	  Korean	  head	  of	  state,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea.	  
Chaebol	  the	  South	  Korean	  form	  of	  business	  conglomerate,	  which	  is	  family-­‐controlled	  and	  government-­‐supported	  corporate group. 
Chaeya opposition	   politicians	   and	   dissident	  without	   political	   party	  membership	   in	  Korea 
Developmental	   state	   a	   state	   that	   plays	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   economic	   development	  through	  planning	  and	  organisation	  based	  on	   strategic	   targets:	   first,	   the	   state	  prioritises	   economic	   development,	   in	   which	   the	   key	   goals	   are	   growth,	  productivity,	   and	   competition;	   second,	   in	   pursuit	   of	   economic	   success,	   the	  state	  aggressively	  intervenes	  in	  the	  market,	  guiding	  and	  controlling	  it	  and	  the	  private	   sector	   via	   the	   strategic	   allocation	   of	   resources;	   third,	   behind	   the	  success	   of	   the	   state’s	   strategic	   intervention	   lies	   an	   efficient	   and	   rational	  bureaucracy	  and	  state	  autonomy	  does	  not	  result	  in	  rent-­‐seeking	  or	  looting.	  
Developmental	   welfare	   state	   a	   state	   that	   comprise	   a	   set	   of	   social	   policies	   and	  institutions	   that	   are	   predominantly	   structured	   for	   facilitating	   economic	  development.	  The	  characteristic	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  welfare	  state	  are	  embodied	  in	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   developmental	   state,	   in	   which	   elite	   policy-­‐makers	   set	  economic	   growth	   as	   the	   fundamental	   goal,	   pursue	   a	   coherent	   strategy	   to	  achieve	  it,	  and	  use	  social	  policy	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  attaining	  that	  goal.	  
Dualism	  of	   labour	  market	   labour	  market’s	  separation	   into	  a	  primary	  sector	  and	  a	  secondary	   sector.	   The	   first	   relates	   to	   jobs	   characterised	   by	   high	   skill	   levels,	  medium-­‐to-­‐high	   rates	   of	   pay,	   job	   security,	   union	   coverage	   and	   other	  advantages.	  The	  second,	   in	  contrast,	   is	  dominated	  by	  precarious	  employment	  (casual	  work/non-­‐regular	  work	   )	  which	   is	   less	   stable,	  with	   low	   rates	  of	  pay,	  mainly	  widespread	  in	  smaller	  enterprises	  and	  with	  little	  union	  coverage.	  
Employment	  system	  a	  set	  of	  institutions	  combining	  labour	  policy,	  industrial	  policy,	  financial	  policy,	  and	  economic	  policy,	  which	  directly	  and	   indirectly	  affect	   the	  character	  and	  transformation	  of	  employment	  practices	  at	   the	  empirical	   level.	  
And the	  informal	  institutions	  embedded	  in	  employment	  practices	  through	  past	  practices	  are	  also	  regarded	  as	  factors	  responsible	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  employment	  system.	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Golden	   triangle	   of	   flexicurity	   a	   unique	   Danish	   employment	   system	   model	   that	  combines	   a	   high	   level	   of	   worker	   mobility	   between	   jobs,	   social	   security	   (a	  generous	  system	  of	  social	  welfare	  and	  social	  insurance,	  such	  as	  unemployment	  benefits/passive	  labour	  market	  policy)	  and	  active	  labour	  market	  programmes. 
Great	   Workers’	   Struggle	   workplace	   struggles	   that	   took	   place	   in	   1987	   occurred	  within	  the	  wider	  background	  of	  political	  reform	  
Institutional	   complementarity	   suggest	   that	   nations	   with	   a	   particular	   type	   of	  institution	   then	   develop	   complementary	   institution	   in	   other	   spheres	   (for	  example,	  countries	  with	  stock	  market	  liberalisation	  has	  less	  labour	  protection	  and	   vice	   versa).	   Firms	   of	   liberal	   market	   economy	   (LME)	   and	   coordinated	  market	   economy	   (CME)	   respond	   very	   differently	   to	   a	   similar	   shock	   and	  institutions	  are	  socialising	  agencies	  and	  go	  through	  a	  continuous	  processes	  of	  adaptation.	  
June	   Uprising	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   democracy	   movement	   in	   Korea	   that	   generated	   mass	  protests	  from	  June	  10	  to	  June	  29,	  1987.	  The	  demonstrations	  forced	  the	  ruling	  government	   to	   hold	   elections	   and	   institute	   other	   democratic	   reforms	  which	  led	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Sixth	   Republic	   and	   Constitution,	   the	   present	  day	  government	  of	  South	  Korea	  
Samkeum	   three	   prohibitions	   in	   Korean	   labour	   laws.	   The	   bans	   on	   third-­‐party	  intervention,	   multiple	   union	   representation	   within	   the	   same	   company	   and	  political	  activity	  by	  unions.	  
Samje	  three	  systems	  in	  Korean	  labour	  laws.	  The	  dismissal system for employees based 
on ‘urgent business reasons’ (which made firing employees easier), the flexible 
working-hours system and the temporary employment agency system.	  
6.29	  Declaration	  of	  Democracy	  a	  speech	  by	  Roh	  Tae-­‐woo,	  presidential	  candidate	  of	  the	   ruling	  Democratic	   Justice	   Party	   of	   South	  Korea,	   on	   29	   June	   1987.	   In	   the	  declaration,	   Roh	   promised	   significant	   concessions	   to	   opponents	   of	   the	  incumbent	   authoritarian	   regime.	   Roh	   went	   on	   to	   win	   the	   open	   presidential	  elections	  that	  were	  held	  that	  year.	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List of Abbreviations 
D	  
DS	  developmental	  state	  
E	  
EI	  Employment	  Insurance	  
EISTF	  Employment	  Insurance	  Study	  Task	  Force	  	  
EPB	  Economic	  Planning	  Board	  	  
ESDC	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Development	  commission	  	  
F	  
FKI	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Industries	  
FKTU	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Trade	  Unions	  
H	  
HCI	  Health	  Care	  Insurance	  	  
I	  
IMF	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  	  
K	  
KCTU	  Korean	  Confederation	  of	  Trade	  Union	  	  
KEF	  Korea	  Employers	  Federation	  
KLI	  Korea	  Labour	  Institute	  
L	  
LME	  liberal	  market	  economy	  
LMGTC	  Labour-­‐Management-­‐Governemnt	  Tripartite	  Commission	  
LRRC	  Labour	  Relations	  Reforming	  Commission	  	  
M	  
MoFE	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Economy	  
MoL	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  
N	  
NBLS	  National	  Basic	  Living	  Security	  	  
NPI	  National	  Pension	  Insurance	  
W	  
WCI	  Workers’	  Compensation	  Insurance	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